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Abstract
This thesis focuses on recent disputes between Canada and the United States about 
appropriate policies for free trade in cultural goods. It argues that the Canadian and American 
positions on free trade and culture can best be understood as normative positions, stemming 
from different perceptions of the nature of culture, the role of culture in social relations, the 
appropriate criteria for ‘good’ public policy, and the ideal relationship between culture and 
free trade. In this context, the relative validity of the different approaches to trade and culture 
is presented as a choice between competing values, the analysis of which is most 
appropriately located within the broad tradition of political theories of justice. On this basis, 
the thesis critically engages with the two positions (free trade and cultural protectionism), 
drawing out their ethics and showing the ways in which they can only partially comprehend 
the moral relevance of culture.
The thesis takes the position that a normatively justifiable approach to culture and 
trade is one that begins from the ontological primacy of culture in the constitution of identity. 
This starting point is developed by drawing on the work of Charles Taylor. He rejects an 
atomist social ontology and develops instead a theory of identity as inseparable from 
qualitative judgements of worth. In turn, such judgements make no sense outside of a 
‘background language’ that itself can only be developed in dialogue. As the thesis notes, 
Taylor’s work presents numerous problems. However, his ontology can nonetheless be taken 
as a starting point for an analysis of culture and trade. Building on Taylor’s theory, the thesis 
draws on Iris Marion Young’s work on social justice to develop an ethics which is founded in 
respect for other cultural forms. This ethics stresses social equality, but broadens it beyond 
distributive concerns to include primarily the ‘full participation and inclusion of everyone in 
society’s major institutions, and the socially supported substantive opportunity for all to 
develop and exercise their capacities and realize their choices’ (1990, p. 173). On this basis, 
the thesis makes specific suggestions for the revision of Canadian magazines policy.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
This study examines recent disputes between Canada and the United States about appropriate 
policies for free trade in magazines. Essentially, this work demonstrates that the Canadian 
and American positions on free trade and culture can be understood as normative positions, 
stemming from different perceptions of the role of culture in social relations, the appropriate 
criteria for ‘good’ public policy, and the ideal relationship between culture and free trade. In 
this context, the relative validity of the different approaches to trade and culture is presented 
as a choice between competing values.
After examining the ethical premises and implications of the main approaches to trade 
and culture, the thesis takes the position that a normatively justifiable approach to culture is 
one that begins from the ontological primacy of culture in the constitution of identity. I 
develop this starting point by drawing on the work of Charles Taylor. He rejects an atomist 
social ontology and develops instead a theory of identity as inseparable from qualitative 
judgements of worth. In turn, such judgements make no sense outside of a ‘background 
language’ that itself can only be developed in dialogue. As the thesis notes, Taylor’s work 
presents numerous problems. However, his ontology can nonetheless be taken as a starting 
point for an analysis of culture and trade. Building on Taylor’s theory, the thesis draws on 
Iris Marion Young’s work on social justice to develop an ethics which is founded in respect 
for other cultural forms. This ethics stresses social equality, but broadens it beyond 
distributive concerns to include primarily the ‘full participation and inclusion of everyone in 
society’s major institutions, and the socially supported substantive opportunity for all to 
develop and exercise their capacities and realize their choices’.1 On this basis, the thesis 
makes specific suggestions for the revision of Canadian magazines policy.
The thesis makes an original contribution in two respects. First, it provides analysis 
and insights into a policy area that has received little scholarly attention, namely, free trade 
in periodicals. Second, it makes a contribution to ongoing debates about the nature and 
importance of methodology in International Relations (IR) and International Political 
Economy (IPE). As this second contribution is likely to be the more controversial of the two, 
most of this introduction will be directed at locating this thesis within existing
1 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1990), p. 173.
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methodological debates. Before turning to metatheory, however, it is important to locate the 
thesis within the existing literature on free trade and protectionism.
Theoretical Context
Introductions to international trade invariably begin from Adam Smith’s conception of 
absolute advantage and its modification in David Ricardo’s tale of British cloth and 
Portuguese wine. According to Ricardo, if the cost ratios of commodities differ within 
national economies, then each can benefit by producing and trading the good in which they 
are relatively more efficient.2 Not surprisingly, this story has been retold and refined over the 
years. In particular, more recent theories have added considerations of factor endowments, 
technological development, innovation, and national industrial policies.3 Economies of scale, 
too, have received significant attention.4 Nonetheless, the fundamental idea that there are 
demonstrable welfare gains from free trade has continued to guide economic thinking on 
international trade.
As Chapter 2 will show, a great deal of economic analysis has demonstrated that 
Canadian protection of magazines is inefficient and can lead to domestic and international 
market distortions. There remains some dispute about whether any of the main economic 
exceptions to free trade (such as externalities or public goods) can legitimately be applied to 
the Canadian case. However, for the most part, economists agree that significant welfare 
gains would result from government non-interference in the magazine market. As a result, 
they argue that Canada should abandon its protectionist measures. If there is sufficient 
demand for Canadian magazines as a distinct product, then the industry will survive and 
market distortions arising from protection will be eliminated. If not, then the market will 
shift towards US magazine producers, who enjoy the economies of scale provided by the size 
and vitality of their domestic market.
This economic approach has much in common with numerous IPE approaches to trade 
more generally. As Susan Strange has described it, ‘a great deal of the literature in IPE 
written in the United States has displayed a marked tendency to imitate the methods and 
concepts of liberal or neo-classical economics’.5 For these analysts, the desirability of free
2 David Ricardo, Principles o f  Political Economy and Taxation (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1911 
[1817]), pp. 82-83.
3 See, for example, the theories developed by Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin, Wassily Leontief, 
Raymond Vemon, and Paul Krugman. These are ably described in Paul R. Krugman and Maurice 
Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy, Second Edition (New York, NY: 
HarperCollins, 1991).
4 On economies o f scale and classical trade theory, see Krugman and Obstfeld, op. cit., in note 3, 
Chapter 6.
5 Susan Strange, ‘Political Economy and International Relations’, in Steve Smith and Ken Booth (eds.), 
International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), p. 167.
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trade is not open to debate—its advantages have already been demonstrated by the economic 
model. The central question of this type of IPE analysis is how to create and maintain the 
political preconditions for mutual gains from free trade to be achieved. In Craig Murphy and 
Roger Tooze’s words, ‘the first political problem is that of assuring that a liberal trade 
regime is maintained’.6 Specifically, as James Mayall has noted, this has been posed as a 
question of will: ‘since liberal trade theory is well-grounded and well-understood, why is it 
that.. .governments.. .repeatedly fail to deliver what they profess?’7 The assumption clearly is 
that states must be helped, as much as possible, from taking actions that would hurt their own 
economic interests. These claims have generated reams of analysis concerned with 
understanding and predicting relationships between actor behaviour and system 
management.8 Hegemonic stability theory and regime theory are both central examples of 
this kind of work.9 More importantly, however, such approaches assume that the role of 
politics is to facilitate the smooth running of the economy. As Stephen Rosow has put it the 
effect of such an assumption ‘is to reduce the interpretation of civil society in modem states 
to an echo of commercial practice’.10
Importantly, not all IPE scholars have been so keen to embrace the primacy of 
neoclassical trade theory. Many differing critics of neoclassical trade theory have focused on 
the impediments to trade inherent in a system of sovereign states. For example, Mayall has 
described the importance of national defence for the liberal system, arguing it constitutes ‘a 
major concession to realism’.11 Taking the idea of national security to its neorealist extreme, 
Joseph Grieco has claimed that the relative gains of one state may often override the absolute 
gains of all.12
Some of these scholars have also focused on concerns beyond a limited idea of 
national security. Indeed, many have focused on the more general ties of obligation between 
nation and citizens and have offered more scope for the state’s role in protecting the national 
community. According to E.H. Carr, ‘the first obligation of the modem national government,
6 Craig N. Murphy and Roger Tooze, ‘Getting Beyond the “Common Sense” o f the IPE Orthodoxy’, in 
Craig N. Murphy and Roger Tooze (eds.), The New International Political Economy (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 1991), p. 16.
7 James Mayall, ‘Reflections on the “New” Economic Nationalism’, Review o f  International Studies 
(Vol. 10, No. 4, 1984), p. 313.
8 Murphy and Tooze, op. cit., in note 6, p. 15.
9 See, for example, Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
10 Stephen J. Rosow, ‘Echoes o f Commercial Society: Liberal Political Theory in Mainstream IPE’, in 
Kurt Burch and Robert A. Denemark (eds.), Constituting International Political Economy (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), p. 43.
11 James Mayall, ‘The Liberal Economy’, in James Mayall (ed.), The Community o f  States: A Study in 
International Political Theory (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 99.
12 Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
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which no obligation will be allowed to override, is to its own people’.13 Similarly, Mayall has 
claimed that ‘[n]o one has ever successfully challenged the claim that the first duty of a state 
is to its citizens’.14 As a result, ‘economic policies which are adopted to defend and 
strengthen the state against foreign competition are adopted for explicitly nationalist 
reasons’.15 In a similar vein, Strange has argued that all governments are faced with the task 
of trading off four different values, namely, wealth, order, justice, and freedom. As a result, 
‘[efficiency never has been and never can be the sole consideration in the choice of state 
policies’.16 Indeed, Joan Robinson sums it up when she claims that economists ignore the fact 
that there are some good national arguments for protection.
Importantly, however, the case that is made by Strange, Mayall, and Robinson is 
hardly the simplistic one decried by economists as mere lobbying for particular interests. All 
three have a profound sense of the metaphysics at work in the legitimation of neoclassical 
claims. Not surprisingly, then, all three also stress the importance of ethical considerations in 
IPE. In Mayall’s words, ‘the major economic problems in international relations in one way 
or another all raise the question of justice’. However, this is no simple concept of allocative 
justice: ‘[t]o talk about justice, of what is owed by men to each other, is necessarily to 
examine the nature, purpose and possibility of human community’.17 Similarly, Strange 
argues that IPE scholars must abandon realism and liberalism and ‘start again at the 
beginning’. For Strange, this means ‘starting with what used to be called moral 
philosophy....[M]oral philosophers were concerned with fundamental values—how they 
could be reflected in the ordering of human society and how conflicts between them might be 
resolved’.18 At an even deeper level, Robinson makes a case for revealing the very roots of 
the ethical system that we take for granted. Such a task is clearly relevant to IPE, not least 
because, in her words, ‘[a]ny economic system requires a set of rules, an ideology to justify 
them, and a conscience in the individual which makes him strive to carry them out’.19
This thesis is sympathetic to these nationalist and statist criticisms of neoclassical 
trade theory. In fact, one important task of this research is to investigate some of the non­
commercial motivations for protectionism in the case of Canadian magazines. Furthermore, 
the purpose of this thesis is to heed these calls for an ethical renewal in IPE, by exploring 
what an ethical analysis might entail in the specific case of periodicals and trade. In so doing, 
however, I will question the ideas of community and the good life which underlie both
13 E.H. Carr, Nationalism and After (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 31.
14 Mayall, op. cit., in note 11, p. 99.
15 James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), p. 72.
16 Susan Strange, ‘Protectionism and World Politics’, International Organization (Vol. 39, No. 2, 
1985), pp. 233-59.
17 Mayall, op. cit., in note 11, p. 97.
18 Strange, op. cit., in note 5, p. 171.
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neoclassical and nationalist approaches. I will suggest that to read the politics of culture and 
trade from exclusively an economic or a nationalist approach is to miss something 
fundamental about culture and cultural products. In this regard, I aim to bring an IPE 
argument to bear on considerations of culture and trade; though, as will become clear, 
heeding the calls for ethical theory results in analysis quite different from very many other 
accounts of IPE. A preview of what this entails is set out below.
Methodological Context
The past few decades has witnessed the steady rise of critical theorising in IR. In less than 
twenty years, critical theory has moved from the periphery of enquiry to a position where it 
can claim some significant gains, not least in terms of the re-invocation and re-articulation of 
cultural concerns. Even though culture is not always itself a direct subject of theorising, the 
return of culture and identity as key concerns in IR was a crucial element in the process of 
reflection on the discipline’s motives, methods, and achievements.20 That culture is so central 
becomes clear in a perusal of the achievements of critical IR theory. Andrew Linklater, for 
one, has recently discussed these achievements, cataloguing them into four central 
categories. First, he claims that critical theory has taken issue with the firm subject-object 
divide in positivist social science theorising. This suggested the impossibility of a neutral 
observer, thereby placing questions of value and of cultural understanding to the fore. It also 
demanded that social theorists engage with their own, culturalised, role in the social world. 
Second, critical theory has enabled IR theorists to understand historical change and the 
central role of human agency in the international system. In this regard, as will be highlighted 
again below, the move away from the more structural nature of Cold War theorising focused 
attention on underlying questions of identity and values. Third, critical theory has been able 
to extend beyond its Marxist roots, thereby revealing forms of identity other than class, and 
forms of interaction beyond production. Finally, critical theory has embraced the role of open 
dialogue in envisaging and creating new forms of community.21 Indeed, specifically 
intercultural dialogue and a respect for cultural difference have since come to be seen as key 
to the creation of just social orders. In each of these cases, the recognition of cultural 
difference and the acceptance of a plurality of relevant (and legitimate) understandings of the
19 Joan Robinson, Economic Philosophy (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962), p. 18.
20 On the idea that culture and identity are ‘returning’ to IR, rather than visiting for the first time, see 
Yosef Lapid, ‘Culture’s Ship: Returns and Departures in IR Theory’, in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich 
Kratochwil (eds.), The Return o f  Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
1997), pp. 3-20.
21 Andrew Linklater, ‘The Achievements o f Critical Theory’, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia 
Zalewski (eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), pp. 279-98.
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world was central to dethroning the positivist approach to the social sciences and this 
approach’s characterisation of the theorist as a neutral observer.
In contrast to the proliferation of approaches in IR, IPE has shown a marked reluctance 
to stray from the dictates of scientific methodology. This tendency is often not directly 
admitted. Indeed, most IPE theorists have refused to engage in metatheoretical debate, 
preferring to draw their legitimacy instead from the fact that they remain within the confines 
of accepted, ‘normal’ science.22 As Murphy and Tooze have noted, ‘orthodox IPE has 
accommodated “paradigmatism” only to a limited extent’.23 Stephen Krasner, however, is 
one traditional IPE theorist who has acknowledged and responded to the methodological 
challenge posed by critical theory. In an article entitled ‘The Accomplishments of 
International Political Economy’, Krasner directly addresses the methodological question in 
IPE. He claims that IPE ‘has been guided almost exclusively by the...assumption that reality 
exists independently of the way in which it is represented by humans and that the truth of a 
statement depends on how well it conforms with this independent reality’.24
If this claim is accepted, the key points of difference between approaches to IPE can 
be characterised as existing within a broad agreement on positivist epistemology.25 In other 
words, approaches can be distinguished according to the positions they take on, for example, 
the possibilities for interstate cooperation under anarchy. In this way, as Murphy and Tooze 
note, ‘although at one level the frameworks are contesting (liberalism versus nationalism 
versus Marxism), at another they...maintain and reproduce a particular form of 
knowledge’.26 Indeed, this triad, along with domestic politics approaches, is. seen by Krasner 
and others as defining the range of approaches to IPE. To his credit, Krasner does 
acknowledge that positivist theorising has numerous faults, not least that it only rarely is able 
to show policy makers what the best course of action is.27 However, he nevertheless
22 Much has been written on this position and the epistemological claims that sustain it. See, for 
example, Robert W. Cox, ‘Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method’, in 
Stephen Gill (ed.), Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 49-66; Murphy and Tooze, op. cit., in note 6; Ralph Pettman, 
Understanding International Political Economy, With Readings fo r  the Fatigued (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 1996); Roger Tooze, ‘Constructive Criticism: Threats, Imperatives, and Opportunities o f a 
Constitutive IPE’, in Burch and Denemark (eds.), op. cit., in note 10, pp. 207-12; and Stephen Gill, 
‘Epistemology, Ontology and the “Italian School’” , in Gill (ed.), Gramsci, Historical Materialism and 
International Relations, pp. 21-48.
23 Murphy and Tooze, op. cit., in note 6, p. 22.
24 Stephen Krasner, ‘The Accomplishments o f  International Political Economy’, in Smith, Booth, and 
Zalewski (eds.), op. cit., in note 21, p. 108.
25 There is significant debate about what constitutes positivism. For useful discussion o f the relevant 
issues, see Mark Neufeld, The Restructuring o f  International Relations Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), Chapter 2, and Steve Smith, ‘Positivism and Beyond’, in Smith, Booth, and 
Zalewski (eds.), op. cit., in note 21, especially pp. 17-18.
26 Murphy and Tooze, op. cit., in note 6, p. 14.
27 Krasner, op. cit., in note 24, p. 125.
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concludes by endorsing conventional methodology because any other method would be anti- 
foundationalist, ‘lead[ing] directly to nihilism’.28
It should be clear that Krasner’s defence of (what he terms) ‘Western Rationalism’ is 
based on a gross overstatement of the dangers of alternative approaches. It delegitimises all 
non-conventional approaches and in so doing, excludes the possibilities held out by critical 
and post-structuralist approaches that fall short of full-fledged anti-foundationalism or 
nihilism.29 Indeed, as Chris Brown stressed in his 1994 article, there is no ‘mythical beast 
called “post-modern (or critical) international relations theory”....[T]here are only critical 
theories in the plural’.30 More importantly, as this introduction has already suggested, these 
theories are not simply marginal contributors to an already existing debate, but are 
flourishing and have already succeeded in making important contributions to our 
understanding of IR. In IPE, however, the variety of new approaches has been more limited. 
One approach that clearly occupies this critical space between ‘normal’ science and radical 
postmodernism is neo-Gramscianism. Because of its central position in the critical IPE 
debate, a discussion of neo-Gramscianism is a crucial first step in orienting the position taken 
by this thesis.
There is, of course, no unified view on what constitutes the ‘Italian school’ or the new 
‘Gramscian approach’. Indeed, many theorists who have been labelled neo-Gramscians have 
rejected the characterisation as one-sided and inaccurate.31 However, it is nonetheless 
possible (and important) to speak of the numerous historical materialist (and post-Marxist) 
approaches to IPE that have been spawned by Robert Cox’s now-famous comment that 
‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’.32 As Randall Germain and Michael 
Kenny have noted, the notion of a school ‘is useful to the extent that it highlights how a 
particular set of ideas has come to exert an important influence within the discipline’.33 
Indeed, while acknowledging the impossibility of faithfully discussing a single ‘school’, we 
can nonetheless summarise the main invocations of these Gramscian-inspired approaches.
First, and contrary to structural Marxism, Antonio Gramsci stressed the role of human 
consciousness in historical development. Indeed, ‘he consistently argues for a more 
empowering self-understanding in which humans are actively self-constitutive in the process
28 Ibid.
29 Indeed, this diversity within the critical camp is emphasised by Chris Brown in his “‘Turtles All the 
Way Down”: Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory and International Relations’, Millennium: Journal 
o f  International Studies (Vol. 23, No. 2, 1994), pp. 213-36.
30 Ibid., p. 236.
31 Robert Cox, for example, has indicated that he does not identify with any ‘school’. See Randall 
Germain and Michael Kenny, ‘International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians’, Review o f  
International Studies (Vol. 24, No. 1, 1998), p. 4, note 3.
32 Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders’, in Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. 
Sinclair, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 87.
33 Germain and Kenny, op. cit., in note 31, p. 4.
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of consciously reconstructing their internal relation with society and nature’.34 In other 
words, not only are humans conscious of their involvement in the natural and social world, 
but they are further able to consciously affect the course of history.
Second, while human consciousness is central to historical development, this 
consciousness does not have influence independently of material conditions. In particular, 
Gramsci stressed the importance of specific historical circumstances as the inescapable 
context of historical struggle. As Cox has claimed, ‘[i]n Gramsci’s historical 
materialism,.. .ideas and material conditions are always bound together, mutually influencing 
one another, and not reducible one to the other’.35
Third, Gramsci identified a conception of social power that is complex and not easily 
reducible to economic, political or cultural factors alone. Ideology, for example, is central to 
hegemonic leadership and distinguishes it from material dominance. In particular, a 
hegemonic class can only become so by ‘combining the interests of other... groups.. .with its 
own interests so as to create a national-popular collective will’.36 Further, ‘there must be a 
cultural-social unity through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills...are welded together 
with a single aim’.37 Revolutionary struggle, then, must take place on both ideological and 
material grounds!
Finally, we must note Gramsci’s political goals, namely transcending the divisions of 
capitalist society and creating a new historic bloc based on proletarian leadership. In Mark 
Rupert’s words, ‘Gramsci’s radical politics envisions a comprehensive transformation of 
social reality through the creation of an effective counter-culture, an alternative world view 
and a new form of political organization’.38
The specific methodological contribution made by Gramscian-inspired approaches has 
been summed up by Stephen Gill. In particular, Gill argues that neo-Gramscian approaches 
do not accept ‘symmetry between the social and natural sciences with regard to concept 
formation and the logic of inquiry and explanation’.39 Further, unlike the natural scientist, the 
social scientist cannot be a neutral, distant observer. The separation of observer and observed 
which is so central to positivist accounts is rejected by neo-Gramscian approaches. In other 
words, ‘the Gramscian approach is an epistemological and ontological critique of the 
empiricism and positivism which underpin the prevailing theorisations’.40 According to Gill, 
neo-Gramscian approaches provide this critique through historicism, methodological holism,
34 Mark Rupert, Producing Hegemony: The Politics o f  Mass Production and American Global Power 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 26.
35 Cox, op. cit., in note 22, p. 56.
36 Roger Simon, Gramsci's Political Thought, Revised Edition (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1991),
p. 61.
37 Ibid.
38 Rupert, op. cit., in note 34, p. 28.
39 Gill, op. cit., in note 22, p. 21.
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dialecticism, and a deliberate involvement in both theorising and bringing about human 
emancipation.41 Indeed, Gill even claims that Gramsci’s work is overtly ethical, displaying 
‘something akin to the Aristotelian view of politics as the search to establish the conditions 
of the good society’.42 As a result, ‘questions of justice, legitimacy and moral credibility are 
integrated sociologically into the whole’.43
Neo-Gramscian political economy has been attractive precisely because of the 
methodological claims just described. In particular, neo-Gramscianism is often seen to offer 
the possibility of reconciling subject and object, material and ideal, theory and praxis.44 It is 
perceived as the ultimate alternative to the individualism of liberal IPE and the rigid 
structuralism of Marxist IPE. However, as Germain and Kenny are correct to point out, such 
an interpretation hardly does justice to the inherent contradictions and irreconcilable tensions 
within Gramsci’s own work. In particular, Germain and Kenny are not convinced that 
Gramsci’s thought holds the possibility of overcoming the subject-object dualism.45 In 
response, they call for a careful reconsideration of Gramsci’s concepts and their applicability 
to IR and IPE. Although I agree that such a reconsideration is necessary, this thesis does not 
aim to undertake this type of critical engagement with neo-Gramscianism. However, it 
originates in a similar unease about the methodological claims made on behalf of neo- 
Gramscianism and shares the view that alternative, critical theories must be developed.
In particular, the method taken by this thesis developed out of a sense of the ethical 
inadequacy of neo-Gramscian approaches. As noted above, neo-Gramscians are apt to make 
claims about the capacity of their theory to transcend the subject-object divide, or the gulf 
between theory and praxis. This transcendence is intimately connected to the process by 
which a proletarian historic bloc will gain power and legitimacy. However, this vision is 
problematic for two reasons. First, the neo-Gramscians are quick to show the political and 
normative implications of ‘normal’ science, but they rarely acknowledge that their own 
vision is also only a singular and contestable vision of a particular moral order. They gain 
great moral purchase by portraying themselves as the liberators of IR from the shackles of 
problem-solving theory. The reason that they succeed in this offers the second reason that 
neo-Gramscianism is ethically inadequate. In particular, neo-Gramscians often refer to the 
goal of emancipation, but rarely specify what emancipation might actually entail. It is not 
clear if they wish to see a new hegemony grow out of subaltern forces or if they are striving 
for a post-hegemonic order. In other words, they fail to set out and defend their specific
40 Ibid., p. 22.
41 Ibid., pp. 22-24.
42 Ibid., p. 25.
43 Ibid., p. 24.
44 Ibid., p. 22.
45 Germain and Kenny, op. cit., in note 31, p. 12.
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vision of the good life. This is highly problematic for a theory which purports to assume the 
critical mantle in IPE and which seeks to dethrone conventional methodologies for their 
inability to recognise the role of theory in serving particular political ends.
However, the ethical critique of neo-Gramscians runs even deeper than this. It is not 
merely the case that neo-Gramscians refuse to elaborate on the content of their new world 
order, but rather that they are actually incapable of doing so without violating some of their 
central assumptions. In particular, if the role of human consciousness is to be taken seriously, 
then a theorist can hardly presume to dictate the actual shape of any future social 
organisation. Indeed, Gill goes further than any other neo-Gramscian theorist in outlining the 
desired characteristics of a new order: rational, democratic, and open. However, even he 
stops short of further explanation or justification, claiming that he ‘offers no promises or 
prescriptions for the form that such a society might take’.46 According to he and Cox, 
Gramsci described ‘a normative force, but not a normative plan or set of normative 
criteria’.47 As a result, although neo-Gramscians are consistently emphasising the importance 
of emancipation as a goal of their theory, they remain fundamentally incapable of thoroughly 
elaborating or justifying this vision of the good life. This is a serious ethical shortcoming that 
prevents neo-Gramscianism from offering any useful conceptualisation of what constitutes 
the good and, more importantly, the terms on which we can understand one theory or state of 
life as better than any other.
In this context, one aim of this thesis is to further exploit the space for counter­
discourse that has been opened in IPE by neo-Gramscian approaches. Indeed, paralleling the 
neo-Gramscians, this thesis aims to expand considerations of IPE beyond the 
liberal/realist/structural Marxist triad. However, it seeks to chart a different course from that 
of the ‘Italian school’. In particular, since I have found the problems of neo-Gramscian ethics 
to be their most significant failing, this thesis adopts an explicitly normative approach. In 
other words, it begins with an IPE problem—trade and culture—but then considers it 
normatively, focusing on many of the cultural and critical questions that have informed 
recent discussions within IR. In so doing, it seeks to extend our ways of understanding IPE, 
thereby expanding the range of questions that may legitimately be asked about IPE and the 
range of reasons for action that may be taken as legitimate. In this sense, then, the thesis 
seeks to comprehend what a normative approach to IPE might entail.
In light of the discussion above, the choice made to rely upon normative theory should 
be clear. Indeed, for some time already, IR theorists have made the claim that normative 
theorising is not simply desirable. It is unavoidable. Indeed, as has been often repeated in IR 
literature, even the most scientific observer cannot hope to be neutral in his starting
46 Gill, op. cit., in note 22, p. 25.
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assumptions, methods, and desires for the future. In Isaiah Berlin’s words, ‘[s]uch men are in 
the first place students of facts, and aspire to formulate hypotheses and laws like the natural 
scientists. Yet as a rule these thinkers cannot go any further: they tend to analyse men’s 
social and political ideas in the light of some overriding belief of their own’.48 The central 
problem, then, centres around a need for what Mark Neufeld has referred to as reflexivity or 
‘theoretical self-consciousness’. Reflexivity entails ‘(i) self-consciousness about underlying 
premises; (ii) the recognition of the inherently politico-normative dimension of paradigms 
and the normal science tradition they sustain; and (iii) the affirmation that reasoned 
judgements about the merits of contending paradigms are possible in the absence of a neutral 
observation language’.49 Without a neutral language, ‘judgements about contending 
paradigms are possible by means of reasoned assessments of the politico-normative content 
of the projects they serve, of the ways of life to which they correspond’.50 Without such 
reflexivity, we are ill-placed to recognise that ‘to engage in paradigm-directed puzzle-solving 
is—intentionally or not—to direct one’s energies to the establishment and maintenance of a 
specific global order’,51 nor can we question the methods and conclusions of normal science. 
Indeed, as Berlin has noted, only where society is dominated by a single goal can scientific 
methods be of use, since ‘there could in principle only be arguments about the best means to 
attain this end—and arguments about means are technical, that is, scientific and empirical in 
character’.52 Where there is no total acceptance of any single end, then we cannot avoid a 
‘critical examination of presuppositions and assumptions, and the questioning of the order of 
priorities and ultimate ends’.53 Despite having so far avoided the question of reflexivity, IPE 
embodies no greater agreement on the goals of society and the purposes of theorising than 
any other social science discipline. In this respect, the aim of this thesis is to take one very 
modest step towards this theoretical self-awareness in IPE.
It should be noted, however, that the idea of normative theory has developed a 
radically new meaning in the context of the developments in IR theory that were detailed in 
the first paragraphs of this introduction. Indeed, the connection between critical theory and 
culture has completely altered the meaning of ethics for those who see themselves in the 
critical tradition. Most importantly, ethics is no longer considered as a realm of inquiry that 
is separable from the considerations of ER theorists. In other words, ethics is not a domain of 
external questions that can either be heeded or ignored by IR. Indeed, if, as Cox noted, theory
47 Ibid.
48 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Does Political Theory Still Exist?’, in Peter Laslett and W.G. Runciman (eds.), 
Philosophy, Politics and Society, Second Series (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), p. 27.
49 Neufeld, op. cit., in note 25, p. 40.
50 Ibid., p. 46.
51 Ibid., p. 69.
52 Berlin, op. cit., in note 48, p. 8.
53 Ibid.
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is always for someone or something, then the task of theorising itself cannot be considered 
morally or culturally neutral. In consequence every act of theorising is considered to embody, 
if implicitly, normative claims about the nature of the individual and the appropriate ends of 
human endeavour. Method and meaning are no longer clearly separable. In this context, 
critical theory takes on many roles. One task, in particular, is to ask, ‘what constitutes good 
theory with regard to world politics?’54 Providing a preliminary and contestable answer to 
this question in the realm of IPE is one goal of this thesis.
Importantly, in light of this shift in understanding normative theory, the question of 
good theory is no longer separable from questions of value and meaning. Moreover, and as a 
result, cultural issues have clearly returned into view. For normative theory, the result is that 
justice is no longer understood primarily as an end-state between individuals. Instead, justice 
is often conceived of as a process, in which the establishment of adequate intercultural 
dialogue is key. The rise of cultural concerns, then, has forced a reconsideration of the ethical 
premises and implications of different theories in an effort to establish their capacity to 
seriously endorse and enable value pluralism. For IPE, a concern for processes and 
institutions as well as outcomes has meant a challenge to traditional notions of distributive 
justice.
In this context, another purpose of the thesis is to show how an adequate understanding 
of social life and an adequate emancipatory method for IPE entails taking seriously the 
meaning and importance of culture. In other words, culture as a moral referent, however it is 
conceptualised, is an inescapable element of critical theory. In this light, this thesis asks (i) 
what are the ethical premises underlying the conventional approaches to trade and culture, 
and (ii) what legitimate alternatives can we envisage? The purpose is not to refuse the merit 
of conventional approaches, but to reevaluate their centrality or obviousness and to make a 
case for an alternative, culturally-informed way of understanding and legitimising 
government policy. Indeed, the thesis is intended, in part, to challenge the economic notion 
that state activity is only legitimate if it is ‘adjusting national economic activities to the 
exigencies of the global economy’.55 However, as we will see, the position taken here 
nonetheless remains very distant from the realist notion that the national interest is the 
ultimate justification for any policy.
Method of the Thesis
Answering these questions will require a serious consideration of the normative bases of 
different approaches to trade and culture. More importantly, it will demand a wide-ranging
54 Neufeld, op. cit., in note 25, p. 2.
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and often theoretically dense discussion of the importance of culture in the constitution of 
identity and moral personality, and the relevance of this relationship for considerations and 
evaluations of government action. The thesis will proceed by questioning the normative 
foundations of different approaches, enquiring whether these premises are adequate for our 
task and for society. The thesis will then seek to build an alternative picture based on 
normative premises that, according to the argument, better reflect our values and self- 
understandings. In taking such an approach, I must begin by being clear about my own values 
and foundations. This work is clearly located within the broad spectrum of critical theory 
(small c, small t) that developed out of western Marxism. It is, however, post-Marxist, in the 
sense that it seeks to go well beyond the narrow and often-teleological considerations of class 
and production that have dominated much Marxist analysis. In particular, the thesis must be 
understood as taking a broadly interpretive or hermeneutic approach to trade and culture, 
drawing on insights developed most recently by Taylor and Young.56
Culture
But why focus on culture? In one sense, an ability to accommodate the relevance of cultural 
pluralism is now perceived by theorists of all stripes to be important to understanding the 
post-Cold War world. Indeed, the reemergence of identity politics in IR has clearly posed a 
challenge to realist conceptions of power and interests. Moreover, for critics of neo-realism, 
cultural factors are an important element of theorising which can conceptualise difference 
and change in the international system.
However, as this introduction has highlighted, cultural issues are also inextricably 
intertwined with the project of critical theory itself. By questioning the dominance of 
scientific epistemology, critical theorists have forced open the question of what constitutes 
good knowledge. They have challenged the universality of Western rationalism as the only 
standard by which knowledge can be evaluated. The recognition of fundamental differences 
between cultures and the consequent problem of cross-cultural understanding have thus come 
to dominant the epistemological landscape. In this sense, prioritising metatheory and taking 
an interpretive approach is in one sense to already have accepted a focus on culture.
55 Robert W. Cox, ‘Structural Issues o f Global Governance’, in Gill (ed.), op. cit., in note 22, p. 260.
56 For more on interpretive or hermeneutic approaches generally, see Michael T. Gibbons, 
‘Interpretation, Geneaology and Human Agency’, in Terence Ball (ed.), Idioms o f  Inquiry: Critique 
and Renewal in Political Science (Albany, NY: State University o f  New York Press, 1987), pp. 137- 
66; Craig Calhoun, Critical Social Theory: Culture, History and the Challenge o f  Difference (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1995), especially Chapter 2; Smith, op. cit., in note 25; Neufeld, op. cit., in note 25, 
especially Chapter 4; Charles Taylor, ‘Interpretation and the Sciences o f Man’, in Charles Taylor, 
Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), pp. 15-57; and Jere Paul Surber, Culture and Critique: An Introduction to the Critical 
Discourses o f  Cultural Studies (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), Chapter 2.
18
But what understanding of culture underlies such a position? Craig Calhoun has noted 
that there are numerous ways in which sociologists have attempted to understand culture. 
However, many of them, including the idea of culture as a commodity or as an intervening 
variable, represent attempts to ‘scientise’ the study of culture. In other words, many studies 
of culture have felt ‘obliged to interpret the social world as one in which meaning was not 
problematic’.57 However, unless meaning is taken as problematic, there is little opening for 
the insights of hermeneutic approaches. Or, to consider the problem from a different point of 
view, hermeneutic approaches both require and generate a culturalisation of social science. 
As a result, the only sense of culture that fully accords with the methodological imperatives 
of interpretive social science is one that ‘starts with the recognition that social life is 
inherently cultural, that is, inherently shaped and even constituted in part by differences in 
the ways in which people generate...meaning’.58 This is the type of definition of culture 
adopted by this thesis, which follows Taylor in defining culture as ‘the background of 
practices, institutions, and understandings which form the langue-analogue for our action in a 
given society’.59 In this regard, Taylor has been significantly influenced by Clifford Geertz, 
whose anthropological, symbolic, and interpretive approach to culture has received a great 
deal of attention throughout the social sciences.60
Clearly, this conception of culture is necessarily a broad one. In this respect, it goes 
well beyond approaches that define the whole of culture in terms of certain particular cultural 
forms or manifestations, such as cultural goods. Particularly, this thesis does not accept the 
relevance of distinctions that are often drawn between ‘high’ and Tow’ culture or between 
culture and entertainment. Taking such a position, however, implicitly raises the question of 
the status of cultural ‘goods’ such as magazines. Indeed, if so many elements of social life 
can be considered cultural, what special justification is there for focusing on magazines? 
More importantly, can the insights of this thesis be applied to justify protectionism in any 
sector deemed broadly ‘cultural’? It is clearly important to ‘draw the line’ in terms of the 
goods that can appropriately be considered cultural. However, doing so adequately would 
require a very extensive discussion; and, indeed, the issue is very likely to be one that ought 
not to be established once and for all. In this context, the argument of this thesis requires only 
that magazines are amongst the goods that can be described as cultural. The position taken 
here is that once culture is understood as consisting of background languages (including the 
symbolic) that are developed through dialogue and interaction, we must accord a special 
importance to sites of debate and forms of communication. Magazines, amongst many other
57 Calhoun, op. cit., in note 56, p. 63.
58 Ibid.
59 Charles Taylor, ‘Irreducibly Social Goods’, in Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 136.
60 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation o f  Cultures (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1975).
19
social forms, are clearly important to the process of communal ‘self-understanding’ and the 
development and contestation of the cultural background language.61 For this reason, 
wherever the line is drawn in the Canadian context, magazines are clearly within the cultural 
realm. Furthermore, as we will see, it is precisely the importance of magazines in providing a 
forum for dialogue and outlets for cultural expression which justifies the theoretical 
weightiness of the argument presented in this thesis. Indeed, unlike other protectionist 
arguments which also appeal to the security or survival of the community, the argument 
surrounding magazines necessarily raises important questions about our understanding of 
culture and identity, our view of the community, and the implications of the relationship 
between them. Adequately addressing these questions demands the extended theoretical 
discussion undertaken in this thesis.
It should be made clear from the outset that this thesis will focus specifically on the 
cultural claims being made by proponents and opponents of free trade in magazines between 
Canada and the United States. Considerations of space have meant the exclusion of many 
approaches to culture that could potentially generate very interesting insights into culture and 
trade. In particular, the argument that is set out in this thesis does not consider Theodor 
Adorno’s comments on cultural industries, Nicholas Gamham’s Marxist political economy of 
culture, or the varied positions taken by members of the British cultural studies school.62
Outline of Chapters
Having delineated the context in which this thesis is located and the methodology to which it 
adheres, the only remaining task for this introduction is to outline the argument which 
follows. Chapters 2 and 3 analyse the existing literature on trade and culture in the Canada- 
United States context. This literature is divided into two categories corresponding to the two 
main approaches, namely market-based approaches and community-based approaches. 
Chapter 2 discusses market-based approaches. Market-based approaches begin from a very 
firm commitment to the free market. When the market is functioning properly, it is seen to 
provide the best guarantee of individual welfare. Moreover, although very few market-based 
authors define culture, it is clear from their analyses that it is both possible and desirable for 
culture to be understood through a market paradigm. They view culture as essentially like
61 It is important to note here that this thesis does not oppose cultural change. Indeed, foreign 
influences have always been a central force in the constitution and adaptation o f cultures. In this 
context, this thesis is concerned to ensure that differential economies o f scale in the magazine industry 
do not inhibit adequate cultural exchange.
62 See Theodor W. Adomo, The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture (London: 
Routledge, 1991) and Nicholas Gamham, Capitalism and Communication: Global Culture and the 
Economics o f  Information (London: SAGE, 1990). For a very useful introduction to cultural studies,
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any other good, with a market for its creation, its sale, and even its subsidisation. As a result, 
the question of culture and trade resolves itself into the question of when government can 
legitimately interfere in the free market. ‘Good’ policy, in this context, is that which uses 
(measurable) welfare effects to guide government intervention in the free market.
Chapter 3 sets out what are termed community-based approaches. Community-based 
approaches to trade and culture all begin from the premise that cultural activity fulfils 
important social functions. They stress the benefits to the community of cultural production 
by, for, and representing that community. In turn, the good of the community, broadly 
defined, is the ultimate justification for policy. Beyond this premise, however, there are many 
differences between community-based approaches, not least in their assessments of what 
constitutes the community and what constitutes the ‘good’, as well as in their ideas of how 
this good can be promoted. Within the literature, there emerge six different dimensions 
through which culture can be seen to contribute to the ‘good’ life of the community. These 
are identity, unity, sovereignty, prosperity, democracy, and artistic fulfilment. These themes 
are each drawn out in detail.
Chapter 4 offers a brief synopsis of the Canadian periodicals industry. It discusses the 
overall health of the Canadian periodicals industry and sets out the main policies that govern 
trade in periodicals. This chapter pays particular attention to the details of the Canadian 
policy context and the economic position of different magazines in the Canadian market. It 
also addresses the central points of contention in the trade and periodicals debate.
Building on the previous chapter, Chapter 5 shows how market-based and community- 
based approaches have been relevant in Canada-United States disputes relating to trade in 
periodicals. It highlights two particular instances in which Canadian attempts to implement a 
policy protecting Canadian periodicals resulted in disputes between the Canadian and 
American governments. An examination of the positions taken by the governments, 
opposition groups, publishers, and advertisers demonstrates the precise ways in which the 
market-based and community-based approaches have played out in practice. The chapter 
concludes with the claim that US publishers and policy-makers rely very heavily upon 
market-based assertions, even when their actions are not consistent with free market logic. 
Similarly, the Canadian government has trumpeted the rhetoric of community-based 
positions (national identity, in particular), even when, in practice, it has sometimes balanced 
these concerns against economic or other policy interests.
Chapters 6 and 7 will begin the process of ethical critique. Chapter 6 focuses on the 
market-based approach, with particular attention to its ethical premises and implications. The 
chapter discusses the core values of market-based approaches, namely, individual well-being
see Graeme Turner, British Cultural Studies: An Introduction (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1990), or
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and freedom. Each value is discussed in turn, demonstrating that the manner in which 
market-based approaches deal with culture is flawed in two related ways. First, proponents of 
market-based approaches do not recognise that their values are particular. In other words, 
they do not acknowledge that their own assertions are culturally-grounded and have both 
moral premises and implications. Because proponents of these approaches perceive their 
values to be universally-accepted (or at least universally acceptable), they have great 
difficulty in understanding that cultural particularity may be morally significant. As a result, 
and second, the conception of social justice suggested by market-based approaches is 
fundamentally incapable of conceptualising the moral relevance of culture.
Chapter 7 addresses the question of whether and in what ways it is possible to provide 
a moral justification for community-based approaches to trade and culture. In other words, 
are there good ethical reasons why the state should intervene to support culture, and, if so, 
what might these reasons be? This chapter argues that, in considering community-based 
approaches, we can and ought to distinguish between community-based approaches which 
are morally acceptable and those which are not. Having made this distinction, this chapter 
focuses on those community-based approaches which are not ethically justifiable, delineating 
the reasons why these community-based approaches are unacceptable as a basis for Canadian 
periodicals policy.
Building on this discussion, Chapter 8 offers a detailed delineation of an ethics which 
can support the acceptable forms of community-based approach. The first part of this chapter 
sets out Taylor’s ontology and especially the main points of his understanding of culture and 
its relationship to identity.63 The second part of the chapter focuses on the cultural ethics 
which is generated by Taylor’s work. It also addresses several criticisms of Taylor which are 
the most relevant for the application of Taylor’s work to Canadian cultural policy. The 
chapter concludes by suggesting the most important connections between Taylor’s work and 
the policy debate on free trade and culture.
Chapter 8 also sets out the foundations of the approach that this thesis takes towards 
free trade and culture. It establishes the value of Taylor’s ontology, even though it argues that 
his ethical and political positions contain serious difficulties and are inappropriate for this 
project. In this light, Chapter 9 shows how Taylor’s ontology can be developed to produce a 
different and more useful ethics for cultural policy. This is achieved by drawing on the work 
of Young. In terms of the concerns of this thesis, Young’s ethics clearly have value. Her 
work builds upon the many attributes of Taylor’s ontology, developing a sound and useful 
statement of how culture should be accommodated in social theory and practice. Her
Marjorie Ferguson and Peter Golding, Cultural Studies in Question (London: SAGE, 1997).
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conception of social justice and its manifestation in radical democracy will be taken up by 
this thesis as the ethical basis for its claims about Canadian policy towards culture and trade.
Finally, the conclusion of the thesis suggests ways in which these theoretical and 
methodological gains can be used to generate new and more ethically acceptable forms of 
policy for trade in periodicals. This concluding chapter will first rely on Young’s ethics to 
address the outstanding question of why magazines are so important for the community. It 
will also briefly discuss the concept of community that is implied by this approach. Second, 
the conclusion will argue that Canadian magazines policy must be as enabling, participatory, 
and, ultimately, democratic as possible. The particular implications of these demands will be 
discussed in detail. Finally, the conclusion will offer suggestions as to the ways in which 
ethical considerations can be incorporated into trade debates and negotiations within North 
America and at the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The conclusions of the thesis are not 
meant to be once-and-for-all solutions to the dilemmas presented by culture and trade. 
Instead, they are presented suggestively, as examples of the gains in understanding that can 
result from the ethics suggested here.
63 This thesis understands the ontology of a theory to refer to ‘the list o f sorts o f things whose existence 
is presupposed by that theory’. Rob Martin, The Philosopher’s Dictionary, Second Edition 
(Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1994), p. 166.
Chapter 2 
Market-Based Approaches to Trade and Culture
Market-based approaches to trade and culture have significantly influenced the cultural 
policy debate within Canada as well as the free trade debate between Canada and the United 
States. Moreover, such approaches have gained increasing attention during periods of fiscal 
restraint. This chapter will first outline the claims of several key proponents of market-based 
approaches. Subsequently, it will draw out the key features of market-based approaches by 
examining the claims of its proponents on three central issues: definition of culture, criteria 
for ‘good’ policy, and conclusions about Canadian culture and free trade. Finally, a critique 
of market-based approaches will be offered.
The Approaches Described
Market-based approaches to trade and culture can be identified primarily by an ideological 
commitment to the free market. All of the approaches described below seek to apply the tools 
of welfare economics to generate a better understanding of culture.1 However, since this 
chapter is concerned with the relationship between culture and trade, it will focus specifically 
on the question of government intervention in support of cultural endeavours.2 Nonetheless, 
within this framework there remains much room for debate. The two most important 
positions are set out below.
First, there are those cultural economists3 who believe that there are few, if any, 
grounds for government intervention in the cultural market. In the Canadian context, Steven 
Globerman is the foremost proponent of this approach. In several books and articles, he has
1 See, for example, the contributions in Ruth Towse and Abdul Khakee (eds.), Cultural Economics 
(Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1992), and in Ruth Towse (ed.) Cultural Economics: The Arts, the Heritage, 
and the Media Industries, 2 vols. (Lyme, NH: Edward Elgar, 1997). See also Douglas V. Shaw, 
William S. Hendon, and Virginia Lee Owen (eds.), Cultural Economics 88: An American Perspective 
(Akron, OH: The University o f  Akron for the Association for Cultural Economics, 1989), and James 
Heilbrun and Charles M. Gray, The Economics o f  Art and Culture: An American Perspective 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Finally, the Journal o f  Cultural Economics provides 
numerous examples o f this approach.
2 There are others who seek to apply the precepts o f economics more generally to culture, in other 
words, who ‘view cultural economics as a field o f applied economics’. Towse and Khakee (eds.), op. 
cit., in note 1, p. 1.
3 The term cultural economist refers to those who study the economics o f cultural industries and the 
efficiency implications o f state support for culture.
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repeatedly challenged the assumption of cultural nationalists4 and policy-makers alike that 
the sphere of culture must be insulated from the constraints of economic theory. He argues 
that if policy is to be effective and if limited resources are to be efficiently used, cultural 
policy must be subjected to economic analysis. Thus, in his 1983 book, Globerman sets out 
to critically address the justifications and the instruments of Canadian government 
intervention in the cultural marketplace.5 Not surprisingly, Globerman concludes that the 
rationales for intervention are either insufficiently defended at a theoretical level (for 
example, the idea that Canadian culture is required to preserve Canadian identity) or are 
empirically irrelevant (for example, the argument that intervention is necessary to remedy 
externalities).6 Moreover, he argues that the instruments chosen for government intervention 
are, at best, ‘hardly contributory to alleviating obvious market failure problems’.7 Combining 
this assessment with a public choice approach to the formation of domestic policy, 
Globerman concludes by arguing that ‘ [i]n the absence of an identification of genuine market 
failure problems, one would anticipate the imposition of policies that serve no obvious social 
function but, rather, benefit a small number of individuals who assume certain costs 
associated with lobbying for their favoured policies’.8 Globerman makes some very 
important points, not least of which is that the assumptions of cultural nationalists should not 
be immune from critical and popular assessment. However, his approach also has serious 
limitations, as will become apparent in the final section of this chapter.
Like Globerman, the second type of market-based approach to culture, the market- 
failure school, begins with a firm commitment to the free market. However, proponents of 
this approach use the arguments of welfare economics to show why culture should be 
considered an exception to the free market.9 These are often theorists who have some
4 In the Canadian context, cultural nationalists are those who wish to see culture protected from the 
demands o f freer trade. Usually, they also see culture as a national phenomenon. They are not referred 
to as nationalists more generally, since their views on other issues cannot in all cases be inferred from 
their cultural position.
5 Steven Globerman, Cultural Regulation in Canada (Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public 
Policy, 1983). See also Steven Globerman and Aidan Vining (eds.), Foreign Ownership and Canada's 
Feature Film Distribution Sector: An Economic Analysis (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1987); Steven 
Globerman, ‘Price Awareness in the Performing Arts’, Journal o f  Cultural Economics (Vol. 2, 1978), 
pp. 27-42; and S.H. Book and Steven Globerman, The Audience fo r  the Performing Arts (Toronto: 
Ontario Arts Council, 1975).
6 Globerman, Cultural Regulation, op. cit., in note 5, Chapter 3, especially pp. 60-61.
7 Ibid., p. 85.
8 Ibid., p. 90.
9 See the arguments in Dick Netzer, The Subsidized Muse: Public Support fo r  the Arts in the United 
States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Twentieth Century Fund, 1978); J. Mark 
Davidson Schuster, ‘Arguing for Government Support o f the Arts: An American V iew ’, in Olin 
Robison, Robert Freeman, and Charles A. Riley II (eds.), The Arts in the World Economy: Public 
Policy and Private Philanthropy fo r  a Global Cultural Community (Hanover, NH: University Press of  
New England for Salzburg Seminar, 1994), pp. 42-55; and David Cwi, ‘Merit Good or Market Failure: 
Justifying and Analyzing Public Support for the Arts’, in Kevin V. Mulcahy and C. Richard Swaim 
(eds.), Public Policy and the Arts (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 59-89.
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sympathy with the arguments of arts groups and cultural nationalists, but have sought to 
justify government support for culture in terms acceptable to most economists. As Abraham 
Rotstein has noted, ‘[t]he intellectual challenge as they see it, is to find a suitable rationale 
for such intervention within the parameters and concepts that economics establishes’.10 Like 
Globerman, these theorists examine the concepts of merit goods, public goods, market 
failure, and externality as exceptions to the market rule. However, compared to Globerman, 
these cultural economists are more supportive of the legitimacy of government intervention 
in the cultural sphere. However, even though they might advocate cultural protection, these 
cultural economists remain firmly part of the market-based school. This is because they agree 
with Globerman in accepting that the justifiability of reasons for cultural policy derives from 
considerations of market efficiency. The problems with this assertion will be drawn out in 
Chapter 6.
The above approaches can be analysed according to their views on several important 
dimensions of cultural policy. These views will be addressed in the following sections.
Conception of Culture
Within the literature of cultural economics, there is surprisingly little attention paid to the 
definition of the terms ‘culture’, ‘cultural industries’, or ‘the arts’. In fact, most analyses use 
these words interchangeably and as though there already existed a commonly-agreed 
meaning of them.11 Nonetheless, a careful reading of the work of the cultural economists 
reveals that, with few exceptions, they use a very narrow definition of culture.12 Several 
characteristics of this definition are immediately obvious. In the first place, in order for an 
economic analysis of culture to make sense, culture must be understood in supply and 
demand terms; it must be something that can be bought and sold. Moreover, culture must 
have a price, which, in turn, is seen to reflect its value to consumers. Finally, those who 
produce, buy, and sell culture must be seen as sovereign economic agents who are presumed 
to act in the interests of their own individual welfare.
10 Abraham Rotstein, ‘The Use and Misuse o f Economics in Cultural Policy’, in Rowland Lorimer and 
Donald C. Wilson (eds.), Communication Canada: Issues in Broadcasting and New Technologies 
(Toronto: Kagan and Woo, 1988), p. 142.
11 In order to do justice to the work being discussed, this chapter will follow the terminology used by 
each author. This will result in the term ‘art’ being used to mean ‘culture’, even though this rests 
uneasily with the understanding o f culture adopted by this thesis. Clearly, the authors discussed here 
are often referring to cultural forms that would traditionally have been considered ‘high’ culture. 
However, it is generally accepted that economic arguments for supporting the arts can be applied 
equally to many cultural forms, including magazines.
12 One notable exception is Tibor Scitovsky, who extends his economic analysis to understand the 
process o f learning to enjoy the arts as a necessary component of human satisfaction. See Tibor 
Scitovsky, ‘Subsidies for the Arts: The Economic Argument’, in James L. Shanahan, William S.
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Remarkably, these three characteristics say nothing about the substantive nature of 
culture. One article explains this as follows: ‘[i]t is not the economist’s task to provide a 
definition of culture; in a paradigm dominated by consumer sovereignty, the necessary and 
sufficient conditions to identify culture are to be determined by each individual, according to 
his experience and preferences’.13 Given the invocation of consumer sovereignty, this 
statement can only be understood to mean that no policy-maker or scholar should dictate to 
the consumer which types of activities should be considered culture and which are merely 
leisure activities or entertainment. Nonetheless, this still presumes that, at a fundamental 
level, we all share an idea of what is implied by the term ‘culture’. Clearly, this approach 
avoids the difficult issues involved in defining culture. However, as will become clear in 
Chapter 6, it also artificially limits the ways in which we understand and legitimate cultural 
activity.
Globerman is one of the few cultural economists who attempts to define the subject 
which he is discussing. He initially argues that ‘there is no one universally accepted 
definition of culture industries’.14 However, the candidates for this definition, according to 
Globerman, are limited to Statistics Canada’s definition of ‘culture’ and the Federal Cultural 
Policy Review Committee’s definition of the ‘cultural sector’. After reviewing these options, 
Globerman ‘admittedly somewhat arbitrarily’ chooses to follow the statistical definition of 
culture employed by the federal government.15 This conception defines culture as ‘the 
creative and expressive artistic activities generally referred to as the performing, visual and 
creative arts and those functions related to their preservation and dissemination’.16
This definition of culture is notable for several reasons. First, although it claims to be a 
definition of culture, it focuses mainly on cultural activities and products. It says nothing 
about the relationship of these discrete activities to other, broader understandings of culture 
as a social force or as a way of life. This is not surprising, given that the originator, Statistics 
Canada (Canada’s statistical agency), would want to define culture in a way that would allow 
them to quantify its social and economic effects. However, because it ignores the broader 
social context of cultural activities, this is a very limited definition for the purposes of 
evaluating policy-making. Moreover, to complicate matters further, Globerman uses the 
terms ‘culture’, ‘cultural sector’, and ‘culture industries’ interchangeably throughout his 
work. The implication of this loose use of terms is that culture is not relevant beyond its
Hendon, Izaak Th. H. Hilhorst, and Jaap van Straalen (eds.), Economic Support fo r  the Arts (Akron, 
OH: The University o f Akron for the Association for Cultural Economics, 1983), pp. 15-25.
13 Michele Trimarchi, ‘The Funding Process in a Comparative Perspective: Some Methodological 
Issues’, in Alan Peacock and Ilde Rizzo (eds.), Cultural Economics and Cultural Policies (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), p. 24.
14 Globerman, op. cit., in note 6, p. 4.
15 Ibid., p. 5.
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‘industrial’ or commercial manifestations. For Globerman, culture is essentially like any 
other good that can be bought and sold on the open market; it is a commodity with no social 
role apart from the generation of national income and the satisfaction of wants.
The market-failure school takes a substantively similar position, although culture is 
rarely explicitly defined. Nonetheless, a survey of the main texts on the subject quickly 
confirms the supposition that culture must be defined in a fairly limited sense for the 
application of economic tools to be fruitful. In this context, economic analysis has been 
applied to explain the costs and benefits of government intervention as well as such diverse 
topics as the demand for opera tickets, the market in fake art, artists’ income, and taste- 
formation. In all of these cases, for economic analysis to make sense, culture must be defined 
as a product, with a market for its creation, its sale, and even its subsidisation. As James 
Heilbrun and Charles M. Gray attest, ‘[w]e have suggested that the arts share most attributes 
of ordinary consumer goods, and that the standard tools of demand analysis can usefully be 
brought to bear on them’.17 Cultural economists do often recognise that their subject of study 
has social or individual value. However, this value is usually understood quantitatively, 
manifesting itself through the price mechanism. In this sense, cultural goods play the same 
role as all other commodities in society—they satisfy consumer wants.
Criteria for ‘Good’ Policy
For both types of market-based approaches, the question of what is good policy can be 
answered by addressing the question of what constitutes a strong economic argument for 
government support of cultural activities. This is because market-based approaches agree that 
the free market is the best guarantee of individual welfare. ‘Good’ policy, in this context, is 
that which uses (measurable) welfare effects as its guide to government intervention in the 
free market.18 For example, Globerman describes the object of his book as to ‘set out clearly 
and explicitly the conditions under which government intervention into cultural activities 
might improve the welfare of Canadians’, using neoclassical economics as a tool ‘for 
evaluating the efficiency with which resources will be used under alternative institutional 
arrangements’.19 Thus, government intervention can only be justified when it will produce a 
more optimal allocation of resources than the market. Indeed, market-based approaches see
16 Ibid., pp. 4-5. Quoted from Statistics Canada, Culture Statistics, Vol. 3, No. 9 (Ottawa: Ministry of 
Supply and Services, 1980), p. 1.
17 James Heilbrun and Charles M. Gray, The Economics o f  Art and Culture: An American Perspective 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 97.
18 For a more detailed discussion o f the principles o f welfare economics, see Yew-Kwang Ng, Welfare 
Economics: Introduction and Basic Development o f  Concepts, Revised Edition (London: Macmillan,
1983), especially Chapter 1, and Robin Broadway and Neil Bruce, Welfare Economics (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1984).
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their own task as the very limited one of providing analysis so that intervention occurs only 
when it is justified. In this context, Mark Schuster has set out the constraints on any 
explanation which seeks to interfere with the free market:
[a] strong economic argument would demonstrate that financial resources other 
than government support are not likely to support the arts....[It] would specify 
the amount of support necessary. It would also specify the form of support 
necessary and would be able to cite research demonstrating that this type of 
government support would be effective.20
In other words, market-based approaches agree that welfare economics is the ultimate source 
of legitimacy of intervention. In other words, as we will see in Chapter 6, the ends of society 
are presumed to be settled. However, their conclusions as to the legitimacy of individual 
policies differ. These differences will become apparent in the following discussion of the 
three main economic justifications for government intervention: market failure, equity, and 
merit goods.
i) Market Failure
A first economic justification for government intervention relates to cases of market 
failure. It is acknowledged by most economists that, in some cases and for fairly specific 
reasons, the market will fail to produce optimal economic outcomes. In these cases, 
continuing a free trade policy would not be optimal and the government should intervene to 
rectify the particular market failure. Several types of market failure arguments have been 
applied to the case of culture. First, market failure may arise due to imperfect information. 
For the market to produce the optimum allocation of resources, it is presumed that both 
consumers and producers have cost-free access to all available information. However, in 
many circumstances, this is not the case, leading to a diversion of resources from more 
productive activities into less productive ones. In these cases, government intervention is 
justified. In the particular case of the arts, David Cwi has argued that a taste for art may 
never be developed without the opportunity to sample it. Similarly, Globerman has 
highlighted the argument that many people are ignorant of the net benefits of the arts and 
therefore do not consume cultural goods.21 In these cases, government subsidies have been 
called for to lower ticket prices, to increase the number of performances available, and to aid 
with advertising. However, as Globerman has argued, it is not clear that there actually is an 
information problem. According to Globerman, although potential consumers of the
19 Globerman, op. cit., in note 6, pp. 4 and 2.
20 Schuster, op. cit., in note 9, p. 44, emphasis in original.
21 Cwi, op. cit., in note 9, p. 74, and Globerman, op. cit., in note 6, p. 51. This argument originates with 
Netzer, op. cit., in note 9.
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performing arts do consistently overestimate ticket prices, many do not attend due to lack of 
interest, rather than poor information or lack of opportunity.22
The second example of market failure in cultural industries relates to William Baumol 
and William Bowen’s ‘cost disease’. This is an example of market failure particular to the 
labour-intensive cultural industries, in particular the performing arts.23 In essence, they argue 
that the labour-intensive nature of the performing arts means that these industries cannot 
substitute capital for labour at the same rate as other industries. As a result, they will not 
experience the same rates of productivity growth as other sectors. Moreover, the production 
costs of performing arts organisations will increase relative to other industries and their 
relative prices will consistently rise. Baumol and Bowen conclude that government subsidy is 
therefore necessary just to maintain the existing level of cultural output. The Baumol and 
Bowen thesis has been refuted many times over by proponents of both types of market-based 
approach. Dick Netzer, for example, has argued that, even in the performing arts, there are 
significant opportunities to increase technical efficiency. Moreover, he claims that consumer 
demand is not highly sensitive to increases in ticket prices. Nonetheless, he tempers his 
criticism by reminding us that ‘[p]ublic intervention to prevent economic pressures from 
causing any change whatever in the arts is a reductio ad absurdum of the Baumol-Bowen 
thesis’.24 In other words, the thesis has limited relevance and can justify government subsidy 
only in certain specific cases. Globerman, however, is far less charitable in his analysis of the 
Baumol-Bowen thesis. He claims that there are significant opportunities for arts 
organisations to market more effectively, to increase earned and charitable revenue, and to 
reduce fixed costs without significantly damaging the quality of production. He 
acknowledges that ‘some contraction of arts activities would result from a significant real 
reduction in government support to the arts’. Nonetheless, ‘such a contraction would not be 
per se evidence of market failure’.25 In sum, according to cultural economists, the Baumol 
and Bowen thesis alone does not justify increased government subsidy to the arts. It is even 
less relevant to more technology-intensive cultural activities such as book or magazine 
publishing and television broadcasting.
Third, markets are also acknowledged to fail in the provision of public goods. These 
goods are defined according to two characteristics: non-excludability and non-rivalry. In 
other words, people cannot be excluded from consuming them once they have been produced 
(or the costs of collecting payment would be prohibitive) and one individual’s consumption
22 Globerman, op. cit., in note 6, p. 51. Survey information on people’s estimated costs o f attending is 
drawn from Globerman, ‘Price Awareness’, op. cit., in note 5. Survey information on interest and 
attendance is drawn from Book and Globerman, op. cit., in note 5.
23 William Baumol and William Bowen, Performing Arts: The Economic Dilemma (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1966).
24 Netzer, op. cit., in note 9, p. 30, emphasis in original.
25 Globerman, op. cit., in note 6, p. 54. See also Cwi, op. cit., in note 9, p. 76.
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does not preclude another’s.26 General examples of such goods might include national 
defence, crime prevention, and public parks. The market failure arises because of the free­
rider problem: no individual will agree to pay for the service if the benefits of it can still be 
achieved when it is paid for by others. Thus, payment for this ‘social infrastructure’ must be 
secured through government intervention, usually in the form of taxes. Following a strict 
interpretation of the idea of public goods, most cultural products, including magazines, do 
not qualify: for the most part, individuals can easily be excluded from consuming them.27 
Nonetheless, it is possible that culture could be seen as a public good by virtue of its 
connection to broader social values or national defence. The question of broader social 
values will be addressed in the next chapter.
National defence is widely-acknowledged to be the ‘classic example’ of a public 
good.28 It is non-excludable and non-rival in consumption and is acknowledged by most to be 
crucial to the public interest. In the context of the perceived American challenge to Canadian 
culture, many cultural advocates have claimed that culture should rightfully be considered an 
element of national defence.29 Clearly, however, many people would disagree. Globerman, 
for example, questions whether culture actually establishes national identity and therefore 
contributes to a more easily defended nation.30 What this illustrates, however, is that what 
actually comprises the public good called ‘national defence’ cannot be take for granted. 
There are, of course, certain elements of defence which we would all agree are meritous. 
Nonetheless, the question of whether culture can be considered an element of a public good 
like national defence is a political one. It is for this reason, along with the difficulties of 
classing cultural goods as public goods, that the national defence argument for cultural 
protectionism will be treated more extensively in the following chapter on community-based 
approaches to culture and trade.
A fourth source of market failure involves the presence of externalities. Externalities 
can be defined as ‘the unintended social effects, desirable or undesirable, of production or 
consumption’.31 Whether positive or negative, it is an entailment of externalities that the 
exact cost or value of the good in question is not reflected in consumer choices or in price. In 
some cases, this disparity occurs because part of the value of the good in question is 
unquantifiable, such as the appreciation of scenic countryside. In other cases, however, such
26 William C. Apgar and H. James Brown, Microeconomics and Public Policy (Glenview, IL: Scott, 
Foresman and Company, 1987), pp. 226-27.
27 See Cwi, op. cit., in note 9, p. 79 on this point. Netzer argues that US television broadcasting very 
closely approximates a public good and, on these grounds, should be subsidised. See Netzer, op. cit., in 
note 9, p. 21.
28 Globerman, op. cit., in note 6, p. 23.
29 See, for example, Franklyn Griffiths, Strong and Free: Canada and the New Sovereignty (Toronto: 
Stoddart Publishing Co. Limited for Canadian Foreign Policy, 1996).
30 Globerman, op. cit., in note 6, p. 42.
31 Apgar and Brown, op. cit., in note 26, p. 391.
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as the common example of industrial pollution, externalities arise because the polluting firm 
is not responsible for the costs of cleanup and so these ‘costs to society’ are not reflected in 
the price of the good being produced.
Arguments relating to externalities have often been applied to justify Canadian cultural 
protectionism. Four specific arguments are relevant here. In the first place, it has been argued 
that production in one cultural field has important spillover effects for other fields.32 In 
particular, it is argued that valuable training and employment opportunities may be provided 
for some industries by others. As Netzer argues, by way of example, ‘[virtually all the 
musical art forms tend to support one another....Thus the consumer of one form of music is 
likely to derive some benefit from the flourishing of another form even if he does not 
actively patronize it’.33 These benefits are not realised in the market for cultural goods, it is 
argued, and, pursuing Netzer’s example, ‘[i]f that form [of music] cannot flourish on its own, 
it may have a legitimate claim to public subsidy’.34 Not surprisingly, Globerman has argued 
against this justification, questioning the extent to which there is cross-fertilisation between 
art forms, Moreover, he has suggested that, to the extent that interdisciplinary training 
improves the marketability of the artist, its costs can be internalised and thereby reflected 
more accurately in the cultural marketplace.35 In any case, the spillover argument entails 
limited and specific support for the arts on the grounds of artistic development. It could not 
provide a firm justification for the wide-ranging cultural measures undertaken by the 
Canadian government.
Another common example of externalities in cultural production is the argument that 
government should support experimental cultural endeavours. Many of these undertakings 
will fail, or at least, they will be very high risk, and so the market support for them is limited. 
However, without the benefit of such experiments, future creative efforts will be less well- 
informed and, more importantly, some cultural products might never materialise.36 As Netzer 
has argued, ‘[f]ailure may cause a theater company to go out of business or a writer to stop 
writing, but other artists and society at large may learn a lot from the failed experiment’.37 
Moreover, in Netzer’s view, given that no one can convincingly assert which art will be 
valuable to society, support for risky endeavours is necessary to counter the weight of 
government support for conventional artistic projects.
A third example of externalities in cultural markets relates to the benefits accruing to 
future generations as a result of the preservation and nurturing of cultural activities in the
32 Globerman, op. cit., in note 6, p. 46.
33 Netzer, op. cit., in note 9, p. 23.
34 Ibid.
35 Globerman, op. cit., in note 6, p. 46.
36 Ibid., p. 47.
37 Netzer, op. cit., in note 9, p. 24.
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present. It is usually argued that subsidy is necessary to preserve ‘continuity and access in 
future years to the product of current artistic endeavour’.38 It is also sometimes argued that 
cultural skills will be forgotten and therefore lost to future generations if particular industries 
are allowed to flounder. There is an element of this argument in the claim that Canadian 
culture is necessary to preserve Canadian social values and traditions, and to keep these alive 
for future generations. A version of this argument also appears as the ‘option demand’ claim, 
namely that cultural activities should be supported so that they are available for consumption 
by existing consumers at a later date. Globerman dismisses all of these arguments in relation 
to the performing arts, on the grounds that the art of performing is not likely to disappear 
with the bankruptcy of a few performing companies. Moreover, new technologies allow 
particular performances to be recorded and stored indefinitely.39 However, this argument may 
not be so persuasive in the context of other cultural goods, particularly if it is deemed 
important that Canadian culture remain a ‘lived’ culture. This latter argument, however, 
depends on a strong connection being drawn between Canadian cultural products and the 
preservation of Canadian traditions and values. This link will be addressed in greater detail in 
Chapter 7.
The final externality which is commonly discussed in relation to cultural protectionism 
is what Cwi has called a public externality.40 He argues against the assumption that cultural 
goods are public goods on the grounds that there is both excludability and rival consumption 
in the cultural goods markets. However, he also points out that the private consumption of 
cultural goods produces public externalities. Government support could be justified on the 
grounds that these goods ‘redound to the acknowledged benefit of the general public; that 
these goods are generally desired; and that additional benefits can only accrue if the private 
market is augmented by public support’.41 Such public benefit could accrue in an economic 
form, such as positive national income and employment effects, or it could be purely social.42 
Netzer supports such subsidisation, but argues that it should not be justified on the grounds 
of economic development, since this development can better be achieved through other 
means.43 Globerman has dismissed the public externalities argument on the grounds that it
38 Ibid.
39 Globerman, op. cit., in note 6, p. 48.
40 Cwi, op. cit., in note 9, pp. 59-89.
41 Ibid., p. 79.
42 On national income effects, see particularly, Joanne Boucher, Funding Culture: Current Arguments 
on the Economic Importance o f  the Arts and Culture, Ontario Legislative Library Current Issue Paper 
158 (Toronto: Legislative Research Service, 1995). See also Canadian Conference o f the Arts, ‘Fast 
Facts on Arts and Culture’ (Ottawa: Canadian Conference o f the Arts, 1995), and Canadian Magazine 
Publishers Association, ‘The Canadian Magazine Industry: General Statistics’ (Toronto: Canadian 
Magazine Publishers Association, 1994). On social effects, see Cwi, op. cit., in note 9, pp. 79-80.
43 Netzer, op. cit., in note 9, p. 25.
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leads to a tendency to overstate demand, especially when the taxpayer will foot the bill.44 
Nonetheless, this argument has much appeal in the Canadian context, especially when it is 
understood that the public benefits arising out of cultural consumption may include national 
identity. In the case of Canadian culture, it is not universally agreed that cultural goods are to 
the benefit of the general public (as opposed to a large minority), nor that these goods are 
generally desired. Both of these measures are highly political and, in this respect, are more 
usefully dealt with under the ‘merit goods’ justification below.
ii) Equity
A second economic argument for government intervention is sometimes made on the 
grounds of equity. For example, Schuster argues that ‘[i]f, from society’s point of view, it is 
determined that people who deserve to enjoy artistic output cannot because it is too 
expensive, overcoming that barrier needs to be considered as a part of public policy’.45 
Netzer further argues that, ‘[m]ost economists would agree that market processes, if left to 
themselves, will result in a distribution of personal income that is unacceptably unequal’.46 
Moreover, he draws attention to the fact that a primary goal of many cultural granting bodies 
and a common condition of government support is that the arts are made more widely 
available.
Globerman also discusses government intervention to fulfil one of its democratic 
responsibilities, namely to ‘assure equitable treatment for all individuals in society’.47 
According to Globerman, this is a legitimate reason for intervention. However, he dismisses 
this justification in cultural cases on the grounds that ‘the “rationale” for income 
redistribution must be found in the operations of political markets, whereby policies directed 
at redistributing income are, in turn, largely the outcome of supply and demand forces in the 
“market” for government intervention’.48 By treating the political process as itself a market, 
Globerman is able to conclude that government intervention to support distributional 
outcomes will ‘reduce allocative efficiency in the culture industries’.49 Netzer, however, is 
more optimistic. He acknowledges that government subsidies have not been very successful 
in making the arts more accessible.50 Nonetheless, he maintains committed to the principle 
that income barriers to arts consumption must be overcome and argues for ‘long-term
44 Globerman, op. cit., in note 6, p. 49.
45 Schuster, op. cit., in note 9, p. 46.
46 Netzer, op. cit., in note 9, p. 18.
47 Globerman, op. cit., in note 6, p. 27.
48 Ibid.
*9 Ibid., p. 33.
50 Netzer, op. cit., in note 9, p. 20. Schuster concurs with this assessment, citing an experiment with
London audiences in which free theatre tickets were offered and the demographic changes in the
audience were measured. An increase in student attendance was the only difference. Schuster, op. cit., 
in note 9, p. 49.
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subsidies for audience development...which provides initial exposure to the arts to large 
numbers of people’.51
As we will see in Chapter 6, considerations of equity rest uneasily with the market- 
based approach. In particular, it is difficult to achieve greater equity without sacrificing well­
being or freedom. Clearly, such a trade-off has been accepted in many spheres. However, 
market-based approaches have, in general, been loathe to accept equity as a legitimate 
justification for cultural protectionism. In particular, for reasons discussed in Chapter 6, 
market-based approaches are unlikely to consider access to cultural forms as sufficiently 
important to justify the negative effects of such a policy for allocative efficiency.
iii) Merit Goods
A third and final economic justification for government intervention falls under the 
heading of ‘merit goods’. There exists no single agreed-upon definition of a merit good. The 
most useful definition, from the point of view of analysing cultural protectionism, is that 
provided by David Austen-Smith. He argues that a merit good is one which is intrinsically 
good, and is thereby necessary for the good society.52 Moreover, to justify state support, this 
good must not only be meritous, but must be unable to be financially self-supporting within 
the free market. The argument that culture deserves protection because it is intrinsically good 
is an attractive one, particularly for those who already have a natural or financial interest in 
the cultural industries. Not surprisingly, the merit good argument has been applied frequently 
to urge or justify state support for the cultural industries, not least in the 1982 Report of the 
Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee which argued that the merit goods approach 
provides a ‘congenial setting for the view of the Committee that the manifest value of 
cultural activity is in releasing the creative potential of a society and in illuminating and 
enriching the human condition’.53
Despite, or perhaps because of this public attention, the merit goods argument has 
been extensively criticised by both types of market-based approach. The essence of these 
criticisms relates to conceptions of consumer sovereignty. Alan Peacock has argued that the 
central premise of consumer sovereignty, and the linchpin of welfare economics is that the 
individual is presumed to be the best judge of his or her own interests.54 Not only is this 
principle crucial to the functioning of the economy as a whole, it is linked to a faith in
51 Netzer, op. cit., in note 9, p. 20.
52 David Austen-Smith, ‘On Justifying Subsidies to the Performing Arts’, in William S. Hendon, James 
L. Shanahan, and Alice J. MacDonald (eds.), Economic Policy fo r  the Arts (Cambridge, MA: ABT 
Books, 1980), p. 29.
53 Canada, Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee, Report (Ottawa: Information Services, 
Department o f Communications, 1982), p. 68.
54 Alan Peacock, ‘Economics, Cultural Values and Cultural Policies’, in Towse and Khakee (eds.), op. 
cit., in note 1, p. 10.
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individual judgement and acts as an endorsement of individual free will. However, a 
questioning of individual preferences is implicit in the merit goods argument.55 In some 
cases, these preferences are challenged on the grounds that people do not know what is good 
for them, while in others, consumers are presumed to have poor, but alterable, tastes.56 In all 
cases, however, the merit goods argument entails that someone must be allowed to judge 
what has merit. Following Austen-Smith, Globerman has argued that ‘if there is no 
consensus within society on what constitutes “the good society” with a high degree of arts 
activity, then the argument can be reduced to a claim that some tastes are “better” than 
others’.57
In this understanding, the merit goods justification would only be valid if it could be 
shown that it is supported by the majority of the population. Many surveys have been 
conducted in an attempt to substantiate the merit goods case. Ironically, however, even if it 
were the case that the majority agreed with state support for cultural activities, then the merit 
goods argument would reduce to a case of market failure and the question would become 
how to encourage the market to reflect the desires of these consumers. Even so, as Schuster 
argues, ‘the strong [economic] argument essentially requires as its first step a determination 
that the arts are a merit good....But it is impossible to imagine this argument being made in 
solely economic terms; and so, from an economic perspective, the first link in the argument 
may also be the weakest’.58 Despite these weaknesses, the argument is one of the most 
frequently referred-to and it is for this reason that significant attention will be paid to its 
treatment in the critique section below.
The discussion above has focused on the question of the circumstances in which 
government may intervene in the free market. In market terms, however, as was noted above, 
a description of ‘good’ policy must go further, to show also how such intervention should be 
undertaken and to what magnitude. There are many debates, particularly within welfare 
economics, but also within cultural economics, about the efficiency of subsidies as opposed 
to tax breaks, or tariffs, and about the appropriate extent of government support.59 These 
latter arguments reinforce the measurable welfare criteria for ‘good’ policy described above. 
However, the terms of the culture and trade debate for market-based approaches is, in the 
first place, defined by the question of whether government should intervene and so this has 
been the primary focus of this section.
55 See John G. Head, Public Goods and Public Welfare (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1974), p. 
216.
56 For the former argument, see ibid. ; for the latter, see Cwi, op. cit., in note 9, pp. 61-64.
57 Globerman, op. cit., in note 6, p. 37, emphasis added.
58 Schuster, op. cit., in note 9, p. 51.
59 See, for example, Globerman, op. cit., in note 6.
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From the above arguments, it should be clear that for market-based approaches, ‘good’ 
policy for culture and trade is defined primarily by whether it will promote consumer 
welfare, defined in measurable, if not strictly economic terms. Differences exist between 
proponents of the market-based approach as to whether or not government intervention in 
cultural markets can be justified. Moreover, even though they rely on the same conceptual 
apparatus, different analysts come to different conclusions about the allocative and 
distributional effects of the same policies.
Canadian Culture and Free Trade
The argument above has largely been concerned with the criteria for government intervention 
in the cultural market generally. There are very few economic analyses that deal specifically 
with culture and free trade. Those that do will be discussed in this section. Notably, however, 
the arguments which follow deal with the general case of free trade in culture. A more 
specific discussion of magazines will be provided in Chapters 4 and 5. Nonetheless, it will be 
clear from the arguments below that free trade arguments are derived from the same welfare 
economics principles as are those dealing with the free market domestically and basically the 
same conditions for government intervention apply.60 For market-based approaches, ‘good’ 
trade policy is that which can be shown to have positive welfare effects.
In this spirit, Globerman is very clear about the costs and benefits of freer trade in 
cultural products. In a 1985 conference paper, he and Aidan Vining aim to assess the 
potential impact on Canadian culture of a free trade deal with the United States.61 They 
reiterate Globerman’s argument that the central economic justifications for government 
intervention are is highly problematic in its application to the Canadian case.62 Having 
decided that there are no good (economic) theoretical grounds upon which to exclude culture 
from a free trade agreement, they move on to explore the likely distributional effects of such 
an agreement.
60 Arguments detailing ‘legitimate’ forms o f protectionism usually also include the cases o f infant 
industries, optimal tariff, and natural monopoly. However, none o f these arguments is useful in 
explaining cultural policy generally, nor the specific Canadian case. On legitimate forms of  
protectionism, see, amongst others, Alan Winters, International Economics, Fourth Edition (London 
and New York, NY: Routledge, 1992); Jan Tumlir, Protectionism: Trade Policy in Democratic 
Societies (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1985); and 
Cletus Coughlin, K. Alec Chrystal, and Geoffrey E. Wood, ‘Protectionist Trade Policies: A Survey of  
Theory, Evidence, and Rationale’, in Jeffry A. Frieden and David A. Lake (eds.), International 
Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, Third Edition (New York, NY: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1995), pp. 323-38.
61 Steven Globerman and Aidan Vining, ‘Bilateral Cultural Free Trade: The U.S.-Canadian Case’, in 
Fred Thompson (ed.), Canada-U.S. Interdependence in the Cultural Industries, proceedings of a 
conference held at Columbia University (New York, NY: Canadian Studies Program, Columbia 
University, 1985), pp. 4-26.
62 Ibid., pp. 15-17.
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Globerman and Vining propose that the effects of free trade on cultural industries vary 
according to whether the cultural activity is nationality specific (such as local news) or non­
nationality specific (such as Star Wars) and according to whether the activity is a ‘highly 
specialized asset’ or a ‘massed economy’ good (these terms are never defined).63 They 
conclude that free trade will have little effect on highly specialised assets that are nationality 
specific, while for non-nationality specific and massed economy goods, there will be a shift 
in production following the sizeable US comparative advantage in these goods. However, 
since these goods are non-nationality specific, the location in which these are produced 
should have little relevance to Canadian national identity. Globerman and Vining are less 
certain about the other two categories. For goods which are nationality specific but are mass 
goods, they argue that there will be substitution according to price. For example, Canadians 
might prefer to read Maclean’s, but they will substitute Newsweek at the margin. Finally, for 
goods which are non-nationality specific and highly specialised, such as trade magazines, 
there will be increased specialisation. However, since the United States will not necessarily 
have a comparative advantage in these goods, there is no reason, according to Globerman and 
Vining, for production to necessarily move from Canada to the United States.
In conclusion, Globerman and Vining argue that the United States would be expected 
to desire free trade in cultural industries with Canada because they would not be worse off in 
any quadrant of the typology. Moreover, Canada has more trade barriers in cultural industries 
than does the United States. Canada, however, is likely to be worse off as a result of trade in 
all mass cultural goods, regardless of nationality specificity. In particular, free trade in 
nationality specific, mass goods would likely result in an influx of American mass culture at 
the expense of Canadian goods.64 However, Globerman and Vining argue that this 
substitution at the margin for American goods would actually allow Canadians to buy more 
nationality specific, highly specialised goods with the same income than they would have 
been able to before free trade. In light of this, they conclude that ‘[i]t is conceivable...that 
total Canadian-specific cultural output will increase pursuant to free trade’.65 Thus, they 
assert that ‘[o]n balance, it would therefore seem that free trade is a first-best solution for 
both countries, at least in a partial equilibrium sense’.66
Other proponents of market-based approaches have argued for free trade in cultural 
goods from the point of view of freedom of information. As discussed above, in order for the 
market to function efficiently (and in order for consumer sovereignty to have any meaning) 
there must be adequate information. Culture, by some accounts, constitutes such information. 
In this sense, free trade in cultural goods is necessary to facilitate the efficient functioning of
63 Ibid., p. 20.
64 Ibid., p. 25.
65 Ibid.
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the market more generally. As Donald Armstrong has argued, ‘[i]f free choice and the 
offering of alternatives among competing beans and beers can enhance human welfare, how 
much more important it must be to have that free market in the competition of ideas, and 
values, and cultures’.67 The real rhetorical force of this argument, however, arises less from 
welfare economics than from the general importance attached to freedom of speech. In this 
sense, framing the argument in terms of freedom of information is a powerful rhetorical 
move, and one that does not necessarily reflect the differing sets of values at stake.68 In this 
context, the freedom of information argument is a powerful example of market-based 
approaches to trade and culture. It will be dealt with again in the critiques section of this 
chapter, while the importance of freedom more generally will arise in Chapter 6.
Market-failure school analyses of culture and free trade are sparse. Many argue that 
free trade is a valuable thing, but there are few who exempt culture on welfare grounds. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to extrapolate from the criteria for ‘good’ policy set out in the last 
section in order to ascertain what such ‘good’ policy might look like in practice. In 
particular, those market-based analysts, such as Netzer, who accept the legitimacy of a 
significant degree of government support for culture are likely to maintain the same position 
when free trade is introduced. If domestic market distortions were significant enough to merit 
subsidy in the domestic case, then a consistent argument from welfare economics would also 
claim that the international market would not produce optimal results without government 
intervention. Elements of this reasoning can be seen, for example, in Richard Lipsey’s 
assessment of the cultural provisions of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA). In replying to claims that Canada’s cultural policies will be put at risk, he argues that 
‘the Agreement does not affect any cultural support policy that does not conflict with free 
trade’.69 According to Lipsey, such policies include those which support non-tradable cultural 
goods such as ballet, music, and sports, but also those which support ‘the publication of 
Canadian authors, and all other cultural activities’.70 He does not explain what distinguishes 
those cultural activities which interfere with free trade from those that do not. Nonetheless, it 
is clear that, within a welfare economics framework, Lipsey is willing to acknowledge that 
some cultural policies can be consistent with free trade. Admittedly, this is far from a 
complete analysis of the ways in which such cultural exemptions would generate positive
66 Ibid.
67 Donald Armstrong, ‘Canada-U.S. Free Trade and Canadian Culture’, in A.R. Riggs and Tom Velk 
(eds.), Canadian-American Free Trade: Historical, Political and Economic Dimensions (Montreal: 
The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1987), p. 193.
68 On the rhetorical force o f the freedom o f information concept, see Mark D. Alleyne, News 
Revolution: Political and Economic Decisions About Global Information (New York, NY: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1997).
69 Richard G. Lipsey and Robert C. York, Evaluating the Free Trade Deal: A Guided Tour through the 
Canada-U.S. Agreement (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall for the C.D. Howe Institute, 1988), p. 108.
70 Ibid.
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welfare effects. However, it does provide one example of the ways in which the assumptions 
of welfare economics can be reconciled with an interventionist cultural policy. Nonetheless, 
as will become clear in Chapters 6 and 7, it is not merely the resulting policy that matters, but 
also the reasoning behind it and the overall social goals towards which it is directed.
From the above analysis, it is clear that the criteria for ‘good’ policy established by 
welfare economists are the primary determinants of good trade policy. Moreover, these 
criteria are applied by cultural economists to determine whether culture should be exempted 
from freer trading arrangements. Not surprisingly, most analysts, including Globerman, are 
extremely sceptical of the possibility of exempting cultural industries from free trade. 
Judging from the market-failure literature in general, there should also be others who argue 
for the exemption of Canadian cultural industries from free trade on the grounds of market- 
failure, equity, or merit goods. However, there are very few who argue this latter case. Most 
likely, this lack of attention to market-failure arguments is due to the extreme polarisation of 
the recent debate surrounding Canadian culture and free trade compared to the academic 
discussions cited above. Thus, in discussing Canada-United States free trade, advocates of 
market-based approaches have tended to be very ardent believers in the market, downplaying 
the possibilities of market-failure. Advocates of special treatment for culture have mainly 
been cultural nationalists, rather than cultural economists. Thus, they have sought to explain 
the need for an interventionist cultural policy, but they do so on the grounds of cultural and 
political values, rather than with reference to efficiency or consumer welfare.
Critique
This final section of the chapter will address some of the main critiques of market-based 
approaches to trade and culture. Most critiques focus on the problems associated with 
applying economic methodology to the cultural sphere. Some, however, focus on the 
inadequacy of the approach itself in a cultural context, while others point to empirical 
problems associated with economic analysis in this field. It is important to note that some of 
these critiques will be further developed in Chapter 6. However, it is important to set them 
out briefly here in the general context in which they appear.
One of the most common critiques challenges the conception of culture employed by 
market-based approaches. A non-economic definition of culture is implicit in the approaches 
to be described in the next chapter. However, some analysts have directly challenged the 
market-based understanding of culture and it is their arguments which will be discussed here. 
Critics allege that market-based approaches treat culture as though it is purely a commodity. 
In so doing, they neglect the many other understandings of culture, namely, culture as a way 
of life or a set of shared values. Abraham Rotstein, for example, argues that it is impossible
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to separate the artefacts of cultural expression (i.e., cultural products) from the social 
languages and values of the society which they represent. He argues against an economic 
approach on the grounds that ‘[t]he intrinsic properties of the artifact [sic], its functions 
within a society, the intentions of its producer...are all beside the point when it appears for 
sale on the market’.71 This is not to deny that economic factors play a role in culture. Rotstein 
agrees that culture and particularly cultural industries do have an important economic 
component. Nonetheless, this economic dimension does not justify the complete 
subsumption of culture by economic analysis. Moreover, Rotstein acknowledges that 
economic livelihood may provide some of the impetus for cultural production, but it does not 
completely explain why such production takes place, nor what meaning it holds for society at 
large: ‘[t]he cultural expressions of a society have their own integrity and their own intricate 
rules and forms. They are not produced anonymously for sale on the market and they 
generally are not substitutable for other homogenous alternatives’.72
This point is also taken up by other critics who focus specifically on the question of 
meaning. Mark Freiman argues that to talk about consumer welfare in terms of maximisation 
of efficiency is to miss out on the most essential parts of what culture is.73 In particular, the 
fundamental point about a policy of Canadian culture is not simply to favour local over 
foreign producers. Rather, if one understands that culture also has meaning, then the demand 
for indigenous Canadian production becomes a request ‘that some component of the social 
construction of reality have an input grounded in Canadian reality’.74 In other words, culture 
is socially relevant because it has meaning. To neglect this, according to critics, would be to 
misunderstand the social relevance of cultural products and to underestimate the need for 
their preservation. In a similar vein, Freiman also argues that a commercial conception of 
culture imposes a ‘monopoly of meanings, not because of any conspiracy, but because the 
media naturally gravitate towards certain messages’.75 This, he argues, is a threat to 
democracy because citizens are deprived of the wide diversity of meanings which is 
necessary for them to make intelligent decisions. In other words, a conception of culture 
which deprives it of any social and personal meaning is one which cannot perceive the 
possibility of danger to the democratic state arising from the subjection of culture to the 
rigours of the free market.
71 Rotstein, op. cit., in note 10, p. 154.
12 Ibid., p. 155.
73 Mark J. Freiman, ‘Consumer Sovereignty and National Sovereignty in Domestic and International 
Broadcasting Regulation’, in Canadian-U.S. Conference on Communications Policy, Cultures in 
Collision: The Interaction o f  Canadian and U.S. Television Broadcast Policies (New York, NY: 
Praeger, 1984), p. 110.
74 Ibid.
15 Ibid., pp. 111-12.
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A second and related point of critique deals with the relationship between conceptions 
of culture and the legitimate role of economics in society. In particular, these criteria 
highlight the dangers of allowing economic analysis and the economy in general to 
circumscribe social and political spheres of life. Rotstein argues that the various spheres of 
society all interact and ‘virtually all of them have budgets and, hence, interact with the 
economy’.76 Nonetheless, the needs and aims of different spheres are different, and thus, 
different elements of social policy have different goals and responsibilities. In this context, 
cultural advocates have often argued that to subject cultural activities to criteria of economic 
viability would be to lose the essence of meaningful art and culture. Moreover, in Rotstein’s 
words, ‘[u]nless the economy is clearly defined and circumscribed, there is a risk...that it will 
be regarded as a proxy for society itself....[T]he analytical paraphernalia associated with the 
economy will be taken to represent the reigning norms everywhere and will be 
indiscriminately applied in all realms of public policy’.77 For Rotstein, this would be ‘an 
artificial and arbitrary distortion’ of the goals and operations of the diverse spheres of 
society.78 The economics of culture, in this sense represents just one example of the 
economisation of society. Moreover, in the Canadian case, ‘[t]he economics of culture...in 
this pristine form becomes an intellectual Trojan horse for the further intrusion of American 
culture in a fragile Canadian setting’.79
Bernard Ostry takes this point one step further. He argues that ‘ [t]o rack the arts on the 
Procrustean bed of the marketplace—to give the marketplace the supreme value, that is—is 
itself a cultural choice’.80 In this context, he argues that freer trade need not be incompatible 
with a preservation of national culture. However, the acceptance of the free market and the 
limits of its applicability should be considered in ‘its proper setting, which is the public 
good’.81 In other words, rather than assuming, as market-based approaches do, that 
economics is applicable and valid for all spheres of society, it is possible and even legitimate 
to make the limits of the free market a subject of public policy. Indeed, this too is a cultural 
choice.
Market-based approaches have also been criticised for their reliance on a simple 
conception of consumer sovereignty. As discussed above, consumer sovereignty is the 
principle of welfare economics which dictates that government should not intervene to affect 
the consumption decisions or the tastes of consumers. Freiman, has challenged market-based 
approaches for their reliance on this concept on several grounds. He argues that there are two
76 Rotstein, op. cit., in note 10, p. 146.
77 Ibid., p. 147.
78 Ibid., p. 148.
79 Ibid., p. 149.
80 Bernard Ostry, ‘Canada-U.S. Interdependence the Cultural Industries’, in Thompson (ed.), op. cit., in 
note 61, p. 53.
81 Ibid.
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preconditions for the principle of consumer sovereignty to be meaningful. First, there must 
be sufficient information about a product in order to allow consumers to make an intelligent 
decision. Second, there must ‘be a meaningful choice from among which to exercise 
selection’.82 If culture is understood, at least in one of its dimensions, as information, then 
Freiman argues that there is a case for culture as a precondition of the effective operation of 
consumer sovereignty. At face value, this argument seems to support those market-based 
approaches which argue for free trade in cultural goods on the grounds of freedom of 
information.83 However, Freiman argues that those kinds of culture which conform most 
closely to the definition provided by market-based approaches have a tendency to gravitate 
towards the satisfaction of consumer needs. This is because these forms of culture display a 
concern for maximising profit, utilising excess capacity, and reaching the largest audience 
possible. ‘[W]ithin the economic paradigm’, argues Freiman, ‘that’s rational behaviour’.84 
However, he continues, ‘[t]here may be needs beyond consumer needs, needs that are 
incapable of being met by commercial media and needs that commercial media have no need 
to generate’.85 Thus, for Freiman the monopoly of meanings (as discussed above) means that, 
without government intervention to preserve cultural diversity, there is actually not sufficient 
information and therefore, there is a threat to meaningful choice in the cultural sphere. In 
other words, without state support to assure that a variety of cultural forms can survive, the 
two preconditions for consumer sovereignty have not been met and thus there is no guarantee 
that government non-intervention will produce the best welfare results. As Freiman sums up, 
‘[t]he point is not to introduce a new monopoly of meaning...but rather to allow precisely the 
sort of choice that is the ostensible underpinning of the consumer welfare argument, but that 
in fact is made impossible by that precise consumer welfare argument when put into 
practice’.86
The concept of merit goods has been criticised by economists on the grounds that it 
implies that consumers are incapable of determining what is good for them. Nonetheless, 
government regulation to promote social choices and even to regulate what is good for its 
citizens is one of the defining functions of a national polity. In essence, then, the concept of 
merit goods may not be, as economists would have it, an example of unreasonable 
government interference in consumer choice. Rather, it is at the heart of political decisions 
about what will be considered meritous: which values and institutions contribute to our
82 Freiman, op. cit., in note 73, pp. 110-11. On critiques o f the concept o f consumer sovereignty, see 
also Sonia S. Gold, ‘Consumer Sovereignty and the Performing Arts’, in James L. Shanahan, William 
S. Hendon, Izaak Th,. H. Hilhorst, and Jaap van Straalen (eds.) Markets fo r  the Arts (Akron, OH: The 
University o f Akron for the Association for Cultural Economics), pp. 99-111.
83 For a more general critique o f the rhetoric o f  freedom o f information, see Alleyne, op. cit., in note 
68 .
84 Freiman, op. cit., in note 73, pp. 110-11.
85 Ibid.
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conception of the good life. These questions of value are precisely the focus of analysis in 
Chapters 6 through 9.
It is important to note here that, for some, it is precisely this political dimension of 
merit goods that is its greatest failing. David Mitchell, for example, has argued that the 
concept of merit goods is ‘nothing other than an intrinsic rationale for support now dressed in 
the economic language of goods and services’.87 Nonetheless, in Rotstein’s words, ‘merit 
goods’ as a way of talking about the value of culture is ‘a cross we have to bear’ only if ‘we 
are mired in the market as our original point of departure’.88 Removing the market from this 
central place is precisely the purpose of Chapter 6.
Finally, there exists a group of critiques of market-based approaches which question 
the feasibility of applying economic analysis to cultural issues. Globerman himself has 
claimed that ‘publicly available data are inadequate for evaluating (in a rigorous statistical 
manner) the distributional impacts of cultural intervention’.89 This claim is reiterated by 
numerous other proponents of the market-based approach.90 Moreover, critics and proponents 
alike have pointed to the inherent difficulties of defining and measuring cultural indicators. 
Due to lack of public information, and inadequate measuring techniques, as well as the 
important non-quantifiable elements of culture, it has been impossible to even be sure of the 
extent to which different governments offer support to cultural endeavours. Leaving aside the 
narrow definition of culture which is applied, a lack of data and adequate measuring 
techniques are serious problems for an approach based on quantifiable welfare effects. This 
critique will be extended in Chapter 6 to show how the non-quantifiability of culture creates 
even further difficulties for the market-based approach.
The critiques presented above are clearly fallible themselves. As Globerman himself 
has commented, there are many connections and assumptions that would need to be drawn 
out and substantiated if these arguments were to replace those of the market school.91 Indeed, 
it is not the purpose of this thesis to replace market-based approaches, but only to challenged 
their centrality. In this respect, these critiques suggest ways of looking at culture beyond 
those implied by the market-based approaches. In so doing, they highlight the limited vision 
of these approaches and the possibility of other explanations of culture and trade. These 
explanations will be dealt with in the following chapter. Subsequent chapters will interrogate 
the conceptions of the good life invoked by these different sets of explanations.
86 Ibid.
87 David Mitchell, ‘Culture as Political Discourse in Canada’, in Rowland Lorimer and Donald C. 
Wilson (eds.), Communication Canada: Issues in Broadcasting and New Technologies (Toronto: 
Kagan and Woo, 1988), p. 163.
88 Rotstein, op. cit., in note 10, p. 152.
89 Globerman, op. cit., in note 6, p. 67.
90 See also Schuster, op. cit., in note 9, p. 46.
91 Globerman, op. cit., in note 6.
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Chapter 3
Community-Based Approaches to Trade and Culture
Community-based approaches are manifold and are implicit in many of the nationalist, 
political, and cultural arguments surrounding Canada-United States free trade. This chapter 
will first briefly outline the defining characteristics of community-based approaches. 
Subsequently, it will draw out the central premises of these approaches by examining the 
claims of their proponents on three central issues: definition of culture, criteria for ‘good’ 
policy, and conclusions about Canadian culture and free trade. Third, this chapter will offer a 
critique of these approaches.
The Approaches Described
Community-based approaches to trade and culture all begin from the premise that cultural 
activity fulfils important social functions. They stress the benefits to the community of 
cultural production by, for, and representing that community. In turn, the good of the 
community, broadly defined, is the ultimate justification for cultural policy. Beyond this 
premise, however, there are many differences between community-based approaches, not 
least in their assessments of what constitutes the community and what constitutes the ‘good’, 
not to mention how this good can be promoted. The parameters of these debates will become 
clear in the following sections.
C onception o f  Culture
There is little disagreement within community-based approaches about the definition of 
culture to be applied. Proponents of community-based approaches do not deny the validity of 
the market-based understanding of culture as an industry. However, for community-based 
approaches, this is only one of several aspects of culture. All community-based approaches 
also see culture as an artistic process, while many go even further, understanding culture as 
the way of life of a people.
All proponents of community-based approaches see culture as a process of artistic 
creation. However, this creation is not understood as autonomous individual production. 
Instead, it is perceived to be inseparable from its social context. Cultural products, in this 
sense, are responses to the artist’s interaction with the social and material reality around him.
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The process of cultural creation and the cultural artefact which results serve to give meaning 
to this reality, both for the artist and for society at large. In this sense, for all community- 
based approaches, cultural artefacts are the result of an individual and social process of 
meaning-creation; they arise out of and reflect the community from which they emanate.
Most proponents of community-based approaches to culture also make a further step 
in their understanding of the term. They argue that culture must be also understood as a ‘way 
of life’ of a particular people. Moreover, for these community-based approaches, all of the 
meanings of the term culture—as industry, as artistic process, and as a way of life—are 
inextricably linked. In other words, they see cultural goods as manifest forms of cultural 
expression, inescapably bound up with their broader cultural origins. Culture, as Bernard 
Ostry has famously put it,
is central to everything we do and think. It is what we do and the reason why we 
do it, what we wish and why we imagine it, what we perceive and how we 
express it, how we live and in what manner we approach death. It is our 
environment and the patterns of our adaptation to it. It is the world we have 
created and are still creating; it is the way we see that world and the motives 
that urge us to change it. It is the way we know ourselves and each other; it is 
our web of personal relationships, it is the images and abstractions that allow us 
to live together in communities and nations. It is the element in which we live.1
For community-based approaches, then, culture is much more than an undifferentiated 
commodity. At the very least, it is a representation of a community; potentially, it is an 
integral element in the very constitution of the community. In either case, culture is a much 
broader (and more complicated) concept than it is for market-based approaches.
Criteria for Good Policy
In general, for all community-based approaches, ‘good’ policy is that which contributes to 
the good life of the community. Within this broad school, differences arise over the 
definition of community and over the primary dimensions through which culture can be seen 
to contribute to the good of the community. Six different aspects of community are 
highlighted in the literature: identity, unity, sovereignty, prosperity, democracy, and artistic 
fulfilment. Obviously, these themes overlap quite substantially, especially as they are all, in 
one respect or another, tied to the preservation and enhancement of the community. 
Nonetheless, each of them stresses a different element of the relationship of culture to the 
good life and each embodies a different conception of the community.
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i) Identity
The conception that cultural activity is crucial for the development and maintenance of 
community identity is very popular, whether such identity is presumed to be based around 
the nation, the state, the ethnic group, the region, or any other collectivity. Most of the 
arguments dealing with Canadian culture focus on the ‘Canadian nation’ as the primary locus 
of cultural identity. This is particularly tricky territory in the Canadian case as, by most 
definitions, it is difficult to see Canada as a single nation. Nonetheless, the term is often 
applied loosely to refer to the political loyalties of the community of people encompassed 
within the state, whether these people feel themselves to be part of a single nation or not. As 
we will see in Chapter 7, it is in this way that the term ‘nation’ has often been applied in 
reference to Canada, though it equally applies to other nationalisms within the Canadian 
state. Both meanings will be discussed below. Other, non-national, identities will also be 
considered.
The work of A.W. Johnson emphasises the connection between culture and Canadian 
national identity. He defines culture broadly, as ‘the whole complex of knowledge and 
beliefs and attitudes and practices which are embodied in the society, and in its social, 
political and economic arrangements’.2 In this definition, he refers to society generally, but it 
soon becomes clear that his primary point of reference is specifically the nation. For 
example, Johnson draws a connection between culture and cultural industries in specifically 
national terms: ‘[t]he cultural industries are simply the vehicles by which the expressions of a 
nation’s culture are “published”’.3 Moreover, he argues that the appreciation of the quality of 
a work stems, in part, from an understanding of the cultural roots of that work. These roots, 
for Johnson, are nationally-based. Because Canadians will necessarily have a greater 
appreciation of the value of Canadian cultural expressions, Canadian ownership is crucial to 
the survival of Canadian culture and therefore national identity. In particular, he comments 
that ‘[t]here is, in short, such as thing as an intrinsically Canadian work, and it should, as a 
generalization, be judged by Canadians’.4 Thus, Johnson argues that culture is rooted in and 
reflects the natural and social realities faced by the nation. Moreover, if culture is taken to 
include values and beliefs, as Johnson intends, then it is clearly a defining element of 
national identity. ‘Good’ policy is therefore that which supports culture and, hence, 
buttresses national identity.
1 Bernard Ostry, The Cultural Connection: An Essay on Culture and Government Policy in Canada 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978), p. 1.
2 A.W. Johnson, ‘Free Trade and Cultural Industries’, in Marc Gold and David Leyton-Brown (eds.), 
Trade-Offs on Free Trade: The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (Toronto: The Carswell Company, 
1988), p. 350.
3 Ibid., emphasis in original.
4 Ibid., p. 355.
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Similarly, Allan Smith focuses on the importance of national self-knowledge in 
linking cultural policy to nationalist ideas. In particular, he relies on the idea that the state, as 
a national community, is ‘held together by the ability of its people to communicate with and 
understand one another’.5 Moreover, he argues that contact with one’s own culture is a 
‘normal attribute of national life’ and it ‘makes life in definable and self-conscious 
communities possible’.6 In this context, he shows how the ideas of romantic nationalism, 
including the connection between culture and nation, have consistently underlain Canadian 
cultural policy since the time of Confederation. He argues that the proliferation of cultural 
activity after Confederation was ‘stimulated by the seriousness with which cultural producers 
viewed the need to equip their new national society with what they saw as a key attribute of 
national life’, namely an indigenous national culture with a consciousness of its own.7 This 
was again reflected later in the century when government established the Dominion Archives 
and the National Gallery, according to Smith, as a means of ‘promoting national self- 
awareness through the establishment of cultural institutions’.8 Smith also highlights the fear 
of American influences as a driving force in the creation of a national culture. In other words, 
the creation or fostering of a national identity was perceived to be a matter of national 
survival in face of the threat posed by foreign influences. Discussing the twentieth century, 
Smith continues to emphasise the nationalist dimension of the continued development of 
Canadian culture. Drawing a specific connection between culture and national identity, he 
argues that cultural activity ‘strengthened the confidence and certainty with which Canadians 
went about the task of explaining its character and meaning, a development that not 
unnaturally found its clearest expression in the new forcefulness and determination with 
which issues of identity were approached’.9 In this sense, Smith argues that, in the Canadian 
case, cultural policy has been essential for the development of national identity. Since Smith 
places a high value on national identity for the good life of the community, then this cultural 
policy provides an example of ‘good’ policy.
Ostry, too, has a very definite understanding of the relationship between culture and 
national identity. At the heart of Ostry’s understanding of culture is its basis in human 
imagination. In this context, he argues that ‘[i]t is with the eye of imagination that we 
perceive Canada, and perceive it as belonging to us and ourselves as belonging to it’.10 In this 
sense, it is culture which provides the ‘image of the nation’ by demonstrating the ‘best that 
has been thought and felt and imagined by its artists and writers, its scientists and historians’
5 Allan Smith, Canadian Culture, The Canadian State, and The New Continentalism (Orono, ME: The 
Canadian-American Center, The University o f Maine, 1990), p. 19.
6 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
7 Ibid., p. 8.
8 Ibid., p. 9.
9 Ibid., p. 15.
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and by turning the territory of the nation into an emotional symbol.11 Moreover, it is culture 
which highlights the common history and destiny of a people and thereby allows them to 
‘connect’ and to understand the ‘things we cherish in common’.12
However, for Ostry, culture goes further than simply representing a national identity to 
the people. First, culture is more than just a finished work—it is an active and ongoing 
process. As a result, all of the members of the nation may potentially be agents in their own 
cultural development. Thus, allowing for the importance of culture means also ‘giving a 
society the ability to create its own life and environment’.13 Second, however, cultural 
participation plays the role of critic in society, challenging people’s views and continuing ‘to 
feed the sources of change’.14 In other words, culture not only reflects a nation, but it also 
creates and continuously recreates it. Thus, policy which supports cultural activity is ‘good’ 
policy.
In discussing the nation, questions of identity can hardly be addressed without 
recognising the relationship between culture and national identity in the Quebecois context. 
The tradition of provincial government involvement in culture is stronger in Quebec than 
anywhere else in Canada. Moreover, the importance of Quebecois culture is clearly seen 
within the context of a Quebecois national identity. Cultural policy in the province does not 
reflect the same strength of commitment to the arm’s length policy typical of English 
Canada; in other words, cultural production is more deliberately politically driven.15 Another 
sign that culture is tied to Quebecois, rather than Canadian, national identity is the repeated 
demand by Quebec’s political leaders that all federal monies for culture in the province 
should be turned over to the provincial government. As Ostry has remarked, ‘they recognize 
the centrality of culture in the development of the sense of community essential to the 
preservation of a minority’s identity. They equate certain conditions of life with their cultural 
security and not necessarily Canada’s’.16
Finally, several authors are notable because they include non-national identities in 
their analysis. Paul Audley, for example, focuses on the relationship between culture and
10 Ostry, op. cit., in note 1, p. 204.
11 Ibid., p. 180.
12 Ibid., pp. 4 and 177.
13 Ibid., p. 5. Originally quoted from UNESCO International Fund for the Promotion o f Culture, 
Information Document, CC/77/CONF.003, IFPC/EXT.2/3 (Paris: UNESCO, 12 August 1977).
14 Ibid.
,5 With regard to culture, an arm’s length policy is one which assigns responsibility for cultural funding 
decisions to special cultural agencies. These agencies are deliberately granted a very high degree of 
autonomy from the government, hence, they operate at ‘arm’s length’ from the government o f the day. 
The Arts Council o f Great Britain is often cited as the first example o f  arm’s length policies in practice. 
See, for example, John Meisel and Jean Van Loon, ‘Cultivating the Bushgarden: Cultural Policy in 
Canada’, in Milton C. Cummings, Jr. and Richard S. Katz (eds.), The Patron State: Government and 
the Arts in Europe, North America, and Japan (New York, NY and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1987), pp. 276-310.
16 Ostry, op. cit., in note 1, p. 3, emphasis in original.
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identity, though his conception is broadened to include identities beyond the national. In 
relationship to national identity, he stresses the role played by culture in recreating and 
keeping alive the past experiences of the nation. He argues that ‘ [communities and nations 
whose past is not reflected in publications, broadcast programs, films, and video and audio 
productions are as handicapped as individuals afflicted with amnesia’.17 He also shows how 
the historic focus of Canadian cultural policy has been on meeting the needs of citizens, 
rather than consumers. This has very important implications for the relationship between 
culture and democracy, which will be discussed below. However, it also impacts on 
questions of national identity, especially if it is understood that the formal recognition of 
non-national identities might also place demands on government. Indeed, for Audley, the 
principles outlined in this section also apply to describe the role culture plays in promoting 
other, non-national identities. He does not spend much time developing this strand of 
argument, although he does cite government publications which discuss the way in which 
broadcasting reflects who we are and thereby contributes to national, regional, and local 
identities.18
Abraham Rotstein makes similar points when he discusses community or social 
identity. For him, culture can be understood as a ‘domain of discourse that links seemingly 
autonomous individuals into a coherent and living entity, that is, a society cognizant of its 
past and in control of its future’.19 Culture, in this sense, comprises many social activities, but 
at its broadest, is a language which provides unity and coherence to a society, ‘[i]t is the 
essential binding feature without which any semblance of orderly discourse and interaction 
would disappear’.20 In this sense, it is the framework through which people are shaped but 
also in which they come to recognise themselves. Without culture, there could be no 
common identity, whether national or non-national, and, in the words of Raymond Breton, 
‘individuals feel like social strangers’.21
Whether the identity under discussion is national, regional, or local, all of the above 
commentators agree that identity is essential to the ‘good’ life of the community. They also 
agree that culture is an essential element in the formulation and contestation of identities.
17 Paul Audley, ‘Cultural Industries Policy: Objectives, Formulation, and Evaluation’, in Stuart 
McFadyen, Colin Hoskins, Adam Finn, and Rowland Lorimer (eds.), Cultural Development in an 
Open Economy (Burnaby: Canadian Journal o f Communication Corporation (distributed by Wilfred 
Laurier University Press, Waterloo, 1994), p. 64.
18 Audley refers to Canada, Department o f Communications, Canadian Voices, Canadian Choices: A 
New Broadcasting Policy fo r  Canada (Ottawa: Minister o f Supply and Services Canada, 1988).
19 Abraham Rotstein, ‘The Use and Misuse o f Economics in Cultural Policy’, in Rowland Lorimer and 
Donald C. Wilson (eds.), Communication Canada: Issues in Broadcasting and New Technologies 
(Toronto: Kagan and Woo, 1988), p. 143.
20 Ibid., p. 144.
21 Ibid., p. 143. Originally from Raymond Breton, ‘The Production and Allocation o f Symbolic 
Resources: An Analysis o f the Linguistic and Ethnocultural Fields in Canada’, Canadian Review o f  
Sociology and Anthropology (Vol. 21, No. 2, 1984), p. 125.
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‘Good’ policy, in this context, is one which supports the development of culture towards 
these goals.
ii) Unity
National unity has appeared often as a concern of federal cultural policy. Surprisingly, 
this level of concern has not been reflected in scholarly writings, where the question of 
culture in the service of national unity arises relatively infrequently. National unity is clearly 
perceived by the federal government to be a key element of the ‘good’ society and culture 
has been allocated a role in promoting this. On this basis, a few observations can be made 
about the relationship between culture and national unity.
It should be noted that in all discussions of national unity in the Canadian context, 
‘national’ is intended to refer to the Canadian federal state, while ‘unity’ is usually a 
constitutional term entailing agreement between all of Canada’s provinces and territories. In 
this sense, national unity as a goal of cultural policy places the Canadian federation as the 
primary locus of community whose ‘good’ should be served. Moreover, in the second 
example, below, the goal of cultural policy is not only to create greater material connections 
between the provinces, but also to create a singular Canadian national identity. In this latter 
understanding, the community is accepted as the state, but there is also an attempt to create a 
coterminous sense of nationhood.
The first way in which culture can contribute to the goal of national unity can be found 
in the work of those scholars who emphasise the uniqueness of Canada’s political culture, 
especially as it compares with the United States. They argue that specifically Canadian 
political institutions are a reflection of national needs and interests as well as an important 
factor in the development of a distinctive Canadian sense of self.22 In this context, it is argued 
that a tradition of state intervention to build an East to West oriented economy as well as a 
national communications and transportation network has been crucial to the creation of a 
Canadian nation from such a vast territory and disparate population. Public cultural 
institutions have also been crucial in this regard. Moreover, state intervention has created 
national social programs whereby society as a whole takes responsibility for the health and 
welfare of even the poorest. Finally, government intervention has ensured a net shift of 
income from the most prosperous regions and provinces to the most needy. All of these 
actions, it is argued, are seen as justifiable interventions by government into the private 
sphere and the values which underlie them are seen as reflections of a distinct Canadian 
political culture. Moreover, all of these actions contribute to the maintenance of the Canadian
22 See, for example, Michelle Landsberg’s contribution to Laurier LaPierre (assembler), I f  You Love 
This Country: Facts and Feelings on Free Trade (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987), pp. 51-54,
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federation. In this sense, the promotion of culture is crucial to national unity, where the 
nation is understood to be the sum of all the Canadian provinces and territories.
Secondly, culture can contribute to a sense of national unity, if cultural products are 
understood as a means to promote a common or even singular vision of Canadian identity. 
Taken to its extreme, this vision of cultural politics would imply the direction and/or 
censorship of all cultural activity, so that only an acceptable vision of the nation or 
community would be available. Because of these connotations, cultural groups are rightly 
wary of such policies. Moreover, viewed in this extreme way, there is an inevitable conflict 
between the ideals of cultural diversity and those of national identity or unity in federal 
cultural policy. Nonetheless, these goals need not be completely incompatible, as we will see 
below, if any kind of cultural expression by Canadians is accepted as the nationalist premise. 
Despite all of this, however, there is still room for the argument that culture promotes 
national unity, whatever the nation, by reminding the nation of its common past and future 
and by interpreting the natural and social challenges faced by the nation as a commonality of 
experience.23
Despite their differences about what is implied by national unity, commentators who 
support the above positions all agree that ‘good’ policy is that which supports culture and 
therefore contributes to the maintenance of national unity.
iii) Sovereignty
Some scholars maintain that the primary contribution of culture to the ‘good’ society 
is through its role in buttressing and defending the sovereignty of the state. Most often, these 
arguments refer to sovereignty as the freedom of Canadians (or their government) to choose 
what is best for them. In these understandings, the territorial state is clearly the primary 
embodiment of community.
In an article tracing the development of Canadian cultural nationalism, Ramsay Cook 
argues that the link between culture and national sovereignty is an important one. He argues 
that, despite persistent Canadian concerns about the American cultural threat, Canada has 
been drifting towards increased cultural continentalism. As he comments, ‘whether for 
ideological reasons, lack of will, conflicting vested interests, varying regional needs, or just 
plain lack of imagination, only a few definite policies have emerged out of the clouds of 
rhetoric’.24 Nonetheless, for Cook, the preservation of national culture, understood broadly, is
and Randall White, Fur Trade to Free Trade: Putting the Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement in Historical 
Perspective, Second Edition (Toronto: Dundum Press, 1988).
23 See, for example, Meisel and Van Loon, op. cit., in note 15, p. 277.
24 Ramsay Cook, ‘Cultural Nationalism in Canada: An Historical Perspective’, in Janice L. Murray 
(ed.), Canadian Cultural Nationalism: The Fourth Lester B. Pearson Conference on the Canada—
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inextricably connected to national sovereignty: ‘[t]he wellspring of cultural nationalism in 
Canada has always been the desire to make our own judgements about what is best for us’.25 
Clearly, without the preservation of national culture, sovereignty would be circumscribed. 
Moreover, he ties sovereignty to culture in a deeper way, arguing that ‘[mjaking your own 
decisions, after all, is itself an evidence of a distinctive national culture’.26
Franklyn Griffiths makes a connection between culture, sovereignty, and defence, 
arguing that the defence of sovereignty increasingly requires a vibrant cultural life. Griffiths 
begins by distinguishing between two types of threats to sovereignty. Type One threats are 
those which challenge the right of the state to exercise exclusive jurisdiction within a given 
space. These are traditional military threats. In contrast, Type Two threats are transboundary 
processes that threaten the quality of life, environment, or government within Canada. By 
way of illustration, Griffiths describes how processes of economic globalisation are creating 
new governance issues for all nation-states despite the fact that their territorial integrity 
remains intact. To a certain extent, this has always been the case. Nonetheless, Griffiths 
perceives that these threats are now superseding traditional military threats. The result is that 
conceptions of national defence must be rethought. In so doing, the defence of sovereignty 
must have as a key element the defence of a national cultural life. As Griffiths writes, ‘[f]or 
Canada, defence of sovereignty comes down to our ability to nourish the processes that hold 
us together as a people with purposes and a destiny of our own....Defence of sovereignty is, 
au fond, a matter of culture—political culture very much included’.27 Griffiths clearly draws 
upon the themes discussed in the previous sections on identity and unity. However, he builds 
on these to argue for a renewed defence policy with expenditures for cultural policy in the 
order of current spending on military security. In this sense, as Griffiths himself argues, 
‘[t]he state of our cultural life becomes a key variable in our security, in our survival as a 
people with the capacity to decide for ourselves in an interdependent world’.28
‘Good’ policy, in this context, is that which supports culture as a means to the 
preservation of state sovereignty.
United States Relationship (New York, NY: New York University Press for the Canadian Institute of  
International Affairs and the Council on Foreign Relations, 1977), p. 37.
25 Ibid., p. 38.
26 Ibid., p. 37.
27 Franklyn Griffiths, Strong and Free: Canada and the New Sovereignty (Toronto: Stoddart 
Publishing Co. Limited for Canadian Foreign Policy, 1996), p. 7.
28 Ibid., p. 9.
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iv) Prosperity
Since the early 1980s, cultural lobby groups have increasingly tried to demonstrate the 
economic advantages provided to society by their activities.29 Essentially, these cultural 
groups attempt to use the rhetoric of economics to justify state cultural support for the arts. 
They have emphasised that culture is an industry which employs increasing numbers of 
people, contributes to the GDP, and generates sales and export revenues.30 These arguments, 
however, are not based on the free-market premises of neo-classical welfare economics. 
They are strategic industry-specific claims made in an attempt to secure revenues during a 
decade where fiscal restraint generally has become the government’s ‘order of the day’.31 
What is most interesting about these arguments, however, is that they are based on the 
presumption that the economic policy of governments is oriented towards increasing the 
wealth of the nation (very broadly defined), even if this comes at the expense of a completely 
free market. In this sense, while the actual arguments may be interpreted as nothing more 
than self-interested rent-seeking, they betray a perception that governments value national 
prosperity as an element of the good life of the community.
v) Democracy
The argument that culture is necessary for any democracy to function effectively is 
expressed mainly in the work of the cultural development school, although it is implicit in 
many other analyses, particularly those which focus on high culture. In all cases, the 
community is perceived to be embodied in the liberal democratic state, while its members are 
defined by the established norms of citizenship. The argument is set out best by Marc Raboy, 
Ivan Bernier, Florian Savageau, and Dave Atkinson in their 1994 article. First, however, the 
work of Matthew Arnold will be discussed.
Although he did not write in the Canadian context, Arnold’s ideas are important in 
understanding the early roots of the cultural democracy argument. Writing in the late 
nineteenth century, Arnold sought to defend high culture on the grounds that the values 
which it naturally produced were essential to the proper functioning of liberal democracy. In
29 On this point, see Joanne Boucher, Funding Culture: Current Arguments on the Economic 
Importance o f  the Arts and Culture, Ontario Legislative Library Current Issue Paper 158 (Toronto: 
Legislative Research Service, 1995). See also Canadian Conference o f  the Arts, ‘Fast Facts on Arts and 
Culture’ (Ottawa: Canadian Conference o f the Arts, 1995); Canadian Magazine Publishers Association, 
‘The Canadian Magazine Industry: General Statistics’ (Toronto: Canadian Magazine Publishers 
Association, 1994); and excerpt in Duncan Cameron (ed.), The Free Trade Papers (Toronto: James 
Lorimer, 1986), pp. 167-73. The exception to this has been the Canada Council, the Canadian arts 
organisation which has most vociferously defended arts funding against political, nationalist, 
bureaucratic, and economic interference. See David Mitchell, ‘Culture as Political Discourse in 
Canada’, in Rowland Lorimer and Donald C. Wilson (eds.), Communication Canada: Issues in 
Broadcasting and New Technologies (Toronto: Kagan and Woo, 1988), pp. 165-66.
30 See, for example, Canadian Conference o f the Arts, op. cit., in note 29.
31 Mitchell, op. cit., in note 29, pp. 171-72.
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particular, he argued that culture provided a ‘source of concern for the common good’, which 
would act as an antidote to the more selfish values which Arnold perceived to have 
accompanied the liberal progress of the nineteenth century. Arnold saw that there was a 
tendency in Victorian society to confuse ‘political liberalism with purposeless freedom, 
economic liberalism with selfish materialism, and liberal progress with mere technological 
innovation’.32 Culture would balance these tendencies and aid democracy by producing a 
concern for the common good.
This was further reinforced by Arnold’s second claim on behalf of culture, namely, 
that it was intrinsically a force for freedom. This was a liberal humanist conception of 
freedom which emphasised that man was never truly free until his intellectual, moral, and 
spiritual qualities were fully developed.33 Moreover, this was a very elitist conception of 
freedom, stressing the civilisational and educational virtues of high culture in contrast to the 
more pluralistic conceptions of culture and freedom emphasised more recently. For Arnold, 
the importance of culture was not primarily a matter of self-awareness, of communication 
amongst the members of society, or of social criticism. His was a defence of high culture and 
its relevance to a civilised democracy. In particular, the social function of culture was ‘the 
pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which concern 
us, the best which has been said and thought in the world’.34 Only with this insight could 
people be effective citizens of a democracy.
In a more recent context, Raboy et al., argue that the government should support 
cultural activities because these contribute to cultural development, namely, ‘the process by 
which human beings acquire the individual and collective resources necessary to participate 
in public life’.35 The goals of cultural policy, in this context, should be oriented towards 
increasing access to the ‘means of cultural production, distribution and consumption’ both in 
absolute terms and also to generate a greater equality of cultural opportunity within society.36
32 Paul Litt, ‘The Massey Commission as Intellectual History: Matthew Arnold Meets Jack Kent 
Cooke’, in Canadian Issues Volume IX: Practising the Arts in Canada, proceedings o f the Annual 
Conference o f  the Association for Canadian Studies, University o f  Windsor, 31 May— 2 June 1988 
(Montreal: Association for Canadian Studies, 1990), p. 24.
33 Ibid.
34 Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981 [1869]), pp. 
58-62 and 165-68.
35 Marc Raboy, Ivan Bemier, Florian Savageau, and Dave Atkinson, ‘Cultural Development and the 
Open Economy: A Democratic Issue and a Challenge to Public Policy’, in Stuart McFadyen, Colin 
Hoskins, Adam Finn, and Rowland Lorimer (eds.), Cultural Development in an Open Economy 
(Bumaby: Canadian Journal o f Communication Corporation (distributed by Wilfred Laurier University 
Press, Waterloo, 1994), p. 48.
36 Ibid., p. 45. Originally from Nicholas Gamham, Contribution to the Project 'Le developpement 
culturel dans un context d ’economie ouverte’ (Quebec: Centre quebecois des relations intemationales, 
1992), pp. 2-3. This would entail, specifically, a focus on accessibility in networks o f distribution, a 
broadening o f the range o f cultural institutions that enjoy public support, media regulation oriented to 
non-market goals, broader public participation in the policy process, and greater public accountability 
in cultural policy. See Raboy et al., op. cit., in note 35, pp. 52-54.
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This vision of culture as an instrument of democratic development is explained and 
buttressed by a Habermasian concept of the public sphere. In essence, the public sphere 
comprises ‘all types of information, communication, and symbolic exchange—in sum,...the 
entire sphere of culture’.37 The social role of the public sphere is to provide a forum which is 
‘free, transparent, and accessible to all, where citizens can discuss and be informed about the 
social and political issues that concern them’.38 Thus, a focus on culture and specifically a 
cultural development approach is crucial in that it promotes an enlightened public. Moreover, 
‘the values it generates constitute the best insurance that basic democratic rights will be 
exercised intelligently, and that democratic behaviour spreads throughout the society’.39
Audley also picks up on the increasing concern of government for the needs of 
consumers at the expense of the needs of citizens. In particular, he highlights the work of 
Mark Starowicz. Starowicz defines culture as the aggregate values of the national group, 
however diverse (and even incompatible) these may be.40 In this context, Starowicz argues 
that television is an instrument of the process by which such national culture is continuously 
being made and remade. Starowicz clearly draws on the arguments linking culture and 
national identity which were discussed above. Nonetheless, his work has important 
implications for democracy. In particular, he argues that ‘[television has become essential to 
the maintenance and functioning of any body politic today’, in the sense that it is integral to 
‘the power to set the national agenda in all fields, not just entertainment’.41 Moreover, he 
shows how foreign programming does not deal adequately with Canadian realities. He argues 
that ‘our problems and the solutions are not those we are watching on our screens. Our mirror 
is showing us someone else’s reality’.42 For Audley, this is an issue of democracy. In his 
words, ‘[s]ocieties whose current realities are not adequately explored, reflected, debated, 
and contested through works that are widely available, and create a substantial body of 
shared knowledge, will increasingly become democratic in name only, with propaganda, 
social management, and manipulation becoming ever easier’.43 Notably, for these 
approaches, good policy furthers democracy, but does not necessarily prioritise national 
identity.
37 Raboy et al., op. cit., in note 35, p. 51.
38 Ibid., p. 50.
39 Ibid., p. 52.
40 Audley, op. cit., in note 17, p. 85. Originally from Mark Starowicz, ‘Citizens of Video-America: 
What Happened to Canadian Television in the Satellite A ge’, paper presented at the symposium on 
Television, Entertainment and National Culture, sponsored by Duke and Laval Universities, Quebec 
City, 1989, p. 11.
41 Starowicz, op. cit., in note 40, p. 12.
42 Ibid., p. 15.
43 Audley, op. cit., in note 17, p. 64
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vi) Artistic Fulfilment
Finally, there is a group of scholars who maintain that culture is good for society 
because it provides a channel for artistic and creative fulfilment. Often, these arguments are 
referred to as ‘intrinsic’ justifications for cultural subsidy, because they argue that it is the 
intrinsic properties of cultural activity which are valuable, rather than its potential political 
uses.44 In one sense, however, this is a false distinction, since most of these ‘intrinsic’ 
justifications ultimately justify cultural subsidy in terms external to cultural activity. 
Nonetheless, in most artistic fulfilment arguments, the external referent is not a political 
actor, such as the nation or the state. Instead, the external referent is usually society as a 
whole. Society, in these understandings, is a fairly open-ended concept. It is not necessarily 
defined by any political, national, or economic criteria (although it may be). At its broadest, 
it refers to all bonds of human association. Correspondingly, these arguments are inherently 
sceptical of the potential for government interference in culture in support of political aims. 
Moreover, they believe that cultural activity, on its own terms, can make a substantial 
contribution to the good life.
Some of the arguments for the social value of artistic and creative fulfilment are 
reflected in the arguments for a cultural contribution to democracy. However, there are a few 
scholars who make the case specifically on the grounds of artistic fulfilment. The most 
notable example of this argument is probably the 1982 Report of the Federal Cultural Policy 
Review Committee (the Applebaum-Hebert Committee). The sympathy of this Committee 
for intrinsic justifications for cultural subsidy was noted in the previous chapter’s discussion 
of merit goods. More specifically, however, the Committee placed priority on a view of ‘the 
manifest value of cultural activity in releasing the creative potential of a society, and in 
illuminating and enriching the human condition—celebrating its strengths and exposing its 
frailties’.45 It argued very vehemently against any attempt to subjugate the arts to political 
purposes, commenting that, ‘ [t]he well-being of society is threatened if the state intrudes into 
the cultural realm in ways that subordinate the role and purposes of the latter to the role and 
purposes of government itself.46 For the Committee, the prior and most important variable in 
cultural policy must be the creative artist and, in turn, the relationship between that artist and 
his audience. This relationship must be facilitated by government, but it must not be 
subjected to political aims. In order to achieve this, the Committee re-emphasised the 
government’s commitment to ‘arm’s length’ support for cultural activities. The report also 
argued for the principle of diversity in Canadian cultural experience, including support for
44 See, for example, Mitchell, op. cit., in note 29, p. 161.
45 Canada, Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee, Report (Ottawa: Ministry o f Supply and 
Services, 1982), p. 68.
46 Ibid., p. 16.
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increased participation by women and minorities, an increased priority for native peoples, 
and increased exposure to arts and culture for Canadian youth.
Many critics have argued that the recommendations of the Applebaum-Hebert 
Committee belied their stated commitment to the primacy of cultural activity. In particular, 
those recommendations which involved serious restructuring of the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation and the National Film Board were seen to demonstrate a real lack of 
understanding of the cultural role of these institutions.47 Nonetheless, many of the pluralistic 
themes of the cultural development school are reflected in the report, though without the 
concern for democracy and good citizenship. Clearly, however, even if it did not entirely 
succeed in reconciling the imperatives of government with the intrinsic value of cultural 
activity, the Applebaum-Hebert Committee nevertheless reflected a commitment to the 
intrinsic value of cultural activity for the ‘good’ society.
Audley also reflects this concern for the intrinsic social value of artistic activity. 
Specifically, he argues that ‘communities in which talented individuals lack opportunities to 
create works of the imagination that grow out of their character and knowledge will 
atrophy—losing vitality, energy and depth of understanding’.48 For Audley, however, this is 
only one element of the social importance of culture. The other elements, namely, its national 
and democratic potential are mentioned first in his work and take priority throughout his 
analysis.
From the above discussion, it should by now be clear that for community-based 
approaches to culture and trade, ‘good’ policy is that which places the best interests of the 
community at the forefront. These best interests, and the community in question, differ 
substantially within the community-based school. Nonetheless, and especially in comparison 
to market-based approaches, all of the approaches described above have a relatively strong 
sense of community to which all policy must be addressed if the ‘good life’ is to be achieved 
for its members.
Canadian Culture and Free Trade
Having set out the views of community-based approaches on the nature of culture and the 
criteria for good policy, this section will move on to address their positions on culture and 
free trade. Community-based approaches to Canadian culture and trade have been voiced 
since the beginning of this century. However, they increased dramatically in number and 
intensity at the time of the negotiation of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
47 See, for example, Brooke Jeffrey, Cultural Policy in Canada: From Massey-Levesque to 
Applebaum-Hebert, Library o f Parliament, Backgrounder Report BP-59E (Ottawa: Library of 
Parliament, 1982), especially pp. 48-50.
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(FTA). It is the arguments from this time which will be examined here, since they provide 
the widest diversity of community-based positions on the subject of Canadian culture and 
free trade. A general introduction to the arguments will be provided here. Greater detail will 
be presented in the next two chapters, where the specific question of magazines and trade is 
discussed.
John Herd Thompson is an anomaly amongst community-based approaches, in that he 
subscribes to a very limited view of culture. For him, it refers only to ‘the works and 
practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity’ and should not be extended to include 
an entire way of life.49 Nonetheless his analysis of culture and trade hinges on the idea of 
preserving cultural sovereignty, which he defines as the ‘power of a sovereign government to 
control the operation of cultural industries’.50 In this context, Thompson analyses what he 
refers to as the ‘protectionist’ Canadian cultural policies of the 1960s and 70s. In essence, he 
argues that these policies have not succeeded in firmly establishing cultural sovereignty. 
However, he seconds John Hutcheson in arguing that ‘Canadian production holds only a 
minor share of the market, but what little there is [is] a consequence of some form of 
government support’.51 Thus, for Thompson, protectionist policies are clearly ‘good’ policies 
for trade and culture.
Moreover, Thompson argues directly that free trade in cultural goods with the United 
States is not ‘good’ policy. In discussing the FTA, he argues that ‘[t]he Canadian 
government’s claim that Canada’s cultural legislation has any privileged position in the FTA 
is specious. The most generous interpretation would be that the FTA restores the cultural 
status quo ante bellum’.52 In other words, while Canada can keep most of its existing cultural 
policies, it has lost a significant degree of freedom in making future decisions. In effect, 
Canada has lost cultural sovereignty. From this point of view, free trade (at least in the form 
in which it takes in this particular agreement) is not a good policy for Canadian culture.
Graham Carr is another scholar who has much to say about the relationship between 
Canadian culture and free trade. Contrary to Thompson, he argues that it is not only useful, 
but imperative that culture be understood as broadly as possible. In negotiating the FTA, 
Canadian negotiators subscribed to a narrow definition of culture as cultural industry. In this
48 Audley, op. cit., in note 17, p. 64.
49 John Herd Thompson, ‘Canada’s Quest for Cultural Sovereignty: Protection, Promotion, and Popular 
Culture’, in Stephen J. Randall (ed.) with Herman Konrad and Sheldon Silverman, North America 
Without Borders? Integrating Canada, the United States, and Mexico (Calgary: University o f Calgary 
Press, 1992), p. 270. Thompson is referring here to Raymond Williams’ three-fold classification of  
definitions o f culture. See Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary o f  Culture and Society 
(London: Fontana, 1983), p. 90.
50 Thompson, op. cit., in note 49, p. 270.
51 Ibid., p. 279. Quoted from John Hutcheson, ‘Culture and Free Trade’, in Michael D. Henderson, The 
Future on the Table: Canada and the Free Trade Issue (Toronto: Masterpress, 1987), pp. 109 and 111.
52 Thompson, op. cit., in note 49, p. 280, italics in original.
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context, the achievement of a cultural exemption has been taken as a significant 
breakthrough. However, Carr argues that by focusing exclusively on cultural industries and 
Canadian cultural sovereignty, Canadian negotiators actually supported the more 
fundamental US achievement in the FTA. This was the redefinition of culture as 
information—a commodity that should incontestably be freely traded. According to Carr, this 
achievement is itself fundamentally cultural and has potentially very damaging implications 
for the Canadian community as well as for other trading partners of the United States. In this 
sense, free trade is clearly not good policy for culture. However, Carr’s analysis highlights 
the fact that the cultural dimensions of the agreement and the threat which they may pose to 
Canadian society can only be seen if culture is not only understood as an industry, but also as 
a way of life.53
The understanding of culture as a way of life is a key element of all of the 
contributions to Laurier LaPierre’s edited volume, If You Love This Country: Facts and 
Feelings on Free Trade. It is a collection of short pieces written by prominent Canadian 
artists, broadcasters, publishers, journalists, and business people, each expressing their views 
on the possibility of freer trade in North America. Most of the pieces are rather emotional 
and convey a sense of impending doom for the Canadian nation. From this point of view, 
they are not particularly scholarly. Nonetheless, they are very valuable for the emphasis 
which they place on community (usually the Canadian nation) in discussing culture and free 
trade. While they all see culture as a way of life, they differ in their views of the way in 
which free trade will be detrimental to culture and subsequently, to the community.
First, there are those who see freer trade in culture as a threat to national identity. 
Some, such as Martin Katz and Rick Salutin, focus specifically on the cultural provisions of 
the FTA. Much like Carr, they judge these provisions from the point of view of the effects 
these will have on culture as a way of life. Katz argues that the FTA entails Canadian 
acquiescence to the American vision of culture as industry. Further, because culture is 
treating in the FTA as an exception to a general rule of free competition, the agreement will 
cause the Canadian economy to take an increasingly large role in Canadian life, much as it 
does in the United States. Moreover, it will alter the way Canadians live from day to day and, 
subsequently, their collective mindset. Salutin argues, somewhat differently, that ‘[t]he 
whole notion of an “exemption for cultural industries” is offensive, uncultured, and 
philistine’.54 He argues that the FTA as a whole is equivalent to selling out on the Canadian 
way of life: ‘[w]e are inundated with a new imagery’ which is alien, but in which Canadians
53 Graham Carr, ‘Culture’, in Duncan Cameron (ed.), Canada Under Free Trade (Toronto: James 
Lorimer, 1993), pp. 203-13.
54 Rick Salutin, in LaPierre (ass.), op. cit., in note 22, p. 209.
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will be forced to formulate their thoughts about themselves.55 In this sense, for Salutin and 
Katz, free trade in cultural goods cannot be separated from its detrimental effects on national 
culture, and particularly national identity.
Second, others make the claim that free trade is a threat to culture as a way of life and 
therefore to national identity without discussing the specific cultural provisions of the FTA. 
Pierre Berton, for example, argues that, since Americans and Canadians are two different 
peoples, ‘at the heart of the free trade debate is a fear of surrendering some of those peculiar 
institutions and practices that help make us a distinct and sovereign people.... [F]or the first 
time, Canadians have had to ask themselves what kind of people we are and what kind of 
people we want to be’.56 Graeme Gibson continues this line of argument. He first sets out his 
idea of nationhood, following from Andre Malraux (former French Minister of Culture):
‘ [t]he mind supplies the idea of the nation, but what gives that idea its sentimental force is a 
community of dreams’. In this context, he asks, ‘[w]hat “community of dreams” is evoked by 
the phrase “Canada is open for business”?’57 According to Gibson, this is a very passive 
national conception. In this light, he encourages Canadians to be more actively nationalist 
and to look beyond free trade towards different options which may better serve the ‘good’ of 
the Canadian nation. Michelle Landsberg focuses on the idea of political culture. She argues 
that the strength of the democratic left in Canadian politics has spun a web of collective 
responsibility that inspires a view of the world different from that of the United States, 
including a whole tradition of non-commercial culture. If expressions of Canadian culture 
wither away in the competitive market, then a distinctive Canadian political culture and 
national identity will also be lost. Finally, Mel Hurtig sums up the feelings of many in the 
book when he argues that the free trade agreement will mean giving up on Canada.
Third, some commentators in the LaPierre volume are specifically concerned with the 
effects that free trade will have on national unity and subsequently on national culture. 
Margaret Atwood argues that a comprehensive free trade agreement would leave the federal 
government so powerless that it would no longer be useful to Canadians. She claims that the 
free trade issue has the potential to fragment Canada unless Canadians begin to discuss what 
is ‘good’ for the country as a whole. In her view, the good for Canada means more than just 
money, but includes other values (though she doesn’t indicate what specifically these might 
be). Unless these values can be preserved, national identity and subsequently national unity 
will be lost.58
Finally, many contributors to the LaPierre volume stress the effects that free trade will 
have on Canadian sovereignty, understood as the ability of Canadians to make decisions
55 Ibid., p. 210.
56 Pierre Berton, in LaPierre (ass.), op. cit., in note 22, p. 28.
57 Graeme Gibson, in LaPierre (ass.), op. cit., in note 22, p. 46.
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about their way of life. Frank Stronach, an automotive manufacturer, argues that while freer 
trade would be good for his business, it would not be good for the country. In his view, if the 
economy of Canada becomes too closely integrated with that of the United States, then so too 
might Canadian culture and society. This, he argues, is not a bad thing, unless Canadians 
should decide that they want something different. In his view, preserving the sovereignty to 
make these decisions is essential. In Stronach’s words, ‘any agreement to improve trade must 
not preclude us from having the ability to make those unique economic decisions we 
consider imperative to determining our national future’.59 David Crane takes a similar view, 
focusing specifically on Canadian sovereignty in foreign policy-making. He argues that free 
trade with the United States would make Canada even more dependent on the United States. 
This increased dependency would increase the risk of disagreeing with the United States and 
thereby discourage an independent foreign policy. Moreover, Crane defines Canada’s role in 
the world as a crucial element of Canada’s distinct society.60 This ties Canadian foreign 
policy to national identity, so that the preservation of foreign policy sovereignty becomes an 
essential component in maintaining the Canadian way of life.
Thus, for most of the contributors to LaPierre’s book, culture is understood to be the 
Canadian way of life. Free trade is therefore seen as a threat to culture insofar as it endangers 
national identity, national unity, or state sovereignty. It is interesting to note that the 
contributions in LaPierre’s book focus only on the most rhetorically powerful dimensions of 
the free trade threat to culture and community, namely, national identity, national unity, and 
sovereignty. Clearly, the book was intended as a polemical contribution to the national 
debate on FTA. Moreover, many of the contributors simply do not want free trade on any 
terms and use a broad conception of cultural threat to justify this position. Nonetheless, the 
book has much emotional force—the depth of feeling for the community in question is 
undeniable—and for this reason, the book is a valuable insight, however partial, into the 
meaning and force of community-based approaches to culture and trade.
The final approach to Canadian culture and free trade encompasses those who discuss 
the FTA in the context of non-national cultures. Michael Cross, for example, argues that 
there is a distinct North American culture, evidenced in ‘a convergence of state ideologies, 
an ascendancy of business and its values....[a] convergence in middle-class style’.61 
Moreover, these values are ‘often advanced in support of North American free trade’.62 Cross 
argues against the acceptance of these ‘homogenizing, materialistic pressures of the official
58 Margaret Atwood, in LaPierre (ass.), op. cit., in note 22, pp. 20-21.
59 Frank Stronach, in LaPierre (ass.), op. cit., in note 22, p. 62.
60 David Crane, in LaPierre (ass.), op. cit., in note 22, p. 98.
61 Michael S. Cross, ‘Towards a Definition o f North American Culture’, in Randall (ed.), op. cit., in 
note 49, p. 305.
62 Ibid., p. 306.
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North American culture’.63 Instead, he suggests that Canadians must strike a balance between 
finding ‘enough elements of a common Canadian culture to maintain their national identity’, 
and respecting ‘the local, regional, and ethnic cultures that reflect the reality and meaning of 
our lives’.64 This very pluralistic conception of culture cannot be achieved through the 
cultural convergence that it is assumed would result from North American free trade.
Sheldon Silverman also acknowledges the importance of non-national cultures, 
although he differs substantially from the authors above in his assessment of free trade. 
Unlike Cross, he sees the North American context as the most promising site for the 
expression of culture by ‘the multitudinous racial, ethnic, religious, and caste subgroups’.65 
Essentially, Silverman perceives the national model of social organisation to be increasingly 
under pressure from economic forces. As a result, ‘[t]he future of cultures defined by 
national elites is questionable’.66 Thus, North American free trade poses a threat to national 
cultures, but nonetheless may be the most advantageous context for the democratic 
expression of minority cultures. There are many who would no doubt disagree with 
Silverman’s analysis. Nonetheless, by highlighting the potential conflict between dominant 
and minority sources of culture, and by suggesting that some cultures might be better served 
outside the state, it does provide a importantly different view of the relationship between 
community, culture, and free trade.
In this regard, it is clear that most community-based approaches are highly resistant to 
freer trade in culture. They generally argue that freer trade would threaten national identity, 
national unity, and Canadian sovereignty. Several strands of community-based approach, 
however, have sought to take a wider view of community, thereby allowing them to make 
more varied claims about the relevance of freer trade. Indeed, these examples highlight the 
essential indeterminacy of the questions addressed in this thesis, and suggest that these are 
matters of judgement concerning the type of social life that is both desirable and possible. In 
this context, this thesis seeks to add to our understanding of how such judgements may be 
made, rather than claiming to resolve the issue once and for all.
Critiques
Not surprisingly, critiques of community-based approaches to trade and culture originate 
mainly (although not exclusively) from the market-based school. Market-based approaches 
do not acknowledge that the ‘good’ life is primarily constituted by the community and argue
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Sheldon A. Silverman, ‘Reflections on the Cultural Impact o f  a North American Free Trade 
Agreement’, in Randall (ed.), op. cit., in note 49, p. 312.
66 Ibid.
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instead that a well-functioning market is the most important factor in human welfare. Due to 
this difference in starting points, market-based approaches often do not deal with the specific 
arguments of community-based approaches, instead dismissing their claims as ‘emotional’ or 
‘unscholarly’ or, at best, as mere rent-seeking.
When they do deal with community-based approaches, market-based critiques do not 
tend to have a very broad knowledge of these approaches. As a result, their criticisms are 
usually levelled at the arguments which have acquired the most emotional and rhetorical 
force, namely those which focus on nationalism. These critiques will first be discussed. 
Subsequently, by further examining the principles of market-based approaches that were set 
out in the previous chapter, the implicit critique of the remaining community-based 
approaches will also be developed. Finally, a few non-market-based critiques will be offered.
One scholar in the market-based tradition who does devote attention to critiquing 
community-based approaches is Steven Globerman. Not surprisingly, he focuses primarily 
on the arguments of cultural nationalists. He identifies cultural nationalists by two assertions 
which he attributes to them: first, that ‘increased Canadian cultural output is required to 
maintain Canada’s national identity and political sovereignty’, and second, ‘that government 
intervention is required to realise the goal of increased Canadian cultural output’.67
Globerman’s main point of critique is that cultural nationalists do not adequately 
develop their understanding of Canadian culture and national identity. First, he criticises 
them for not explaining why indigenous art more effectively promotes a sense of national 
identity than imported art. Second, he criticises them for not adequately developing a sense 
of what constitutes Canadian culture: is it simply cultural production by Canadians or must it 
reflect some particular values and themes? If it is the former, he argues, then the link 
between Canadian culture and national identity becomes much more difficult to sustain. 
Cultural nationalists must more adequately show that cultural intervention by the government 
actually leads to increased national cohesiveness. However, if it is the latter, according to 
Globerman, then the substance of this culture must be defined. Globerman seems to think 
that this would be a ridiculous exercise, although he does not deal with the essentialist 
implications which follow from it. Finally, cultural nationalists must address the reason why 
‘most Canadians will not voluntarily choose to consume “Canadian culture” rather than “U.S. 
culture’” .68 Without such an understanding, government interference with freedom of choice 
is a threat ‘to political and cultural freedom’.69
Globerman also criticises the argument that indigenous culture should be supported 
because it contributes to national defence. He claims that, without an adequate conception of
67 Steven Globerman, Cultural Regulation in Canada (Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public 
Policy, 1983), p. 31.
68 Ibid., p. 40.
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how indigenous culture generates a stronger national identity, it is not possible to understand 
how Canadian culture would contribute to the defence of Canada. Moreover, without this 
link, ‘it is quite plausible to argue that there may be much less costly ways to accomplish the 
objective, including spending more on national defence’.70
Criticisms of the other dimensions of culture and community are implicit in 
Globerman’s work. For example, given his commitment to the principles of neoclassical 
economics (as was shown in the previous chapter), he is unlikely to agree with the suggestion 
that increased prosperity will result from government intervention in the cultural sphere, 
unless this claim is accompanied by evidence of market failure. Also, and again referring 
back to the previous chapter, Globerman’s view that merit goods justifications interfere with 
consumer sovereignty are likely to lead him to dismiss the suggestion that culture should be 
supported by government on the grounds that it contributes to artistic fulfilment.
Globerman’s argument is useful insofar as it points to the tensions which exist in any 
community-based approach between the good of the community, broadly understood, and the 
rights and freedoms of every individual. Moreover, his calls for cultural nationalists to be 
more specific in their use of terms and their descriptions of relationships can only enhance 
the debate on culture and trade. While these two issues should temper the claims of 
advocates of community-based approaches, as we will see in Chapter 7, they do not provide 
significant justification for a complete dismissal of these claims. This is particularly true of 
those community-based approaches which have made a consistent attempt to integrate 
concerns for pluralism, freedom, and individual development in their analysis, namely, the 
cultural democracy school.
Moving away from the critiques offered by market-based approaches, a few other 
significant points of critique can be noted. The first relates to the definition of culture 
adopted by community-based approaches, while the second deals with the essentialisation of 
the community which is implicit in these approaches. Both of these points are reminiscent of 
some of Globerman’s criticisms, though the analysis below does not reflect the values of the 
market-based approach.
The very broad and inclusive definition of culture adopted by some community-based 
approaches is intrinsically appealing, especially for those who wish to make the case against 
free trade. More importantly, however, it reflects some fundamental beliefs about the 
importance of social interconnection in the lives of individuals. Nonetheless, there is the 
distinct danger that if culture is defined too broadly, it may come to have very little meaning 
at all. Furthermore, the very breadth of the term encourages slippage in its use, thereby 
allowing community-based approaches to trade on their indeterminacy.
69 Ibid.
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For community-based approaches, the conceptions of culture as an industry and as an 
artistic process are both quite clear. When they incorporate a concern for the social 
dimension of cultural activity, they are also easily differentiated from market-based 
definitions. However, as soon as culture is defined as a way of life, it sometimes becomes 
difficult to perceive what distinguishes the culture of a community from the community 
itself.71 In analytic terms this causes confusion about how different factors influence each 
other: is free trade damaging to culture because it prejudices national identity or is it 
damaging to national identity because it prejudices culture?
These questions cannot be clearly answered, primarily because, in its broadest sense, 
culture as a way of life is the nation and is the national identity under consideration, although 
it is also comprised of other influences. However, this does not preclude the need to strive for 
as much analytical clarity as possible. In particular, those approaches which employ such a 
broad definition of culture must be especially careful to delineate their views on the nature of 
the relationship between culture and the many other entities which constitute our social 
world, such as the nation, the state, the government, the ‘people’, and the artist. Furthermore, 
they must be careful to avoid using the term culture interchangeably in the same analysis to 
mean both ‘cultural products’ and a way of life, unless they have taken pains to establish 
their understanding of the relationship between the two. Without these clarifications, it will 
be difficult to achieve whatever gains in understanding that might result from a broad 
definition of culture.
Second, there is a tendency, particularly amongst the most nationalist of the 
community-based approaches, to treat the nation and its culture as though the membership 
and substance of these were somehow fixed and uncontested. This is very common, 
especially in those analyses which try to offer criteria upon which to distinguish between 
Canadian and American culture. The risk of defining what does and does not constitute 
Canadian culture, as Globerman hinted, is that Canadian culture, so-defined, may no longer 
be the reflection of the changing Canadian community. What is judged to be Canadian in 
Canadian culture may be essentialised and, as a result, some Canadian cultures may be 
perceived as more authentic than others. However, it also has an immediate practical 
relevance as is evident in several contexts, not least in the problems posed by the singular 
vision of national identity implicit in some approaches to the national unity debate. Both of 
these problems will be discussed in Chapter 7.
Some community-based approaches have sought to avoid the consequences of this 
issue by identifying Canadian culture as any cultural artefact actually crafted by a Canadian. 
In fact, the Canadian government itself has persistently applied Canadian content rules,
70 Ibid., p. 42.
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especially in broadcasting and print. Although this does not predefine the substance of 
Canadian culture, it nonetheless sets particular limits to the ways in which cultural change 
may take place. This thesis will raise this issue again, agreeing with the 1993 Task Force on 
the Canadian Magazine Industry that Canadian content ought to be replaced by original 
content. Of course, both Canadian content and original content pose the risk for ardent 
cultural nationalists that, if allowed to depart from essentialist conceptions of Canadian 
culture, Canadians might actually choose to produce and consume more and more cultural 
artefacts which reflect American or global capitalist values rather than distinctively Canadian 
ones. In contrast, as will be developed in Chapter 7, this thesis takes the view that the 
substance of Canadian culture must be seen as inherently pluralistic and necessarily open to 
contestation. Only by taking such a view will it be possible to take account of and do justice 
to the constantly changing Canadian social and cultural landscape.
Conclusion
The discussion of the previous two chapters has outlined the basic approaches to culture and 
trade and highlighted the key points of contestation. While each is concerned with improving 
human conditions, market- and community-based approaches nonetheless represent two 
fundamentally different ways of looking at the relationship between the individual, the 
market, the state, and society. Moreover, each prioritises different values, institutions, and 
processes in its quest to improve the human lot. In essence, they comprise very different 
visions of the good life. These visions will be drawn out and interrogated in Chapters 6 and 
7. In practice, however, it is important to note that these two approaches are not mutually 
exclusive. In defining any given cultural policy, every government is influenced by concerns 
both for the community which it represents and for its budgetary restrictions and its relations 
with other countries. The following chapters will examine in greater detail how these 
approaches have been manifest throughout several decades of discussion between Canada 
and the United States regarding their mutual trade in periodicals.
71 See Thompson, op. cit., in note 49, p. 270, n. 6 on this point.
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Chapter 4
The Canadian Periodicals Industry
Chapters 2 and 3 set out the main approaches to trade and culture, paying particular attention 
to their respective conceptions of culture, their understandings of ‘good’ policy, and their 
views about the appropriateness of free trade in cultural goods. These chapters also offered 
some preliminary critiques. In this respect, Chapters 2 and 3 have set out the terms of the 
debate and provided crucial insights into arguments about trade and culture. However, they 
indicated only briefly the ways in which these ideas have influenced policy and, more 
importantly, how they have appeared in trade disputes between Canada and the United 
States. The chapter following this one will build on the previous two by demonstrating how 
these approaches have played out in Canada-United States disputes relating to trade in 
periodicals. First, however, this chapter will discuss the nature of the Canadian periodicals 
industry and set out the main policies that govern trade in periodicals.
Periodicals make an interesting and useful case study for several reasons. First, the 
periodical industry is as old as the Canada-United States relationship itself. This long history 
provides ample material from which to develop a picture of Canadian and American attitudes 
to trade in periodicals. Second, periodicals have very recently been a high profile issue in 
both Canada and the United States. At the time of writing, they are the most recent cultural 
sector to be the subject of a Canada-United States trade dispute. Moreover, Canadian policy 
pertaining to periodicals is the first Canadian cultural policy to be challenged by the United 
States before a dispute resolution panel of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). As a result, 
a study of periodicals can provide important insights into very recent trade developments in 
the cultural sector. Finally, there has been no detailed study of Canadian periodicals since the 
1974 publication of Isaiah Litvak and Christopher Maule’s Cultural Sovereignty: The Time 
and Reader’s Digest Case in Canada. Several articles have been written on the subject more 
recently, but none deal in any detail with the recent WTO dispute and its aftermath.1 As a
1 The 1974 text is Isaiah Litvak and Christopher Maule, Cultural Sovereignty: The Time and Reader’s 
Digest Case in Canada (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1974). For newer perspectives, see Isaiah 
Litvak and Christopher Maule, The Impact o f  Bill C-58 on English Language Periodicals in Canada 
(Ottawa: Secretary o f State, 1978); Isaiah Litvak and Christopher Maule, ‘Bill C-58 and the Regulation 
of Periodicals in Canada, International Journal (Vol. 36, No. 1, 1980-81), pp. 70-90; Paul Audley, 
Canada’s Cultural Industries: Broadcasting, Publishing, Records and Film (Toronto: James Lorimer, 
1983), Chapter 2, pp. 54-84; and Lon Dubinsky, ‘Periodical Publishing’, in Michael Dorland (ed.), The 
Cultural Industries in Canada: Problems, Policies and Prospects (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1996), pp. 
35-59. For the WTO dispute, but not its aftermath, see Keith Acheson and Christopher Maule, Much 
Ado About Culture: North American Trade Disputes (Ann Arbor, MI: University o f Michigan Press,
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result, there are extensive opportunities for original research on the subject of Canada-United 
States trade in periodicals.
It should be noted that the claim being advanced here is not so much that the insights 
of this and the following chapter can be applied to all cultural issues and sectors. Rather, the 
claim is that a study of the international trade dimensions of Canada’s periodical policies can 
show how general ideas about trade and culture have been manifest in policy debate and 
action. In this light, this chapter will offer a brief background on the Canadian periodicals 
industry. It will pay particular attention to the details of the Canadian policy context and the 
economic position of different magazines in the Canadian market. It will also address the 
central points of contention in the trade and periodicals debate. Chapter 5 will offer more 
detail on particular magazine policies and specific disputes between Canada and the United 
States.
Periodicals in Canada: An Overview
Following the definition set out by Statistics Canada, this thesis will understand a periodical 
as ‘a medium of communication’ that:
i) is directed to the general public, or to consumers with special, personal, 
business, hobby or leisure interests...
ii) is issued on a regular basis, more frequently than once a year, but not more 
than once a week;
iii) has a name and some form of chronology on the cover;
iv) is printed on newsprint, coated stock or some other grade of paper; is 
stapled, glued, folded or otherwise formed into a distinct package, and is 
produced in magazine, digest, tabloid, broadsheet or some other size;
v) does not contain more than 70 per cent advertising; and
vi) is available to the public.2
The terms ‘magazine’ and ‘periodical’ will be used interchangeably.
The State of the Industry
Canada’s statistical agency issues regular reports detailing data on the main indicators of
1999), pp. 186-205, and Gordon Ritchie, Wrestling with the Elephant (Toronto: Macfarlane, Walter 
and Ross, 1997), pp. 226-30.
2 This excludes government publications, newsletters, community newspapers, directories, and 
catalogues. See Canada, A Question o f  Balance: Report o f  the Task Force on the Canadian Magazine 
Industry (Ottawa: Minister o f Supply and Services Canada, 1994), pp. 7-8.
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performance in the periodicals industry in Canada.3 These reports give an excellent picture of 
the overall health of the industry, including total numbers of periodicals being published, 
annual revenues, and annual expenditures. However, Statistics Canada does not collect data 
on foreign periodicals imported into Canada or on ‘Canadian’ or split-run editions of foreign 
magazines.4 Unfortunately, the last comprehensive study of the Canadian periodicals market 
that included foreign magazines dates back to 1994. This study was compiled by the 
economic research firm Informetrica, at the request of the Task Force on the Canadian 
Magazine Industry.5 Although it is six years out of date, the data collected by Informetrica 
remains highly relevant, especially when considered alongside the more recent Statistics 
Canada data.6
Magazines generally have two main revenue sources, namely, advertising revenue and 
circulation revenue. Throughout the 1990s, circulation revenues in Canada remained fairly 
constant at about 30 percent of total revenues. Advertising revenues accounted for about 60 
to 65 percent of the total, with the difference being accounted for by back issue sales, grants, 
and donations.7 These revenue streams are highly interdependent, however, since circulation 
figures are an important determinant of the amount of advertising a magazine can attract and 
the rates that it can charge to advertisers. As the 1994 Task Force on Periodicals noted, this 
interdependency can lead to a spiralling action—larger circulation leads to more advertising 
revenues, thereby allowing more money to be spent on editorial content and increasing the 
magazine’s chances of increasing circulation.8 Of course, the spiralling action may also occur 
in the opposite direction.
Tied to these two revenue sources are two different types of foreign competition in the 
Canadian market and, in essence, two different categories of Canada-United States trade in 
magazines. In the Canadian market, the main competition for circulation revenues comes 
from ‘overflow’ circulation of American magazines. These are magazines that are exported 
to Canada in exactly the same form as they are sold in the United States—no new editorial or 
advertising content is added. Trade in these magazines has never been limited by the 
Canadian government. As a result, the main effect of these magazines has been to compete
3 For the latest report, see Statistics Canada, The Daily, 14 September 1998. See also Statistics 
Canada’s web site: http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/People/Culture/arts30.htm. For a more general 
(and less statistical) overview o f the periodicals industry in Canada, see Dubinsky, op. cit., in note 1.
4 Differences between these types o f magazines will be discussed below.
5 Nancy Cebryk, Bob Jenness, and Michael McCracken, The Canadian Periodical Publishing Industry 
(Ottawa: Informetrica, 1994). Much o f the data from this study is repeated in Canada, op. cit., in note 
2 .
6 Since Statistics Canada and Informetrica use different sources and rely on different accounting 
periods, their data are not directly comparable. However, the chapter attempts to avoid confusion by 
not drawing any direct comparisons between the data and by footnoting the source o f each piece of 
data.
7 Ibid.
8 Canada, op. cit., in note 2, p. 9.
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with Canadian magazines for circulation and subscription revenues.
In one limited respect, however, overflow circulation also affects the advertising 
market. In particular, some large brands are able to reach Canadian and American consumers 
using ads placed in US magazines. But, while this may slightly reduce the total pool of 
advertising revenues available in Canada, it is not seen as important enough to justify action 
against overflow circulation.
Primarily, however, competition for advertising revenues takes on a different form. In 
this case, the main foreign competitors are split-run or ‘Canadian’ editions of US magazines. 
These are editions of US magazines sold in Canada with little or no new editorial content, but 
with ads solicited from Canadian advertisers. These types of magazine have been considered 
dangerous to the Canadian magazine industry because they largely recoup their editorial 
costs in the US market and can afford to undercut the ad rates of Canadian magazines. This 
type of competition is seen to be particularly threatening because of the high degree of 
dependence of Canadian magazines on advertising revenue and the small size of the overall 
advertising market in Canada. As a result, limiting trade in foreign split-run magazines, or at 
least limiting their access to the Canadian advertising market has been a goal of Canadian 
policy for several decades.9
i) Circulation
In the 1996-97 reporting year, 1137 Canadian publishers produced 1552 periodicals. 
Both periodicals and publishers have suffered a small but steady decline in numbers at least 
since 1991-92, when 1733 periodicals were published by 1282 publishers.10 Overall industry 
revenues, however, remained fairly constant, at around C$lbillion (US$850 million). To put 
this in perspective, in 1993, the US magazine industry published more than 11,000 
periodicals and earned US$22.7 billion in revenues. US periodical exports in 1992-93 alone 
exceeded US$800 million, 78 percent of which went to Canada. More importantly, however, 
in 1992, Canadian magazines accounted for 67.6 percent of total circulation in Canada. This 
remains one of the lowest figures in the industrialised world, although it nonetheless marks a 
significant improvement over the 1959 figure of 23.3 percent. This jump is usually attributed
9 There is a significant debate concerning whether Canada’s policies are directed at limiting trade in a 
specific good (a split-run magazine) or at limiting access to a particular service (Canadian advertising). 
Indeed, in this case, access to the service is so closely connected to production o f the good, that the 
issues at stake and the effects o f policy are virtually identical, however the policy is justified. As we 
will see in the final section o f this chapter, the only important difference arises in terms o f the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 and the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) commitments. For purposes o f convenience and for ease o f  understanding, this thesis mainly 
relies on the language o f goods to describe trade in split-run magazines. However, it is sensitive to the 
fact that the issue can also be discussed in terms o f trade in services.
10 Statistics Canada, Profile o f  Canadian Periodicals, available at http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pedb/ 
People/ Culture/arts30.htm
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to Canadian cultural policies in effect through the 1970s and 1980s.11
These numbers alone, however, do not tell the complete story. In particular, it is 
important to distinguish between newsstand circulation and subscription circulation. 
Subscriptions are the main source of circulation revenue for most Canadian magazines, 
accounting for about 22 percent of total revenues throughout the 1990s.12 Indeed, the 
importance of the subscription base of Canadian magazines should come as no surprise when 
we examine newsstand revenues. In 1992, for example, 81.4 percent of English-language 
magazines sold on newsstands in Canada were foreign, and 99 percent of these were 
American. It is important to note that this is not merely a reflection of consumer tastes. As 
Paul Audley has discussed in detail, newsstand distribution in Canada is controlled by 
several large companies. They are overwhelmingly American firms, owned by particular US 
publishers, and they tend to treat Canadian distribution as if it were part of their domestic 
market.13 As a result, many Canadian magazines experience great difficulties in gaining 
access to newsstands in Canada. For example, in Toronto, Canadian magazines can be found 
at outlets of five bookstores and speciality magazine shops. They have not succeeded in 
entering the distribution chain for supermarkets or comer shops.14 Moreover, where they can 
gain access, they often cannot afford to pay the rates demanded for prime rack space.15 Not 
surprisingly, in contrast to American publications, for whom North American newsstand 
sales account for 70 percent of all circulation, Canadian magazines sell only about 19 percent 
of their circulation on newsstands.16 This is important not just in terms of lost revenue, but in 
terms of lost opportunities to attract subscribers and advertisers. Nonetheless, as we will see, 
the Canadian government has not sought to interfere with the overflow circulation of 
American magazines, viewing this as an inevitable part of life next to a large English- 
language cultural power, such as the United States.
ii) Advertising
In terms of advertising, the situation is somewhat different. As noted above, 
advertising revenues provide by far the largest share of magazine revenues in Canada. In this 
way, advertising not only supports the creation of original editorial content, but it allows 
magazines to be provided to readers at competitive rates. In 1992, the pool of total
11 See, for example, Litvak and Maule, ‘Bill C-58’, op. cit., in note 1; Dubinsky, op. cit., in note 1; and 
Fraser Sutherland, The Monthly Epic: A History o f  Canadian Magazines, 1789-1989 (Markham: 
Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1989), pp. 260-63.
12 Statistics Canada, op. cit., in note 10.
13 Audley, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 72-73. See also Canadian Magazine Publishers Association, Canadian 
Magazine Publishing, unpublished paper, 23 May 1989, p. 8. For a description o f the process by which 
distributors consolidated, see The Toronto Star, 10 December 1997, p. E3.
14 The Toronto Star, 8 March 1997, p. K l.
15 Ibid.
16 Canadian Magazine Publishers Association, op. cit., in note 13, p. 7.
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advertising dollars in Canada was estimated at C$8,295 billion, with 6.8 percent (C$569 
million) allocated to magazines. Owing to several key policy decisions which are outlined 
below, no foreign split-run magazines were allowed to compete for this advertising revenue 
from 1965 until early 1999. However, it should be noted that the Canadian advertising 
market was not completely without competition, as magazines are constantly competing 
amongst each other and with other media for advertising revenue.
It is only possible to estimate the effects that free competition in magazine advertising 
(or free trade in split-run magazines) would have on the Canadian magazine industry. Indeed, 
this was one of the questions posed to the 1994 Task Force. They examined the number of 
US magazines that have the potential to enter the Canadian market in search of ad revenue, 
the average number of advertising pages in those magazines, and the proportion of ad pages 
that might be sold to Canadian advertisers. In all cases, they were careful to use conservative 
estimates. Nonetheless, in discussing consumer magazines, they estimated that some 53 US 
magazines might enter the Canadian market, resulting in a potential 37 percent drop in 
advertising revenue for magazines in this category.17 Based on similar calculations, business 
and trade magazines were expected to lose 39 percent of revenues. Some of this drop could 
be offset by a lowering of variable costs, but the major fixed costs associated with producing 
quality editorial content would change little. As a result, profits were expected to drop by an 
average of 60 percent, placing 94 percent of profitable Canadian magazines in a zero profit 
position. Indeed, most Canadian magazines can only afford to lose 17 percent of advertising 
revenue before dropping to zero operating profit.18 This is not to suggest that magazines 
cannot operate from zero profit, nor should they be discouraged from becoming more 
efficient. However, the importance of these estimates was not in their detail, but rather in 
reinforcing the idea that free trade in American split-run magazines had the potential to 
obliterate the Canadian magazine industry. Indeed, as we will see, the Canadian policy of 
allowing free trade in ‘overflow’ magazines, while severely limiting split-run editions has 
long been based on the assumption that split-run magazines had the potential to seriously 
limit the vitality and diversity of the Canadian magazine industry. Coupled with the idea that 
a healthy magazine industry is essential to the maintenance and flourishing of an independent 
national identity and political culture, this assumption has provided a powerful justification 
for restricting the inflow of American split-run magazines.
17 Consumer magazines are usually defined as general interest publications, in contrast to scholarly 
periodicals and special interest publications, such as business, professional, trade, or farm periodicals. 
The distinctions, however are rather fluid. See, for example, Statistics Canada, Industry Profile: 
Periodical Publishing (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1991), p. 1, and Audley, op. cit., in note 1, p. 55.
18 Canada, op. cit., in note 2, p. 55.
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iii) Exports
Before moving on to a consideration of the basis of Canadian periodicals policy, it is 
important to address the role of exports in the Canadian magazine industry. This role has 
always been very small. In 1995, for example, 245 million copies of magazines entered 
Canada and only 12 million went out.19 Only one percent of Canada’s periodical output is 
exported.20 The figures for advertising and circulation revenues beg the question: if American 
publishers have been able to profitably treat North America as a single cultural market, why 
have Canadian publishers not been able to do so? This question often arises during debates 
about cultural protection and so it is worth briefly addressing it here.
The very suggestion that Canadian magazine publishers should relieve their 
difficulties by promoting exports is often seen as heretical. Indeed, publishers and many 
government ministers are quick to claim that it is precisely the Canadian quality of the 
magazines that would make them uninteresting to readers south of the border.21 For many 
magazines, there is no doubt a great deal of truth in that statement. A newsmagazine such as 
Maclean's, which devotes on average only 10 percent of its pages to non-Canadian events, is 
hardly likely to be marketable on any large scale outside of Canada. Indeed, in this respect, 
there is a certain extent to which American news and popular culture are more interesting to 
Canadians (and, for that matter, the rest of the world) than vice-versa.
However, as Keith Acheson and Christopher Maule have noted, the international 
failings of Canadian magazines may arise in part because of the negative ways in which they 
understand their opportunities abroad.22 As an illustration of this point, only one Canadian 
magazine has even tried to establish a split-run edition in the United States. Ironically, the 
US edition failed precisely because it fell foul of Canadian laws designed to target American 
split-runs.23 In this respect, in contrast to newsmagazines, there is no necessary reason to 
believe that some Canadian business, lifestyle, and hobby magazines could not be appealing 
to the general American reader.24 Some of these also have the Canadian revenue base to 
contemplate expansion. In these cases, the potential for exports is one that ought to be taken 
much more seriously. However, given that Canada’s entire publishing industry generates 
little more revenue than US magazine exports to Canada, given the economies of scale
19 The Toronto Star, 13 January 1996, p. K7.
20 ‘Menacing magazines’, M aclean’s, 24 March 1997, p. 54. This figure is very similar to that o f most 
other countries, except the United States, which exports about 5 percent. The Ottawa Citizen, 13 June 
1998, p .B l.
21 Fran?ois de Gaspe Beaubien, President o f Telemedia Publishing, quoted in Maclean's, 24 March 
1997, p. 54.
22 Acheson and Maule, op. cit., in note 1, p. 203.
23 Harrowsmith Country Life, a Canadian magazine, started up a US split-run edition in the early 
1990s. It contravened the provisions o f Canada’s 1995 Excise Tax (a tax targeted at US magazines) 
and was therefore forced to stop publishing its US edition.
24 For a similar argument, see ‘Editorial’, Strategy, 17 August 1998, p. 12.
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inherent in producing magazines for the large US market, and given the problems of 
distribution described above, there ought to be some realism about what can actually be 
achieved by Canadian magazines abroad.25 In this respect, Canadian magazine publishers 
should be more open to the possibility of export revenue and Canadian policies should in no 
case prevent them from exploiting these opportunities. However, as will be set out in greater 
detail in Chapter 9, the primary role of Canadian periodicals is to provide a site for dialogue 
and outlets for artistic expression for the Canadian community. Exports ought to be 
contemplated only in so far as they do not conflict with these central goals. In other words, 
Canadian magazines ought not to alter content simply to become more marketable abroad.
The Basis of Public Policy
The goals of Canadian policy for periodicals have remained virtually unchanged since the 
1960s. Most importantly, successive Canadian governments have prioritised the need to 
create the conditions in which a distinctly Canadian periodicals industry could flourish. As 
the 1961 Royal Commission on Publications (the O’Leary Commission) put it, ‘the 
Commission has no desire to create a protected haven or storm shelter for Canadian 
periodicals....Its sole aim is to secure a climate of competition in which Canadian 
publications now serving Canada worthily, and other publications which may come later to 
serve Canada worthily, shall have a chance to survive’.26 The framing of this question in 
terms of the very survival of the industry has continued to the present day, just as the survival 
and flourishing of Canadian magazines has remained the central goal of policy.
Nonetheless, there has been some change in the subtle remarks that serve to indicate 
precisely why such an indigenous magazine industry should be important.27 Indeed, these are 
never uttered as the main justification of the policy, though in many respects, they are 
necessary to underpin and make sense of the stated policy goal. In this regard, the history of 
Canadian magazine policy reveals one theme that is of great salience and a second that is less 
notable. The theme that recurs most often builds upon notions of national identity, though it 
often appears under the guise of political culture. Indeed, the Canadian government has often 
claimed that magazines are essential for the spread of information and, hence, national 
values. The report of the O’Leary Commission exemplifies this argument and so is worth 
quoting at length:
25 See The Montreal Gazette, 14 January 1995, p. D l; Hoover’s Business Service, http://www.hoovers. 
com/annuals/2/0.2168.11482.00.html. See also Dubinsky, op. cit., in note 1, p. 49.
26 Canada, Royal Commission on Publications, Report (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1961), p. 93.
27 It should be noted that in Canadian cultural debates, the terms ‘indigenous’ and ‘native’ are often 
used to mean something like ‘truly Canadian’. In this usage, they should not be interpreted as a direct 
reference to Canada’s indigenous or native peoples.
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[C]ommunications are the thread which binds together the fibers of a nation.
They can protect a nation’s values and encourage their practice. They can make 
a democratic government possible and better government probable. They can 
soften sectional asperities [sic] and bring honorable compromises. They can 
inform and educate....In these functions it may be claimed—claimed without 
much challenge—that the communications of a nation are as vital to its life as 
its defences, and should receive at least a great measure of national protection.28
Several years later, in supporting legislation to protect magazines, then Prime Minister 
John Diefenbaker made the similar claim that ‘this legislation is necessary in the interest of 
the Canadian identity and as an assurance that Canada’s destiny will be preserved.. ..[U]nless 
action is taken we shall...be dependent entirely or almost entirely on the viewpoint of 
another nation’.29 Similarly, in 1994, the Task Force asserted that ‘[f]ree speech would lose 
much of its potency if there were no Canadian magazines. Without the means to express a 
distinctive voice, speaking to a Canadian audience, cultural expression, social cohesion and a 
sense of national destiny would be impaired’.30 Even more recently, Canada’s Ambassador to 
the United States claimed that ‘Canadians...want to communicate to themselves about 
themselves. There is a need for writers, for television producers, for artists, to focus on what 
is essentially Canadian...for reasons of cohesiveness, for reasons of what differentiates 
Canadians from Americans, for reasons of identity and national unity’.31 Most clearly, 
Canada’s International Trade Minister claimed that ‘what we’re trying to do here is preserve 
our cultural identity through our magazine industry’.32 Indeed, according to a Saturday Night 
editorial, ‘if we depend on these United States centres [New York and Philadelphia] for 
reading matter, we might as well move our government to Washington, for under such 
conditions it will go there in the end’.33 In this sense, it is clear that national identity is a 
central driving force behind the protection of magazines.
It is important to note here that this strand of reasoning clearly exemplifies the 
community-based approach to trade and culture. Indeed, national identity was a central 
theme of the community-based approaches discussed in Chapter 3. Nonetheless, even in the 
arguments above, several separate community-based claims are intertwined. For example, 
national identity, national values, national defence, democratic participation, citizen 
education, free speech, the need to hear distinctive voices, and social cohesiveness all appear 
as reasons why indigenous magazines should be protected. Although this combination clearly
28 Canada, Royal Commission, op. cit., in note 26, p. 4.
29 Litvak and Maule, Cultural Sovereignty, op. cit., in note 1, p. 141. Originally from Hansard, 24 
January 1962.
30 Canada, op. cit., in note 2, p. 63.
31 Quoted in Ben Wildavsky, ‘Culture Clashes’, The National Journal (Vol. 28, No. 12, 23 March, 
1996), p. 648.
32 Art Eggleton, quoted in The Toronto Star, 12 March 1996, p. D2.
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provides rhetorical force, the separate ideas expressed may not actually be consistent with 
one another.
In particular, the comments quoted above rely on the assumption that increased 
communications and the transmittal of particularly Canadian information will necessarily 
lead to a strengthening of national identity. This might be true if the Canadian nation was 
understood only as a civic association rather than an ethnic or cultural one, since knowledge 
about other Canadians and particularly about Canadian political and social conditions could 
be crucial for the continuance of an independent and democratically active polity. 
Unfortunately, however, it is clear that in considering culture and national identity, most of 
the ideas expressed above require something that includes but goes well beyond a narrow 
idea of political culture. They require, in other words, a sense in which Canadian people can 
be understood as a group with greater coherence and value than a simple political 
association. Indeed, in most cases, their claims are underlain by a very particular (though 
often unarticulated) sense of what is meant by ‘Canadian’. The problem is, however, that 
even if it were possible to articulate this vision, Canadian policy-makers are agreed that they 
should not dictate what constitutes legitimately ‘Canadian’ culture. The resulting gap has 
often been bridged by introducing criteria of ownership or production, assuming that 
Canadian culture is that which is produced by Canadians. However, these criteria can hardly 
support the strong associated claims being made about national identity. This argument will 
be taken up again in Chapter 7, where its ethical stance will be interrogated.
The second, and much more minor theme that appears as a justification for magazine 
protection is the idea of freedom of choice. As the statistics presented above demonstrate, 
even without split-run magazines, Canadians were presented with a great variety of 
periodicals, both Canadian and foreign. Indeed, as the Canadian government stressed in a 
1987 report, ‘Canadians are keen internationalists, a vocation implying a depth and breadth 
of choice’.34 However, as the report went on to say, ‘the concern is not with ease of access to 
the products of other cultures, it is rather with the difficulty of access to our own 
products....The effects are economic, to be sure, but our concerns are cultural—the need to 
sustain for Canadians an adequate choice’.35 Indeed, as successive Canadian governments 
have consistently maintained, blocking trade in split-run magazines is not really about 
preventing freedom of information or a lack of Canadian openness to foreign influences. It is 
about maintaining a reasonable number of Canadian magazines amongst the choices 
available to Canadians. The idea of diversity will be addressed again in the conclusion of the 
thesis.
33 Quoted in The Toronto Star, 10 January 1999, no page given.
34 Canada, Department o f Communications, Vital Links: Canadian Cultural Industries (Ottawa: 
Ministry o f Supply and Services, 1987), p. 11.
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Backed by these assumptions, the preservation of a distinctly Canadian magazine 
industry has consistently been the central goal of Canada’s policy for trade and periodicals. 
In turn, the importance of an independent magazine industry has been explained with 
reference to national identity and freedom of choice. In pursuing these goals, Canadian 
policy has consisted of four main instruments. All of these policies have been in place since 
the 1960s and 1970s and provided the policy context of trade in magazines until the WTO 
challenge of the late 1990s.
i) Section 19 and Tariff Item 9958
The two most important legislative measures in support of magazines are Section 19 of 
the Income Tax Act and Customs Tariff Code 9958. Both were first applied to magazines in 
1965 and both were primarily directed at preserving Canadian advertising revenue for 
Canadian magazines by preventing competition from split-run editions. First, Section 19 of 
the Income Tax Act was amended in 1965 to remove the tax deduction on advertisements 
directed at the Canadian market in non-Canadian publications. Notably, the definition of 
non-Canadian magazines was based purely on ownership and corporate direction criteria. In 
order for a magazine to be Canadian, it would have to be directed by ‘a partnership of which 
at least 3/4 of the members are Canadian citizens’ and in which Canadian citizens own at 
least 3/4 of the total value of the partnership property.36 However, this legislation excluded 
special ‘Canadian’ editions of foreign magazines already printing in Canada, namely, Time 
and Reader’s Digest—the two magazines whose Canadian presence had sparked the need for 
protectionism.37
The second policy instrument, Customs Tariff Code 9958, took a slightly different tack 
and was more directly protectionist. It prohibited the following magazines from entering 
Canada:
35 Ibid.
36 Litvak and Maule, Cultural Sovereignty, op. cit., in note 1, Appendix E, p. 132. Reprinted from 
Canada, ‘The Income Tax Act’, Revised Statutes o f  Canada 1952 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1952), 
Chapter 148.
37 In 1943, Reader’s Digest became incorporated in Canada and Time magazine began printing a 
special Canadian edition from Chicago. Since no new editorial content was required, but Canadian 
advertising revenue could be secured, these magazines could operate at a much lower cost than their 
Canadian competitors. Indeed, these new ventures were the first split-runs in Canada. They marked a 
new and unforeseen type o f competition for the Canadian magazine industry, the special Canadian 
editions o f some US magazines were consistently gaining in advertising market share compared to 
Canadian magazines. For example, in 1954, Time and Reader’s Digest had secured 18 percent o f the 
total advertising revenues o f the 12 general interest magazines in Canada. By 1955, their share had 
increased to 37 percent. Several other well-known US magazines were reputed to be planning special 
Canadian editions. In light o f these factors, Canadian magazine publishers began pressing for 
protection, possibly as early as 1952, but definitely by 1956. See Litvak and Maule, Cultural 
Sovereignty, op. cit., in note 1.
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i) special editions, i.e., split-run or regional editions, of a periodical that 
contain an advertisement that is primarily directed to a market in Canada 
and that did not appear in identical form in all editions of that issue of that 
periodical distributed in the country of origin; and
ii) issues of a periodical in which more than 5 per cent of the advertising space 
is used for advertisements primarily directed at Canadians.38
When these two measures were introduced, Canadian publishers were clearly pleased to be 
offered protective measures. However, there was frustration that the most dangerous 
competitors in the Canadian market would remain unchallenged and, in fact, would also be 
protected from any further American competition. Senator O’Leary himself argued against 
the legislation on these grounds, claiming that,
the Government.. .has accepted the principle of our commission’s 
recommendations, and then proceeded to make a mockery of the principle—to 
strangle the principle in its cradle....As someone remarked in the other place 
last week, they have locked the hen-coop door, but they have left two of the 
biggest foxes inside.39
Indeed, it later emerged that many government ministers also supported this view, but felt 
pressured into legislating otherwise. The Canadian Finance Minister, for example, was later 
to admit that ‘the passage of the automotive agreement through the U.S. Congress had run 
into difficulties, and it was felt the agreement might not be approved if a full-scale row 
developed with Mr. Luce [Editor of Time]’.40 In this context, it seems certain that key 
government ministers, including the Finance Minister actually had wanted stronger 
legislation and did not wish to support the exemption of already-existing special Canadian 
editions.
By 1975, the Canadian government was willing to take a more defiant stance. Through 
the introduction of legislation known as Bill C-58, Section 19 of the Income Tax Act was 
again altered. Bill C-58 directed that magazine advertisements purchased by Canadian 
advertisers would not be tax deductible unless they were placed in a magazine that was at 
least 75 percent Canadian-owned and had editorial content at least 80 percent different from 
that of other magazines.41 Time and Reader's Digest were not excluded. The intent of this 
legislation was to discourage Canadian advertisers from purchasing ads in American split-run 
magazines. Clearly, these terms were stringent and they effectively gave Time and Reader’s
38 Ibid., p. 45.
39 Grattan O’Leary, speaking in the Senate on 28 June 1965, quoted by I. Norman Smith, The Journal 
Men (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1974), pp. 162-3.
40 Walter L. Gordon, A Political Memoir (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart Limited, 1977), pp. 205- 
206.
41 Canada, op. cit., in note 2, p. 44.
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Digest the choice between giving up their Canadian operations completely or significantly 
restructuring these operations so as to ‘Canadianise’ the company. This legislation did not 
significantly affect magazines already operating outside of Canada, since they were still 
subject to Tariff Item 9958 which restricted entry into Canada of magazines containing more 
than 5 percent advertising directed at the Canadian market. In practice, it was reasonably 
effective, although Time magazine was able to lower its ad rates sufficiently to compensate 
advertisers for the lost deduction.
Together, Section 19 and Tariff Item 9958 diverted ad revenues away from US 
magazines and towards their Canadian competitors. This led to a vast increase in the overall 
health of the magazine industry in Canada42 and has been directly credited with the 
emergence of Canada’s first weekly newsmagazine.43 For the 30 years they were in place, 
these legislative items were highly successful in meeting Canadian policy goals. They 
secured advertising revenues for Canadian magazines, without interfering with the inflow of 
‘overflow’ circulation. Importantly, these policies had no effect on the importation of 
American magazines that did not seek Canadian ad revenues.
ii) Postal Subsidy
The third element of Canadian policy was the postal subsidy. This measure dated back 
to the early twentieth century and was designed to contain the costs to readers of delivering 
magazines in a country as large and thinly populated as Canada. It should be noted that the 
subsidy did not cover all postage costs, but offered concessionary second-class postage rates 
for publishers. Initially, the subsidy was granted to all forms of magazine produced in 
Canada, including free circulation-controlled copies and foreign split-run editions (for the 
time from 1943-1965 in which they flourished in the Canadian market).44 Foreign magazines 
mailed from outside of Canada would pay their mailing rates directly to their own post 
offices. However, many American magazines are shipped in bulk to Canada and then mailed 
to Canadian subscribers through the Canadian postal system. Rates for these magazines were 
initially kept low to encourage publishers to use the Canadian rather than American postal
42 From 1975 to 1989, ‘the number o f Canadian consumer magazines doubled, and their share o f the 
domestic market increased from 20 percent to almost 40 percent, with the top 42 magazines in this 
country reaching an average o f 70 percent o f the Canadian population in any given month’. Canadian 
Magazine Publishers Association, The Importance o f  Section 19 o f  the Income Tax Act and Tariff Item 
9958 to the Canadian Magazine Industry (Toronto: Canadian Magazine Publishers Association, 1991), 
p. 4. Moreover, advertising revenues were actually drawn towards magazines and away from other 
media. Litvak and Maule, ‘Bill C-58’, op. cit., in note 1, p. 76.
43 Ibid., p. 82. See also Litvak and Maule, Impact, op. cit., in note 1 and Sutherland, op. cit., in note 11, 
pp. 260-63.
44 Audley, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 75-77. See also, Canadian Periodical Publishers Association, A Brief 
to the Federal Cultural Policy Review Committee (Toronto: Canadian Periodical Publishers 
Association, no date given), pp. 14-17, and Canada, Department o f  Communications, op. cit., in note 
34, p. 38.
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system. However, by 1990, for example, made-in-Canada magazines were charged an 
average of 6.6 cents per copy, while foreign magazines shipped in bulk to Canada were 
charged an average of 42.3 cents per copy.45 As a result, the postal subsidy became one of the 
main grounds upon which foreign magazines protested that they were being discriminated 
against. Further, in 1991, the Canadian government began phasing out the subsidy for all 
magazines except paid-circulation, Canadian-owned magazines.46 Since Reader's Digest had 
opted to become ,a full Canadian magazine under C-58, this change actually affected only 
Time magazine, but it nonetheless strengthened the general grounds for complaint by 
American, mailed-in-Canada magazines.
iii) Grants
The final policy means for protecting magazines in Canada (and the only one to not be 
challenged by the United States at some time)47 came in the form of grants. Since its 
inception in 1957, the Canada Council has acted as an arm’s length body allocating 
government grants to numerous cultural endeavours. Each year, it provides about C$2 
million in direct grants to magazine publishers for the purposes of publication, translation, 
and promotion of their periodicals.48 More limited financial assistance is also provided by 
other federal government departments, as well as provincial and municipal governments.49
Conclusions
In this context, several themes can be drawn out before the discussion moves on to consider 
the two events in Canada-United States trading relations. First, it is important to remember 
that what is at issue between Canada and the United States is not the trade in US magazines 
produced for the US market. Instead, the disputes centre on editions of US magazines which 
are identical in content to their US counterparts, but which contain advertisements directed at 
the Canadian market and so compete for advertising revenues. In other words, the disputes 
deal only with a very particular sub-category of US magazines. Trade in magazines between 
the two countries is inhibited only in this category.
Second, the disputes are not only about physical limitations to cross-border trade. In
45 The Toronto Star, 11 February 1990, p. FI. For more on the postal subsidy in the 1990s, see 
Dubinsky, op. cit., in note 1, especially pp. 44-45.
46 Statistics Canada, Periodical Publishing 1990-1991 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1991), p. 5.
47 Two factors account for this. First, most governments, including that o f the United States have a 
significant program o f direct and arm’s length government aid for cultural endeavours. Second, 
subsidies paid exclusively and directly to domestic producers were allowed under GATT 1948. This 
continues under Article III of GATT 1994.
48 See Canadian Periodical Publishers Association, op. cit., in note 44, pp. 18-20.
49 For more information on other government agencies, see Canada, Department o f  Communications, 
op. cit., in note 34, p. 38.
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important respects, they are also complaints about the discriminatory nature of particular 
Canadian domestic periodicals policies. Some of these policies, such as Tariff 9958, are 
discriminatory trade measures, while others, such as the postal subsidy, were developed with 
specific domestic conditions in mind. In this way, these disputes reflect the increasing 
tendency for domestic regulations to be evaluated by the extent to which they inhibit or 
facilitate trade, even when traditional protectionism is not the aim of legislation. Using the 
expressions of neo-liberal IPE, Canadian policies are exemplary of the ‘new protectionism’.50
Third, for at least four decades, the Canadian government (and much of the Canadian 
public) has perceived the issue in terms of the very survival of the Canadian magazine 
industry. Further, they view a domestic magazine industry as important because they accept 
the legitimacy of arguments linking cultural industries to national identity. In contrast, the 
American government and American publishers have perceived the issue as a simple case of 
fair market access. They do not accept the legitimacy of a connection between magazines and 
national identity, preferring to see this claim as paternalistic towards consumers and as a 
guise for protection of vested interests in the Canadian magazine industry.
These three points provide the initial framework within which the details of Canada- 
United States trade in periodicals can be understood. The following chapter will highlight 
two particular examples of tension between Canada and the United States. It will reinforce 
the claims made above, while also demonstrating how the market-based and community- 
based approaches have played out in actual disagreements surrounding periodicals and trade.
50 .On the new protectionism, see for example, Melvyn Krauss, The New Protectionism: The Welfare 
State and International Trade (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979). For an interesting discussion o f  the idea of 
‘new’ protectionism, see James Mayall, ‘Reflections on the New Economic Nationalism’, Review o f  
International Studies (Vol. 10, No. 4, 1984), pp. 313-21, and Gunnar Sjostedt and Bengt Sundelius 
(eds.), Free Trade—Managed Trade? Perspectives On A Realistic International Order (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1985).
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Chapter 5
Canada-U.S. Disputes Over Periodicals: 
The Approaches Illustrated
Building on the general discussion of the previous chapter, this chapter will highlight two 
particular instances in which Canadian attempts to implement a policy protecting periodicals 
resulted in disputes between the two governments. An examination of the positions taken by 
the governments, opposition groups, publishers, and advertisers demonstrates the precise 
ways in which the market-based and community-based approaches have played out in 
practice. It also provides greater insight into the ways in which these disagreements 
increasingly do not simply involve the movement of goods across borders, but also 
encompass some regulations that were once considered largely in the domain of domestic 
policy.
The chapter will conclude with the claim that US publishers and policy-makers rely 
very heavily upon market-based assertions, even when their actions are not consistent with 
free market logic. Similarly, the Canadian government has trumpeted the rhetoric of 
community-based positions (national identity, in particular), even when, in practice, it has 
sometimes balanced these concerns against economic or other policy interests. This chapter 
will attempt to do justice to the variety of positions in Canada, while showing how the 
majority of Canadian opinion has nonetheless converged around a broad community-based 
position.
The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
As was noted in Chapter 3, cultural issues were especially salient during the negotiation of 
the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in the late 1980s. In particular, from 
the time that negotiations were first discussed in 1985 until the deal was ratified in Canada in 
1988, the cultural terms of the agreement were high on the list of public concerns in Canada. 
Some general observations about culture and the agreement will be made before the 
implications of this agreement for periodicals are assessed.
As was briefly noted in Chapter 2, the 1980s marked a new period in Canadian cultural 
policy. Essentially, the Canadian government no longer had the financial resources to 
continue the expansionary cultural policy that had characterised the 1960s and 1970s. This
83
brought repeated and substantial cuts to government spending on culture.1 More importantly, 
however, it brought a greater concern for the economic dimensions of cultural policy and 
thereby led to an increased sympathy for those approaches to culture which emphasise the 
optimal allocation of scarce resources, namely market-based approaches. Throughout the 
1980s, the Canadian government was relying increasingly on the term ‘cultural industries’2 
and attempting to restructure its cultural policies so as to get the most ‘bang for its buck’, 
both in cultural and economic terms. In response, many cultural lobby groups added their 
economic potential to their (long) list of arguments for support.3 Despite this new 
consideration of economic factors, it is crucial to note that this period did not change the 
dominance of community-based approaches in Canadian cultural policy-making. As we will 
see, despite the harsh economic climate, community-based approaches continued to represent 
the dominant influence on the views of most Canadians on issues of Canadian culture. This is 
the general context in which discussions surrounding Canada-United States Free Trade were 
initiated.
After several months of rumour and discussion, Prime Minister Mulroney announced 
to the House of Commons in September of 1985 that he had ‘spoken to the President of the 
United States to express Canadas [sic] interests in pursuing a new trade agreement between 
our two countries’ and had ‘asked the President to explore with Congress their interest in 
pursuing these negotiations’.4 From the very beginning, the Canadian government was keen 
to reassure Canadians that culture would not be on the negotiating table. Mulroney stated in 
September 1985 that ‘[o]ur unique cultural identity is not at issue in these negotiations’.5 He 
repeated this claim to an American audience in December, stating that ‘[w]hen it comes to 
discussing better trade rules for cultural industries you will have to understand that what we 
call cultural sovereignty is as vital to our national life as political sovereignty’.6 Joe Clark, 
then Minister of External Affairs, was equally forthright, uttering the now-famous statement: 
‘Canada’s cultural identity is not negotiable’.7
1 On this point, see D. Paul Schafer and Andre Fortier, Review o f  Federal Policies fo r  the Arts in 
Canada (1944-1988) (Ottawa: The Canadian Conference of the Arts, 1989), p. 50.
2 George Woodcock, Strange Bedfellows: The State and the Arts in Canada (Vancouver: Douglas and 
McIntyre, 1985), p. 128.
3 Abraham Rotstein, ‘The Use and Misuse o f  Economics’, in Rowland Lorimer and Donald C. Wilson 
(eds.), Communication Canada: Issues in Broadcasting and New Technologies (Toronto: Kagan and 
Woo, 1988), pp. 140-56, and Joanne Boucher, Funding Culture: Current Arguments on the Economic 
Importance o f  the Arts and Culture, Ontario Legislative Library Current Issue Paper 158 (Toronto: 
Legislative Research Service, 1995).
4 Quoted in Duncan Cameron, ‘Introduction’, in Duncan Cameron (ed.), Canada Under Free Trade 
(Toronto: James Lorimer, 1993), p. xvi.
5 Quoted in Susan Crean, ‘Cultural Sovereignty: Negotiating the “Non-Negotiable”’, in Cameron (ed.), 
op. cit., in note 4, p. 174.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., p. 175. Clark’s comments were made at a meeting o f the New York chapter o f the Foreign 
Policy Association, while Mulroney spoke before a Chicago audience. Given that culture had been a
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However, a document leaked from the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) several days 
earlier suggested that the government’s approach to culture was a lot more complex. It 
clearly indicated that the government perceived itself to be trapped between a desire to 
undertake free trade and a fear that this initiative would be rejected by the Canadian people. 
The PMO clearly believed that ‘the merits of the case for going to the negotiating table are 
not merely strong, they are overwhelming’.8 However, as the document put it, ‘while 
Canadian economic nationalism is declining, Canadian nationalism, pure and simple, is not’ .9 
As a result, ‘targets of critics should be consistently narrowed. Broad issues such as 
sovereignty and cultural integrity should be seen as not negotiable’.10
The complexity of the Canadian government’s position is also reflected in a comment 
written by the External Affairs Minister on the eve of negotiations. The statement begins 
with a brief discussion of the benefits that Canada could secure from a broad free trade 
agreement with the United States. In this spirit, it warns Canadians that ‘ [i]t is virtually 
impossible to reach a good deal by placing the negotiators in a straitjacket of exemptions 
before they can even sit down. Exemptions invite further exemptions and can eventually 
ensure that a good deal is no longer achievable’.11 Having issued this disclaimer, he claimed 
that the issue of culture and trade actually entails two separate questions. The first is the 
vitality and support of Canadian culture. On this issue, he claimed that ‘[t]he issue of whether 
or not specific Canadian cultural industries require special measures to assist them is a 
domestic issue that falls outside trade negotiations’.12 The second and separate issue involves 
the negotiation of trade rules that might affect cultural industries. In this regard, Clark’s view 
was, superficially, that cultural industries should not be exempt from the greater benefits that 
a trade agreement would bring. However, the very fact that Clark has separated these two 
issues and that he focused on the benefits of free trade for culture suggest that he was 
sensitive to the importance of culture but that he did not want to jeopardise a broader trade 
agreement by vehemently insisting from the outset on a complete exemption for cultural 
industries.
Nonetheless, whether for pragmatic or principled reasons, the Canadian government 
clearly took the position that Canadian cultural policies ought to be exempted from the final
relatively low profile issue in the US, their comments did little more than puzzle their respective 
audiences. Michael Hart, Decision at Midnight: Inside the Canada-US Free-Trade Negotiations 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994), p. 111.
8 ‘Communications Strategy for Canada-U.S. Bilateral Trade Initiative’, attributed to the Prime 
Minister’s Office, originally printed in The Toronto Star, 20 September 1985, p. A l. Reprinted in 
Cameron (ed.), op. cit., in note 4, p. 7.
9 Ibid., p. 5.
10 Ibid., p. 7.
11 Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, ‘Trade Negotiations and Cultural Industries’, 15 December 1995, reprinted in 
Canada, Department o f External Affairs, Canadian Trade Negotiations: Introduction, Selected 
Documents, Further Reading.
12 Ibid.
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agreement. This was reflected in the course of negotiations. Cultural issues were left 
untouched until late into the negotiations and even then, Canadian negotiators continually 
repeated ‘the litany that Canadian culture was sacrosanct and not part of these negotiations’.13 
In this sense, the government clearly sensed the depth of feeling on cultural issues in Canada 
and remained committed throughout the negotiations to the community-based principle that 
culture ought not to be treated as a good like any other.
In contrast, American negotiators and senior politicians took a consistent market-based 
approach. They repeatedly maintained that what was being exported was not culture, but 
simply entertainment. American negotiators also commonly used the language of freedom of 
information. They criticised the Canadian government for seeking to protect its cultural 
industries and inhibiting the free flow of information.
In this context, it is interesting to note the role that US market rhetoric played in the 
negotiations of the 1988 FTA.14 Graham Carr argues that the Canadian desire to exempt 
culture from the agreements (the ‘strategy of exemptionalism’) was built on the assumption 
that the Canadian cultural tradition is based on a high degree of subsidisation, protection, and 
regulation, while the American approach is not. In accepting this position, Canadian 
negotiators ignored the significant degrees of American government support for culture.15 
More importantly, however, Carr argues that the Canadian acceptance of American market- 
based rhetoric on cultural issues has led to the ‘perception that American cultural policies are 
normal in a free trade arrangement, while Canadian actions are not’.16 This, according to 
Carr, is confirmed by the free trade agreement. Not only did the Americans expect that 
Canada would be more likely than the United States to exercise the exemption, but 
‘[virtually every policy change dictated by the agreement...involved adjustments to be made 
by Canada rather than the United States’.17 The issue here is not so much who would be 
required to give up more, but rather that by accepting US free market rhetoric as the premise 
of Canadian negotiating strategy on this issue, Canada accepted a position which ‘made its 
claims for special protection appear more extraordinary—and American concessions more 
magnanimous—that they really are’.18 In so doing, Canada jeopardised the legitimacy of its 
cultural ends, at least as far as trading relations with the United States are concerned.
13 Hart, op. cit., in note 7, p. 264.
14 Graham Carr, Trade Liberalization and the Political Economy o f  Culture: An International 
Perspective on FTA, Occasional Paper No. 6, Series in Canadian-American Public Policy (Orono, ME: 
The Canadian-American Center, The University of Maine, 1991).
15 Carr estimates that direct funding for culture from all levels o f US government amounted to US$2.4 
billion in 1985. This hardly compares with his estimate o f C$3.3 billion in Canada. Nonetheless, US 
government involvement is clearly not negligible. Moreover, the governments o f both countries also 
act as regulators. Ibid., pp. 14-17.
Ibid., p. 11.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
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Given these political considerations, it is hardly surprising that when an 
comprehensive free trade agreement was finally reached, the cultural provisions did not 
completely live up to the Canadian government’s promises of full exemption. And yet, by an 
interesting twist of words, neither did they deny these promises.
The cultural provisions of the agreement are set out below. It should be noted that 
these provisions were adopted word for word into the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), and so they continue to apply currently. They are:
Art. 2005(1): ‘Cultural industries are exempt from the provisions of this 
Agreement, except as provided in Article 401 (Tariff Elimination), paragraph 4 
of Article 1607 (divestiture of an indirect acquisition) and Articles 2006 
(Retransmission Rights) and 2007 (Print-in-Canada Requirement) of this 
Chapter’;
Art. 2005(2): ‘Notwithstanding any other provision of the Agreement, a Party 
may take measures of equivalent commercial effect in response to actions that 
would have been inconsistent with this Agreement but for paragraph I ’.19
The Canadian government maintained that it had upheld its commitment to exempt cultural 
industries, while critics argued that the achievements of paragraph 1 in this regard had 
immediately been given away in paragraph 2. Indeed, cultural critics (and there were many) 
were vehement in their criticisms of the Canadian government’s handling of the agreement, 
suggesting that by not securing a complete exemption, the government had set a precedent 
for treatment of culture as a commodity. In their view, this virtually opened the way for a 
wholesale sell-out of Canadian identity. Books and pamphlets abounded suggesting that an 
acceptance of the agreement would entail an end to the Canadian nation, not simply on 
cultural grounds, but also because Canada’s unique health, labour, environmental, and social 
programmes would all be threatened.20
In spite of criticisms levelled at the agreement from many sides, the FTA was signed 
in September 1988. However, it could not be ratified by the Canadian government until after 
a November federal election. Not surprisingly, the FTA was a central issue in the campaign. 
As John Herd Thompson and Stephen Randall have noted, ‘emotions and rhetoric mounted to 
a crescendo in the Canadian national election.. ..The opposition Liberal and New Democratic 
Parties made rejection of the FTA, and suspicion and fear of the United States, the focus of 
their electoral campaigns’.21 Nonetheless, the Mulroney government was returned with a 
majority and the FTA was ratified.
19 The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (Ottawa: Department o f External Affairs, 1988)
20 For a sampling, see the contributions to Michael D. Henderson (ed.), The Future on the Table: 
Canada and the Free Trade Issue (Toronto: Masterpress, 1987), and Cameron (ed.), op. cit., in note 4.
21 John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies, 
Second Edition (Athens, GA: The University o f Georgia Press, 1997), p. 288.
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The effects of the FTA on periodicals were threefold. First, a relatively inconspicuous 
Article 2007 required a repeal of certain provisions of 1975’s Bill C-58. In particular, the 
conditions defining a Canadian periodical were to be modified so that typesetting and 
printing in Canada were no longer required in order for advertisers to claim tax 
deductibility.22 However, the requirement that qualifying periodicals be owned and managed 
by Canadians remained untouched. In practice, this modification to C-58 was easily 
accomplished and has had little impact on the magazine industry as a whole.23
Second, certain services related to cultural industries were excluded from the cultural 
exemption.24 Of particular interest to the periodical industry is the exclusion of advertising 
and promotional services. In practice, however, this provision has proved to be of little 
importance, most notably because ensuing debates between Canada and the United States 
have centred on magazines as a good rather than on their role in providing advertising 
services. It is only in the past few years that the long-simmering dispute about split-runs has 
been characterised, in international trade terms, as a question of advertising services. Since 
then, the issue has arisen twice. In the first instance, the issue was referred to a World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) dispute panel, which decided that the presence of service issues did not 
negate the discriminatory issues concerning trade in goods. In the second case, the issue was 
settled bilaterally after the United States threatened retaliation under the WTO and under the 
‘notwithstanding’ clause of the NAFTA cultural exemption. The exclusion of advertising 
services under the FTA has simply never arisen.
The third, and most significant way in which periodicals were affected by the FTA 
arises from the overall thrust of the cultural exemption and the ‘notwithstanding’ clause. As 
was noted above, many critics of the FTA warned that the ‘notwithstanding’ clause would, in 
practice, negate the cultural exemption and would open Canada to broad, cross-sectoral 
retaliation for any action deemed discriminatory. In the case of magazines, this prediction did 
not come true for quite some time. When it did, however, it proved to be of massive 
importance. Without wishing to reveal the story to follow, it should be noted that the United 
States later used this ‘notwithstanding’ clause to threaten massive and disproportional 
retaliation in a flare-up of the split-run issue. As a direct result of these threats, Canada was 
forced to compromise and enacted a piece of legislation that seriously compromised the 
gains of Bill C-58. As one commentator summed it up in 1995, ‘[according to bureaucrats I 
have spoken to, they feel we have been painted into a very tight comer with the
22 McCarthy and McCarthy (Barristers and Solicitors), The Canada-United States Free Trade 
Agreement: An Analysis, January 1998, pp. 23-4. See also Canadian Magazine Publishers Association, 
Canadian Magazine Publishing, unpublished paper, 23 May 1989, p. 4.
23 Fraser Sutherland, The Monthly Epic: A History o f  Canadian Magazines, 1789-1989 (Markham: 
Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1989), p. 259.
24 McCarthy and McCarthy, op. cit., in note 22, p. 20. The full list o f  these services is found in Annex 
1408 o f the FTA.
‘notwithstanding’ clause and the Americans have shown every inclination to take full 
advantage of that provision’.25
In this context, several important observations about the FTA can be made. Clearly, 
the Canadian government had chosen to compromise a full cultural exemption in order to 
achieve a comprehensive trade agreement. Nonetheless, it recognised the depth of support for 
community-based principles in Canada, and defended the so-called cultural exemption on 
these grounds. In this regard, the criticisms levelled at the government must be regarded as 
internal critiques, in the sense that they censured the government for not going far enough in 
defending culture. The nature of this relationship between the Canadian government and its 
critics raises two important points. First, the internal nature of these criticisms highlights the 
extent to which there is general agreement within Canada on the need to protect cultural 
goods because of their broader, non-commercial importance for the national community. 
There remains a great deal of disagreement about the means and extent of protection, but this 
does not deny the salience of community-based approaches in Canada.
Second, because of this strength of feeling about the importance of culture, protection 
of magazines has virtually become a non-negotiable political issue. In other words, even 
some political parties who generally support free trade and might be ideologically likely to 
support free trade in cultural goods, including magazines, have nonetheless protected their 
political interests by appealing to community-based arguments supporting the protection of 
magazines.26 In this sense, Canadian groups, including the government and publishers could 
also be accused of using community-based rhetoric to support their own interests. However, 
this rhetoric would hardly be useful or convincing if it was not based in a significant strength 
of feeling on the part of Canadians as a whole, many of whom have no economic interest in 
preserving a vigorous Canadian magazine industry. In this sense, the concept of ‘interests’ as 
understood by political economists does little to capture the sense in which Canadian culture 
is important for many Canadians. The reasons for this will become clearer in subsequent 
chapters.
Sports Illustrated and the WTO Challenge
Apart from the small modification required by the FTA, Section 19 of the Income Tax Act 
(amended in 1975) and Tariff Item 9958 remained Canada’s main instruments of support for 
magazines until 1995. They were not perfect pieces of legislation, but together they ensured a 
stable and supportive policy context for Canada’s magazine industry. However, by 1993,
25 Keith Kelly, Executive Director o f the Canadian Conference o f the Arts, quoted in The Toronto Star, 
11 December 1995, p. A9.
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technological advances gave American magazine publishers the means to circumvent the 
law.27 The Canadian government attempted to develop new means to reinforce the intent of 
C-58 and Tariff Item 9958 and in so doing, reawakened the magazine dispute with the United 
States.
The issue came to public attention in early 1993 when Time Inc. announced its 
intention to publish a split-run edition of Sports Illustrated in Canada.28 As will be recalled, 
Tariff Item 9958 virtually prohibited split-run editions by stopping at the border any 
magazine with more than 5 percent advertising intended for the Canadian market. C-58, in 
turn, made it difficult for an American magazine based in Canada to secure Canadian 
advertising. With Sports Illustrated, Time Inc. proposed to circumvent these difficulties by 
sending the split-run issue electronically from their editorial offices in the United States to a 
printing plant near Toronto. As the magazines never technically crossed through a border 
point, the applicability and enforceability of Tariff Item 9958 was seriously in question.
The first issue of Sports Illustrated (Canada) appeared on 6 April 1993. Predictably, it 
caused an uproar amongst Canadian magazine publishers. Their fear was not so much about 
Sports Illustrated (Canada)—as Time Inc. had rightly pointed out, there was no Canadian 
general interest sports magazine that would be losing ad revenues as a result of the Canadian 
Sports Illustrated,29 Moreover, on a cost per thousand readers, full page ad rates in Sports 
Illustrated (Canada) were actually broadly comparably with the same rates in Maclean’s, 
although they were well below Sports Illustrated’s rates in US cities.30 In other words, it was 
not obvious that Sports Illustrated was competing unfairly within the Canadian market. 
Primarily, Canada’s magazine publishers were concerned that Sports Illustrated would set a 
precedent for other American magazines, eventually eroding the entire policy structure which 
they credited with creating a vital Canadian magazine industry in the first place. Indeed, 
many commentators chastised the Canadian government for not having updated the law
26 As will be discussed below, a notable exception to this position is the view often taken by the 
Reform Party.
27 No doubt, this will not be the last time that technological developments will encourage national 
cultural policies to be challenged. Indeed, the potential effects o f  the Internet and other digital 
technologies should not be underestimated. However, it is only Sports Illustrated that is under 
discussion here.
28 Time Inc. is the parent firm for Time magazine, Time Canada, and Sports Illustrated.
29 The Washington Post, 8 April 1993, p. B 11.
30 Prior to producing the split-run edition, Sports Illustrated had a Canadian circulation of about 
180,000. At a full-page ad rate o f C$6250, the cost per thousand readers would be $34.72, significantly 
lower than Maclean's $45.68 cost per thousand. However, at the time the Canadian tax was being 
debated, statistics showed Sports Illustrated with a Canadian circulation o f only 125,000 and a 
corresponding cost per thousand o f $50. See The Washington Post, 8 April 1993, p. B l l ;  The New 
York Times, 11 March 1996, p. D l; and The Montreal Gazette, 14 January 1995, p. D l. On the 
comparison to US cities, see Canada, A Question o f  Balance: Report o f  the Task Force on the 
Canadian Magazine Industry (Ottawa: Minister o f Supply and Services Canada, 1994), p. 45, n. 16. 
The cost per thousand in major US cities was roughly twice that charged by Sports Illustrated in 
Canada.
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before anyone attempted to circumvent it. As had happened before, the Canadian government 
was left in the awkward position of having to make new policies in response to a direct 
challenge to the old ones, and with vested interests already in place.
Faced with these issues, the response of the Canadian government was predictably 
confused. Their first reaction was to convey a firm conviction to support Canadian 
magazines. Communications Minister Perrin Beatty claimed that the federal government 
would do ‘everything in its powers’ to prevent a Sports Illustrated Canadian edition from 
siphoning ad revenues needed by ‘real’ Canadian magazines.31 How this would be done, 
however, remained a mystery. To complicate matters further, Revenue Canada (Canada’s 
revenue ministry) decided that they had no authority to apply Tariff Item 9958 to electronic 
transmissions, leaving the Canadian government struggling to respond to the policy 
challenge posed by Sports Illustrated.32 The Revenue Minister was left spluttering that he 
would personally confiscate every issue of the magazine—a rash statement that he later 
recanted, claiming that he had not adequately considered the interests of the Canadian 
printing plant.33
In this context, and within a month of the first issue of Sports Illustrated (Canada), the 
Canadian government announced the creation of a special Task Force on the Canadian 
Magazine Industry. The Task Force, led by Patrick O’Callaghan and Roger Tasse, was given 
until the end of 1993 to ‘propose measures that will enable the Government to effectively 
carry through on its policy objective of ensuring that Canadians have access to Canadian 
ideas and information through genuinely Canadian magazines’.34 In particular, it was 
instructed to assess the marketplace for Canadian magazine publishers (including the 
advertising market and new technologies), to review existing policy mechanisms, and to 
suggest a renewed framework of support.35 It was clear that the Canadian government did not 
want to reevaluate its long-standing policy objectives and the community-based reasoning 
behind them. Instead, its aim in setting up the Task Force was to ascertain how to continue 
the status quo established by C-58 and Tariff Item 9958 in the face of new technological 
developments.
As an aside, it should be noted that although the Canadian government’s policy 
objectives had remained the same, their justification had slightly shifted. The issue of 
survival remained salient. However, the language of Canadian national identity had subtly 
evolved into the need to hear ‘Canadian voices telling Canadian stories’.36 This became
11 The Toronto Star, 3 February 1993, p. D6.
32 The Washington Post, 8 April 1993, p. B 11.
33 The San Diego Union-Tribune, 16 April 1993, p. D-2.
34 Canada, op. cit., in note 30, p. 83.
35 Ibid., pp. 83-4.
36 M aclean’s, 25 January 1999, p. 30.
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evident in the brief given to the Task Force and has continued as the central government 
justification for its magazine policy. There can be no doubt that such a shift away from a 
singular national identity and towards more diverse ‘voices’ was necessary in light of 
Canada’s increasing cultural diversity. However, this shift did not remove the problem of 
defining what a Canadian voice or idea might be. As a result, and as we will see below, a 
shift away from the central concept of Canadian content was eventually required, as much to 
avoid domestic cultural essentialisation as to placate foreign competitors.
In March of 1994, the Task Force released its final report. In it, the Task Force 
reiterated the importance of Canadian magazines to national identity, stressing all the 
familiar community-based themes. It reaffirmed the findings of all previous commissions 
and committees with regard to the poor economic health of the magazine industry and the 
centrality of public policy measures to ensure a level playing field for Canadian magazines.37 
In particular, it examined circulation and advertising revenues, and fixed and variable costs 
in both the Canadian and US market and asserted that ‘there is nothing in our research that 
would lead us to believe that policy measures currently in place have made the Canadian 
industry any less efficient or profit-conscious than its foreign counterparts’.38 Moreover, as 
described above, it estimated the potential results of allowing split-runs to freely enter the 
Canadian advertising market. On this they were clear: ‘some Canadian magazines would 
simply stop publishing altogether and others, in attempting to stay competitive, would reduce 
the budget for quality editorial content. The number of pages of editorial (non-advertising) 
content would decrease, and circulation would decline....The end result would soon be 
evident: a downward spiral’.39 The viability of the Canadian periodical industry was 
perceived to be at great risk. In this light, the Task Force asserted that strong measures must 
be taken to maintain the support necessary for the government’s policy objectives to continue 
to be met. Moreover, they claimed that ‘[i]t is possible to strike a balance between Canada’s 
international trade commitments and our legitimate concerns about cultural development’.40
In this spirit, the Task Force made eleven recommendations. Among them were 
recommendations that Tariff Item 9958 be preserved in its present form, that Canadian 
periodical publishers be required to publish annual information on ownership and editorial 
content, that the Investment Minister be required to consult with the Heritage Minister in 
reviewing cultural investment, and that the government set up regular task forces to assess
37 On the findings o f these earlier commissions and committees, see Isaiah Litvak and Christopher 
Maule, Cultural Sovereignty: The Time and Reader’s Digest Case in Canada (New York, NY: Praeger 
Publishers, 1974), and Canada, Royal Commission on Publications, Report (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 
1961).
38 Canada, op. cit., in note 30, pp. iv and 27.
39 Ibid., p. v.
40 Ibid.
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any necessary new measures.41 By far the most important recommendation, however, 
suggested levying an excise tax on any ‘periodical distributed in Canada that contains 
advertisements primarily directed at Canadians and editorial content which is substantially 
the same as the editorial content of one or more issues...of periodicals that contain 
advertisements that...are not directed at Canadians’.42 The tax would be levied at 80 percent 
of the amount charged for all advertising in the offending issue and would be paid by the 
printer or distributor of the magazine. Furthermore, the Task Force recommended that split- 
run magazines already publishing in Canada (i.e., Sports Illustrated) should be exempt, but 
only for the number of issues that they distributed in Canada in 1993.
Almost as an aside to the main recommendations, the Task Force made one additional, 
very important suggestion. Essentially, they argued that the government should remove the 
concept of Canadian content from its pivotal role in defining Canadian cultural policy. They 
suggested that the government should replace this with the concept of ‘original content’, or 
editorial content that has not previously been published elsewhere and is not simultaneously 
being published elsewhere.43 In justifying this shift, they stated that ‘it is better to aim wide 
and comply with Canada’s trade obligations...than to target a narrow field and end up in 
protracted disputes with Canada’s principal trading partners’.44 Although the Task Force did 
not touch on any further justifications for this suggestion, it is clear that a shift to original 
content would avoid the considerable difficulties that the Canadian government has had in 
adequately and fairly defining what constitutes Canadian content. As we will see below, this 
suggestion was not seriously considered by the government until 1997. However, as the 
conclusion to this thesis will argue, the shift towards original content is a crucial one in 
assuring the democratic and pluralist development of Canadian cultural policy.
The reaction to the recommendations was overwhelming. Immediately, the Heritage 
Minister announced that he would strive for a quick official response to the 
recommendations. As it turned out, his reaction was hardly quick, and in the meantime, many 
other parties voiced their opinions and sought to influence the debate. Sports Illustrated was 
the first to react, claiming that they were about to publish more than their exempted seven 
issues and warning that if the government imposed an excise tax, they would consider it 
‘impairment and confiscation of our business’.45 Reinforcing this view of the issue as purely 
commercial, Time Inc. claimed that ‘[t]he new tax...is not really a tax, but a thinly disguised 
means of driving us out of business’.46
41 For a summary o f all 11 recommendations, see ibid., pp. vi-viii.
42 Ibid., p. vi.
43 Ibid., p. 66.
44 Ibid.
45 The Ottawa Citizen, 25 March 1994.
46 The Toronto Star, 23 December 1994, p. A l.
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The magazine industry expressed its frustration that the Task Force had not made 
bolder recommendations. They felt that the Task Force ought to have taken account of the 
fact that, in proposing legislation, the Canadian government was likely to water down the 
Task Force recommendations. The Task Force chair replied, stating that they had deliberately 
chosen a ‘pragmatic’ approach in order to respect Canada’s trade commitments, and in the 
hopes that the government would be more likely to effect their recommendations.47
Within several months, it became clear that this pragmatic strategy had paid off. It was 
rumoured that the government was preparing legislation to effect the 80 percent excise tax 
and that it was not preparing an exemption for Sports Illustrated. When news of these 
measures leaked out, the American administration hit back with a vengeance. United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) Mickey Kantor lobbied the Canadian government to delay the 
legislation. He described the tax in pure market-based terms, as ‘concrete evidence of an 
increasing and disturbing trend in Canada toward the implementation of policies which are 
intended to protect Canadian industry by discriminating against legitimate US broadcasting, 
publishing and copyright interests in Canada’.48 At the same time, he threatened retaliation in 
the cultural sector, and rumours abounded that a specific hit list of targets for retaliation was 
being drawn up in Washington.49 Nonetheless, on 22 December, Canada’s Heritage Minister 
announced that the tax would be implemented as soon as legislation to support it was drawn 
up.50 Predictably, Washington was outraged, but claimed that they needed time to study the 
issue. Indeed, the Canadian government, too, needed time to draft the legislation, and so the 
issue was quiet again for the first few months of 1995.51
In September of 1995, the Canadian government formally introduced the promised 
legislation into the House of Commons. In the debate that followed, Canada’s Liberal 
government, as well as the Conservative and New Democratic parties supported the 
legislation. Reform Party MPs took the opposing position. Always more inclined towards 
market-based arguments, they argued that the tax was unfair and unnecessary and that 
Canada should not enact legislation that would lead to a trade war with the United States.52 If 
Canada was serious about helping magazines, one Reform Party MP stated, it should reduce 
taxes that hurt the profitability of all magazines.53 Predictably, when Canadian magazine 
publishers were invited to present to the House Committee, they reasserted the dire
47 The Toronto Star, 26 March 1994, p. A24.
48 The Washington Post, 23 December 1994, p. A17. To put his comments in perspective, the Canadian 
policy decision came only days after a Canadian court refused to hear an appeal from Country Music 
Television relating to its replacement on the air by a Canadian country music cable channel.
49 The Toronto Star, 21 December 1994, p. A l.
50 New York Times, 22 December 1994, p. D l.
51 The Montreal Gazette, 1 February, 1995, p. B2.
52 The Toronto Star, 26 September 1995, p. A 13.
53 Marte Solberg, MP, quoted in The Toronto Star, 26 September 1995, p. A13.
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predictions made by the Task Force should split-runs be allowed.54
Officials from Time Inc. were invited to make a presentation to the House Committee, 
in which they repeated their market-based claim that the proposed law was ‘unfair, 
discriminatory and represents the effective confiscation of a commercial enterprise that was 
legitimately established in Canada’.55 Moreover, they threatened that the US government 
would retaliate under the ‘notwithstanding’ clause in NAFTA’s cultural provisions. Finally, 
Time Inc. suggested that the law would violate Canadian Constitutional guarantees on 
freedom of expression for Canadian advertisers.56 Again, the arguments against Canadian 
policy relied mainly on market-based reasoning.57
Indeed, just as Time Inc. promised, as the Bill passed in the Canadian Senate, the US 
government began to make serious threats of retaliation. In a December statement, USTR 
Kantor again referred exclusively to commercial considerations, claiming that the Canadian 
action was ‘directly contrary to the open trade and investment relationship we have worked 
so hard to establish’. Moreover, he claimed that he was ‘profoundly disappointed’ that 
Canada had chosen ‘to evict a US business enterprise that was established in Canada 
consistent with Canadian law’.58 The Bill was passed on 14 December 1995 and again, the 
dispute went quiet as the US administration considered its response. Sports Illustrated 
discontinued its Canadian edition.
In March of 1996, pursuant to Time Inc.’s complaint to the USTR, the US government 
announced that it would lodge a formal complaint against the Canadian tax with the WTO. 
At the request of Time Inc., the complaint also included Tariff Item 9958, and two postal 
subsidy measures.59 On 11 March, the United States requested consultations with Canada. 
When these failed to produce an agreement, the United States formally requested that a WTO 
dispute settlement panel be established. The panel was convened in late 1996.
Before discussing the arguments presented by both parties, it is revealing to question 
the logic behind the United States decision to use the WTO dispute-settlement mechanism. 
United States thinking on this matter seems to have been two-fold. First, the United States 
clearly felt that their case was strong enough to withstand WTO scrutiny. Success at the 
WTO would give them firmer grounds for retaliation than the use of the ‘notwithstanding’ 
clause of NAFTA. Second, the United States very much wanted this case to set a very public 
and universally-applicable precedent. In the words of Kantor, ‘ [w]e want to say to the world
54 The Toronto Star, 20 October 1995, p. A 12.
55 The Toronto Star, 19 October 1995, p. A16.
56 Ibid.
57 As we will see in the next chapter, arguments emphasising freedom are a central, though often 
implicit, element o f market-based claims.
58 The Ottawa Citizen, 16 December 1995, p. E4.
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that this is not to be tolerated....[T]he US is prepared to act on so-called cultural issues’.60 
Since the 1970s, cultural goods have remained amongst the most profitable US exports. In 
the 1990s, for example, cultural exports were the second-largest revenue earners, after the 
aerospace industry. Nonetheless, cultural exports have been (and still are) consistently under 
threat from culturally protectionist policies throughout the world. In this context, it is clear 
why the United States was so eager to set a market-based precedent in its response to the 
Canadian actions.
Clearly, the argument could also be made that presenting a cultural dispute before the 
WTO is itself indicative of a market-based approach to trade and culture. During the 
Uruguay Round, the United States had not succeeded in convincing its trading partners that 
culture ought to be treated commercially and therefore included in the agreement. Bringing a 
cultural case before the WTO would establish a market-based precedent for the treatment of 
culture and so, as Keith Acheson and Christopher Maule note, ‘would be a chance to...win a 
partial victory’.61 Even if one does not accept that bringing an issue before the rules-based 
system of trade constitutes a market-based strategy, some American comments in this regard 
shed light on their particular view, which was clearly market-based. In particular, in 
announcing the WTO action, Kantor made an important claim which clearly betrayed the 
market-based approach of the United States. He repeated his dim view of Canadian policies 
claiming, ‘[w]hat they’re trying to do is protect the financial and economic viability of a 
Canadian industry, not the cultural identity of a people’.62 Most obviously, this statement 
focuses on commercial concerns and dismisses cultural ones. More importantly, however, in 
an effort to delegitimise Canadian policies, it characterises industry protection and the 
promotion of national identity as mutually exclusive activities. This is highly typical of 
market-based approaches, and, notably, it is in direct contrast to the Canadian community- 
based policy which has consistently viewed these activities as inseparable, at least vis-a-vis 
magazines.
To return to the WTO dispute resolution panel, the grounds of the US complaint 
involved the simple market-based argument that the Canadian policies were discriminatory 
against US magazines and therefore were inconsistent with General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) obligations. According to the United States, Canadian measures 
‘effectively prevent US and foreign-produced magazines either from entering the Canadian
59 That this was at the request o f Time Inc. is claimed in ‘A Blow to Magazines’, Maclean ’s, 27 
January 1997, p. 58, and Keith Acheson and Christopher Maule, Much Ado About Culture: North 
American Trade Disputes (Ann Arbor, MI: University o f Michigan Press, 1999), p. 193.
60 Financial Times, 12 March 1996, p. 4. Similar quotes can also be found in The Washington Post, 12 
March 1996, p. C3.
61 Acheson and Maule, op. cit., in note 59, p. 201.
62 USTR Mickey Kantor, quoted in The Washington Post, 12 March 1996, p. C3.
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market or from competing on an equal footing with their Canadian rivals when they do’.63 
Specifically, the United States claimed that Tariff Code 9958 violated Article XI of GATT 
1994, which prohibits quantitative import quotas. Regarding the excise tax, the United States 
argued that Article III of GATT 1994 (national treatment) could be applied to advertising in 
magazines, and therefore, that the tax could be seen to discriminate between like products, 
namely foreign split-run and domestic periodicals. Finally, the United States claimed that 
differential postal rates were applied to Canadian and foreign publications, and that the 
funding for the lower rates could be constituted a subsidy. If proven, these measures were 
also in violation of Article III.64
The Canadian government made several general points. First, they reasserted the 
community-based claim that Canadian measures should not be considered protectionism. 
Instead, they should be seen as ‘a legitimate response to an anti-competitive abuse in the 
advertising field, with the ultimate object of ensuring the survival of a distinct Canadian 
culture’.65 Moreover, they claimed that the measures did not prevent foreign magazines from 
entering the Canadian market, so long as these did not contain Canadian advertising. Far 
from discouraging readership of foreign magazines, the Canadian government argued, their 
measures were designed to maintain an environment in which Canadian magazines could 
exist alongside foreign ones.
In response to the particular claims of the United States, the Canadian government 
made several different arguments. Regarding Item 9958, they argued that it was justified 
under Article XX(d),66 on the grounds that it was necessary to secure compliance with other 
legislation, namely, Section 19 of the Income Tax Act. Regarding the excise tax, Canada 
made two different arguments. First, they claimed that the issue should be understood as a 
dispute over advertising services and should not be considered under GATT provisions at all, 
but under the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS). In negotiating the GATS, 
Canada deliberately had not made any national treatment commitments with regard to 
advertising services. In this regard, they argued that they were not violating any agreements 
with regard to advertising services. Second, however, if the provisions of GATT 1994 were 
found to apply, Canada argued that foreign split-runs and Canadian magazines are not like 
products, but are qualitatively different on the basis of their editorial content. Hence, treating
63 The Toronto Star, 11 October 1996, p. A25.
64 The US case before the WTO panel is set out in WTO, Canada—Certain Measures Concerning 
Periodicals, Report o f  the Panel, 14 March 1997, document number WT/DS31/R, available from 
http://www.wto.org. The US position is also summarised in Acheson and Maule, op. cit., in note 59, 
pp. 194-96.
65 Quoted in The National Journal (Vol. 28, No. 12, 23 March 1996), p. 648.
66 ‘[N]othing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party o f measures:... (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are 
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement’. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
1947, Article XX (d).
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the two products differently does not violate Article III. Regarding the postal subsidy, 
Canada argued that it was a legitimate subsidy under Article III, since it is one paid 
exclusively to domestic producers, through the Canada Post Corporation.67
In January of 1997, the WTO panel’s interim report was leaked. It suggested that the 
panel was about to rule in favour of the United States regarding the excise tax, Tariff Item 
9958 and one aspect of Canada’s publication mail system. The legitimacy of postal subsidies 
for Canadian periodicals was to be upheld.68 These claims were confirmed when the WTO 
Panel Report was made public in March 1997. Regarding the excise tax, the Panel dismissed 
Canada’s claim that the dispute should be considered solely in terms of services. They were 
not convinced that Canada’s tax was intended as a measure regulating trade in advertising 
services. In particular, they cited numerous comments made by the Canadian government 
which suggested that split-run magazines were primarily the target of the legislation. 
Moreover, they did not accept that any exception under GATS should ‘exonerate Canada 
from the Panel’s scrutiny regarding the alleged violation of its obligations...under GATT 
1994’.69 In other words, in cases where the obligations of GATT 1994 conflict with non­
obligations under GATS, GATT 1994 obligations should not be ignored. This is an important 
precedent which now applies, as Canada noted, to any situation where trade in a good is 
bound up with an exempted service. Having established this jurisdiction, they ruled that 
Canadian magazines and American split-run issues could be considered Tike products’. As a 
result, it was determined that the Excise Tax was discriminatory under Article III:2.70 
Regarding Tariff Item 9958, the panel ruled that it was not necessary to secure other 
legislation, namely Section 19. It was therefore ruled inconsistent with Article XI of GATT 
1994, concerning import prohibitions. Finally, they ruled that certain parts of Canada’s postal 
subsidy scheme were in violation of Article 111:4 concerning national treatment.71
Canada’s Heritage and Trade Ministers were stunned and vowed to appeal as soon as 
the final ruling was issued.72 In the words of the Heritage Minister, Sheila Copps, ‘[w]e will 
not taking this sitting down’.73 Indeed, the government appealed the ruling at the end of 
April. At the same time, they began actively seeking new ways of promoting Canadian policy 
objectives, should the ruling stand. Importantly, the United States also appealed the findings 
of the WTO on postal subsidies. In July 1997, the WTO appeals panel ruled to uphold the 
initial rulings on the excise tax and 9958, and judged in favour of the American appeal with
67 Similarly, Canada’s position is set out in WTO, op. cit., in note 64, and summarised in Acheson and 
Maule, op. cit., in note 59, pp. 194-96.
68 For the full text o f the ruling, see WTO, op. cit., in note 64, pp. 65-77.
69 WTO, op. cit., in note 64, p. 68.
70 Ibid., p. 71.
71 Ibid., p. 73.
72 ‘A Blow to Magazines’, op. cit., in note 59, p. 58.
73 Ibid.
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regard to postal subsidies.74 The former ruling had largely been expected, but the latter was a 
complete surprise.75 Paradoxically, Canada’s appeal had resulted in an even greater loss than 
in the first judgement. Canada was given 15 months to adjust to the decisions, if it wished to 
avoid US retaliation. During this time existing policies could remain in force.
The Canadian government’s reaction was surprisingly muted. The Trade and Heritage 
Ministers expressed their disappointment, but did not criticise the WTO directly. 
Furthermore, they reinforced their concern for Canadian culture, claiming that ‘we’ll be 
looking at new ways to attain our policy objectives that are consistent with the WTO 
ruling’.76 True to their community-based logic, they were also anxious to point out that the 
WTO ruling did not challenge the ability of any member to take measures to protect its 
cultural identity.77 Instead, the Canadian ministers interpreted the ruling as a judgement 
against the particular means that Canada had used to achieve its cultural policy objective.
Throughout the autumn of 1997 and the spring of 1998, the Departments of Heritage 
and Trade, in cooperation with the Canadian Magazine Publishers Association and several 
trade lawyers, struggled to find a policy measure that would continue to protect the market 
for Canadian magazine advertising without contravening Canada’s international trade 
obligations. On 29 July 1998, the Heritage and Trade Ministers outlined their proposal for 
new legislation to protect magazines. In keeping with the WTO ruling, the legislation would 
repeal Tariff Item 9958 and suspend the excise tax. It would also harmonise postal rates for 
foreign and Canadian magazines at the lower domestic rate. To replace the excise tax, the 
Ministers proposed to ban Canadian companies from advertising in American split-run or 
‘Canadian’ editions, with the exception of Time and Reader’s Digest. The ban would be 
backed up with a court order to cease publication of the ad, followed by a hefty fine (up to 
C$250,000). But, in a strange twist designed to avoid a Charter of Rights challenge from 
advertisers, the proposed legislation would be directed against the foreign publishers who 
had ‘solicited’ Canadian advertising, rather than against the advertisers. The Ministers gave 
no details of how they proposed to enforce the fines against foreign companies, stating 
instead that ‘[w]e expect that [American publications] will respect the law’.78 Clearly, the
74 The substance o f the Canadian and American appeals and details o f the panel’s findings are found in 
WTO, Canada—Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, Report o f  the Appellate Body, 30 June 
1997, document number WT/DS31/AB/R, available from http://www.wto.org. It should be noted that 
the Appellate Body overturned the initial panel’s finding that Canadian and split-run magazines were 
like products. However, it found these magazines to be ‘directly competitive or substitutable’, thereby 
allowing the conclusions o f the initial panel regarding Article III to be upheld. Report o f  the Appellate 
Body, Section VI (b), pp. 16-22.
75 The Toronto Star, 1 July 1997, p. A l.
76 Heritage Minister Sheila Copps quoted in The Montreal Gazette, 2 July 1997, p. F2.
77 The Journal o f  Commerce, 17 March 1997, p. 1A. See also WTO, op. cit., in note 64, p. 77. As noted 
above, the ruling did, however, declare that American split-runs and Canadian magazines are ‘like 
products’.
78 The Ottawa Citizen, 30 July 1998, p. A3.
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intent of the legislation was to deter foreign publications from accepting Canadian ads. 
However, it is not clear how the legislation would act as a deterrent, since the fine could not 
legitimately be collected unless the publisher had assets in Canada. In any case, as we will 
see, enforcement of this bill never became an issue.
The United States claimed the new policy was ‘the same old story’ and derided it as 
‘protectionist and discriminatory’, ‘anti-competitive’, and ‘every bit as inconsistent with 
Canada’s international trade obligations as its current discriminatory practices’.79 The new 
USTR, Charlene Barshefsky, had already established her market-based credentials, claiming 
at her confirmation hearing, ‘we do object to the use of culture as an excuse to take 
commercial advantage of the United States, or as an excuse to evict American companies 
from the Canadian market’.80 In this spirit, she demanded immediate consultations with the 
Canadian government. Indeed, for the next few months, Washington tried hard to prevent the 
proposals from being introduced to Parliament.81 Nonetheless, despite US protestations, the 
government introduced the legislation (Bill C-55, otherwise known as the Foreign Publishers 
Advertising Services Act) into the House of Commons in October 1998. As the Bill moved 
through its readings in the House, the United States continued to express its displeasure. 
Barshefsky accused Canada of ignoring international trade rules. Furthermore, rumours 
began circulating that the United States was seriously exploring potential areas of 
retaliation.82
In Parliament, support for and opposition to the Bill was broadly the same as during 
the debate about excise taxes. The Liberals, Conservatives, and NDP broadly supported the 
Bill, while the Reform Party opposed it. In particular, Reform MPs repeated their claim that 
they did not wish to risk an all-out trade war with the United States. As MP Inky Mark put it, 
‘[w]hy put our whole economy at risk for this bill?’83 Lest there be any confusion about the 
position of the Reform Party, a spokesman later accused the government of planning to 
‘confiscate millions of dollars for their 19th century protectionist policies’.84 Similar views 
were also expressed by the conservative newspaper The National Post and by several 
independent newspaper columnists. In this regard, the Reform Party and the Post provide 
examples of the diversity of opinion within Canada. However, it is important to recall that 
they were both important exceptions to the broad level of support for community-based 
policies in Canada.
Canadian advertisers and US magazines with a Canadian interest were also derisive,
79 US Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, quoted in Folio, 30 November 1998 and The Ottawa 
Citizen, 30 July 1998, p. A3.
80 Quoted in The Toronto Star, 1 February 1997, p. FI.
81 The Ottawa Citizen, 16 September 1998, no page given.
82 The Ottawa Citizen, 7 November 1998, p. A3.
83 Quoted in The Ottawa Citizen, 23 January 1999, p. 1.
84 Deborah Grey, MP, quoted in The Buffalo News, 1 June 1999, p. 3D.
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claiming that the legislation was no more than a tactic of intimidation against advertisers and 
foreign publishers. According to them, and several notable press critics, it made ‘common 
criminals’ out of publishers and advertisers.85 As one Ottawa lawyer noted, the bill ‘moves a 
quantum step in the direction of a criminal type of provision’.86 Further, advertisers and 
publishers charged that it interfered with freedom of the press.87 On a similar basis, Canadian 
advertisers claimed to be preparing a Charter of Rights challenge to the bill on the grounds 
that it violated free speech’.88 Finally, Canadian advertisers claimed that, in terms of 
Canadian cultural goals, the Bill would be self-defeating since its prohibitions depend on 
who owns a magazine, not on whether it contains any Canadian content.89
By December, the US government was preparing for an all-out diplomatic assault 
designed to prevent the Bill from passing into law. Threats of a massive trade war were 
widespread.90 According to former Presidential Trade Advisor Bill Merkin, the United States 
was planning across-the-board retaliation, including key sectors such as steel and financial 
industries. The purpose of such broad retaliatory threats was to create division within 
Canadian society, forcing other business sectors to oppose the cultural legislation.91 Although 
the potential damage caused by retaliation was serious, many Canadian commentators felt 
that the United States was merely rattling its sabres, hoping that threats of retaliation would 
cause Canadian legislators to reconsider the Bill. A spokesman for Barshefsky later denied 
that any list of retaliatory targets had been drawn up.92 However, even without a firm list, the 
very possibility of retaliation was heightening tensions in Canada. In response, the Canadian 
government postponed its consideration of C-55 into the New Year 1999.
Just as consideration of the Bill was about to resume, the Deputy USTR gave notice 
that if the Bill was passed, the United States would target Canada’s steel, wood, and textile 
industries.93 There had been some initial murmurs that the United States might take Bill C-55 
before another dispute resolution panel of the WTO. However, as threats of US retaliation
85 Editorial from The National Post, quoted in The Toronto Star, 14 January 1999, no page given. 
Similar claims were made by Time Inc. and quoted in The Ottawa Citizen, 19 November 1998, p. D 11. 
For press comments, see the editorials in Strategy, 17 August 1998, p. 12; The Montreal Gazette, 1 
December 1998, p. E3; The Toronto Star, 1 December 1998, no page given; and The Montreal Gazette, 
8 February 1999, p. A 11.
86 Clifford Sosnow, quoted in The Ottawa Citizen, 16 January 1999, p. B l.
87 The Ottawa Citizen, 19 November, 1998, p. D l l .  See also The Montreal Gazette, 1 December 1998, 
p. E3.
88 Ron Lund, president o f the Association o f Canadian Advertisers, quoted in The Ottawa Citizen, 16 
March 1999, p. A l.
89 The Ottawa Citizen, 16 January 1999, p. B l.
90 At about this time, the US was also engaged in a heated WTO battle with the European Union over 
Central American bananas. It is not clear exactly how this affected US actions in the magazine dispute. 
Clearly, the banana case was more important to the US at this time. Nonetheless, it was widely 
perceived in Canada that the US might take an unusually tough stance towards Canada in order to send 
a message to its other trading partners. See The Ottawa Citizen, 12 December 1998.
91 The Ottawa Citizen, 1 December 1998, p. B l.
92 The Ottawa Citizen, 12 December 1998, p. HI.
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against the legislation became stronger, it emerged that they intended to act under the terms 
of the NAFTA ‘notwithstanding’ clause. In particular, it was argued that they wished to do so 
not only because it would be quicker, but because it would largely be unilateral—the onus 
would then be on Canada to justify a reversal of US action.94 Moreover, the United States 
maintained that Canada’s new policy was the ‘same old thing’ and so did not merit a new 
consideration of it by the WTO.95 As it turned out, Canada claimed that it had prepared the 
legislation carefully to withstand a WTO challenge, but they were not prepared for a possible 
$3-4 billion retaliation under the NAFTA ‘notwithstanding’ clause. Indeed, it seems that the 
United States was prepared to use a wide variety of tactics to support its goal of freer 
competition in the Canadian magazine market.
US threats and Canadian declarations of confidence continued through the early 
months of 1999. Both parties seemed intent on asserting and reasserting their respective 
positions. Indeed, a senior US official claimed that C-55 was about nothing more than 
protecting Canada’s two biggest media companies (Maclean-Hunter and Telemedia),96 and 
Time's editor in Canada argued that Canadian policy had enabled Canada to ‘wrap itself in 
the flag of culture with what is essentially a bankrupt economic argument’.97 Along similar 
lines, a senior US trade official said that ‘[t]his is pure protectionism to keep US companies 
from operating in Canada....It isn’t a cultural issue but protectionism disguised as culture’.98 
The Deputy USTR reinforced these claims, stating that ‘ [t]his doesn’t have anything to do 
with culture—this is a purely commercial matter’.99 Reiterating a common market-based 
claim, he argued that ‘this is not an issue of culture, but of consumer choice’.100 He also put 
forward an interesting theory of cultural diversity, arguing that ‘competition is the best way 
to achieve cultural diversity....The objective here is to enhance freedom of speech, freedom 
of choice, multiculturalism, and diversity within Canada. I think that’s what the Canadian 
government would like too’.101
Canadian officials claimed that ‘ [i]f the only standard is market competition, 
obviously the stories that are uniquely ours will be swamped in a larger market. So you have 
to say that, for culture, it isn’t simply a market issue, it’s also an issue of cultural choice and
93 The Ottawa Citizen, 10 January 1999, p. C l.
94 Journal o f  Commerce, 14 January 1999, p. 3 A. In this context, it should be noted that, unlike the 
WTO, NAFTA has no formal dispute resolution mechanisms. As a result, any retaliation justified 
under NAFTA would be costly and time-consuming to reverse.
95 The Ottawa Citizen, 30 July 1998, p. A3.
96 Anonymous official quoted in The Ottawa Citizen, 13 January 1999, p. C l and Journal o f  
Commerce, 14 January 1999, p. 3A.
97 Quoted in ‘Magazine Trade Wars’, Columbia Journalism Review  (January/February 1999), p. 20.
98 Quoted in The Ottawa Citizen, 16 September 1998, no page given.
99 Richard Fisher, quoted in Maclean's, 25 January 1999, p. 30.
100 Jay Ziegler, spokesman for the Office of the US Trade Representative, quoted in The Washington 
Post, 9 October 1998, p. A40.
101 Richard Fisher, quoted in The Ottawa Citizen, 13 March 1999, p. A3.
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cultural space for our own country’.102 In a more abrasive tone, Canada’s Minister for 
International Trade charged that Americans either ‘don’t want to understand or...can’t 
understand what we mean by the word culture’.103 In turn, the Canadian Heritage Minister 
became fond of saying, ‘[c]ulture is not pork bellies’.104 Indeed, if there were any doubts 
about the commitment of the two governments to market-based and community-based 
positions respectively, a Canadian negotiator summed it up neatly, stating that ‘our bottom 
line is all about [Canadian] content and storytelling. And their bottom line is all about access 
to the Canadian market’.105
Yet, behind the scenes, representatives of both governments were working all-out to 
negotiate a workable solution. The public atmosphere was rancorous with top politicians on 
both sides accusing each other of bad faith and personal attacks.106 Then, in mid-March, the 
parties appeared to be nearing a compromise—it emerged that the United States had offered 
some possible amendments to C-55 that Canada was willing to discuss.107 Paradoxically, as 
the debate on C-55 was still proceeding in the Canadian Senate, high-level Canadian 
negotiators were entering serious discussions with the United States about possible 
amendments.108 The negotiations were rough, and both parties walked out several times. 
Finally, however, at the end of May, negotiators announced that they had reached a final- 
hour deal on C-55. Under the agreement, American magazines in Canada can have as much 
as 18 percent of their advertising directed at a Canadian audience.109 Foreign magazines can 
claim a greater percentage if the Canadian edition contains greater than 51 percent original 
content. Furthermore, the Canadian government agreed to allow up to 100 percent foreign 
ownership of periodical publishing businesses, provided that these periodicals contained a 
‘substantial’ level of original content.110 Full tax deductibility on advertisements will be 
allowed for publications that contain at least 80 percent original content. The amended 
legislation was quickly passed through the Senate and approved by Cabinet.
102 Interview with Heritage Minister Sheila Copps, reprinted in The Ottawa Citizen, 30 January 1999, p. 
B3.
103 Interview with Sergio Marchi, Canada’s International Trade Minister, reprinted in The Ottawa 
Citizen, 9 January 1999, p. B3.
104 Sheila Copps, quoted in ‘Lowering the gate’, M aclean’s 10 February 1997, p. 17 and in ‘Destiny 
Undefined’, The Economist, no page given.
105 Anonymous official, quoted in The Toronto Star, 29 April 1999.
106 See, for example, The Toronto Star, 25 January 1999, no page given.
107 The Ottawa Citizen, 12 March, 1999, p. D4.
108 Senators were somewhat sceptical about this approach. See for example, The Ottawa Citizen, 19 
April 1999, p. A6. They eventually were convinced by the Heritage Minister that the amendments 
would not significantly change the law they were debating.
109 The 18 percent will be phased in over three years, with 12 percent allowed in first year, and 15 
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110 ‘Substantial’ has yet to be defined by the Canadian government. See Canada, Canadian Heritage 
News Release, ‘Canada and United States Sign Agreement on Periodicals’, 4 June 1999. Available at 
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Although this was not a central policy issue, it should be noted that the revised C-55 
was the first Canadian cultural policy to rely on the idea of original content rather than 
Canadian content. In keeping with this, C-55 also removed ownership criteria from the 
definition of a ‘Canadian’ magazine. Although foreign takeovers of Canadian magazines will 
not be allowed, new magazines may be 100 percent foreign owned and still be considered 
‘Canadian’ as long as they meet original content requirements. It seems that this was a long- 
delayed reaction to the recommendation of the 1994 Task Force. Furthermore, Canadian 
content issues were a big sticking point in the negotiations surrounding Bill C-55. In this 
context, it is possible that the idea of ‘original content’ was part of the compromise reached 
by Canadian and American negotiators. Whatever the reasoning, this shift has important 
implications for the ethics of cultural policy. These implications will be addressed in the 
conclusion of the thesis.
The Canadian government was quick to defend the agreement, claiming that they had 
allowed Americans access to only ‘18 percent of the pie’.111 Furthermore, they argued that 
this is the first time ‘the US has recognized cultural protection and promotion as a legitimate 
objective’.112 Canadian advertisers were also generally satisfied with the agreement, claiming 
that they were happy to have more choices than under the proposed C-55.113 Canadian 
magazine publishers and many Canadian commentators were much less enthusiastic. In 
particular, they argued that the Canadian government had forsaken their promise to protect 
magazines and had given in to American bullying tactics. According to them, if several big 
American magazines were to enter the Canadian market, they could capture up to 75 percent 
of total advertising revenues in Canada without violating the 18 percent rule.114 In fact, 
several big American magazines have since expressed interest in starting Canadian 
editions.115 The Canadian government has responded to these critics by proposing a 
programme of subsidies to Canadian magazine publishers. At the time of writing, however, 
no details of this plan have been released. In this regard, it remains to be seen how effective 
the new legislation will be in promoting Canadian cultural goals.
The US government expressed satisfaction with the outcome of negotiations. 
Barshefsky said that she was ‘pleased that we have negotiated a settlement to this long­
standing dispute with our largest trading partner’.116 Setting out the specific achievements of 
the agreement, she focused, not surprisingly, on commercial gains: ‘[i]t will increase market 
access in clear and predictable ways, address anti-competitive regulatory concerns and
111 The New York Times, 27 May 1999, p. C5.
112 Heritage Minister Sheila Copps, quoted in The Washington Post, 27 May 1999, p. E3.
113 The Toronto Star, op. cit., in note 177.
114 The Toronto Star, 28 May 1999, no page given.
115 ‘Trade War Over Magazines?’, Media Week (Vol. 9, No. 22, 31 May 1999), p. 50.
116 Quoted in The New York Times, 27 May 1999, p. C5.
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provide tax and investment benefits and opportunities for foreign publishers in Canada’.117 
However, it is not clear that the US government was completely satisfied with the agreement. 
Indeed, US officials were keen to downplay the possibility that the agreement had set a 
precedent for cultural concerns, saying that this was merely a ‘garden-variety’ commercial 
dispute that had no connection to cultural issues.118 However, it seems more likely that the 
opposite was true, namely that the United States failed to achieve a fully commercial 
settlement and so it did not wish the precedent to be noted. Indeed, in a cryptic statement that 
carefully avoided legitimising the cultural claims made by Canada, an official claimed that 
the United States had been fully willing to ‘temporise’ its demands for full and open 
competition ‘out of respect for the dynamics of this issue in Canada and the respect that 
President Clinton has for the prime minister’.119
Despite this final policy compromise, it is clear that there has been no real ‘meeting of 
minds’ between the community-based and market-based approaches. Indeed, Canada 
continues to assert that it has a right to ensure the survival of its cultural industries, and US 
interests continue to press for increasing liberalisation in the cultural sphere. The periodicals 
issue may now go through another quiet phase, but the question of market vs. community is 
far from solved. As Acheson and Maule noted in early 1999, ‘[f]urther rounds of the same 
unproductive engagement appear inevitable’.120
Conclusions
This historical discussion has aimed to show how different ideas about the relationship 
between trade and culture have been manifest in Canadian cultural policy and American 
responses to it. In this context, several summary observations can be made.
The past 25 years has been a time of broad agreement within Canada about the need to 
protect Canadian ad revenues from split-run or nominally ‘Canadian’ editions. This is not to 
suggest that there has been agreement about the means by which this protection should be 
assured, nor about the reasons why periodicals should be protected. Nonetheless, the rhetoric 
of Canadian magazine publishers and most Canadian policy-makers has relied upon a strong 
connection between ad revenues, the survival of an independent magazine industry, and the 
health of the national community. In essence, the Canadian position has broadly exemplified 
the community-based approach, in its many strands. Indeed, the Canadian government’s 
many references to national identity, unity, and the importance of civic debate suggest that at 
least several strands of the community-based approach are relevant to understanding their
117 Ibid.
118 The Washington Post, 27 May 1999, p. E03.
119 Anonymous official quoted in ibid.
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stated position.
Moreover, even though Canadian protectionist rhetoric can often be shameless, there is 
definitely more than simple economic self-interest underlying the Canadian position. Indeed, 
Canada has very few cultural exports and the magazine industry makes only a small 
contribution to the Canadian economy. Even the two biggest publishers in Canada have 
relatively little influence with the government, compared to the large US lobbies.121 
However, questions of cultural sovereignty are highly emotive issues in the Canadian polity 
and few governments have wanted to challenge this strength of feeling. In this sense, the 
positions taken by different Canadian governments have no doubt partially reflected their 
own interests in reelection. However, to understand cultural policy as an instrument of 
bureaucratic self-perpetuation is to miss the point. Indeed, the point is precisely that cultural 
issues are important to many Canadians. More importantly, this is so for reasons that cannot 
be understood through the narrow lens of economic interests. It is only with a deeper 
understanding of values that the consensus on community-based approaches can properly be 
understood. Nonetheless, as we will see in later chapters, the Canadian approach to culture 
has hardly been faultless. In particular, Canadian policy has focused heavily on national 
identity and so, ironically, has essentialised the Canadian community and thereby 
underestimated the need for a meaningfully democratic cultural policy. What is entailed by 
democracy and how this conflicts with an essentialised concept of national identity will be 
the subject of Chapters 7 through 9.
The rhetoric of magazine publishers is also riddled with declarations indicating 
support for a community-based position. Indeed, much of this is no doubt pure rhetoric. 
However, as was suggested above, this rhetoric carries a resonance within Canadian society 
that far exceeds its economic importance. Indeed, it is virtually unquestioned in Canada that 
an end to protection would mean the end of a vigorous Canadian magazine industry. Without 
this industry, the common story goes, Canada’s very sense of itself as a society would be 
threatened. As a result, even the most protectionist arguments of magazine publishers, rightly 
or wrongly, resonate with and are legitimated by the strength of community-based arguments 
in Canada.
There have, of course, always been vocal dissenters within Canada. The 1920s through 
to the 1950s, for example, were marked by great dissent within the Canadian parliament 
about the need for protectionist measures for magazines. Indeed, Prime Ministers Mackenzie 
King and John Diefenbaker, at different times each gave very traditional market-based
120 Acheson and Maule, op. cit., in note 59, p. 204.
121 The Toronto Star, 16 January 1999, no page given.
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defences of freer trade in magazines.122 However, since a broad consensus emerged in the 
1960s, such a defence has been heard much less frequently from Canadian sources. Several 
academics, such as Steven Globerman, some politicians, a few news commentators, and the 
Canadian advertising lobby have been the chief exceptions. Even when the Reform Party 
disagreed with periodicals policy in the 1990s, they usually did not claim that Canadian 
magazines should not be protected. Instead, they relied on the argument that ‘saving’ 
Canadian magazines was not worth an all-out trade war with the United States. Similarly, in 
opposing limitations on the advertising market, Canadian advertisers have consistently tried 
to justify their position in terms of the benefits to the Canadian magazine industry. In both 
cases, opposition was based partly on pragmatic opposition to particular policy instruments 
and partly in a challenge to community-based principles.
In contrast, American magazine publishers and the US government have (outwardly at 
least) consistently defended a market-based position. They have persistently refused to 
recognise that there might be a relevant connection between culture and cultural industries. 
In all the dealings described above, they have sought to treat periodicals as merely a good 
like any other, with no other meanings or understandings attached. Not that such a position is 
without its own rhetoric. As was evident above, the United States hardly hesitates to imply 
that economic right is on its side, and that Canada is merely being an unruly and selfish 
trading partner. Even more importantly, the United States is often ready to ‘throw its weight 
around’, threatening massive (and often unjustifiable) retaliation as a prelude to (or substitute 
for) a rules-based solution. Indeed, the rhetoric of the market-based approach often seems to 
conceal a national commercial strategy that is coincident but not always consistent with the 
free market. As was the case with the Canadian position, when the rhetoric is peeled away, a 
different angle on the dispute can be discerned. In the case of the United States, one only has 
to be reminded of the strong export position of American cultural goods, of the persistent US 
trade deficit, and of the immense influence of American media giants with Washington DC, 
to realise that the issue runs deeper than their professed commitment to free trade. In this 
case, as in many others, free trade rhetoric is the province of the stronger power.123
In this sense, several important issues become clear. First, this chapter has reinforced 
the claims of earlier chapters about the importance of market-based and community-based
122 On King’s viewpoint, see Isaiah Litvak and Christopher Maule, Cultural Sovereignty: The Time and 
Reader’s Digest Case in Canada (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 23-27, and H.F. 
Angus (ed.), Canada and Her Great Neighbor: Sociological Surveys o f  Opinions and Attitudes in 
Canada Concerning the United States (Toronto: The Ryerson Press for the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1938), p. 322. On Diefenbaker, see Litvak and Maule, Cultural Sovereignty, pp. 
64-73.
123 On the notion that free trade is the doctrine o f the economic ‘top dog’, see, for example, J. Gallagher 
and R. Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, Economic History Review (Vol. 4, No. 1, 1953) and 
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins o f Our Time (Boston, 
MA: Beacon Press, 1944).
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approaches in characterising ideas about free trade and culture. Second, with a few notable 
exceptions, the broad Canadian view (especially recently) has been dominated by different 
strands of the community-based approach and the American view has been characterised by 
market-based ideas. Indeed, even whether one believes that cultural meanings could possibly 
have a non-commercial relevance seems to depend on one’s initial leanings in the market- 
based/community-based debate. Third, it is clear that over the years, Canadian culture has 
gradually become an unavoidably international (or at least bilateral) issue. Whatever 
proponents of the community-based approach may argue about the need for the community 
to exclusively decide community issues, this is no longer an option for Canadian periodicals. 
Indeed, magazines policy is not a matter of domestic regulation alone. Increasingly, the task 
of Canadian legislators is to find an appropriate balance between Canadian cultural needs and 
international market requirements. In this realm, American interests and the potential impact 
on Canada’s international trading commitments are now an inescapable part of the policy 
landscape.
It is clear that, the debate between market-based and community-based approaches is 
at an impasse. Proponents of both approaches have become adept at asserting and reasserting 
their respective views, but no progress towards substantive discussion has been made. As 
was described in the opening chapters, each subscribes to different values and views of the 
world and proponents of each deny the legitimacy and question the motives of the other 
approach. However, it is far from clear that rhetorical force or technocratic applicability 
ought to be decisive between the different values at stake. In this context, it is important to 
consider anew how the market versus community debate might adequately be mediated. At 
the very least, we must begin to think about the intellectual, social, and moral terrain on 
which such a debate should take place. The remainder of this thesis will outline one possible 
way in which to judge these approaches. Since differing values are at stake, the first task will 
be to draw out and clarify the normative foundations of these two approaches. Subsequently, 
the thesis will interrogate the respective visions of the good life towards which they are 
working. Finally, the concluding chapter will suggest a way of considering policy for culture 
and trade that is both ethically sound and practically useful in the modem international 
context. The aim of the analysis which follows is not to provide a technocratic ‘solution’ to 
disputes about magazines and trade, but to suggest another way of thinking about these 
issues, thereby offering new perspectives on policy.
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Chapter 6 
The Moral Bases of Welfare Economics
The past three chapters set out the framework within which this thesis will discuss culture 
and trade. In those chapters, I argued that the central claims being made in the debate about 
free trade and culture can be categorised as market-based and community-based approaches. 
These two approaches were set out in detail, before their relevance to Canada-United States 
trade in periodicals was drawn out. This chapter and the next will move on to show how 
these are actually ethical positions, stemming from different conceptions of individual self- 
understanding, of the location of value in society, and from different visions of the good life 
and how it can be achieved.
This chapter will focus only on the market-based approach, with particular attention to 
its ethical premises and implications. In particular, it will discuss the core values of market- 
based approaches, namely, individual well-being and freedom. The chapter will discuss each 
value in turn, demonstrating that the manner in which market-based approaches deal with 
culture is flawed in two related ways. First, market-based approaches do not recognise that 
their values are particular. In other words, they do not acknowledge that their own assertions 
are culturally-grounded and have both moral premises and implications. Because market- 
based approaches perceive their values to be universally-accepted (or at least universally 
acceptable), they have great difficulty in understanding that cultural particularity may be 
morally significant. Second, and as a result, the conception of social justice suggested by 
market-based approaches is fundamentally incapable of conceptualising the moral relevance 
of culture.
Establishing these claims is fairly straightforward for the first value, namely individual 
well-being. However, the second value, freedom, is so rarely discussed by market-based 
approaches that much more interpretive work must be done before its importance can be 
firmly established. As a way of bridging this interpretive gap, the chapter discusses an 
approach that parallels the claims of market-based approaches, but originates in moral 
philosophy and highlights the importance of freedom, rather than efficiency, as the core 
value that sets the limits to state intervention. This approach is drawn out through an 
examination of the work of F.A. Hayek. The chapter concludes by arguing that even when 
the moral assumptions of welfare economics are brought to the fore and defended, they 
remain incapable of consistently conceptualising the moral relevance of culture.
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Ethics and Economics
An analysis of the literature on ethics and economics reveals several ways in which ethics is 
considered to be relevant for economics. First, some scholars focus on what constitutes 
ethical economic practice. This entails asking what morals should govern our personal 
economic or business transactions.1 Second, others ask what norms and values are necessary 
in order for the capitalist economy to function. Analyses in this vein might highlight, for 
example, the idea that trust is a social and moral precondition for economic life as we know 
it.2 Finally, many authors have considered the justice of the outcomes of economic activity. 
Here, a crucial debate has centred around how we may judge distributions of wealth to be 
just or unjust.3
The enquiry of this chapter touches upon all three approaches, but its central question 
is somewhat different. Whereas the three examples above concentrate exclusively on norms 
as they relate to economic practice, this chapter will shift the focus of inquiry towards the 
ethical importance of market based approaches as theory -  as a proposal for the ordering of 
human relations that has considerable influence over our understanding of what is both 
possible and desirable.4 The task of this chapter is to make explicit the normative framework 
relied upon by the market-based approaches set out in Chapter 2 and, moreover, to suggest a 
way of comprehending why this framework is inadequate as a basis for our understanding of 
social life. This framework is often not acknowledged by the proponents of market-based 
approaches, but is nonetheless crucial to the legitimacy and intuitive force of their proposals 
-  perhaps all the more so because it is never openly acknowledged and debated.
1 See, amongst others, Tibor R. Machan (ed.), Business Ethics in the Global Market (Stanford, CA: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1999); Robert C. Solomon, A Better Way To Think About Business: How 
Personal Integrity Leads To Corporate Success (Oxford and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
1999); Ian Jones and Michael Pollitt (eds.), The Role O f Business Ethics In Economic Performance 
(New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); and Thomas Donaldson and Thomas W. Dunfee (eds.), 
Ethics In Business And Economics (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishers, 1997).
2 See, for example, Partha Dasgupta, ‘Trust as a Commodity’, in Diego Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making 
and Breaking Cooperative Relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 49-72, reprinted in Frank 
Ackerman, David Kiron, Neva R. Goodwin, Jonathan M. Harris, and Kevin Gallagher (eds.), Human 
Well-Being and Economic Goals (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1997), pp. 231-33. More generally, 
see Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit o f  Capitalism, Second Edition, trans. T. Parsons 
(London: Routledge, 1992).
3 See, for example, Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1979), and John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1973).
4 For an approach that is similar in its overt consideration o f the ethical adequacy o f theory, see, 
amongst others, Mark Neufeld, The Restructuring o f  International Relations Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). For similar issues, but from a perspective different to that taken by 
this thesis, see Jim George, Discourses o f  Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International 
Relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), and R.B.J. Walker, Inside/outside: International 
Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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The Obvious Moral Claim: Individual Well-being
The objectives and techniques of all types of market-based approaches can be best 
categorised under the broad heading of neoclassical welfare economics.5 Indeed, as one 
commentator has noted, ‘[m]ost economists look to welfare economics for principles to 
guide government when it concerns itself with resource allocation’.6 In essence, welfare 
economics is defined by the view that the conceptual and analytical tools of neoclassical 
economics can be applied to determine the desirability of different policy outcomes. More 
specifically, ‘the performance of economic institutions can and should be judged according 
to whether they provide economic goods in quantities that accord with people’s relative 
desires for those goods’.7 In this regard, welfare economics is the central framework through 
which market-based approaches seek to make public policy recommendations. For these two 
reasons, welfare economics is the focus of ethical argument in this chapter. Moreover, as we 
will see, it differs substantially from both utilitarian and Keynesian theories.
Broadly speaking, welfare economics evolved out of earlier utilitarian theories.8 Like 
utilitarianism, it understands the welfare of society in terms of individuals’ subjective senses 
of satisfaction, and perceives that ‘satisfaction is best achieved by letting individuals’ 
preferences determine the use of societal resources’.9 However, utilitarians and welfare 
economists differ substantially in their views of the additive properties of individual 
preferences. Utilitarians seek to maximise the sum of all individual happiness, thereby 
arriving at an unambiguous societal optimum. Welfare economists, on the other hand, are 
extremely reluctant to make interpersonal comparisons of utility, claiming that a social
5 It should be noted here that this chapter will focus exclusively on welfare economics. It will not 
discuss the related, but distinct, ethical issues raised by classical economists and by procedural 
accounts o f political liberalism. Nor will it deal with the paradoxes raised by Lord Robbins or by John 
Maynard Keynes. Robbins endorsed state support for the arts on the grounds that the arts are essential 
to a good life. Notably, Robbins was a vehement opponent o f welfare economics. See Lionel Robbins, 
‘Art and the State’, in Lionel Robbins, Politics and Economics: Papers in Political Economy (London: 
Macmillan, 1963), pp. 53-72. For his views on welfare economics, see Lionel Robbins, ‘Relations 
Between Politics and Economics’, in Robbins, Politics and Economics, especially pp. 14-15. In 
contrast, Keynes in 1933 advocated national self-sufficiency in most goods, but felt that ideas, 
knowledge, and art ought to be international. Nonetheless, as will be discussed below, Keynes was not 
a welfare economist in the strict sense. See John Maynard Keynes, ‘National Self-Sufficiency’, in John 
Maynard Keynes, The Collected Writings o f  John Maynard Keynes, Volume XXI: Activities 1931-1939, 
World Crises and Policies in Britain and America, ed. D. Moggridge (Basingstoke: Macmillan for the 
Royal Economic Society, 1982), pp. 233-46.
6 Steven E. Rhoads, The Economist’s View o f  the World: Government, Markets, and Public Policy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 62.
7 Robin Hahnel and Michael Albert, Quiet Revolution in Welfare Economics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), p. 15.
8 Rhoads, op. cit., in note 6, p. 62. Rhoads cites the ideas o f Jeremy Bentham as particularly relevant in 
this regard. On this point, see also Hahnel and Albert, op. cit., in note 7, p. 15.
9 Rhoads, op. cit., in note 6, p. 62.
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summation approach neglects the ethical integrity of the individual and could lead to gross 
violations of elementary justice.10
Refusing to sum individual utilities, many welfare economists instead use Pareto 
optimality as the ‘bridge’ between individual and social welfare. Pareto optimality dictates 
that ‘[t]he community becomes better off if one individual becomes better off and none 
worse o ff .11 However, since most policy options will entail some harm to someone, Pareto 
conditions are nearly impossible to satisfy. Instead, most welfare economists have come to 
rely on an alternative standard for judging welfare states. This is referred to as the 
compensation principle, since it suggests that if the gainers from any policy change could, in 
principle, compensate the losers, then the policy would be a good one. It is important to note 
that the winners need not actually compensate the losers for the principle to hold. In this 
regard, the compensation principle is akin to choosing between policies based on their 
predicted results in overall social surplus creation. It should be noted that although this 
principle does not require a summation of individual utility functions, it reaches its social 
conclusions through a summation of individual demand curves.12
Although welfare economics arises from a criticism of utilitarianism and although it is 
concerned with general welfare, it is different in important respects from Keynesian theories. 
First, welfare economics is more singularly focused on utility, or preference satisfaction, as 
the measure of welfare. Although John Maynard Keynes did not completely dismiss utility as 
a measure, it is of much less importance to his work. Second, and relatedly, welfare 
economics has a much more limited understanding of its overall social goals. The 
maximisation of welfare is the central and most important goal of welfare economics, even 
though, as we will see, other values act implicitly to buttress their analysis. R.M. O’Donnell 
ably addresses both of these points:
[i]f, for instance, welfare is defined in terms of satisfaction, happiness, utility or 
subjective preference, then welfare is clearly distinct from the goodness of 
[Keynes’] Principia Economica. It is therefore not the final variable to be 
maximised in attaining an ethically preferable state, although it may possess 
value as an intermediate variable. It was through the satisfaction of ethical 
ideals and not through ‘the emptiness of economic welfare’ that humanity 
would gain...spiritual fulfilment.13
10 See Hahnel and Albert, op. cit., in note 7, pp. 22-23.
11 Ibid., p. 16.
12 On the shift to the compensation principle in applied microeconomics, see W. Kip Viscusi, John M. 
Vemon, and Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Economics o f  Regulation and Antitrust, Second Edition 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995), pp. 73-76.
13 R.M. O’Donnell, Keynes: Philosophy, Economics and Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press,
1989), p. 171, emphasis in original. Quoted from John Maynard Keynes, The Collected Writings o f  
John Maynard Keynes, Volume XVIII: Activities 1922-32, The End o f  Reparations ed. E. Johnson 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society, 1978), p. 35.
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Finally, as Joan Robinson has noted, while Keynesians and welfare economists share a 
concern with failures of the market, welfare economists have a much greater faith in the 
market mechanism as a whole. According to Robinson, Arthur Pigou, the formative 
proponent of welfare economics, ‘set out the argument of his Economics of Welfare in terms 
of exceptions to the rule that laisser faire ensures maximum satisfaction; he did not question 
the rule’.14 Keynes, by contrast, identified ‘a deep-seated defect in the mechanism...thereby 
adding an exception...so large as completely to disrupt the reconciliation of the pursuit of 
private profit with public beneficence’.15 Clearly, Keynes and welfare economists share the 
general view that government may usefully intervene in the economy. However, they differ 
substantially in their views on the goals of economic life and on the legitimate purposes and 
extent of government intervention. In all of these respects, welfare economics remains much 
closer to its neoclassical progenitor than to its Keynesian contemporary.
Welfare economics devotes much attention to judging different economic states 
according to their efficiency in allocating resources. Except in unusual circumstances, the 
free market is the best means of ensuring allocative efficiency and it is for this reason that 
welfare economists support the market so strongly.16 More specifically, natural market 
equilibrium, when it does occur, is considered to be a Pareto optimal condition. In cases of 
disequilibrium, policies are favoured that minimise dead-weight loss, or, in other words, that 
maximise efficiency.17 Despite the importance of efficiency, however, it alone does not 
provide the moral vision for welfare economics. In fact, welfare economists do not value 
efficiency for its own sake. Efficiency is desirable primarily because it contributes to one of 
the central goals of welfare economics—maximising individual well-being. Well-being, 
however, is a huge concept, with many different possible meanings. It is by no means 
uncontroversial. In this light, it is imperative to interrogate the conception of individual well­
being espoused by welfare economics.
For welfare economists, the important facts about individual well-being can be 
summed up by two tenets. First, well-being consists in having one’s preferences satisfied. 
Preferences, in turn, simply represent what the individual wants. The relative strengths of 
different preferences, or their value to each individual, is understood in terms of what she is 
willing to pay for something. In turn, then, people’s preferences can be revealed by what they 
choose to buy. Moreover, if they do not buy something at a particular price, then it can be 
assumed that this good was not valuable enough to them vis-a-vis alternative goods. So
14 Joan Robinson, Economic Philosophy (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962), p. 72.
15 Ibid.
16 Unusual circumstances include externalities, cases o f market failure, and public or merit goods. 
These were discussed at length in Chapter 2. It is only important to note here that these exceptional 
cases are accounted for within the framework o f welfare economics.
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strong is this claim that it applies even to those who have no means of purchasing anything. 
For example, if a starving man had no endowments with which to pay for food, it would be 
assumed that he did not value this food enough to pay the price offered. In this context, as 
Neva Goodwin has argued, “‘[u]tility”, “satisfaction,” and “happiness” are thus identified 
with the purchase of marketed goods and services’.18
The second important tenet underpinning individual well-being is that the individual is 
the best judge of her own interests. This entails that welfare economists refrain from any 
evaluation of the merits of what people prefer. As Lionel Robbins famously put it, 
‘[economics is not concerned with ends as such. It assumes that human beings have 
ends....The ends may be noble or they may be base...Economics takes all ends for 
granted’.19 Equally, welfare economists do not place any relevance on an understanding of 
how preferences are determined. People may prefer a variety of things for a great variety of 
reasons. The task of welfare economics is to show how social resources can be marshalled so 
as to satisfy these preferences.
Owing to their focus on individual well-being and preference satisfaction, welfare 
economists are often considered to be amongst the economists most aware of normative 
concerns. Nonetheless, they consistently refuse to acknowledge their own normative 
inclinations, vehemently claiming that their approach is morally neutral.20 Their stated 
purpose is simply to provide value-free technical information to decision-makers. Clearly, 
however, the understanding of individual well-being described above is not value free. It is 
underpinned by certain very particular assumptions about human nature and values, namely 
individualism, subjectivism, and value commensurability. An exploration of these 
assumptions helps to explain the particular understanding of human well-being that is 
endorsed by welfare economics.
This section will first discuss these values, showing how the welfare economists’ 
conception of well-being is a very particular one, before discussing its supposed moral
17 This could also be understood as maximising total social surplus, which is the sum o f consumer and 
producer surplus.
18 Neva R. Goodwin, ‘Overview Essay to Part I: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Well-Being’, in 
Ackerman, Kiron, Goodwin, Harris, and Gallagher (eds.), op. cit., in note 2, p. 2, emphasis added. 
Amartya Sen has made similar criticisms. For a brief version o f this argument, see his On Ethics and 
Economics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), pp. 45-6. Although he is usually perceived to be within the 
broad ‘school’ o f welfare economics, Sen criticises many of the ideas that underlie this school. Since 
proponents o f market-based approaches to trade and culture do not discuss Sen’s work, this chapter 
will focus only on mainstream welfare economics. It will incorporate Sen’s critiques o f the mainstream 
where they are relevant, with the recognition that Sen’s position on welfare economics is vastly more 
sympathetic than that taken by this thesis.
19 Hahnel and Albert, op. cit., in note 7, p. 15.
20 See, for example, Armen A. Alchian and William R. Allen, University Economics: Elements o f  
Inquiry (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1972), pp. 6-7. Quoted in Randall G. Holcombe, 
‘Social Welfare’, in John Cready (ed.), Foundations o f  Economic Thought (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1990), p. 159.
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neutrality. Finally, it will discuss how the combination of moral particularity and claims to 
neutrality act to exclude consideration of the moral relevance of culture. In particular, the 
discussion below will show how, once adopted, these three assumptions act to preclude an 
understanding of the relevance of culture in any non-commercial sense.
Individualism
First, it should hardly be contentious to claim that welfare economics is underpinned by a 
radical individualism. This was evident, above, in the discussion of welfare economists’ 
refusal to aggregate individual welfare functions. Economists do admit the relevance of the 
social sphere, as is shown by their desire to maximise overall surplus. However, even here, 
they believe that the social level can only be understood as a function of individual welfares. 
In this context, even the way that individual and social welfare are related indicates the depth 
of commitment to individualism. The importance of this methodological individualism is that 
it leaves no room for a conception of the social which is something more than a function of 
its individual parts. Most obviously, this means that welfare economists cannot understand 
that a community or other social group may have welfare needs that are not captured by the 
revealed preferences of individuals.
More importantly, however, this view does not capture the ways in which the 
individual’s needs, desires, and understanding of himself as an agent (moral or otherwise) are 
constituted by and through the culture of which he is a part. In other words, it fails to capture 
the importance of the social in establishing our moral frame of reference. Indeed, the same 
concerns can also be applied more broadly to enquire into the cultural preconditions of 
welfare economics’ conception of the individual. In the words of Charles Taylor, ‘the free 
individual of the West is only what he is by virtue of the whole society and civilization which 
brought him to be and which nourishes him; that our families can only form us up to this 
capacity because they are set in this civilization’.21 To be fair, economists have always 
recognised that their conception of the person is an unrealistic abstraction.22 In spite of this, it 
has consistently been supported because of its usefulness as a foundation for theories that 
would make ‘useful and meaningful predictions’23 and, less overtly, because of its perceived 
centrality for freedom. As this section will continue to show, however, one’s starting
21 Charles Taylor, ‘Atomism’, in Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical 
Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 206.
22 See, for example, Geoffrey Hodgson, ‘Economics, Environmental Policy and the Transcendence of  
Utilitarianism’, in John Foster (ed.), Valuing Nature? Economics, Ethics, and Environment (London: 
Routledge, 1997), p. 49.
23 Milton Friedman, ‘The Methodology o f Positive Economics’, in Friedman, Essays in Positive 
Economics (Chicago, IL: University o f Chicago Press, 1953), p. 7. Quoted in Hodgson, op. cit., in note 
22, p. 49.
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assumptions have important implications for the limits of the possible in the theories which 
they support. The following section will address the relationship between individualism and 
liberal freedom.
Subjectivism
Second, there is the assumption that individual preferences are given. Economists would not 
deny that different individuals may have different motivations, including moral ones, for 
making certain choices. However, in order to accommodate ethical motivations, welfare 
economics must characterise them as having been the self-interested choice of the individual. 
Coupled with the claim that each individual knows what he wants (and therefore what is 
good for him), this assumption resonates with our intuitive sense of the importance of 
individual freedom and so provides a very powerful justification for non-interference in the 
market. The importance of freedom in legitimating the market will be discussed in the 
following section. First, however, this sub-section will address the claim that preferences are 
given. In particular, this claim is by no means morally neutral or uncontroversial. In terms of 
understanding culture, it is especially problematic for several reasons.
In the first place, this claim relies upon a very strong moral subjectivism. It assumes 
that since there is no objective way of supporting any one judgement as against any other, 
preferences must be seen as equally valid. Within the framework adopted by welfare 
economics, such subjectivism is clearly important. After all, observation which purports to 
be scientific must also be objective. More specifically, welfare economics sees its task as 
helping individuals to fulfil their wants, whatever these may be. Radical individualism, then, 
demands neutrality between values. However, it will become clear below, that, in this case, 
subjectivism is only plausible because it is located within a theory that has already accepted 
a certain framework of values as given. In other words, the deeper moral issues (and 
questions about the good life) have already been resolved by the existing framework. The 
semblance of subjectivism has important ramifications for culture that cannot adequately be 
drawn out until freedom is discussed in the following section.
Second, as Russell Keat has argued, this approach assimilates ethical choices to well­
being choices. As a result, it fails to capture the possibility that ethical choices may have 
dimensions and ramifications that cannot be understood as choices about consumption 
preferences. Even more starkly, this approach cannot understand that people might make 
ethical choices that actually conflict with their preferences or well-being. Indeed, making an 
ethical choice may not in fact reflect ‘what the person concerned wishes to achieve for his or
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her own well-being’.24 In this sense, the analysis of human behaviour which results from 
conflating ethical and well-being choices will simply not be able to conceptualise a whole 
range of reasons for human action. Broadly understood, the reasons for action are clearly 
relevant since it is these which give the action meaning, which characterise it in a particular 
society as a certain type of action with a certain intent and significance. In this respect, 
welfare economists are clearly ill-equipped to understand the ways in which culture may 
itself provide much of the meaning behind certain reasons. Indeed, in this sense, welfare 
economics cannot understand that culture may be morally relevant.
This argument can be taken even further. In particular, it is only within the context of 
social interaction that we can understand certain actions as self-interested. As Taylor has 
pointed out, the individual and subjectivist approach taken by welfare economics cannot 
understand that ‘all acts and choices....are...only the acts and choices they are against the 
background of practices and understandings.25 Once this is accepted, the cultural background 
of all action is brought forward and it becomes very difficult to maintain a full ethical 
subjectivism. After all, if social understandings give acts meaning as self-interested, rational, 
or charitable, then they also unavoidably bestow culturally-informed judgements about the 
goodness or badness of these actions. If nothing else, the introduction of cultural concerns 
forces us to recognise that no action (economic or otherwise) takes places outside of a moral 
context.
Valuations
Finally, welfare economics entails particular claims about how individuals value things. 
Indeed, the value of something to an individual can only be understood in terms of what he 
would be prepared to trade-off for it. Indeed, rarely do welfare economists understand that 
the way in which we value things may be radically at odds with a question about how much 
we would pay for them. In this sense, as Amartya Sen, amongst others, has noted about 
mainstream welfare economics, ‘[n]ot only is there a unified and complete view of ethical 
goodness (weighing the different objects of value vis-a-vis each other), but even the objects 
of value must be all of the same type’.26 The implications of this for culture are important.
Most particularly, welfare economics is poorly equipped to describe intrinsic value or 
social value, not to mention the connection between them. As John Foster has argued, to see
24 Russell Keat, ‘Values and Preferences in Neo-classical Environmental Economics’, in Foster (ed.), 
op. cit., in note 22, p. 45.
25 Charles Taylor, ‘Irreducibly Social Goods’, in Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 135.
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something ‘as mattering in itself is to yield to a kind of involvement in value—or better, a 
kind of involvement in the world through value—to which the comparative and arbitrative 
posture that goes with optimising is profoundly alien’.27 Many commentators have noted that 
such values as friendship, honesty, and love are actually stripped of their value if we could 
imagine placing a fixed money price on them.28 The argument here is not the simple one that 
some things cannot be bought, but rather that our lives are comprised of an extensive 
diversity of values which cannot be indexed to the same scale. Indeed, it is even possible that 
‘goods are plural in that the authentic evaluative standards they meet are fundamentally 
diverse’.29 In this context, where economists are apt to argue that in making decisions, we do 
in fact rank our preferences (and so our values),30 critics claim that we make decisions 
through a process of weighing which need not entail any commensurability between values at 
all.31
Moreover, once the individualism and subjectivism of welfare economics are taken 
into account, it is clear that economists have no means of understanding that some values 
may be irreducibly social. As Taylor has argued, welfare economics understands that things 
‘are goods to the extent that people desire them’.32 What they neglect is that ‘these things can 
only be good in that certain way, or satisfying or positive after their particular fashion, 
because of the background understanding developed in our culture’.33 Or, as Elizabeth 
Anderson has claimed, ‘I am capable of valuing something in a particular way only in a 
social setting that upholds norms for that mode of valuation’.34
Clearly, welfare economists rely upon a very particular conception of social justice. As 
we have seen, they understand social justice as a Pareto optimisation of individual well­
being. Short of this, a good outcome is realised by a maximisation of total surplus and 
therefore a maximisation of efficiency. This vision is radically individualist. It is also 
subjectivist in the sense that it recognises no source of value beyond the revealed preferences 
of individuals. Its resulting conception of value is poorly equipped to understand the 
importance of the intrinsic or social worth of things. In this context, it is not a coincidence
26 Sen, op. cit., in note 18, p. 62. See footnote 18 for a discussion o f  Sen’s relationship to welfare 
economics. A similar point about valuations is made in Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and 
Economics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
27 John Foster, ‘Introduction’, in Foster (ed.), op. cit., in note 22, p. 12.
28 See, for example, ibid. See also Hodgson, op. cit., in note 22, p. 53, and Kenneth Arrow, The Limits 
o f  Organization (New York, NY: Norton, 1974), p. 23. For a contrary argument, see Dasgupta, op. cit., 
in note 2.
29 Anderson, op. cit., in note 26, p. 4.
30 See, for example, Amartya Sen’s distillation o f this position in Sen, op. cit., in note 18, especially p. 
62.
31 See, for example, Foster, op. cit., in note 27, pp. 13-14, and John O’Neill, ‘Value Pluralism, 
Incommensurability, and Institutions’, in Foster (ed.), op. cit., in note 22, p. 82.
32 Taylor, op. cit., in note 25, p. 142.
Ibid., p. 136.
34 Anderson, op. cit., in note 26, p. 12.
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that market-based approaches conceptualise culture as a good, whose value to people can be 
determined by their consumption choices.
What is clear from the above discussion is that welfare economics is based on some 
very particular value judgements. It may be even-handed in its considerations, but, as a 
theory, it is definitely not morally neutral. Given this highly particular ethical stance, it is 
important to question the implications of the claim that welfare economics is morally neutral. 
In making this claim, welfare economists essentially mean that they do not wish to judge the 
goodness or badness of different ends. It is not the case that the economist is denying that he 
has ethical views or principles. Instead, a position of moral neutrality implies that the 
economist does not bring these views to bear on his analysis. Indeed, the welfare economist 
perceives himself to be the neutral observer of the social world. To be fair, this is actually 
quite possible in one respect. As was discussed above, welfare economists are very strict in 
taking individual preferences as given. Revealed preferences, and never the economist’s own 
feelings, are the basis of value in such an analysis.
To understand, however, why such an analysis cannot be consistently considered 
morally neutral, it is helpful to refer to Robert Cox’s oft-repeated distinction between 
problem-solving and critical theory.35 In this regard, welfare economics provides an excellent 
example of problem-solving theory. In Cox’s words, such theory ‘takes the world as it finds 
it, with the prevailing social and power relationships...as the given framework for action’. 
Within this context, problem-solving theory aims ‘to make these relationships and 
institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble’.36 In the 
case of welfare economics, the goal is to ease allocation problems and therefore facilitate the 
smooth functioning of the economy. The strengths of this type of theory lie in its ability to 
achieve analytically precise solutions to particular problems. Furthermore, the moral 
subjectivism of welfare economics is often seen to be a strength. However, as Cox has 
argued, these strengths rest upon false premises. In particular, problem-solving theories 
assume that the social world is a fixed object that can fruitfully be studied without 
ideological bias. Indeed, as many commentators have noted, it is indeed possible to study the 
social world from a scientific, objective point of view, but the results may not be very 
fruitful, in terms of either understanding or emancipation.37 Welfare economists may concede 
this point, but respond that problem-solving theory actually offers concrete solutions to
35 For details o f  this distinction, see Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States, and World Orders’, in Robert 
W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), p. 88.
36 Ibid.
37 See, for example, Steve Smith, ‘Positivism and Beyond’, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia 
Zalewski (eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), pp. 11-44; Neufeld, op. cit., in note 4, especially Chapter 1, pp. 9-21; and George, op. 
cit., in note 4, especially pp. 1-39.
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problems which require imminent action. This is no doubt true, but it does not obviate the 
need for sustained consideration of the premises upon which problem-solving theory is based 
and the principles which it promotes.
In this regard, adopting a scientific approach to social science creates a very specific 
set of circumstances with regard to moral neutrality. In Cox’s words, problem-solving theory 
‘is methodologically value-free insofar as it treats the variables it considers as objects; but it 
is value-bound by virtue of the fact that it implicitly accepts the prevailing order as its own 
framework’.38 In other words, the practices of welfare economists can be considered morally 
neutral, but only within the context of a very particular framework of values and 
understandings. In unquestioningly accepting this as their framework of analysis, welfare 
economists betray their claims to moral neutrality.
In this regard, welfare economists clearly do not acknowledge that their analysis 
presupposes and perpetuates certain very particular values. Indeed, by not recognising that 
their position is actually a normative one, these approaches keep their moral agenda well 
buried, operating from the assumption that their values are generally acceptable. Indeed, as 
two renegade economists have noted, welfare economics is presumed to be a positivist 
discipline precisely because it rests on ‘innocuous and uncontroversial moral premises’.39 
Denying that their premises are both normative and particular has several important effects.
First, because it assumes that it is morally neutral, welfare economics does not 
recognise that it is promoting a very particular conception of social justice. More 
importantly, however, welfare economists fail to recognise that their values ought to be 
justified vis-a-vis others. As a result, they fail to adequately justify their vision of social 
justice.40
Second, welfare economists cannot understand that even their ‘morally neutral’, 
analysis promotes certain values and delegitimises others. Indeed, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter, market-based approaches consistently act to delegitimise the value claims 
of community-based approaches. They interpret the claims of community-based approaches 
from the context of their own moral paradigm, with the result that an impetus based on 
cultural values is read exclusively as a protectionist and anti-competitive measure. Indeed, as 
will become even clearer below, welfare economics is ill-equipped to recognise that cultural 
particularity may go beyond a lifestyle choice, and may go to the heart of the principles of
38 Cox, op. cit., in note 35, pp. 89-90. A similar argument is powerfully made in Neufeld, op. cit., in 
note 37, especially pp. 95-121.
39 Daniel M. Hausman and Michael S. McPherson, ‘Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics and 
Contemporary Moral Philosophy’, Journal o f Economic Literature (Vol. 31, No. 2, 1993), p. 675.
40 It should be noted that these are not the only ethical critiques o f welfare economics. However, they 
are the most important ones for the argument o f this thesis, since they most clearly highlight the 
cultural difficulties o f welfare economics. Another very important critique o f economic thinking is that
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the system itself. In other words, the presumption of moral neutrality coupled with a 
particular underlying framework of values means that welfare economics cannot recognise 
culture as morally relevant in any way beyond individual choice.
It is clear from the above discussion that, far from being neutral, welfare economics is 
motivated by some very strong moral impulses. The claim that culture is only relevant 
insofar as people choose to consume it is buttressed by a significant and highly contestable 
moral foundation. It begins from an assumption about the relevance of culture for individual 
values that neglects significant aspects of our human and moral experience. Moreover, the 
fully developed picture generated by welfare economics is itself supported and legitimised by 
particular cultural values and practices. Bringing these two dimensions of culture to the fore 
requires us to acknowledge that welfare economics is not the neutral, ‘scientific’ paradigm 
that it claims to be. This is not to suggest that economic efficiency or utilitarian ‘well-being’ 
are irrelevant. Rather, they represent a very particular set of ends that are as contestable as 
any others. The unquestioning acceptance of these values creates some problems within the 
confines of pure economic theory.41 However, when welfare economics is introduced through 
IPE as the legitimating standard for political action, as it is in the market-based approach to 
culture and trade, the issue becomes far more serious.
The Prior Moral Premise: Individual Freedom
The concept of individual well-being set out above is clearly crucial to the concept of social 
justice espoused by welfare economics. However, the careful reader will probably have noted 
that it is not the only value at work in the claims of welfare economists. In particular, it is 
very difficult to make sense of and justify their explicit ethical vision (maximising individual 
well-being) without reference to the importance of individual freedom. Surprisingly, 
however, welfare economists make few direct references to freedom—they do not define 
what they mean by freedom, nor do they offer a justification of its central place in their work. 
This makes its role a particularly difficult one to understand. Nonetheless, the centrality of 
freedom, if not its precise content, can be highlighted by reexamining the treatment of 
individual preferences in welfare economics. Once the importance of freedom has been 
demonstrated, we will discuss different means by which its precise content might be 
detected.
provided by rights-based theories. See, for example, John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1971).
41 See, for example, the critiques made by Sen, op. cit., in note 18. See also Amartya Sen, ‘The 
Impossibility o f a Paretian Liberal’, Journal o f  Political Economy (Vol. 78, No. 1, 1970), pp. 152-7, 
and Charles K. Rowley and Alan T. Peacock, Welfare Economics: A Liberal Restatement (New York, 
NY: John Riley, 1975).
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As the previous section discussed, welfare economists view individual preferences as 
having several characteristics. Most importantly, they are radically individual, they are 
morally subjective, and they are measurable along a single indexed scale of value. In other 
words, the individual is considered to be the best judge of his own interests, and no one else 
ought to be entitled to judge for him. Moreover, we can understand his preferences and the 
value of things to him by examining the choices he makes—what and how much he is willing 
to sacrifice of one thing in order to get more of another.
However, welfare economists consistently fail to explain and justify why we ought to 
view the individual as a radically separate unit and why his preferences must be treated as 
inalterable. Clearly, individualism and subjectivism are instrumentally important in 
achieving individual well-being. However, there is much more than this simple instrumental 
justification going on here. Indeed, the rhetorical power of individualism and subjectivism is 
hardly exhausted by the observation that they contribute to well-being. Without any greater 
sense of the importance of individualism and subjectivism, the argument remains a very 
weak one. Not only does it reveal very little about the substance of well-being but, alone, it 
gives us no firm reasons to desire it. To understand why well-being is valuable, we must be 
shown why individualism and subjectivism are themselves so important. This justification 
cannot come from their role in buttressing well-being; it must come from elsewhere.
The most obvious ethical source of these claims is individual freedom. Although this 
is not made explicit in welfare economics, it is clearly a value that must be accepted if we are 
to make sense of the normative bases of this branch of economics.42 Ironically, the most 
obvious example of the role of freedom arises if one attempts to disagree with welfare 
economists’ claims about individual preferences. As was noted in the discussion of merit 
goods in Chapter 2, any attempt to challenge the supremacy of the dictates of consumer 
sovereignty is met with great suspicion. Questioning whether the consumer is always right or 
querying the method of revealed preferences is tantamount to endorsing government 
coercion. If the individual is not free to choose, then who will be entitled to choose for him? 
After all, if one is not the judge of one’s own interests, then someone else must be.43 In this 
respect, the spectre of coercion, however ill-defined, provides much of the moral impetus 
behind the individualist, subjectivist claims espoused by welfare economists. Freedom,
42 On the importance o f freedom in economics more generally, see Alan Peacock, The Political 
Economy o f  Economic Freedom (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997), especially pp. 19-24. Clearly, 
freedom was also an important concern for classical economists. On the ‘scientisation’ o f economics in 
the twentieth century and the corresponding separation o f ethics and economics, see Kurt W. 
Rothschild, Ethics and Economic Theory: Ideas - Models - Dilemmas (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 
1993), especially pp. 11-17.
43 Steven Globerman, Cultural Regulation in Canada (Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public 
Policy, 1983), p. 37, and Alan Peacock, ‘Economics, Cultural Values and Cultural Policies’, in Ruth 
Towse and Abdul Khakee (eds.), Cultural Economics (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1992), p. 10.
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whatever its precise meaning, is clearly fundamental in justifying the proposals of welfare 
economists.
In this respect, our intuitive sense of what freedom means and why it is important 
‘does the extra work’ of substantiation and justification that welfare economics neglects to 
do. As a result, welfare economists gain great moral force from a premise that they 
consistently fail either to specify or to justify. Like well-being, freedom is a highly contested 
concept, whose use might invoke innumerable different meanings, each implying radically 
different conclusions. In this context, it is crucial to explore the meanings of freedom that 
could support the moral claims made by welfare economics. What does freedom mean for 
welfare economists? Is this a conception that we would want to endorse? Only in this way, 
and not through any intuitive sympathy with ill-defined claims, can the legitimacy of market- 
based approaches be fruitfully assessed.
There are several ways in which the elucidation of freedom could be approached. First, 
the argument could focus exclusively on statements made by welfare economists. By piecing 
together different inferences and comments, we might be able to get a sense of the particular 
vision of freedom that underpins welfare economics. This approach has the merit of focusing 
directly on the texts under discussion. One could thus argue that it is likely to be the most 
faithful interpretation of the relevance of freedom to welfare economics. However, the 
paucity of direct claims about freedom means that this approach would add little to the 
claims made above about freedom. If we are to do justice to our intuitive sense of the 
relevance of freedom in welfare economics, we will need to rely less on direct references and 
more on other interpretive tools. We will need to search for clues as to the conception of 
freedom that underpins the conclusions of welfare economics.
In this context, we might gain insight from those texts which form the intellectual 
history of welfare economics. Although welfare economists themselves rarely discuss 
freedom, they could be seen as one expression of a very long historical tradition which itself 
gives serious consideration to freedom. Following this approach, we would examine the 
claims made by classical economists, detailing those insights which could help us to 
understand the moral bases of modem welfare economics.44 This approach promises a more 
substantive understanding of the nature and relevance of freedom than the approach above. 
Furthermore, classical economists often had a sense of culture and included cultural 
considerations in their analyses.45 However, drawing from the classical economists also has
44 An obvious focus here would be the work of Adam Smith and o f John Stuart Mill. See Smith’s 
comments on freedom in Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f  the Wealth o f  Nations, Book 
I (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976 [1784]). See also J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. H.B. Acton (London: J.M. 
Dent & Sons, 1972 [1863]).
45 See, for example, David Ricardo’s acknowledgement o f cultural factors, such as particular 
manufacturing skills, in his discussion o f comparative advantage. The example o f the lace-makers of
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some failings. Most importantly, it is difficult to establish the extent to which welfare 
economics relies directly on the legacy of the classical economists.46 The importance of this 
divergence from the methods and problematiques of much earlier generations of economists 
would have to be very clearly established. Drawing out and adequately justifying these 
intellectual lineages would be a monumental task—and one that is very likely to produce few 
conclusive results in terms of our understanding of the relevance of freedom in welfare 
economics.
Instead, this chapter will employ a third approach. Like the second approach, this one 
draws upon philosophical work in the economic tradition in order to fill in the gaps in our 
understanding of the meaning and relevance of freedom in welfare economics. However, this 
work must be contemporary—it must reflect the increasing complexity of the modem 
relationship between freedom, the market, and authority which welfare economics must 
negotiate. The work chosen must also fundamentally reflect the concerns of welfare 
economics, even as it seeks to elucidate a broader philosophical basis for them. Several 
authors seem promising in this regard, most notably F.A. Hayek,47 Robert Nozick,48 and 
James Buchanan.49 Together, they provide the most important contemporary elucidations and 
justifications of the relationship between freedom and the market.50 Of these, Hayek is the 
most useful. In particular, although he argues for clearly-defined limits to government, he 
does not wish to advocate the more radical minimal state. As a result, he provides the most 
accurate reflection of the values and claims of the market-based approach.51 Also, he avoids 
many of the logical shortcomings of other approaches and thereby provides the strongest
Lyon has been cited as being particularly insightful in this regard. See David Ricardo, Principles o f  
Political Economy and Taxation (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1911 [1817]), p. 88.
46 See, for example, Lionel Robbins, ‘On the Relations Between Politics and Economics’, in Robbins, 
op. cit., in note 5, especially pp. 14-15.
47 F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago, IL: University o f Chicago Press, 1944); F.A. Hayek, 
The Constitution o f  Liberty (London: Routledge for the University o f  Chicago, 1960), and F.A. Hayek, 
‘Individualism: True and F alse\ in F.A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949), pp. 1-32.
48 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1974). See also Jeffrey 
Paul (ed.), Reading Nozick: Essays on Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1981).
49 James Buchanan, The Limits o f  Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1975), and Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan, The Reason o f  Rules: 
Constitutional Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
50 For this argument, see John Gray, Liberalism, Second Edition (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1995), especially Chapter 8; Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1990); and Rothschild, op. cit., in note 42, pp. 48-49.
51 On the distinction between limits to government and the minimal state, see Gray, op. cit., in note 50, 
p. 70. On the important distinctions between welfare economics and the work o f James Buchanan, see 
Ludwig Van den Hauwe, ‘Public Choice, Constitutional Political Economy, and Law and Economics’, 
in B. Bouckaert and G. De Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia o f  Law and Economics (Aldershot: Edward 
Elgar, forthcoming 2000).
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justification of freedom in the context of market relations.52 Finally, Hayek’s unique 
justification of the free market seems to offer the possibility of moving beyond the simplistic 
treatment of culture offered by the market-based approach. For these reasons, his views on 
freedom and the free market merit exploration.
The section that follows will focus on the work of Hayek. It will rely on his 
philosophy to draw out an understanding of freedom that accords with a market-based 
understanding of social relations. It will be careful to demonstrate the ways in which this 
particular view of freedom is central to the ethics of welfare economics, while being 
sensitive to important points of difference, where appropriate. In doing so, it is crucial to be 
sensitive to the fact that Hayek’s thought may not always be an accurate reflection of the 
views of welfare economists. Indeed, we cannot be sure that what follows is a true and 
complete reflection of what welfare economists would say, if they were to address their 
normative foundations. Nonetheless, we can be sure that it reflects important yet incomplete 
strands of thought within welfare economics, that it shares with them certain fundamental 
values, and that it provides important insights into the normative bases of the free market.
Hayek on Freedom and the Market
Hayek’s substantial contributions to law and political economy may be read in many ways, 
as the diversity of secondary literature attests.53 This chapter will focus only on the three 
main works in which he sets out his thoughts on the importance of the free market and its 
ideal nature, namely, The Road to Serfdom, The Constitution of Liberty, and a short article 
entitled ‘Individualism: True and False’.54 The argument which follows will advance the 
claim that Hayek’s work in this field, whatever its internal contradictions, can fruitfully be 
read as an attempt to define and defend a particular conception of liberalism -  defined by the
52 On the logical shortcomings o f Nozick, see, for example, Jonathan Wolff, Robert Nozick: Property, 
Justice and the Minimal State (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991) and the contributions in 
Paul (ed.), op. cit., in note 46.
53 See, amongst others, Chandran Kukathas, Hayek and M odem Liberalism  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989); John Gray, Hayek on Liberty, Third Edition (London: Routledge, 1998); Calvin Hoy, A 
Philosophy o f  Individual Freedom: The Political Thought o f  F.A. Hayek (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1984); Roland Kley, Hayek’s Social and Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); 
Andrew Gamble, Hayek: The Iron Cage o f Liberty (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); Steve Fleetwood, 
H ayek’s Political Economy: The Socio-Economics o f  Order (London: Routledge, 1995); Graham 
Walker, The Ethics o f  F.A. Hayek (London: University Press o f America, 1986); Richard Bellamy, 
‘“Dethroning Politics”: Liberalism, Constitutionalism and Democracy in the Thought o f F.A. Hayek’, 
British Journal o f  Political Science (Vol. 24, No. 4, 1994), pp. 419-41; Theodore A. Burczak, ‘The 
Postmodern Moments o f F.A. Hayek’s Economics’, Economics and Philosophy (Vol. 10, No. 1, 1994), 
pp. 31-58; Bruce Caldwell, ‘Hayek’s Scientific Subjectivism’, Economics and Philosophy (Vol. 10, 
No. 1, 1994), pp. 305-13; Razeen Sally, ‘Review o f F.A. Hayek, Hayek on Hayek', Government and 
Opposition (Vol. 30, No. 1, 1995), pp. 131-35; and Lionel Robbins, ‘Hayek on Liberty’, in Robbins, 
op. cit., in note 5, pp. 91-112.
54 Hayek, op. cit., in note 47.
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free market and the rule of law. To be clear, however, this liberal vision is not especially 
new. As Hayek himself admits, he is primarily seeking to update and reinvigorate the ideals 
of the 19th century Whigs.55 Indeed, it will soon become apparent that his vision of freedom 
owes much to their influence.
In particular, one of Hayek’s main purposes is to illustrate the nature and value of 
freedom and the central importance of a market economy to the achievement of freedom. In 
this regard, he articulates the vision of freedom that market-based approaches take for 
granted. Further, he draws on the subjectivism within market-based approaches to develop a 
justification of freedom on seemingly non-universalist grounds. This approach not only 
provides a powerful argument for freedom, but it does so in a way that seems to leave room 
for culture.
Hayek’s Liberal Ideal
Hayek devotes a great deal of attention to his conception of liberty. He defines it as ‘that 
condition of men in which coercion of some by others is reduced as much as possible in 
society’.56 Clearly, this is a negative conception of freedom, and, as Hayek acknowledges, it 
depends significantly on what is meant by coercion. In his view, ‘[cjoercion occurs when one 
man’s actions are made to serve another man’s will, not for his own but for the other’s 
purpose’.57 Coercion need not mean that a man is deprived of all choice, but merely that his 
choices have been manipulated to serve someone else’s will. Crucially, in order for coercion 
to occur, the manipulation of a man’s choices must entail both a threat of harm and an 
intention to bring about certain conduct. As a result, not every harm that befalls someone can 
be attributed to coercion. Where harm is not caused by coercion, society need not take 
responsibility for rectifying that harm. Hence the reverse claim about freedom -  to be free is 
not necessarily to be protected from all harm, but only from those acts which aim to make 
one the instrument of someone else’s will.58
For Hayek, freedom is best protected by a particular set of rules and institutions that he 
defines as liberal civilisation. The two main buttresses of liberal civilisation are the free 
market and the rule of law. Together, these institutions serve to protect freedom, while also 
ensuring the maximum rate of social progress. The relationship between freedom and the free
55 The similarity between Hayek’s vision o f the liberal order and that propounded by 19th century 
Whigs has been noted by many commentators. See, for example, Hayek, The Constitution o f  Liberty, 
op. cit., in note 38, p. 409, and Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, op. cit., in note 38, p. 262.
56 Hayek, The Constitution o f  Liberty, op. cit., in note 47, p. 11.
57 Ibid., p. 133. See also ibid., p. 21.
58 Ibid., pp. 18 and p. 137.
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market will be addressed immediately below. Subsequently, this chapter will discuss the way 
in which the rule of law provides the essential framework for the free market.
Liberty and the Market
The free market and liberty are linked in Hayek’s thought in two important ways. In both 
cases, the significance of liberty acts to legitimise the market, though in different ways. First, 
the free market gains normative force because it is essential to the preservation of liberty. 
Hayek builds his argument for liberty on the simple premise that ‘ [t]he sum of the knowledge 
of all the individuals exists nowhere as an integrated whole’. As a result, ‘the great problem 
is how we can all profit from this knowledge, which exists only dispersed as the separate, 
partial, and sometimes conflicting beliefs of all men’.59 Liberal civilisation, and especially 
the free market, provides the solution to this problem. By allowing each individual to freely 
pursue his ends and act upon his particular knowledge, within a general agreement on the 
‘rules of the game’, a free society can make the most of existing knowledge. This is so for 
two reasons. First, a free society allows individuals to make the most of their own individual 
and particular knowledges. Since no one else may have the same knowledge, no one else 
could be in a better position to decide on action. As Hayek comments, ‘there can be no doubt 
that the discovery of a better use of things or of one’s own capacities is one of the greatest 
contributions that an individual can make in our society’.60 The free market is crucial in this 
regard. It is through the market’s adjustment system that individuals receive knowledge 
crucial to their decision-making. Moreover, as a result of the market’s adjustment mechanism 
all individuals can act on their own knowledge and yet society can remain orderly. As Hayek 
stresses, ‘[a] free system can adapt itself to almost any set of data, almost any general 
prohibition or regulation, so long as the adjustment mechanism is kept functioning’.61
Second, according to Hayek, the flow of new ideas springs from the sphere in which 
action and material events impinge upon each other. If free action were to be inhibited, then 
the flow of new ideas would be drastically reduced, leading, in turn, to a declining rate of 
progress and civilisational stagnation. For Hayek, new ideas are the driving force of progress 
and increasing wealth. In his words, ‘[i]t is through the free gift of knowledge acquired by 
the experiments of all that general progress is made possible, that the achievements of those 
who have gone before facilitate the advance of those who follow’.62 Since we cannot know in 
advance which ones will be successful, nor which will appeal to future generations, it is 
crucial that the development of new ideas is unrestricted. According to Hayek, ‘the advance
59 Ibid., p. 25.
60 Ibid., p. 81.
61 Ibid., p. 228.
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and even the preservation of civilization are dependent upon a maximum of opportunity for 
accidents to happen. These accidents occur in the combination of knowledge and attitudes, 
skills and habits, acquired by individual men’.63 On the basis of these ‘accidents’, we achieve 
civilisational progress. This is because groups holding particular ideals compete for social 
survival. In Hayek’s words, ‘[w]ithin any given society, particular groups may rise or decline 
according to the ends they pursue and the standards of conduct that they observe....Though 
there is a presumption that any established social standard contributes in some manner to the 
preservation of civilization, our only way of confirming this is to ascertain whether it 
continues to prove itself in competition with other standards, observed by other individuals 
and groups’.64 Free competition, then, is a defining feature of Hayek’s philosophy. Again, it 
is not difficult to see why the free market, with its competitive, self-adjusting structure, is 
such a central element of Hayek’s work.
Liberty underpins the free market in a second way. In particular, the market is seen to 
be the product of liberty. In Hayek’s view, the market arose spontaneously, as the result of 
free individual action. Unfortunately, he devotes little attention to a substantiation of this 
claim. On the two occasions where it is discussed in detail, Hayek merely asserts this claim 
and provides no historical evidence.65 Nonetheless, for Hayek’s argument to stand, the idea 
of a spontaneous market order must be true, regardless of the historical record. After all, 
according to Hayek, a social order that does not arise spontaneously must arise as the result 
of someone’s rational design, and a planned order cannot but be coercive.66 Furthermore, 
although Hayek claims that spontaneous order may erupt in any area of life,67 the free market 
is the only sphere in which he can convincingly claim that spontaneous order has actually 
arisen. If the spontaneous development of the free market were to be challenged, then Hayek 
would have little basis upon which to argue that a spontaneous order would be possible at all. 
This would seriously limit the important normative claims established above. More 
importantly, however, the supposed spontaneous development of the free market provides a 
great deal of its normative force. The fact that the free market arose without planning or 
coercion provides a crucial element of its legitimacy. It also buttresses the claim that we 
should not presume to have enough knowledge to successfully amend or replace it. Thus, it is 
crucial to Hayek’s argument that the free market developed as a result of free and 
spontaneous human action. The market is, for Hayek, the epitome of free social relations and 
its normative status is largely established on this basis.
62 Ibid., p. 43.
63 Ibid., p. 29.
64 Ibid., p. 36.
65 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, op. cit., in note 47, p. 19 and Hayek, op. cit., in note 56, p. 160.
66 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, op. cit., in note 47, p. 117.
^ Ibid., p. 21.
128
The importance of the free market for freedom is further illustrated by Hayek’s 
comments on the dangers of economic planning. According to him, competition is hindered 
by any attempt to control prices and quantities of particular commodities. He does admit that 
competition ‘can bear some admixture of regulation’, but argues that, ‘it cannot be combined 
with planning to any extent we like without ceasing to operate as an effective guide to 
production’.68 Acceptable forms of planning include acquiring facts of general importance, 
providing a monetary system, setting weights and measures, surveying, census-taking, 
providing support for education, and in some limited circumstances, offering social 
security.69 Hayek is also willing to support an extensive system of taxation, as long as it is 
proportional, rather than progressive.70 Paralleling the claims of some welfare economists, 
Hayek argues that beyond these limits, however, government intervention is necessarily 
detrimental. More importantly, Hayek is convinced that a little planning always generates the 
need for more: ‘the close interdependence of all economic phenomena makes it difficult to 
stop planning just where we wish....[0]nce the free working of the market is impeded 
beyond a certain degree, the planner will be forced to extend his controls until they become 
all-comprehensive’.71 Finally, if economic activity is directed by government, then 
government will also be forced to decide on principles guiding its actions. Since no single 
principle will be agreeable to all, the powerful will be forced to use coercion and propaganda 
to stay on top. The details of how this breakdown is likely to occur are not especially relevant 
here. What is important is that, in Hayek’s view, the consequences of departing from nearly 
free competition are nothing short of disastrous for freedom. There is no middle ground 
between Hayek’s ideal of competitive capitalism and totalitarianism. Once we impair the free 
market in any way that Hayek does not condone, we are on the slippery slope to 
totalitarianism.
It is important to highlight the point that Hayek’s justification of liberty does not rest 
on any assumed agreement about man’s natural capacities or predispositions, nor does he 
require the type of social or pre-social agreement demanded by social contract theory. 
Instead, Hayek’s case for freedom is grounded in an observation about the scope of man’s 
knowledge and the limits of human reason. Hayek states this clearly: ‘[i]f we were 
omniscient men, if we could know not only all that affects the attainment of our present 
wishes but also our future wants and desires, there would be little case for liberty’.72 The 
parallels between this claim and the comments made by welfare economists about individual
preferences are striking. Indeed, for both Hayek and welfare economists, their final defence
68 Ibid., p. 47-8.
69 Hayek, op. cit., in note 56, p. 223.
70 See ibid., Chapter 20.
71 Hayek, op. cit., in note 66, p. 117.
72 Hayek, op. cit., in note 56, p. 29.
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against critics is always the subjectivist one—that we cannot know what other people desire 
or what is good for society.
The argument above has shown the importance of the free market for Hayek’s vision 
of freedom. Moreover, it has shown that Hayek has in mind a particular conception of the 
free market, with few deviations allowed. Hayek’s free market is both the product and 
embodiment of freedom, and is the driving force of progress. In fact, so closely are freedom 
and the free market related that one must question whether a free society could continue to be 
free in any other form. This question and the implications it raises for the non-universality of 
Hayek’s liberalism will be raised in due course. Immediately, however, we must turn our 
attention to the other pillar of Hayek’s free society, the rule of law.
The Rule of Law
Hayek is careful to distinguish his liberalism from pure laissez-faire. While he clearly places 
great weight on the value of competition, he does not advocate a competitive free-for-all. As 
he claims, ‘ [t]he liberal argument is in favor of making the best possible use of the forces of 
competition as a means of coordinating human efforts.... It is based on the conviction that, 
where effective competition can be created, it is a better way of guiding individual efforts 
than any other’.73 As a result, the liberal free market is meaningless without the rule of law. 
The rule of law both defines and embodies all the claims about freedom made above—it sets 
limits to coercion and thereby defines and protects the space for individual free action. 
Correspondingly, it provides the framework for the free market. As Hayek himself states, 
‘[f]reedom of economic activity [means] freedom under the law, not the absence of all 
government action....[Interference or intervention...[means] only the infringement of that 
private sphere which the general rules of law were intended to protect’.74
According to Hayek, the preservation of liberty entails that each person be assured of a 
delimited private sphere. Within this realm, the individual can be sure that his actions are 
safe from the coercive acts of others, including the government. But if the government may 
itself be tempted to coerce individuals, then how is the private sphere protected? According 
to Hayek, the private sphere can only be properly protected, and freedom assured, if 
government and all citizens are subject to a series of general rules. The first function of these 
rules is to set down ‘the conditions under which objects or circumstances become part of the 
protected sphere of...persons’.75 Here, Hayek is clearly referring to the establishment of
73 Hayek, op. cit., in note 66, p. 41, emphasis added.
74 Hayek, op. cit., in note 56, p. 220.
75 Ibid., p. 140.
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private property, though there may be other relevant examples.76 More generally, however, 
these rules establish when and how the protected sphere of individuals may be breached.77 In 
other words, general laws constitute a general doctrine on what particular laws are 
admissible. In order to achieve this, however, general rules must conform to three criteria. 
They must be general and abstract, in the sense that they set down general principles, rather 
than specific dictates. Second, they must be known and certain in the sense that they provide 
a predictable framework within which individuals may exercise choices. Third, laws must 
apply to all people equally, including lawmakers.78 In this way, the rule of law provides a 
framework within which individual action may be free. In Hayek’s words, ‘[i]n observing 
such rules, we do not serve another person’s end. My action can hardly be regarded as 
subject to the will of another person if I use his rules for my own purposes as I might use my 
knowledge of a law of nature’.79
Hayek is aware that if the rule of law is to act as a safeguard against coercion by 
governments, it must be anchored securely beyond the easy reach of the lawmakers of the 
day. In this light, he sets out two related sources of the rule of law. The first, and most 
obvious source is the constitution. Here, Hayek envisages that general rules will be set down 
by a representative ‘constitutional convention’. Apart from conforming to the criteria set out 
above, these laws will be designed to endure for a very long period, and any modifications to 
them must require a very lengthy procedure.80 But, according to Hayek, the principles behind 
any constitution do not merely come from the minds of the drafters. If a constitution is to be 
effective, it must recognise and embody the second source of general laws, namely, the tacit 
rules which regulate conduct in any society. In Hayek’s words, ‘even constitutions are based 
on, or presuppose, an underlying agreement on more fundamental principles -  principles 
which may never have been explicitly expressed, yet which make possible and precede the 
consent and the written fundamental laws’.81 Moreover, the rule of law ‘will be effective only 
in so far as the legislator feels bound by it. In a democracy this means that it will not prevail 
unless it forms part of the moral tradition of the community, a common ideal shared and 
unquestioningly accepted’.82
In this way, the rule of law provides the essential framework within which freedom 
can be guaranteed. Moreover, in making this claim, Hayek articulates the underlying 
assumption made by welfare economists that the free market be underpinned by ‘rules of the 
game’. All agree that without minimal guarantees, such as those elucidated by Hayek, the
76 On private property, see ibid., p. 140.
77 Ibid., p. 206.
78 Ibid., p. 209.
79 Ibid., p. 152.
™ Ibid., p. 180.
81 Ibid., p. 181.
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free market could not provide spontaneous order, nor could it assure freedom. The rule of 
law therefore is an essential element of liberal civilisation. Without it, neither society nor the 
market could maintain any meaningful form of freedom.
The Free Market, Liberty, and Culture
As this chapter has already noted, one of the chief advantages of Hayek’s interpretation of 
freedom is its basis in epistemological uncertainty.83 Since Hayek avoids grounding his 
liberalism in universal values or a prior social contract, he seems to evade the charges of 
universalism that have been made against other liberal approaches.84 If any liberal argument 
linking freedom and the free market can accommodate particularisms, Hayek’s ought to have 
a very good chance. Nonetheless, it will become clear below that Hayek’s non-universalist 
justification is not as open-ended as it seems. In order for freedom to legitimise the free 
market vis-a-vis other forms of social organisation, a very particular definition of freedom 
must be adopted. The particularities of this conception will first be drawn out. Second, it will 
be shown that Hayek refuses to see this as a particular, culturally-imbued understanding of 
freedom. As a result, it will emerge that this concept of freedom is actually incapable of 
accommodating considerations of culture that might challenge the liberal ideal. 
Subsequently, Hayek’s vision of social justice through the free market is fundamentally 
unable to conceptualise culture as morally relevant
Freedom
Several observations must first be made about the very particular nature of Hayek’s 
conception of freedom. First, it is a very strict negative conception. In other words, it focuses 
on eliminating unnecessary coercion and on the importance of non-interference in the 
individual’s private sphere.85 In this context, it is rooted very firmly in equality before the 
law. Although Hayek acknowledges that formal equality may not imply material equality, he 
does not view material equality as necessary for freedom in any way. For Hayek, as was 
noted above, inequality is actually an essential force for progress. Not surprisingly, then, he 
understands formal equality to be incompatible with any government action towards material
82 Ibid., p. 206.
83 See, for example Gray, op. cit., in note 53, p. 7.
84 On this point, see Caldwell, op. cit., in note 53 and Miller, op. cit., in note 53.
85 The distinction between positive and negative liberty has been popularised through Isaiah Berlin, 
‘Two Concepts o f Liberty’, in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 
118-172. Berlin attributes the concept o f negative liberty to J.S. Mill. Hayek, on the other hand,
attributes the conception to T.H. Green and, even earlier, to Hegel. Hayek, op. cit., in note 56, p. 425,
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equality. In one sense, this conclusion is not altogether unreasonable. Indeed, it would strike 
most readers as reasonable that full material equality cannot consistently be the goal of a free 
society. However, for Hayek, any move to reduce inequality, however slight, is damaging to 
freedom.86 Any non-market distribution would reward people who have failed to be 
productive on their own initiative. Further, in order to determine rewards, it would require 
that individuals be evaluated directly by their government. However, since no single 
schedule of values could ever be universally agreed-upon, people’s life chances would 
depend on their evaluation according to other peoples’ standards. To understand the full 
significance of this for Hayek, we must be aware of his conviction that government 
involvement in people’s lives can never be a matter of degree: ‘[t]he principle of distributive 
justice, once introduced, would not be fulfilled until the whole of society was organized in 
accordance with it’.87 The result would be nothing short of a dictatorship. Negative liberty 
and equality before the law are therefore strict principles in Hayek’s analysis—they cannot 
be applied partially.
Second, Hayek’s conception of freedom is strictly individualist. According to him, the 
necessity of individualism emerges from the fact that no man can know the needs of all men. 
As a result, no single mind can comprehend a scale of value for a whole society, and scales 
of value will necessarily differ between individuals. The implications for freedom are 
profound. In Hayek’s words, ‘individuals should be allowed, within defined limits, to follow 
their own values and preferences rather than somebody else’s; that within these spheres the 
individual’s system of ends should be supreme and not subject to any dictation by others’.88 
Clearly, Hayek believes that some social limitations are necessary for individuals to be free. 
In particular, social organisation must be governed by some principles, but, according to 
Hayek, even these are by definition general and universally accepted, and so are unlikely to 
conflict with individual liberty.89 In particular, a free society is defined, in individual terms, 
as one which maximises the results of free and spontaneous individual action. In this 
connection, Hayek does not rule out the possibility that some ends may be social, but defines 
these as nothing more than ‘a coincidence of individual ends’.90 In turn, ‘[cjommon action 
is.. .limited to the fields where people agree on common ends’.91 If common action, including
n. 26. He cites T.H. Green, ‘Liberal Legislation and Freedom o f Contract’, in R.L. Nettleship (ed.), The 
Works o f  T.H. Green, Volume III (London, 1888).
86 Hayek, op. cit., in note 56, p. 94.
Ibid., p. 100.
88 Hayek, op. cit., in note 66, p. 66.
89 Hayek, ‘Individualism’, op. cit., in note 47, pp. 18-19.
90 Hayek, op. cit., in note 66, p. 67.
91 Ibid.
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state action, exceeds this sphere of agreement, then it is inevitable that those in power will 
‘impose their scale of preferences on the community for which they plan’.92
It is not difficult to establish that such a stringent conception of freedom is required by 
market-based approaches. To begin with, all of these approaches agree with Hayek’s 
description of the free market located within the rule of law. Moreover, none of these 
approaches could consistently condone anything approaching a positive conception of 
freedom. Granted, they are all concerned that government should act to ensure equal and fair 
playing conditions for all market actors. Government may also be required to intervene to 
counteract market failures. This might entail sizeable interventions in some fields (as Hayek 
himself noted). However, only rarely may the government act to improve the lot of some at 
the expense of others. Hayek and market-based proponents agree that this would 
detrimentally alter the adjustment mechanism of the market. As Hayek has set out in detail, 
government intervention inevitably remunerates people according to criteria other than the 
value that their products have for his fellows. In so doing, it alters the incentives for socially 
productive work, encourages wastefulness and reduces men’s sense of responsibility for their 
own actions.93 Moreover, market-based approaches generally agree with Hayek that 
government intervention cannot be achieved without imposing a unified scale of values on 
society. Since, as was shown above, these approaches are also strongly individualist, any 
such imposition of values is necessarily seen to be coercive.
The important question, however, is how does such a view of freedom accommodate 
culture? According to Hayek, one of the chief advantages of this conception of freedom is 
precisely that it allows the individual to nurture and pursue whatever cultural impulses he 
should wish. In other words, culture remains clearly within the liberal private sphere. In the 
language of the market-based approaches, the individual can hold whatever values he 
chooses and can consume whatever cultural goods he wishes to. Indeed, like most negative 
conceptions of freedom, there is nothing in this theory that actively excludes cultural issues. 
However, once we acknowledge that such a view is not universal, but has a particular 
(negative and individualist) character, we can see how Hayek’s vision of social justice 
reflects certain values and resists others.94 Crucially, and contrary to what many liberals 
imply, the social rules at the heart of this arrangement are not impartial between different
92 Ibid., p. 73.
93 See, for example, Hayek, op. cit., in note 56, p. 96.
94 This critique parallels those made by other critics o f liberalism. See, for example, Chantal Mouffe, 
The Return o f  the Political (London: Verso, 1993); Anne Phillips, ‘Dealing with Difference’, in Seyla 
Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f  the Political (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 139-52; and Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f  
Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
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forms of life—they limit what is considered possible and valuable.95 In particular, these rules 
are not impartial between cultures. They clearly bear the mark of an individualist, 
competitive and self-reliant society, and leave little room for an understanding of non- 
quantifiable value, of common values and truly social ends. In other words, this conception 
of freedom leaves little room for understandings of culture that view it as something deeper 
than an individual consumption choice.
It is clear that this conception of freedom is a very particular one. But, given Hayek’s 
view that no one (including economists) can know what is good for society, it is important to 
assess whether we have grounds for claiming that he intends it to be understood as a 
universal. Clearly, if Hayek does understand his position as a morally particular one, then the 
force of the criticisms of this chapter will be reduced. Indeed, Hayek initially seems open to 
values other than his own. As he points out in the Preface to The Constitution of Liberty, his 
aim is not to put forward a scientific explanation of the world. Instead, he intends to ‘picture 
an ideal, to show how it can be achieved, and to explain what its realization would mean in 
practice’.96 In keeping with this approach, Hayek is quite willing to acknowledge that his 
work is political -  that it is motivated by certain ‘ultimate values’ and that it is written in 
response to a very particular constellation of political and social forces after WWII.97 Indeed, 
much of Hayek’s argument reflects his sense that he is engaged in a political contest over the 
future of Western civilisation. His adversaries are not only committed communists and 
National Socialists, but also defenders of the extensive welfare state. In Hayek’s words, 
‘many who think themselves infinitely superior to the aberrations of nazism, and sincerely 
hate all its manifestations, work at the same time for ideals whose realization would lead 
straight to the abhorred tyranny’.98
Yet despite his formal acknowledgement that this is a political battle between 
contending views, there is little in the core of Hayek’s argument to suggest that he recognises 
the possible validity of any values other than his own.99 Clearly, people may prefer different 
things than Hayek and they may express these preferences in the market. However, at a 
deeper level, Hayek does not allow that people might fundamentally disagree with his 
understanding of the good life. In fact, the substance of Hayek’s work demonstrates that he is 
completely convinced of the rightness of his position and the universality of his values. In 
one sense, this is what we should expect from someone engaged in such an important 
political battle. However, as we will see below, this universalism runs deeper than rhetoric
95 This point is very closely related to the argument about the priority o f the right over the good. For a 
summary, see Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, Second Edition 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 31-33, 119-21, and 124-26.
96 Ibid., p. vii.
97 See, for example, Hayek, op. cit., in note 66, pp. xxiv and xlv.
98 Ibid., p. 6. See also, Hayek, op. cit., in note 56, pp. 253-66.
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and can be shown to have a detrimental effect on both the legitimacy and feasibility of his 
suggestions for social order.
Acknowledging the problems raised by a particularist conception posing as universal 
provides only part of the argument. And indeed, the discussion above has only hinted at the 
ways in which this manoeuvre acts to impede an understanding of the moral relevance of 
culture. The discussion which follows will shift the focus slightly to the free market. Within 
this context, it will demonstrate that the kind of freedom advocated by Hayek actually 
requires that cultural imperatives be limited within established procedural boundaries. In 
other words, despite his commitment to spontaneous development and limited knowledge, 
Hayek’s vision of the free market and social justice is fundamentally unable to conceptualise 
culture as morally relevant.
Free Market
Spontaneity is a crucial concept in Hayek’s work. Once we have accepted that knowledge is 
limited, spontaneous innovation becomes the driving force of progress and both embodies 
and guarantees freedom. In this respect, much of the moral force behind the market emerges 
from its supposed spontaneity. Owing to this connection, the market is seen to be an order 
that both embodies freedom and that has been freely arrived at. In this sense, because it is 
spontaneous and, hence, fosters freedom, the market is especially valuable in the context of 
epistemological uncertainty.
However, it is not clear that Hayek would be so positive about any other arrangement 
that had arisen spontaneously. Indeed, as we will see, he is not so tolerant of any spontaneous 
development (no matter how freely arrived at) that might challenge his very particular 
conception of liberal civilisation.100 This is most apparent in Hayek’s discussion of two 
related subjects: the status of social norms and institutions, and the normative status of 
majority decisions.
One might assume that Hayek’s treatment of the evolution of social norms and 
institutions would generally accord with his claims about competition. Indeed, he claims that 
the groups which espouse the most beneficial values will succeed and their values will be 
imitated by the rest of society. Other groups will destroy themselves by the* moral beliefs to
99 On this point, see, for example, Miller, op. cit., in note 53, p. 347.
100 The conflict in Hayek’s work between freedom and tradition has been noted by several 
commentators. See, for example, Caldwell, op. cit., in note 53, Burczak, op. cit., in note 53, and 
Kukathas, op. cit., in note 53. The argument being made here draws upon their observations, but differs 
substantially from their analysis.
136
which they adhere.101 In keeping with his view of progress, he further claims that individuals 
should be able to transgress rules when it seems worthwhile.102 After all, how could progress 
occur without innovation? Morally, too, the freedom to differ is important. According to 
Hayek, ‘[o]nly where we ourselves are responsible for our own interests and are free to 
sacrifice them [for what is right] has our decision any moral value’.103 However, it soon 
becomes clear that Hayek is not willing to accept the possibility of general or unchannelled 
innovation. In particular, he argues that ‘a successful free society will always in large 
measure be a tradition-bound society’.104 In its more limited sense, this is an uncontroversial 
claim. As Hayek himself notes, existing institutions embody the experimentation of many 
generations.105 However, Hayek takes the claim further, arguing that because our knowledge 
is limited, ‘[w]e...have no choice but to submit to rules whose rationale we often do not 
know, and to do so whether or not we can see that anything important depends on their being 
observed in a particular instance’.106 On another occasion, he repeats the claim, criticising his 
contemporaries for their ‘new unwillingness to submit to any rule or necessity the rationale 
of which man does not understand’.107 In this stronger form, it is difficult to see how this 
claim can avoid conflicting with the value that Hayek places on innovation and spontaneity. 
After all, an innovative spirit is unlikely to rest well with the blind acceptance of existing 
social rules. Hayek resolves this apparent tension by placing two qualifications on the 
exercise of spontaneity. Neither of these qualifications.is explicit, but without them, Hayek’s 
argument is untenable.
First, Hayek treats different types of rules and institutions differently. The first group 
comprises all those rules and institutions that define his vision of liberal civilisation, 
including the free market and the rule of law. The second group is made up of all other rules 
and institutions within a liberal civilisation. While innovation within liberal civilisation is 
crucial for progress, innovation which calls this civilisation into question is never endorsed. 
According to Hayek, freedom ‘demands that it be accepted as a value in itself, as a principle 
that must be respected without our asking whether the consequences in the particular instance 
will be beneficial. We shall not achieve the results we want if we do not accept it as a creed 
or presumption so strong that no considerations of expediency can be allowed to limit it’.108 
The point is not necessarily whether one agrees or disagrees with Hayek about the value of 
freedom. What is important to note is that, for Hayek, certain rules and institutions are
101 Hayek, op. cit., in note 56, p. 67.
102 Ibid., p. 63.
103 Hayek, op. cit., in note 66, p. 231.
104 Hayek, op. cit., in note 56, p. 61.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
107 Hayek, op. cit., in note 66, p. 223.
108 Hayek, op. cit., in note 56, p. 68.
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beyond question. In Hayek’s own words, ‘there is ample scope for experimentation and 
improvement within that permanent legal framework’.109
Viewed in this light, many of the tensions discussed above become clear. For example, 
Hayek can afford to neglect the possibility that spontaneous human relations might result in 
undesirable outcomes, since, by definition, spontaneity is only exercised within the context of 
liberal civilisation. As a result, it cannot do other than perpetuate the free market. In this 
respect, Hayek can afford to be so supportive of innovation precisely because his own values 
are never really in question. His liberal civilisation is both the existing framework and the 
goal of competition. It is more than a teleology—it is built directly into the system. How 
could conflicting values and cultures have a chance—the normative presumptions of liberal 
civilisation are brought in through the back door and are never defined or justified.
Second, Hayek qualifies his idea of spontaneity by limiting the types of people who 
can be trusted with the task of innovation. For example, in discussing majority rule, Hayek 
claims that ‘the imposition of majority view.. .is coercive, monopolistic, and exclusive and so 
destroys the self-correcting forces which, in a free society, ensure that mistaken efforts will 
be abandoned’. More specifically, he claims that ‘it is always from a minority acting 
differently from what the majority would prescribe that the majority in the end learns to do 
better’.110 Clearly, Hayek does not hold out much hope for the innovativeness of the 
majority.111 However, given his vitriolic opposition to certain minority-governed systems,112 
it is clear that he would not see the value in supporting the innovativeness of just any 
minority. Not surprisingly, there is one particular minority group that Hayek believes is most 
likely to produce useful innovation, namely, ‘men of independent means’.113 According to 
him, if new ideas are to come forth, ‘representatives of all divergent views and tastes should 
be in a position to support with their means...ideals which are not yet shared by the 
majority’.114 For Hayek, this does not mean that people with dissenting views ought to be 
given the means to promote their beliefs. Rather, it means that those who already have 
significant means are the principal ones who shall be trusted to represent new and innovative 
ideals. Using inheritance as a criteria will ensure that those ‘who are given this opportunity 
are educated for it and will have grown up in a material environment in which the material 
benefits of wealth are familiar and have ceased to become the main source of satisfaction’.115 
Moreover, the wealthy are perfectly placed for innovation. They ‘are already living in a
109 Ibid., p. 231, emphasis added.
uo Ibid., p. 110.
111 For a critical discussion o f Hayek’s treatment o f democracy, see Robbins, op. cit., in note 53.
112 See Hayek’s discussion o f nazism and fascism throughout Hayek, op. cit., in note 66.
113 Hayek, op. cit., in note 56, p. 125.
114 Ibid., emphasis added.
"5 Ibid., p. 126.
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phase of evolution that the others have not yet reached’.116 It seems to matter little to Hayek 
that men of independent means will not represent the full spectrum of ideas and are amongst 
the least likely to be truly socially innovative. In fact, it quite suits Hayek to limit spontaneity 
to that group which has most to lose from radical changes to the status quo. Innovation, in 
this context, may involve tinkering with the forms of life within liberal civilisation, but it is 
never likely to call into question the basic structure of Hayek’s liberal ideal.
The same paradox presents itself in other contexts. For example, on some occasions, 
Hayek exalts tradition, while on others, traditions are described contemptuously as ‘relics of 
an earlier type of society’, in competition with freedom.117 Further, he notes that certain new 
policy aims have arisen that cannot be accommodated within his vision of the rule of law. 
Rather than acknowledge these as a potential source of social innovation, Hayek dismisses 
them as wrong and dangerous.118 Similarly, in comparing the English and French visions of 
liberty, Hayek argues that ‘the British philosophers laid the foundations of a profound and 
essentially valid theory, while the rationalist school was simply and completely wrong’.119 
These are harsh words for a social innovation that, two centuries later, is continuing to 
evolve.
It should be noted that welfare economists do not generally make claims as extreme as 
the ones above. They are generally supportive of democracy and political equality. However, 
the comments above are not wholly irrelevant. Similarly to Hayek, welfare economists begin 
from a position of limited knowledge and yet rely upon the claim that their vision of well­
being and their particular model of market-society relations is the obviously right one. 
Indeed, what is actually a very particular understanding of the relation of people to society 
and the value of formal versus material equality is passed off as a universal and obvious 
model, requiring no elaboration or justification.
Several points are of relevance here. First, it should by now be clear that Hayek is not 
open to innovations simply by virtue of their spontaneous evolution, and hence their 
contribution to freedom. In fact, Hayek consistently and deliberately denigrates or excludes 
any values that do not support his vision of liberal civilisation, no matter how innovative or 
ffeely-arrived-at they may be. At best, such values are ignored. At worst, as much of The 
Road to Serfdom demonstrates, they are castigated as promoting totalitarianism.120 Clearly, 
some uses of freedom are better than others. Unfortunately, because of the strength of his 
epistemological justification, Hayek gives no indication of what the additional ethical criteria
116 Ibid., p. 44.
U1 Ibid., p. 81.
m Ibid., p. 231.
119 Ibid., p. 56.
120 See, for example, Hayek, op. cit., in note 66, especially Chapter 12, ‘The Socialist Roots o f  
Naziism’, pp. 183-98.
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may be and how they might be substantiated. In this respect, we can conclude that it is not 
solely the intrinsic value of freedom that justifies the form and substance of liberal 
civilisation, including the free market. With no further justification offered, Hayek’s entire 
argument seems to rest on the simple claim that his view of freedom and the good society is 
better than others.
Second, however, we can only accept this latter claim if we accept that Hayek himself 
has the very knowledge of what is best that the epistemological uncertainty of his theory 
rules to be impossible. Indeed, the whole point of valuing spontaneity is that ‘because every 
individual knows so little and, in particular, because we rarely know which of us knows best 
that we trust the individual and competitive efforts of many to induce the emergence of what 
we shall want when we see it’.121 Yet the acceptance of Hayek’s conclusions (including the 
naturalness of the free market) depends precisely on our acceptance that he has the very 
knowledge that he eschewed as impossible. In other words, believing Hayek’s conclusions 
about the universal legitimacy of liberal civilisation may actually require us to reject the very 
grounds upon which he justifies this civilisation. In this context, far from reflecting a victory 
for particularisms, Hayek’s specific conception of freedom and the free market emerge as 
universalisms, bereft of any adequate justification whatsoever.122
To sum up, this engagement with Hayek’s thought has illustrated the central role 
played by negative freedom in legitimising market-based approaches. Furthermore, it has 
shown how this conception of freedom is fundamentally unable to accommodate culture in 
any meaningful way. Even Hayek’s innovative epistemological defence of freedom is 
ultimately grounded in his own very particular views on the form and substance of the good 
life. Because of its strong pretences to universality, such an approach fundamentally rules out 
a substantive pluralism. The appropriate nature of such a pluralism, and its attending 
justification will be the subject of the remainder of this thesis.
Conclusion
This chapter has criticised welfare economics on several grounds. First, it has argued that 
welfare economists do not adequately acknowledge their own moral premises as contestable 
moral premises. Even the choice of individual well-being as the goal of economic theory is 
rarely seen by economists as a contestable normative claim. As a result, they are unable to 
recognise the particularity of their own approach, as well as the existence of other approaches 
based on other moral frameworks. Second, however, when the normative premises of welfare
121 Hayek, op. cit., in note 56, p. 29.
122 This point is made in a different way by John Gray, The Moral Foundations o f  Market Institutions 
(London: The IEA Health and Welfare Unit, 1992), pp. 16-17.
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economics are examined in any detail, it becomes difficult to see how they are either 
‘innocuous’ or ‘uncontroversial’. In fact, they actively work to exclude considerations of 
culture as morally relevant. Their claims about individual well-being invoke a very strong 
individualism and a moral subjectivism. Moreover, their analysis is greatly strengthened by a 
reliance on implicit notions of individual freedom. When these notions are explored, they too 
invoke very particular claims about individualism, values, and the nature of human self- 
understandings. Combined, these arguments act to ensure that market-based approaches 
cannot understand culture as anything more meaningful than a consumption choice. In effect, 
they limit the legitimacy of other values and ways of life. In so doing, they foreclose the 
possibility of a genuine cultural pluralism.
In this regard, the success of this thesis does not depend on the strong claim that 
welfare economics is somehow obliterated by the rise of cultural concerns. Instead, it is 
motivated by the conviction that a greater sense of the relevance of culture can generate 
important insights into our self-understandings, our motivations, and our values. These 
insights are crucial to IPE and to public policy more generally, and yet, as this chapter has 
shown, they cannot adequately be captured by welfare economics. We need new approaches. 
In this spirit, the following chapters are dedicated to exploring the positive possibilities of 
cultural insight.
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Chapter 7
The Moral Status of Community-Based Approaches
Having discussed the legitimacy and universal applicability of welfare economics as a theory 
of the good life, this chapter will now address the question of whether and in what ways it is 
possible to provide a moral justification for community-based approaches to trade and 
culture. In other words, are there good ethical reasons why the state should intervene to 
support culture, and what might they be? This chapter will argue that, in considering 
community-based approaches, we can and ought to distinguish between those community- 
based approaches which are morally acceptable and those which are not. Having made this 
distinction, this chapter will focus on those community-based approaches which are not 
ethically justifiable, delineating the reasons why these approaches are unacceptable as a basis 
for Canadian periodicals policy. This chapter will also indicate why a culturally-sensitive 
liberal position is not endorsed. The subsequent chapter will build on this discussion, offering 
a detailed delineation of the ethics underlying acceptable forms of community-based 
approach. It will offer this analysis as a particular ethics to which cultural policy should 
aspire if it is to be justifiable. The thesis will conclude with a sympathetic critique of 
Canadian magazine policy, agreeing with it generally, but suggesting ways in which it could 
be improved to better accord with the community-based ethics set out here.
Theorists of political morality raise this question of state support for the arts more 
often than one might expect. Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, and Charles Taylor, for example, 
have all addressed the question specifically.1 Their responses are quite illustrative within the 
context of their own theories, and also within the context of the liberal-communitarian 
debate.2 Relying on some of these ideas, this chapter will seek to ascertain what grounds 
there may be for asserting the moral status of culture, in the contexts in which it is framed by 
the various community-based approaches described in Chapter 3.
As the reader will recall, community-based approaches to trade and culture were 
defined earlier as those approaches which begin from the premise that cultural activity fulfils
1 See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, ‘Can a Liberal State Support Art?’, in Dworkin, A Matter o f  
Principle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 221-33; Ronald Dworkin, ‘The Foundations of 
Liberal Equality’, in G. Petersen (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, No. 12, p. 272, note 44; 
Joseph Raz, The Morality o f  Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 201; and Charles 
Taylor, ‘Atomism’, in Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 205.
2 On this point, see, for example, Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, 
Second Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 300-303. See also Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, 
Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), and Will Kymlicka, Multicultural
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important social functions. They stress the benefits to the community of cultural production 
by, for, and representing that community. In turn, the good of the community, broadly 
defined, is the ultimate justification for cultural policy. Moving beyond the claims of Chapter 
3, community-based approaches to trade and culture can be divided into two basic categories. 
The first type, comprising the majority of community-based approaches, can be labelled the 
national survival approach, while the second type can be titled the cultural pluralism 
approach. Importantly, both approaches share a broad view of the person as a moral agent 
that is inescapably culturally constituted.3 In other words, both approaches emphasise the 
central role of culture in defining our identities and shaping our conceptions of the good. 
Building from this, however, they differ radically in terms of the cultural influences that they 
prioritise and, consequently, in terms of the politics that they advocate. It is primarily in 
terms of the acceptability of their politics that both approaches will be evaluated.
National survival approaches focus exclusively on culture as it relates to the nation or 
the nationally-defined political community. In this sense, they adopt a fairly singular view of 
identity. Factors other than the nation may contribute to identity, but these are perceived to 
be secondary allegiances. In this regard, they seek support for culture because this is 
instrumental to the achievement of other ends, such as national identity, national unity, state 
sovereignty, defence, and prosperity.4 However, these are not just any particular ends, but are 
goods that are perceived to be intimately bound to the survival of the national community. 
Indeed, as we noted in discussing Canadian periodicals, the most common community-based 
themes are those that revolve around the very survival of the nation. State support for 
Canadian culture is very often presented as essential to the survival of the nation-state.
In contrast, cultural pluralism approaches take a much more plural view of culture and 
identity. They argue for the moral relevance of all cultural sources of identity, whether 
national or not, and they refuse to give priority to national cultures in the scheme of social 
justice. Building from the claim that culture is constitutive of identity, they argue for a 
conception of justice that can publicly recognise and embrace cultural difference. They seek 
to move beyond the shallow pluralism of liberal democracy towards a deeper, public 
pluralism characteristic of radical democracy.5 Philosophically, these views are closest to the
Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f  Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
3 This should not be interpreted to mean that they espouse identical views o f the person. Indeed, when 
this thesis sets out its particular view o f the cultural constitution o f the person, it will become clear that 
a great deal depends upon the nuances with which such a conception is developed. As recent debates 
have highlighted, much depends on the author’s understanding o f the degree to which a person can 
choose or change their cultural allegiances.
4 It should be noted that my use o f ‘instrumental’ refers to all approaches which value culture only in 
so far as it contributes to other values, whether these be universalist or particularist. This should be 
differentiated from more common, materialist uses o f the term.
5 For an introduction to radical democracy and its points o f difference with liberal democracy, see 
Chantal Mouffe, ‘Preface: Democratic Politics Today’, in Chantal Mouffe (ed.), Dimensions o f  Radical
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insights of those community-based approaches which emphasised democratic development 
and artistic fulfilment as the central contributions of culture to the community. However, 
even these latter approaches often revert to the idioms of national identity—a practice 
explicitly rejected by cultural pluralism approaches. As a result, cultural pluralists are less 
exclusivist in their understanding of the sources of identity, and less essentialist in their 
conceptualisation of national identities than most other community-based approaches.
This chapter will begin by discussing the national survival approach. The purpose of 
this discussion is to highlight the ways in which this particular type of community-based 
approach is an ethically unsatisfactory basis upon which to defend Canadian periodicals 
policy. This discussion will raise important questions about the role of liberal theories in any 
ethical analysis of culture. The chapter will argue against the use of such approaches. This 
will create the basis upon which subsequent chapters, using the work of Taylor and Iris 
Marion Young, will delineate an ethically acceptable justification for community-based 
approaches.
National Survival
The national survival approach has been exemplified repeatedly throughout this thesis, even 
though it has not previously been given this epithet. Indeed, it was dominant in the 
approaches described in Chapter 3, and reappeared regularly in the Canadian policy 
statements discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. As a brief reminder, the reader ought to recall the 
words of the 1994 Task Force: ‘[mjagazines help foster in Canadians a sense of ourselves.
They enable us to see ourselves as no others see us They also enable us to view the rest of
the world from a Canadian standpoint’.6 Or the words of the O’Leary Commission: 
‘communications are the thread which binds together the fibers [sic] of a nation. They can 
protect a nation’s values and encourage their practice’.7 More recently, Canada’s Prime 
Minister reinforced these themes, claiming that ‘[w]e have to protect the cultural interests of 
Canada. There have always been some Americans who don’t like the protection we are 
offering to our industries in the cultural field but it is part of the national identity’.8
Further, as was fully demonstrated in Chapter 4, the claims being made are not only 
the simple ones that national identity or unity depend on cultural protection. Many 
commentators are quick to make the further claim that the very survival of the Canadian 
nation or polity is at stake. In Franklyn Griffiths’ words, ‘[a]s we lose the ability to give
Democracy (London: Verso, 1992), pp. 1-14.
6 Canada, A Question o f  Balance: Report o f  the Task Force on the Canadian Magazine Industry 
(Ottawa: Minister o f Supply and Services Canada, 1994), p. 1.
7 Canada, Royal Commission on Publications, Report (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1961), p. 4.
8 Prime Minster Jean Chretien, quoted in The Ottawa Citizen, 26 January 1999, p. A3.
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voice to feelings, ideas, and purposes that unite us....we stand to lose control over our 
land.. ..The state of our cultural life becomes a key variable in our security, in our survival as 
a people’.9 Survival of the nation is clearly a defining theme in these community-based 
approaches.
This is a variant of an essentially nationalist position. In the first place, it relies 
centrally on the claim that there is an identifiable and uncontested Canadian nation and that 
this nation is a good thing that ought to be continuously renewed. More importantly, 
however, proponents of this position understand culture in exclusively national terms. In a 
view that resonates with many theories of nationalism, culture is perceived as both a forum 
for and a symbolic language of national expression. It is, in this case, a defining element of 
the nation.10 However, if this claim is to be take seriously, we must first ask whether it is 
possible to conceive of a Canadian nation.
The Canadian Nation?
Clearly, there are many ‘criteria’ by which Canada falls far short of nationhood. Most 
particularly, if singularity of spoken language, religion, or descent, or the presumption of a 
long and glorious common history are important, then Canada would hardly qualify. In fact, 
few commentators are willing to argue that there is even a common symbolic culture 
embracing both French and English Canadians.11 In this context, understanding the claims of 
community-based approaches as nationalist claims requires us to understand the very 
particular character of the Canadian nation (and culture), as it is reflected in these claims. In 
so doing, we are aware of Max Weber’s warning that the homogeneity of a nation is both
9 Franklyn Griffiths, Strong and Free: Canada and the New Sovereignty (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing 
Co. Limited for Canadian Foreign Policy, 1996), pp. 7 and 9.
10 This view resonates with, for example, Johann Gottfried Herder, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and more 
recently, Karl Deutsch. See, for example, Herder, ‘Essay on the Origin o f Languages’, in On the Origin 
o f  Language, tr. J. Moran and A. Gode (Chicago, IL: University o f Chicago Press, 1986 [1772]); 
Fichte, Addresses to the German Nation, ed. G.A. Kelly (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1968); and 
Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York, NY: Wiley, 1953). See also Charles 
Taylor’s discussion o f Herder in Taylor, ‘The Importance o f Herder’, in Taylor, Philosophical 
Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 79-99. For a sense o f  the debates 
about the idea and substance o f cultural nationalism, see John Breuilly, ‘Race and Ethnicity: A 
Sociobiological Perspective’, Ethnic and Racial Studies (Vol. 1, No. 4, 1978), pp. 402-11; John 
Hutchinson, The Dynamics o f  Cultural Nationalism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987); Paul Gilbert, 
The Philosophy o f  Nationalism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), especially Chapter 7; and 
Avishai Margalit, ‘The Moral Psychology o f Nationalism’, in Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan 
(eds.), The Morality o f  Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 74-87. It should be 
noted that other theorists are much more sceptical about the independent importance o f cultural factors 
in the definition and development o f the nation. See, for example Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, Fourth 
Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), and Ernst Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1983).
11 On this point, see Richard Collins, Culture, Communication and National Identity: The Case o f  
Canadian Television (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 20.
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essential but also frequently indefinite.12 Bearing in mind the indefinite and unarticulated 
nature of Canadian nationalism, the following paragraphs will attempt to offer a limited 
understanding of what the Canadian nation might consist in. It should be noted that the 
discussion which follows is not necessarily intended as an endorsement of the nationalist 
position. Indeed, such an argument has numerous deficiencies, not least in the way in which 
it does not adequately take account of Quebecois identity. The following paragraphs are 
meant only to set out the way in which the Canadian nation is understood by national 
survival approaches. A subsequent discussion will be devoted to criticising this position.
In this context, there are several important things to note about Canadian nationalism. 
First, it is perceived largely in opposition to other cultural influences, especially American 
ones. Reflecting this antithetical vein, one commentator has labelled Canada ‘Notland’: ‘not 
English, not American, not Asian, not European’.13 This sense of being not-American no 
doubt accounted for some of the vociferousness with which anti-free traders attacked the 
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA).14 Many felt that the FTA would bring a 
greater Americanisation of society.
Second, however, not-Americanism was not simply reactive, but was coupled with 
certain myths about Canadian society.15 As a result, not-Americanism took on a particular 
form which itself reflected certain self-perceptions on the part of Canadian nationalists. In 
particular, Canada was portrayed as a kinder, gentler society than the United States, a place 
where collective responsibility carries more weight.16 In other words, a country ‘that leaves 
room for the democratic left’,17 is less materialistic,18 and accepts a greater degree of 
government intervention in order to create a more compassionate society.19 Further, Canada 
was portrayed as a less violent society—one more tolerant of difference and less tolerant of 
militarism and social inequity.20 These claims are interesting because they demonstrate the 
degree to which Canadian nationalism centres on the importance of certain social values and 
political institutions. Particular emphasis is laid upon tolerance, compassion, and substantive 
equality. In turn, then, a national health system and generous welfare provisions are viewed 
as the political embodiment of a particularly Canadian culture. Interestingly, the sense in
12 Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. G. Roth and C. Wittich (New York, NY: Bedminster Press, 
1968), p. 923. Quoted in Walker Connor, ‘A Nation is a Nation, is a State, in an Ethnic Group, is a ...’, 
Ethnic and Racial Studies (Vol. 1, No. 4, 1978), p. 387.
13 A. Wilden, The Imaginary Canadian (Vancouver: Pulp Press, 1980), quoted in Collins, op. cit., in 
note 10, p. 20.
14 On this point, see Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990).
15 Myth, in this context, is not meant to indicate that there is no empirical substance to these claims.
16 Jack McClelland, in Laurier LaPierre, (assembler), I f  You Love This Country: Facts and Feelings on 
Free Trade (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987), p. 244.
17 Michele Landsberg, in ibid., p. 52.
18 Lipset, op. cit., in note 14, p. 7.
19 Bob White, in LaPierre (ass.), op. cit., in note 16, p. 69.
20 Jack Layton, in ibid., pp. 138-42.
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which these values are defining elements of the Canadian nation is also reflected in Canadian 
perceptions of their role abroad. Indeed, the myths of Canada as a middle power, a 
conciliator, and a committed peacekeeping nation are all powerful elements of the national 
self-perception.21 In all of these roles, Canada is perceived to be embodying and promoting 
tolerance and compassion.
Third, and related to the value placed on tolerance, it is crucial to note the defining 
role of multiculturalism in Canadian nationalism. Ironically, it is the particular way in which 
Canada has embraced multiculturalism that provides an important element of national 
distinctness. In other words, Canada has few myths of common descent and shared history, 
relying instead on a myth of common acceptance of difference. Not surprisingly, even this 
myth is deliberately and carefully differentiated from the oft-cited American ‘melting pot’. In 
particular, it is often claimed that the Canadian model encourages immigrants to retain their 
cultural heritages. It does not ask them to be Canadian first. This is contrasted with the 
American melting pot where, it is claimed, everyone must be American first, relegating the 
enjoyment of their cultural heritage to the private sphere.22 Ironically, as Richard Collins has 
noted, the result of this is that ‘an important element of [Canadian] distinctiveness is its weak 
national symbolic culture’.23
In her formative text on Canadian nationalism, Sylvia Bashevkin has reinforced the 
above observations. She notes, first, that theories of nationalism based on race and ethnicity 
are not as useful for studying Canadian nationalism as are notions of in-group loyalty and 
sovereignty. In particular, she describes Canadian nationalism as focused on the members of 
an in-group and their loyalty to a sovereign political unit which is perceived to be 
representative of that in-group. Pan-Canadian nationalism, then, is defined as ‘the organized 
pursuit of a more independent and distinctive Canadian in-group on the North American 
continent, primarily through the introduction by the federal government of specific cultural, 
trade and investment policies that would limit US out-group influences’.24
This definition is highly instructive, especially when considered in light of the values 
articulated above. In the first place, Bashevkin captures the sense in which Canadian 
nationalism is defined against other political and cultural influences. Second, she highlights 
the importance of political institutions in Canadian self-understandings. In particular, the
21 On the idea o f  ‘middlepowermanship’, see J. King Gordon, Canada’s Role as a Middle Power 
(Toronto: Canadian Institute o f International Affairs, 1966) and, more recently, Andrew F. Cooper 
(ed.), Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997). On the 
characterisation o f Canada as an international mediator and peacemaker, see Norman Hillmer and J.L. 
Granatstein, Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman 
Ltd., 1994), especially pp. 350-51. Also see Landsberg, op. cit., in note 17, p. 53.
22 Lois M. Wilson, in LaPierre (ass.), op. cit., in note 16, p. 249.
23 Collins, op. cit., in note 11, p. 24.
24 Sylvia Bashevkin, True Patriot Love: The Politics o f  Canadian Nationalism (Toronto and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 4.
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bonds of connection between Canadians are, in her understanding, provided by a common 
loyalty to a representative self-determining political unit. Being Canadian, for Bashevkin, is 
defined by little more than being a common member of the Canadian political community. In 
one respect, this leads her to underestimate the degree to which certain common values are 
perceived to define the Canadian nation. However, she is clearly right to emphasise the 
centrality in Canadian nationalism of loyalty, not to a cultural group, but to a politically- 
defined in-group.
As a result, and finally, Bashevkin’s analysis usefully highlights the central role 
occupied by the federal state in Canadian nationalism. The state, in this case, is not the 
protector of primordial cultural ties or the guardian of a glorious national history. 
Nonetheless, it plays a crucial role in protecting and defending the nation. It is the guarantor 
of multiculturalism, of universal health care, and, importantly, it is the protector of the 
Canadian way of life as against American influences. In the words of Bernard Ostry, ‘[i]t 
seems obvious that.. .the federal government has a clear responsibility—if we are to have a 
country at all—to encourage the growth of that missing sense of a common heritage and 
destiny’.25 Indeed, so closely is the nation tied to the state, in this analysis, that the state itself 
would be in danger if it failed to protect the nation. These close links explain in large part 
why the Canadian state has often been accepted as the obvious and uncontested agent of 
Canadian nationalism.
It should be noted that, although this is a dominant conceptualisation of Canadian 
nationalism, it is not one that would be accepted by all Canadians. In particular, as Bashevkin 
herself has noted, the pan-Canadian nationalist view must be understood as an attempt to 
define a singular identity amongst members of a society who hold multiple, often strong 
identities. In this context, the pan-Canadian position tends to reflect the identities of its 
proponents—usually anglophones from central Canada who hold broadly left-of-centre 
political views.26 Indeed, she goes so far as to accuse pan-Canadianists of romanticising the 
unity of French and English and of neglecting the legitimacy of identities that do not fit in 
with the ‘One Canada’ thesis.27 This criticism of pan-Canadianism will be reinforced when 
the singular vision and exclusionary elements of nationalist theories are criticised below. The 
need for an understanding of plural and shifting identities will be further substantiated.
Despite the partiality of this understanding of nationalism, the discussion above has 
clarified the terms on which nationalists tend to speak of a Canadian nation, however diverse 
and loosely connected it may be and, more importantly, however little it may have in 
common with some traditional ideas of the nation. Having developed this understanding, it is
25 Bernard Ostry, The Cultural Connection: An Essay on Culture and Government Policy in Canada 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978), p. 4, emphasis added.
26 Bashevkin, op. cit., in note 24, p. 26.
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possible to see how the national survival variants of community-based approaches rely on an 
essentially nationalist position. As noted above, they understand that a Canadian nation does 
in fact exist and that it ought to be protected and enhanced by the Canadian federal 
government. Indeed, in this regard, we can truly understand their claim that the protection of 
Canadian culture is essential to national identity, national unity, and the sovereignty of the 
Canadian state.
Nationalism and Ethics
The ethical problems with nationalist approaches such as this have already been repeatedly 
discussed in the so-called liberal-communitarian debate.28 In fact, the claims made by 
national survival approaches represent some of the worst communitarian excesses, and the 
ones upon which liberal critiques most often focus. To briefly summarise, not all liberals take 
issue with the basic conception of the person posited by national survival approaches. 
Specifically, they do not contest that cultural influences may be a crucial element in the 
constitution of moral personhood. However, they charge that in a communitarian framework, 
the assumption of cultural embeddedness leads to a singular, group-based conception of the 
good. As Will Kymlicka argues, ‘[i]n a communitarian society...the common good is 
conceived of as a substantive conception of the good which defines the community’s “way of 
life’” .29 Indeed, according to Kymlicka, ‘the common good for communitarians is precisely 
the pursuit of these shared ends, which constrains the freedom of individuals to choose and 
pursue their own life-style’.30 As a result, liberals perceive that, when applied within a 
communitarian framework, the assumption of cultural embeddedness can be used as a basis 
for ‘the brutal oppression of individuals’.31
Given that both liberals and communitarians claim to accept some version of a 
culturally-embedded view of the person, much of the debate between them actually centres 
on the extent to which the individual is able to revise his values and goals. In a liberal 
understanding, culture provides no more than a context of choice within which individuals 
make decisions about their lives. If individual freedom is to be respected, according to them, 
the individual must be considered able to reflect upon and revise his cultural and value 
commitments. Theorists identified as communitarians may accept the possibility of such
27 Ibid. p. 27.
28 I refer to it as a ‘so-called’ debate to reflect the fact that many liberals and particularly 
communitarians would not identify themselves as such or perceive themselves to be part o f a formal 
debate. Nonetheless, the concept o f a debate is extremely useful for understanding the points at issue. 
For a good summary o f the issues at stake between liberals and communitarians, see Mulhall and 
Swift, op. cit., in note 2.
29 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, op. cit., in note 2, p. 77.
30 Ibid., p. 78.
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revision, but contend that such revisions cannot necessarily be consciously or easily 
undertaken. Indeed, as was evidenced by Taylor’s remarks in Chapter 6, they often try to 
highlight the ways in which the very idea of a free chooser, and hence the substance of the 
liberal project is itself inescapably culturally embedded.
As we will see in Chapter 8, acknowledging culture as a way of life and granting it a 
corresponding ethical status does not in itself generate the stereotypical communitarianism 
that many liberals associate with it. In fact, the problem with the national survival arguments 
set out above is not their acknowledgement of the central relevance of culture in constituting 
individual identity. Instead, their failing lies in the distinctive politics that arise from their 
interpretation of cultural embeddedness. In particular, they essentialise the community and 
reify the relationship between culture and identity. They assume that the identity of an 
individual is a singular thing, that it exists in direct relation to a single, uncontested (national) 
culture which itself is manifest in a single well-defined (and usually political) community. 
These claims will be developed in the next few paragraphs.
First, and most importantly, this approach requires that the cultural basis of the 
community be understood in terms of the nation. Focusing as it does on the survival of the 
nation, such an approach leaves no room for the possibility that non-national cultural 
influences may constitute important moral sources. As Bashevkin noted, the national 
community may be only one of many plural and overlapping communities that together 
define (or compete for) the moral framework of the individual. As a result, it is not a 
foregone conclusion that there is only one relevant moral community and that it is the 
national one. In this sense, focusing exclusively on the nation—its identity, unity, and 
sovereignty—generates an essentialist understanding of community that excludes the 
relevance of other cultural sources of value.
Second, the national survival view requires a fixed conception of the nation. In this 
sense, as we noted above, the nation is defined by certain values and goals. In one sense, this 
is required, if the idea of defending an entity defined as ‘the nation’ is to make any sense at 
all. However, it is still important to ask which values are being defended and to allow the 
possibility that the nation may change over time. To be fair, the question of which culture is 
being defended is hardly absent from the debate among community-based approaches to 
trade and culture. The singular vision of the Canadian nation is often challenged, most 
particularly by the Quebecois. Further, many of those who seek to defend state support for 
culture are keen to see that the state does not impose a singular view of Canadian culture 
upon both artists and citizens.32 However, it is nonetheless clear that proponents of the
31 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 18.
32 See, for example, the arguments for arm’s length policies in John Meisel and Jean Van Loon, 
‘Cultivating the Bushgarden: Cultural Policy in Canada’, in Milton C. Cummings, Jr. and Richard S.
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national survival approach have defended a particular (i.e., national, Canadian) culture on 
the grounds that it contributes to the good of a particular (ostensibly pan-Canadian) 
community. Within this type of approach, a view of who is in and who is out is unavoidable, 
however implicit it may be. Furthermore, and especially since the particularity of this vision 
is largely implicit, it is not clear that the nation is a concept open to substantive revision. It 
has boundaries, like any other concept, that are policed through the designation of what 
constitutes ‘Canadian culture’, not least through government criteria for Canadian content 
and ownership. In a multicultural state like Canada, such assertions about the basis of 
Canadian culture can be especially damaging.
In this context, the potentially exclusionary politics of the national survivalist 
approach are evident. If this view is brought to bear on EPE, it creates the nationalist, 
protectionist, elitist, and rent-seeking state that economists have long decried. In contrast, 
and as a first step towards a more adequate ethic, the following two chapters will draw out 
another set of ethical claims arising out of the community-based approaches, namely the 
cultural pluralism approach. It will be argued that identities must be understood as plural and 
shifting and that these may be identified by many different (and often evolving and 
competing) cultures. In turn, these cultures may interact in very different ways and numbers 
to form communities. Moreover, and very importantly, none of these categories can be 
understood as fixed or given. The boundaries of membership as well as the substance of 
community are constantly the subject of political conflict. As a result, the claim that 
acknowledging culture in a deep way leads to totalitarianism must simply be rejected. 
However, this rejection need not neglect the constitutive significance of culture. It does mean 
that any adequate conception of social justice must more fluidly conceptualise the 
relationship between culture and identity. Such an approach will be set out in the following 
two chapters, before the implications for trade in periodicals are drawn out. First, however, it 
is necessary to deal with one further question.
Why Not Liberalism?
In the foregoing discussion of liberal and communitarian differences, it was noted that many 
liberals claim to accept the communitarian conception of the person as culturally embedded. 
Indeed, although liberals have often been criticised for adopting a view of the individual as 
completely unencumbered, much of this criticism has been unfair. In this context, although 
the previous chapter ruled out highly individualist forms of liberalism, it is reasonable to ask
Katz (eds.), The Patron State: Government and the Arts in Europe, North America, and Japan (New 
York, NY and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 276-310. See also Canada, Federal Cultural 
Policy Review Committee, Report (Ottawa: Ministry o f Supply and Services, 1982), p. 16.
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why this thesis does not adopt a moderate liberal approach, based on the constitutive 
relevance of culture, but seeking to accommodate it within a framework of liberal pluralism. 
In other words, why go to the bother of elucidating a communitarian-leaning framework, if 
culture is already adequately conceptualised by John Rawls, Raz, Yael Tamir, or Kymlicka?33 
This is hardly a simple question, requiring as it does an elucidation of the finer points of 
certain liberal commitments. In this context, answering it is no easy task. Rather than taking 
issue with the already highly-contested Rawlsian position34 or the uneasy middle ground of 
Raz35 or Tamir, the argument which follows will take the harder road, focusing on the 
culturally-oriented work of Kymlicka. Indeed, Kymlicka does offer the most detailed and 
consistent consideration of cultural themes of any modem liberal theorist. Taking the work of 
someone so intimately concerned with cultural themes will help us to avoid creating a liberal 
straw man. One drawback, however, is that in focusing our critique on Kymlicka’s concerns, 
the thesis will not have space to critique the procedural dimension of some liberal theories. 
Fortunately, this criticism has been well-developed elsewhere.36
More importantly, however, the thesis will not explore in any great detail the 
conception of cultural rights.37 Nonetheless, most conceptions of cultural rights exhibit 
problematic ambiguities very similar to those which are drawn out and critiqued below. Once 
these key problems with the liberal conception of culture are realised, the basis for a rights 
position will consequently be seriously weakened. In this light, and taking the work of 
Kymlicka as an example, this section will argue that it is impossible to be a consistent liberal 
while maintaining that culture, defined broadly, is constitutive of people’s ends.
33 Classical liberal economists, such as David Ricardo, also include culture in their analyses. See, for 
example, David Ricardo, Principles o f  Political Economy and Taxation (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 
1911 [1817]). However, the classical economists have not been included here for the simple reason that 
they do not offer an adequate delineation or justification o f their treatment o f  culture. The modem  
liberal scholars mentioned here are much more thorough and systematic in this regard and, as a result, 
their arguments about culture are more useful.
34 For the arguments surrounding Rawls and constitutive attachments, see Chantal Mouffe, The Return 
o f  the Political (London: Verso, 1993), especially pp. 41-59,
35 For the cultural precepts o f Raz, see his ‘Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective’, in Raz, Ethics in 
the Public Domain, Revised Edition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), pp. 170-91. See also Raz, with 
Avishai Margalit, ‘National Self-Determination’, in Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, pp. 125-45, and 
Raz, op. cit., in note 1, especially Chapters 1 and 12. John Gray provides an interesting extension of 
Raz’s ideas in Gray, The Moral Foundations o f  Market Institutions (London: The IEA Health and 
Welfare Unit, 1992).
36 See, for example, Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982), especially pp. 121-22; Sheldon S. Wolin, ‘Fugitive Democracy’, in Seyla 
Benhabib (ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f  the Political (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 31-45; and Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f  
Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
37 The concept o f cultural rights is further explored in Raz, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 245-63; Raz, op. cit., 
in note 35; UNESCO, Cultural Rights and Wrongs (Paris: UNESCO, 1998); Chandran Kukathas, ‘Are 
There Any Cultural Rights?’, Political Theory (Vol. 20, No. 1, 1992), pp. 105-39; and the reply by 
Will Kymlicka, ‘The Rights o f Minority Cultures: Reply to Kukathas’, Political Theory (Vol. 20, No. 
1, 1992), pp. 140-46.
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Few theorists would now deny the basic point that culture is of fundamental 
importance to individuals. In this vein, Kymlicka concedes that, ‘[p]eople are bound, in an 
important way, to their own cultural community....Someone’s upbringing isn’t something 
that can just be erased; it is, and will remain a constitutive part of who that person is’.38 
Moreover, he attributes similar ideas to both Rawls and Dworkin, though, at least for Rawls, 
such constitutive attachments should be confined to the private sphere.39 However, while 
maintaining this as an ‘ontological fact’, many liberals would attach ethical significance to 
culture only in an instrumental and conditional way. Many of these are also theorists who 
would refer to our ordinary moral sense as the ultimate reference point for theories of justice. 
These claims, I will argue, cannot be reconciled. The attempt to make both of these claims -  
that culture is constitutive of individual identity, but that it is only instrumental in a moral 
theory -  is inconsistent and represents an attempt to ‘have the best of both worlds’. This will 
be illustrated below.
Throughout his work, Kymlicka seeks to show that liberalism can and, in fact, must 
accommodate ‘the virtues and importance of our membership in a community and a 
culture’.40 In this sense, his work is directed at communitarians who have criticised the 
liberal conception of the individual and its portrayal of the social context in which individual 
moral action takes place. Not surprisingly, he suggests that these critiques arise in large part 
due to a communitarian misreading of liberal ideas. However, his work is also directed at 
those liberals, such as Rawls and Dworkin, who, according to Kymlicka, are aware of the 
‘importance of the cultural context of choice’, but do not recognise ‘cultural membership as a 
primary good, or as a ground for legitimate claims’.41 In this sense, Kymlicka’s work can be 
read as a critique of liberals for what they have failed to say about culture, rather than for 
what they are unable to say. This section will address Kymlicka’s work with particular 
attention to three questions: 1) what is Kymlicka’s definition of culture; 2) how does culture 
relate to identity; and 3) what is the moral status of culture? Taking culture as constitutive of 
identity, but valuing it only instrumentally, I will argue, leads to a disjuncture between the 
answers to questions 2 and 3.
Kymlicka is quite keenly attuned to the myriad uses of the term culture in 
contemporary theory. Within this range of ideas, he locates himself by focusing on ‘societal 
culture’, ‘that is, a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across 
the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and
38 Kymlicka, op. cit., in note 29, p. 175, emphasis in original.
39 See Kymlicka’s discussion in op. cit., in note 29, pp. 177-78, and Kymlicka, Multicultural 
Citizenship, op. cit., in note 2, pp. 158-63. Kymlicka refers mainly to John Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: 
Political not Metaphysical’, Philosophy and Public Affairs (Vol. 14, No. 3, 1985), pp. 223-51, and 
Dworkin, A M atter o f  Principle, op. cit., in note 1.
40 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, op. cit., in note 2, p. 1.
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economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be 
territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language’.42 This is synonymous with ‘a 
nation’ or ‘a people’, and includes shared memories and values as well as common 
institutions and practices. Although Kymlicka claims that he does not wish to dismiss the 
importance of claims made by non-national minorities,43 he never adequately explains why 
he prioritises this national understanding of culture over others. Moreover, as we will see, his 
theory requires that he prioritise the claims of national minorities over immigrant groups. 
Both of these issues create problems for him when he later wishes to accord a moral status to 
culture.
In any discussion of the moral status of culture, the relationship of culture and identity 
must be a central issue. Here, Kymlicka’s position is not as clear. It is essential for his ethical 
theory that he subscribe to the vision of the individual as able to question and revise his 
chosen ends and projects. But what is the role of the community and communal attachments 
in this process? According to Kymlicka, cultural attachments cannot be dismissed. However, 
‘[liberals...insist that we have an ability to detach ourselves from any particular communal 
practice. No particular task is set for us by society....Nothing is authoritative before our 
judgement of its value’.44 More specifically, for Kymlicka, ‘[w]hat is central to the liberal 
view is not that we can perceive a self prior to its ends, but that we understand our selves to 
be prior to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible re­
examination\ 45
There are two arguments at work here. First, Kymlicka seems to be saying that it is a 
matter of common agreement that the self is encumbered and that a liberal theory can only 
make sense in this context. For example, he claims that, ‘Taylor is right to emphasize the 
importance of his social thesis, and hence the importance of a secure social context, of public 
principles of justice, and of civic participation. All these are of unquestionable importance. 
But that is just the problem. No one does question their importance’.46 However, in making 
that point, Kymlicka relies on a second argument that threatens to contradict the first. While 
he clearly thinks that it is impossible for someone to choose to have no culture at all, it is 
feasible for someone to choose between two cultures as if they were discrete products with 
no relation to the identity of the person concerned.47 For example, with regard to immigrant
41 Ibid., p. 177.
42 Ibid., p, 76.
43 Ibid.,-pp. 18-19.
44 Ibid., pp. 50-51.
45 Ibid., pp. 52-53, emphasis in original.
46 Ibid., p. 95.
47 It is instructive to note here the distinction drawn by Kymlicka between the cultural rights o f national 
minorities and o f immigrant groups. By having chosen to leave the institutions and practices o f their 
own societal culture, immigrant groups can be granted certain rights to ease their passage into a new 
societal culture, but, fundamentally, are required to integrate into the societal culture to which they
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groups, Kymlicka claims that ‘[a]fter all, most immigrants choose to leave their own 
culture’.48 Elsewhere, he argues that ‘the process of ethical reasoning is always one of 
comparing one “encumbered” potential self with another “encumbered” potential self.49 As 
will be argued below, Kymlicka is quite determined to preserve this element of choice and to 
resist the full implications of adopting a view of ends as constitutive, even when this does 
serious damage to his own understandings. In so doing, he is endorsing a view of identity that 
suggests that, while culture is important, one can choose to replace any particular culture by 
another. I will argue that this is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the implications 
of describing ends as constitutive.
In this context, Kymlicka is quite clear about the moral status of culture. Similarly to 
Raz, he argues that ‘[cjultures are valuable, not in and of themselves, but because it is only 
through having access to a societal culture that people have access to a range of meaningful 
options’.50 Within a liberal framework, this range of meaningful options is itself relevant 
insofar as and because it contributes to the freedom to hold and question our own beliefs: 
‘[liberals should be concerned with the fate of cultural structures, not because they have 
some moral status of their own, but because it’s only through having a rich and secure 
cultural structure that people can become aware, in a vivid way, of the options available to 
them, and intelligently examine their value’.51 Thus, culture (and cultural membership) is 
instrumentally and conditionally valuable; it is valuable insofar as it contributes to the value 
of freedom, defined in terms of certain civil and personal liberties.52
The problem for Kymlicka is that in order to successfully defend this point, he relies 
on an understanding of meaning and especially its social construction that cannot make sense 
without a conception of culture as constitutive of identity. For example, Kymlicka argues 
that,
freedom involves making choices amongst various options, and our societal 
culture not only provides these options, but also makes them meaningful to us.
People make choices about the social practices around them, based on their 
beliefs about the value of these practices. And to have a belief about the value of 
a practice is, in the first instance, a matter of understanding the meanings 
attached to it by our culture....To understand the meaning of a social practice,
have emigrated. This seems to imply several things. First, either one has a full culture, or one has none
at all. Second, culture is not something that one ‘is’, it is something that one ‘has’. Third, the
presumption that immigrants must be required to forego their culture, while national minorities have 
rights to retain theirs suggests that cultural rights arise more from the context in which they are located, 
rather than from any intrinsic value. Finally, this suggests that culture is something that may be given 
up, though we do not require this o f all groups in society.
48 Ibid., p. 95.
49 Kymlicka, op. cit., in note 29, p. 53.
50 Kymlicka, op. cit., in note 40, p. 83. See Raz, op. cit., in note 1, p. 375.
51 Kymlicka, op. cit., in note 29, p. 165.
52 Ibid., p. 13.
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therefore, requires understanding this ‘shared vocabulary’—that is, 
understanding the language and history which constitute that vocabulary.53
This understanding of language and meaning is crucial for Kymlicka to be able to defend the 
value of cultural membership. However, this interpretive conception of meaning cannot 
easily be reconciled with an instrumental conception of culture.54
The same difficulty manifests itself again in a second sense. The fact that Kymlicka 
lacks an idea of constitutive culture means that he cannot satisfactorily account for several 
important dimensions of our conceptions of what it means to be human. First, he is unable to 
provide an explanation for why people need access to their own societal culture. His answer 
is fundamentally an empirical one—that culture is important to people. He draws an analogy 
with the choice to take a vow of perpetual poverty: ‘[i]t is not impossible to live in poverty. 
But it does not follow that a liberal theory of justice should therefore view the desire for a 
level of material resources above bare subsistence simply as “something that particular 
people like and enjoy” but which “they no longer can claim is something that they need’” .55 
Not only does this reiterate the idea that culture is something, though important, which can 
be chosen, it begs the question of why culture should be so important to people.
This is the second question which Kymlicka’s theory only inadequately explains. For, 
if culture is as important to people as Kymlicka suggests, then this must be accounted for in a 
way that does not conflict with his view of it as instrumentally valuable. Faced with the 
empirical commitment of individuals to their culture, but with no deep theory of human 
interaction, Kymlicka can only reply that ‘[i]t is an interesting question why the bonds of 
language and culture are so strong for most people’.56 Nonetheless, he claims, as above, that 
‘[pjeople are bound, in an important way, to their own cultural community....Someone’s 
upbringing isn’t something that can just be erased; it is, and will remain, a constitutive part of 
who that person is. Cultural membership affects our very sense of personal identity and 
capacity’.57 Clearly, however, Kymlicka cannot afford to entertain the possibility that such a 
conception of the value of culture might undermine his earlier claims that the individual must 
be seen as prior to his ends. In other words, Kymlicka is keen to partake of the theoretical
53 Kymlicka, op. cit., in note 40, p. 83.
54 There is, o f course, the option o f admitting that people may hold contradictory views, seeing 
themselves as both instrumental cultural free choosers and as deeply culturally embedded. This view is 
especially likely in liberal cultures, where the idea o f  free choice is itself an important element o f the 
cultural framework. However, most political theories, including Kymlicka’s and the one pursued in this 
thesis, do not begin from a conception of the person that could accommodate contradiction at such a 
fundamental level. What might be entailed by such a conception o f the person is highly interesting, but 
it is not central to the claims o f this thesis and, due to space constraints, cannot be developed in any 
greater detail here.
55 Ibid., p. 86.
56 Ibid., p. 87.
57 Kymlicka, op. cit., in note 29, p. 175, emphasis in original.
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advantages provided by a view of culture as constitutive of identity, but he is not willing to 
accommodate the implications of this for his universalist foundations.
Kymlicka does, however, admit that to revise one’s ends is a difficult task. He 
comments that, ‘[i]t is not easy or enjoyable to revise one’s deepest ends, but it is possible, 
and sometimes a regrettable necessity’.58 Moreover, he claims that in making judgements 
about the value of ends, ‘we must take something as a “given”....But liberals believe that 
what we put in the given in order to make meaningful judgements can not only be different 
between individuals but can also change within one individual’s life’.59 Neither of these 
points would be contested by some (although not all) communitarians. Taylor, for example, 
makes precisely these points.60 The difference is that Taylor’s deep theory of identity is able 
to show precisely why a revision of one’s deepest ends is such a tortuous process. He can 
account for the ‘how’, ‘why’, and ‘with what effects’ questions that are obscured by 
Kymlicka’s reliance on the idea of a free choosing individual whose culture is important, but 
nonetheless instrumental. In other words, without a deeper theory of identity, Kymlicka is 
unable to adequately explain why cultural membership is, in fact, important. Clearly, culture 
may have moral significance in terms of its contribution to the promotion of other liberal 
values. However, this does not provide any substance to our intrinsic sense that culture is of 
value to us. Moreover, it threatens to conflict with his later assertion that non-liberal societal 
cultures should not be coerced into adopting liberal values.61
This latter point raises a very interesting question about the broader context in which 
something can be described as instrumental or constitutive. It is possible to make two distinct 
claims in this regard. First, one could argue that culture is instrumental or constitutive in 
relation to the ends of the individual concerned. Second, culture may be instrumental or 
constitutive vis-a-vis the moral values of the perspective from which culture is discussed. For 
example, it might be possible for someone like Kymlicka to argue that while culture is 
constitutive of individual ends, it should not be accorded value in itself by a moral theory. 
This is not an uncommon perspective—it is reflected, for example, in the desire to separate 
atavistic from civic nationalism.62 However, this position relies on a separation between the 
value attributed to culture by agents and the judgement of this value by cultural outsiders. 
While this allows us to attribute moral standing to culture only insofar as it serves ‘good’ 
purposes, it fundamentally does not do justice to the value that non-liberal cultures may have
58 Kymlicka, op. cit., in note 40, p. 91.
59 Kymlicka, op. cit., in note 29, p. 51.
60 See, for example, Charles Taylor, ‘What is Human Agency?’, in Human Agency and Language: 
Philosophical Papers I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 15-44.
61 Kymlicka, op. cit., in note 40, p. 167.
62 For work in this vein, see David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
157
for those who belong to them. More broadly, it does not adequately make sense of the human 
feeling that culture is foundational.
So, despite his discussion of culture, Kymlicka is fundamentally committed to the idea 
of the free chooser. However, in an interesting twist, this assumption is not in fact necessary 
to make the claims that he wishes to make. Instead, his insistence on holding to the idea that 
ends cannot be constitutive rests, I will argue, on a fundamental misreading of the 
communitarian position. In one passage, Kymlicka claims that,
[c]ommunitarians deny that we can ‘stand apart’ from (some of) our ends. 
According to Michael Sandel,...some of our ends are ‘constitutive’ ends in the 
sense that they define our sense of personal identity....Whereas Rawls claims 
that individuals ‘do not regard themselves as inevitably bound to, or identical 
with, the pursuit of any particular complex of fundamental interests that we may 
have at any given moment’, Sandel responds that we are in fact ‘identical with’ 
at least some of our final ends. Since these ends are constitutive of people’s 
identity, there is no reason why the state should not reinforce people’s 
allegiance to these ends, and limit their ability to question and revise these 
ends.63
This may be an accurate reading of Sandel, but it is fundamentally misleading to apply these 
conclusions to all those who might perceive ends as constitutive. There is no necessary 
reason why having constitutive ends should mean that these could not be revised. It only 
means that we are required to give a fuller account of the ways in which this occurs and the 
implications that it produces. At one point, Kymlicka addresses the possibility that 
communitarians do not mean to suggest that ends cannot be revised. He claims that in this 
case,
the advertised contrast with the liberal view is a deception, for the sense in 
which communitarians view us as embedded in communal roles incorporates the 
sense in which liberals view us as independent of them, and the sense in which 
communitarians view practical reasoning as a process of self-discovery 
incorporates the sense in which liberals view practical reasoning as a process of 
judgement and choice. The differences would be merely semantic.64
Apart from a short footnote asserting that liberals and communitarians have achieved their 
positions in different ways, this is the end of Kymlicka’s discussion of what should have 
been a crucial point. Although this thesis would not agree that the differences between 
liberals and communitarians are semantic, Kymlicka ought to have given greater 
consideration to the possibility of a more moderate communitarianism. However, despite the 
allusion above, he soon reverts back to the assertion that acknowledging ends as constitutive
63 Kymlicka, op. cit., in note 40, p. 91.
64 Kymlicka, op. cit., in note 29, p. 58.
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requires that these be unrevisable. This (false) assertion is one major factor in explaining his 
reluctance to explicitly acknowledge the constitutive value of culture, despite the fact that his 
theory implicitly relies on a much deeper conception of the moral value of culture than he 
acknowledges.
Acknowledging that culture is constitutive, whether implicitly or explicitly, has 
fundamental implications for any theory of political morality. Most importantly, it raises the 
question of how this can be reconciled with another fundamental human (or liberal) 
commitment, namely that to basic universal rights. Few among us would wish to argue that 
culture should be accorded moral status no matter how unfavourably we judged the ends to 
which it was addressed. More importantly, the status of cultural dissenters within our own 
and other communities cannot be ignored. Nonetheless, it is not clear that these problems can 
be dealt with as easily as liberals sometimes assert.
There is a strong tendency amongst liberals to judge the merit of communitarian 
positions according to how their positions deal with such extreme cases. In this regard, it is 
crucial to recall that liberalism has its own series of extreme cases. As Kymlicka asks in a 
section entitled ‘Is Liberalism Sectarian?’, if all people do not value autonomy or believe that 
we can stand back from and evaluate our ends, then how can liberal institutions be defended? 
His own answer is to affirm the value of autonomy, although this time it emerges less as a 
matter of fact and more one of belief. In Kymlicka’s words, ‘I believe that the most 
defensible liberal theory is based on the value of autonomy, and that any form of group- 
differentiated rights which restricts the civil rights of group members is therefore 
inconsistent with liberal principles of freedom and equality’.65 Admitting culture to be 
constitutive necessarily raises the question of cultural and moral relativism. In response to 
this, Kymlicka’s reduction of liberalism to a question of his own beliefs hardly accounts for 
his moral prioritisation of autonomy over culture in cases of conflict. We must resolve the 
question of competing values in a different way.
What is clear from the above discussion is that it is inconsistent to claim that culture is 
ontologically constitutive and yet morally instrumental. If we are to take seriously the fact 
that people value their cultural attachments as essential to their self-understandings, then we 
must be willing to admit that these attachments have value, even when they lead to ends 
which we might not appreciate. In this context, the liberal approach to culture must be 
rejected. Nonetheless, in developing an alternative ethic for culture and trade, we must be 
attuned to the criticisms that liberals have raised. Indeed, we must strive to avoid the 
essentialisation of the community that has consistently raised the spectre of totalitarian 
politics.
65 Kymlicka, op. cit., in note 40, p. 165.
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Conclusion
This chapter has assessed the various claims surrounding community-based approaches. It 
has argued that several different ethical visions can be drawn from the same starting 
assumptions about the cultural constitution of the moral agent. Indeed, this chapter has 
assessed two such ethical visions, judging them both inadequate as a basis for Canadian 
periodicals policy. First, national survival community-based approaches were rejected on the 
grounds that they rely upon an essentialist understanding of the nation and the community, 
and that they thereby act to exclude non-national moral sources. Second, this chapter 
considered the claims made by some liberal political theorists that their approach could 
recognise the fundamental relevance of culture in the constitution of moral personality. The 
chapter argued that the success of such a claim depends fundamentally on our acceptance 
that liberals can consistently uphold two inconsistent claims. This is not to suggest that there 
is no middle ground in this debate, but only that it must be approached from a different point 
of view. Indeed, finding an adequate middle ground is precisely the task of the next two 
chapters. The ethics that is developed in this discussion will underscore the relevance of the 
second community-based approach—that of the cultural pluralists. Finally, it will provide 
grounds for a sympathetic critique of Canadian periodicals policy. It will suggest ways in 
which such policies can be made more ethically sound and, therefore, more defensible on an 
international stage.
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Chapter 8
Towards an Ethics for Cultural Policy:
Charles Taylor Considered
The argument of the past few chapters has claimed, first, that economic efficiency cannot be 
considered of value in itself. This led us to argue that theories of welfare economics cannot 
provide a satisfactory account of the good life; they must be located within other moral 
theories. Second, the thesis sought to assess the moral claims of community-based 
approaches to trade and culture. So far, we have found market-based and some (national 
survival) community-based approaches to be inadequate and distorting. In one form or 
another, this includes most of the arguments for cultural protectionism put forward in the 
Canadian public policy debate.
In an attempt to move beyond these arguments and to generate a basis for new 
insights, this chapter will discuss the work of Charles Taylor. He understands culture as 
integral to identity, as an ontological fact and gives moral value to culture for this reason. 
Crucially, however, he does not neglect the important ways in which people do revise their 
ends. As a result, his work is ideally placed to further our conceptions of culture and identity 
and to suggest ways of understanding culture and trade that are substantively located within 
the liberal-communitarian ‘debate’.
The first part of this chapter will set out Charles Taylor’s ontology and especially the 
main points of his understanding of culture and its relationship to identity. The second part of 
the chapter will focus on the cultural ethics which is generated by Taylor’s work. It will also 
address several criticisms of Taylor which are the most relevant for the application of 
Taylor’s work to Canadian cultural policy. In this regard, this chapter establishes the value of 
Taylor’s ontology, even though it argues that his ethical and political positions contain 
serious difficulties and are inappropriate for this project. In this light, the chapter which 
follows will show how Taylor’s ontology can be developed to produce a different and more 
useful ethics for cultural policy.
Taylor’s Position
Taylor’s philosophical writings are extensive and yet they are relatively cohesive. As Taylor 
himself describes the collected articles in Philosophical Papers: ‘they are the work of a
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monomaniac.... [A] single rather tightly related agenda underlines all of them’.1 His target, in 
this collection, as well as in his broader works, is naturalism and its related concepts 
(atomism, proceduralism, disengaged reason). Taylor himself describes these approaches as a 
family, and defines them by ‘the ambition to model the study of man on the natural 
sciences’.2 According to Taylor, it is crucial to ask what conception of the person underlies 
these theories and what moral sources inform this conception. These questions lead him 
across a broad terrain of philosophical argument and, ultimately, require him to present a full 
development of his own views. Elements of Taylor’s critique of welfare economics were set 
out in Chapter 6. Here, the remaining details of his critique will be set aside so that the focus 
can rest on Taylor’s own philosophical position.
Culture and Identity
Taylor begins from the premise that the influences of culture are an inescapable fact of 
human existence. However, this point is not simply stated, but is illustrated with a complex 
theory of language and identity. According to Taylor, humans are distinguished from other 
beings by their ability to make qualitative distinctions of worth. This means that they not 
only have desires, but that they can pass judgement on these desires. For example, one may 
want something, but also be able to judge that such a desire is base.3 This ability to 
discriminate is uniquely human. Moreover, the evaluations that result are inseparable from 
identity. In Taylor’s words,
the concept of identity is bound up with that of certain strong evaluations which 
are inseparable from myself. This either because I identify myself by my strong 
evaluations, as someone who essentially has these convictions; or else because I 
see certain of my other properties as admitting of only one kind of strong 
evaluation by myself, because these properties so centrally touch what I am as 
an agent, that is, as a strong evaluator, that I cannot really repudiate them in the 
full sense.4
In other words, it is impossible to imagine a human agent who was not defined by some 
orientation in moral space. However, as Taylor is careful to point out, ‘[o]ur evaluations are 
not chosen. On the contrary they are articulations of our sense of what is worthy’.5 
Nonetheless, change is possible: ‘ [t] [hat description and experience are bound together in this
1 Charles Taylor, ‘Introduction’, in Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers, 
Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 1.
2 Ibid.
3 Charles Taylor, ‘What is Human Agency’, in Taylor, op. cit., in note 1.
4 Ibid., p. 34. On this point, see also Charles Taylor, Sources o f  the Self: The Making o f  the Modern 
Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), Part I.
s Taylor, op. cit., in note 3, p. 35.
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constitutive relation admits of causal influences in both directions: it can sometimes allow us 
to alter experience by coming to fresh insight; but more fundamentally it circumscribes 
insight through the deeply embedded shape of experience for us’.6 In this sense, ‘[t]here are 
more or less adequate, more or less truthful, more self-clairvoyant or self-deluding 
interpretations’.7
More importantly, these commitments and identifications cannot be understood apart 
from an understanding of the language within which certain terms are distinguished from 
others and within which meaning is constructed.8 In his words, ‘[t]here is no way we could be 
inducted into personhood except by being initiated into a language....I can only learn what 
anger, love, anxiety... are through my and others’ experience of these being objects for us, in 
some common space’.9 For Taylor, however, language is not merely designative or 
descriptive, but is also irreducibly expressive. Moreover, language ‘is fashioned and grows 
not principally in monologue, but in dialogue’.10 In other words, the question of meaning is 
inescapably social. The implications of these two points are profound. For Taylor, ideas 
cannot exist prior to their expression in language; nor can man articulate his own ideas and 
values in the absence of language. Thus, language is not an instrument under the control of 
any speaker: ‘ [t]o speak is to touch a bit of the web, and this is to make the whole resonate. 
Because the words we use now only have sense through their place in the whole web, we can 
never in principle have a clear oversight of the implications of what we say at any moment’.11 
As a result, one cannot ‘have’ an identity without having first been inducted as an 
interlocutor in a language community. Identity is inherently social. Moreover, language is 
essential to the condition of being reflectively aware, which is crucial to the human capacity 
to make qualitative distinctions of worth.
It is important to note that although language is not manipulable by any single person, 
it is not static and unchangeable. Language can be altered, but only within certain limits. 
Since language is developed in dialogue, it is constantly evolving through the articulations 
and rearticulations of the speech community. More importantly, however, individuals may 
break away from the language community. Taylor is nonetheless somewhat dismissive of the 
possibilities of detaching oneself completely: ‘is [such detachment] not always in view of a 
fuller, more profound and authentic communication, which provides the criterion for what I
6 Ibid., p. 37.
7 Ibid., p. 38.
8 It should be noted that language, for Taylor, encompasses more than prose. It must include all o f the 
symbolic/expressive creations of man, including poetry, music, art, dance, etc. See Charles Taylor, 
‘Language and Human Nature’, in Taylor, op. cit., in note 1, p. 233.
9 Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, op. cit., in note 4, p. 35.
10 Taylor, op. cit., in note 8, p. 234.
" Ibid., p. 231.
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now recognize as an adequate expression?’12 This is because alterations of language, ‘are 
never quite autonomous, quite uncontrolled by the rest of language. They can only be 
introduced and make sense because they already have a place within the web’.13 This is quite 
a deep point, and one that should not be taken lightly. For any innovation to make sense and 
have meaning within a particular context, it cannot exist completely outside of the language 
in which it is deployed. Thus, while one can and is constantly making alterations to language, 
one can never be completely in control of the language, nor can one simply choose to define 
oneself outside of this language. One’s identity, then, as a complex of different goals and 
ends, cannot arise except in the context of a language in which one is an interlocutor. It is an 
inherently social process. But what is the relationship of culture to identity?
Taylor defines culture as ‘the background of practices, institutions, and understandings 
which form the langue-analogue for our action in a given society’.14 Culture, then, is the 
framework which provides the background for identity. What Taylor presents, then, is a view 
whereby culture is the inescapable premise, the ontology, upon which all other goals, values, 
and conceptions of the person must be based. In this sense, there is no question of 
establishing the value of culture itself in relation to other values. In other words, culture is 
not something that one can choose to dispense with when universal morality dictates 
otherwise. Culture, moreover, is constitutive, but there is nothing to prevent the individual 
from seeking to re-evaluate his own life projects, or elements of the culture of which he is a 
part. However, this is a deep process of self-examination, articulation and rearticulation.15 It 
is by no means a simple choice. In this way, Taylor acknowledges culture as constitutive, but 
contests the liberal criticism that this ‘communitarian’ claim provides grounds for the state to 
intervene to preserve a singular view of the good life.
Intercultural Understanding
Although Taylor places great importance on culture as the framework in which we can locate 
our identities, he is radically opposed to any kind of subjectivism or cultural relativism. In 
fact, he is determined to show that there can be a middle ground between value subjectivism 
and universalism. This middle path is grounded in Taylor’s theory of language.
Taylor is clearly not willing to endorse the universalist position and thereby assume 
that there are some values which may be appealed to universally. Even more importantly, he 
is not willing to suggest that his own, culturally-informed values be applied to everyone
12 Ibid., p. 237.
13 Ibid., p. 232. See also Taylor, op. cit., in note 9, pp. 35-36.
14 Charles Taylor, ‘Irreducibly Social Goods’, in Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 136.
15 See, for example, Taylor, op. cit., in note 3, p. 40.
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else—either in everyday or in extreme cases. There is no bedrock of universal values to 
which Taylor appeals. However, he also rejects the notion that there can be no judgement 
whatsoever in the absence of universals. In his own words, ‘ [t]he interpretive view, I want to 
argue, avoids the two equal and opposite mistakes: on the one hand, of ignoring self­
descriptions altogether, and attempting to operate in some neutral “scientific” language; on 
the other hand, of taking these descriptions with ultimate seriousness, so that they become 
incorrigible’.16
But, on what grounds should such judgements be made; or, to rephrase the question to 
better suit Taylor’s terms, in what language can these judgements be made? According to 
Taylor, making a judgement about another culture using our own language and our own 
distinctions of qualitative worth would be ethnocentric.17 However, ‘the type of 
understanding needed when we have to grasp the articulating-constitutive uses of words is 
not available from the stance of a fully disengaged observer’.18 In other words, once it is 
accepted that language is not merely designative, nor is it monological, it becomes clear that 
‘it is plainly impossible to learn a language as a detached observer’.19 This is crucial for 
Taylor, since it implies that it is impossible for an outsider to understand another culture 
without actively engaging with it. In this sense,
we only arrive at this understanding by some exchange of mutual clarification 
between ourselves, or some other member of our culture, and members of the 
target culture....[I]n a kind of language negotiated between the anthropologist 
and his informants. There has to take place a kind of ‘fusion of horizons’ if 
understanding is to take place.20
For Taylor, this is not merely a fusion of languages, nor is it the imposition of one language 
upon the other. It is instead, a ‘language of perspicuous contrast’ in which both our way of 
life and theirs might be formulated.
However, this active engagement with another culture does not leave either party 
unchanged. As Taylor argues, ‘[b]y challenging their language of self-interpretation, we may 
also be challenging ours....Understanding is inseparable from criticism, but this in turn in 
inseparable from self-criticism’.21 Thus, in approaching other cultures, we should begin from
16 Charles Taylor, ‘Understanding and Ethnocentricity’, in Taylor, Philosophy and the Human 
Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 123-24.
17 See Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, in Taylor, op. cit., in note 14, pp. 255.
18 Charles Taylor, ‘Theories o f Meaning’, in Taylor, op. cit., in note 1, p. 280.
19 Ibid., p. 281. It is precisely the inescapable sociality o f language that distinguishes Taylor’s 
conception o f understanding from David Hume’s conception o f  sympathy. On Hume’s use of 
sympathy, see, for example, John J. Jenkins, Understanding Hume (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1992), pp. 149-58. For Taylor’s comments on Hume’s atomism, see Charles Taylor, ‘Heidegger 
and Wittgenstein’, in Taylor, op. cit., in note 14, p. 71.
20 Ibid.
21 Taylor, op. cit., in note 16, pp. 125 and 131.
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a ‘presumption of equal worth’, which would allow us to be open to a comparative cultural 
study of the kind that might displace our original horizons.22 Judgements could then be made 
about the merits of different cultures on the grounds of the relative merits of the 
interpretations that they offer. According to Taylor, ‘the ultimate basis for accepting any of 
these theories [of identity] is precisely that they make better sense of us that do their rivals’.23
These few premises ground most of Taylor’s extensive writings. In fact, the 
relationship that he sets out between identity and culture has proven to be a very powerful 
weapon in his debates with naturalism and procedural liberalism. It also has successfully 
grounded a crucial new way of understanding and accommodating demands for cultural 
recognition. Because it treats culture as constitutive of identity and gives it moral value for 
that reason (and not for any instrumental reasons) and because Taylor deliberately argues 
against the method which informs welfare economics, this theory promises to contribute a 
great deal towards a normatively adequate approach to culture and trade.
Taylor’s Ethics
Taylor’s work is not directed at producing a thoroughgoing statement of cultural ethics. In 
fact, this is one of the primary drawbacks of using Taylor’s work to inform a thesis on 
cultural policy. Nonetheless, a careful reading of his writings suggests that he does have a 
coherent sense of what constitutes the cultural good and, more specifically, what the goal of 
cultural politics should be. This section will first set out Taylor’s main claims in relation to 
the cultural good. It will argue that Taylor’s ethics is based on a conception of cultural 
freedom, best described as ‘freedom to be’. Although Taylor does not often use either of 
these terms, this section will argue that cultural freedom acts as the ethical core which 
grounds his two main ideas about intercultural ethics: understanding and recognition. Each of 
these ideas will be discussed before conclusions about Taylor’s ethics can be drawn.
For Taylor, understanding is the goal of intercultural communication. It is the good, in 
cultural terms, that we should strive for in our dealings with other cultures: it is only through 
a ‘fusion of horizons’ that it is possible to ethically engage with cultures other than our own. 
Without this fusion of horizons, a judgement of the worth of other cultures would either be 
ethnocentric (it would praise the other for being like us) or it would be condescending (it 
would give a positive judgement on demand).24 But why is it important for us to treat cultures 
in this way? What is the ethic which underlies the goal of understanding? Taylor is very quiet
22 Taylor, op. cit., in note 17, p. 256.
23 Taylor, op. cit., in note 9, p. 32. On the question o f what is entailed by ‘making sense’ in this 
context, see also pp. 8-9 and 27, and Charles Taylor, ‘Rationality’, in Taylor, op. cit., in note 16, p. 
151.
24 Taylor, op. cit., in note 17, p. 256.
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on this point. However, on several occasions, he employs the language of ietting people be’ 
as the ultimate justification for understanding. In Taylor’s words, ‘the goal is to reach a 
common language, common human understanding, which would allow both us and them 
undistortively to be’.25 In similar language, he also argues elsewhere that ‘we only liberate 
others and ‘let them be’ when we can identify and articulate a contrast between their 
understanding and ours, thereby ceasing.. .to read them through our home understanding’.26 It 
should be noted that Taylor does not intend to advocate any form of passivity or 
disengagement towards other cultures. Being, in this context is connected to the dialogical 
and social nature of identity and so the only ethical way of letting someone be is through the 
active achievement of a language of perspicuous contrast.
The suggestion that ‘letting them be’ plays a pivotal role in Taylor’s ethics is 
reinforced by the second strand of his cultural ethics—the concept of recognition. The 
importance of recognition in Taylor’s thought cannot be understood outside of the centrality 
he accords to language in the constitution of identity. In particular, it should be recalled that 
it would be impossible to have an identity without being an interlocutor in a language 
community. Identity is dialogical. Moreover, our self-understandings, which very much 
shape what we feel, cannot be understood outside of the context of the language 
community.27 As a result, Taylor argues, ‘our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its 
absence, often by the mwrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer 
real damage...if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or 
demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves’.28 This is particularly true since, according 
to Taylor, people cannot simply or easily renounce their identities just because it would be 
instrumentally advantageous to do so.
Just as with understanding, recognition is a central element of the good in intercultural 
relations. However, recognition cannot be separated from understanding: authentic 
recognition is impossible in the absence of a fusion of horizons in which the worth of the 
other culture could be appreciated. Moreover, recognition adds a new dimension to Taylor’s 
‘freedom to be’. For if ‘[n]on-recognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form 
of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted and reduced mode of being’,29 then 
the recognition of people ‘for what they are’ is a crucial element of letting them be.
25 Charles Taylor, ‘Comparison, History, Truth’, in Taylor, op. cit., in note 14, p. 151.
26 Ibid., p. 150.
27 Charles Taylor, ‘Self-Interpreting Animals’, in Taylor, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 65 and 72.
28 Taylor, op. cit., in note 17, p. 225, emphasis in original. See also, Charles Taylor, ‘Why Do Nations
Have to Become States?’, in Charles Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian 
Federalism and Nationalism, ed. Guy Laforest (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1993), especially pp. 52-53.
29 Taylor, op. cit., in note 17, p. 225.
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The discussion above has suggested that Taylor’s cultural ethics can be described as an 
ethics of freedom. Taylor’s two cultural goals are both valuable because they serve the higher 
goal of letting people be. This is an important starting point. However, the specific nature of 
Taylor’s conception of freedom can be drawn out in more detail. His discussion of freedom 
is sparse, but Taylor does make a few direct comments which can provide us with some 
insight into his thinking on this question.
In a clear contrast to market-based approaches, Taylor is clear in his rejection of 
freedom as the independence of the subject from external interference.30 Specifically, he 
claims that true freedom is not simply a matter of available opportunities, but must also 
entail an element of self-understanding. In Taylor’s words,
[fjreedom cannot just be the absence of external obstacles, for there may also be 
internal ones. And nor may the internal obstacles be just confined to those that 
the subject identifies as such, so that he is the final arbiter; for he may be 
profoundly mistaken about his purposes and about what he wants to 
repudiate....For freedom now involves my being able to recognize adequately 
my more important purposes, and my being able to overcome or at least 
neutralize my motivational fetters, as well as my way being free of external 
obstacles....I must be actually exercising self-understanding in order to be truly 
or fully free. I can no longer understand freedom just as an opportunity- 
concept.31
If freedom requires self-understanding, and self-understanding can only make sense within 
the language community, then freedom must be incomprehensible in terms which do not 
relate to this community. Freedom, then, involves a certain self-realisation that is not 
achieved by denying one’s identity. Instead, for Taylor, freedom is achieved by recognising 
that identity is constitutive of who people are and what they value. Freedom means allowing 
people to be who they are—in a deep, culturally-informed sense.
This view of freedom also emerges in Taylor’s discussion of Hegel’s relevance for 
modem society. Taylor argues that the difficulty in defining modem freedom arises from the 
problem of relating freedom to a situation. In other words, what is needed is the recovery of 
‘a conception of free activity which is ours in virtue of our condition as natural and social 
beings....The struggle to be free...is powered by an affirmation of this defining situation as 
ours. This cannot be seen as.. .a mere occasion to carry out some freely chosen project, which 
is all that a situation can be within the conception of freedom as self-dependence’.32 
Situation, in this sense is who we are and where we are located in moral space. This is not to
30 See, for example, Charles Taylor, ‘Atomism’, in Taylor, op. cit., in note 16, p. 196 and Taylor, op. 
cit., in note 9, pp. 82-83.
31 Charles Taylor, ‘What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?’, in Taylor, op. cit., in note 16, pp. 228-29.
32 Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 160, 
emphasis in original.
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say that this situation can never be altered. As was discussed in the opening paragraphs of 
this chapter, our cultural position may change, but this entails a deep personal upheaval. In 
this sense, freedom cannot be seen as the denial or refusal of our situatedness, but instead 
embraces that situation. In Taylor’s words, ‘the philosophical attempt to situate freedom is 
the attempt to gain a conception of man in which free action is the response to what we 
are’.33
This conception of freedom could be criticised on the grounds that its emphasis on 
culture and community provides an easy gateway to totalitarian politics. In fact, Taylor 
acknowledges this possibility.34 However, he does not see that his ethics necessarily commits 
us to endorsing such a politics. Moreover, he sees that his ethics has the potential to ground 
another, more productive form of politics that cannot arise from a procedural ethics. This is a 
civic humanist republicanism.35 The delineation of what is entailed by such a politics adds 
detail to Taylor’s concept of freedom and, moreover, highlights how Taylor’s ethics might 
work in practice. According to Taylor, the civic humanist thesis ‘is that the essential 
condition of a free (nondespotic) regime is that the citizens have a deeper patriotic 
identification’.36 Freedom, in this understanding, is not non-interference, but ‘citizen liberty, 
that of the active participant in public affairs’.37 In other words, civic humanism entails a 
citizen identification with the polis. This is a common good, but not one that is the sum of 
instrumental individual purposes. According to Taylor, ‘the very definition of a republican 
regime as classically understood requires an ontology very different from atomism’.38 It 
requires that we examine the ‘possible place of we-identities as against merely convergent I- 
identities’.39
In the context of Taylor’s ontology, the above discussion clearly leaves open the 
question of how cultural ‘we-identities’ might be reconciled with civic ‘we-identities’. In 
arguing against procedural liberalism, Taylor does address this question, showing how 
identification with society might arise out of identity-politics. He claims that if liberals value 
certain human capabilities, then they should also accept that ‘any proof that these capacities 
can only develop in society or in a society of a certain kind is a proof that we ought to belong 
to or sustain society or this kind of society’.40 Of course, this necessarily raises the question 
of when, how, and by whom any interference is justified, as well as whose freedom is being
33 Ibid., p. 169.
34 Taylor, op. cit., in note 31, p. 229.
35 Taylor, op. cit., in note 14, p. 142.
36 Charles Taylor, ‘Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate’, in Taylor, op. cit., in note 14, 
p. 192.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Taylor, op. cit., in note 30, p. 197.
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promoted. These are difficult questions which, as will be shown below, Taylor has difficulty 
answering. Nonetheless, it is clear that Taylor’s political ideals reinforce his view that 
freedom can only be achieved through the linguistic community.
This section has aimed to show that Taylor’s conception of the cultural good can 
usefully be characterised as an ethics focused on the freedom to be. This ultimately underlies 
the value that he places on understanding and recognition—the two central concepts in his 
intercultural relations. Moreover, Taylor’s vision of ‘freedom to be’ is reinforced by his 
political vision and his critique of procedural liberalism.
Taylor’s Ethics Reconsidered
The discussion of the previous few pages has aimed to extract the most important elements of 
Taylor’s ethical position. Most importantly, it has aimed to provide a sketch of the cultural 
good in Taylor’s work. However, Taylor’s ethics is not without its difficulties. The 
remainder of this chapter will argue that although Taylor’s claims provide a useful starting 
point, they leave several crucial difficulties unresolved. The most important of these for this 
thesis concern the paradigm of understanding, the conception of culture, and the status of 
Taylor’s conception of the good. It will be argued that Taylor’s cultural ethics provides few 
workable insights for cultural policy and trade. Nonetheless, as this chapter will conclude, his 
ontology can be built upon in different ways to produce a more workable cultural ethics.
P aradigm  o f  U nderstanding
The main difficulties with Taylor’s ethics stem directly from his ideas about intercultural 
communication and his paradigm of understanding. As described above, Taylor believes that 
understanding can come about through a language of perspicuous contrast, or a fusion of 
horizons. At first glance, this formulation seems as though it can facilitate mutual 
understanding without misunderstanding or misrecognition of the ‘other’. However, by 
asking how this understanding is supposed to come about and the conditions under which it 
is possible, some important qualifications to the paradigm become apparent.
Taylor is not especially clear on the details of how this understanding is supposed to 
come about. At some points, he argues that the first step towards understanding a completely 
foreign culture is the ability to articulate a contrast between their practices and ours so that 
we no longer read them entirely from our own frameworks. In other words, understanding is 
a comparative exercise.41 At other times, Taylor argues that understanding entails having a
41 Taylor, op. cit., in note 25, p. 150.
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sense of why particular things are meaningful for people of other cultures.42 Finally, and most 
comprehensively, Taylor argues that practical reason is the best route to understanding. The 
task of practical reason is to convince someone of the rightness of a certain position, to reach 
agreement, by showing that the transition between two points of view is an error-reducing 
one. But how can we be sure that we agree on what constitutes an error? Taylor is 
remarkably brief on this point, stating that our proof should be ‘the direct sense of the 
transition as an error-reducing one’.43 However, other comments offer some insight into what 
is necessary to achieve a common understanding on what constitutes an error. In several 
places, Taylor comments that overcoming an error may entail ‘rescuing from (usually 
motivated) neglect a consideration whose significance they cannot contest’.44 In this sense, 
then, reaching intercultural agreement requires at least a small number of values whose 
significance is commonly recognised. Without shared values, there would be no grounds for 
convincing someone of the advantages of the transition to a new position. Taylor admits this 
point, stating that ‘ [t]he notion that we might have to convince people of an ultimate value 
premise that they undividedly and unconfusedly reject is, indeed, a ground for despair....[I]n 
this case, practical reason is certainly powerless’.45 This claim seems to remove the greatest 
force of Taylor’s argument. After all, if his paradigm of understanding is of no use between 
cultures which share no values, then it can hardly been seen as a great new model for ethical 
intercultural communication.
However, Taylor is quick to qualify his claims, asking, ‘[d]o we really face people 
who quite lucidly reject the very principle of the inviolability of human life? In fact, this 
doesn’t seem to be the case’.46 This is quite a remarkable claim. Not only does Taylor 
suppose that there is a significant degree of shared values throughout all cultures of the 
world, he is suggesting that this convergence occurs around the respect for human life. As an 
empirical claim, this is clearly contestable, especially as Taylor’s understanding of culture is 
intended to apply back in time as well as around the entire globe. However, as a justification 
for a philosophical position, it is unacceptable. The difficulties of intercultural 
communication can hardly be assuaged by the assertion that cultures simply don’t disagree 
on the ‘universal’ value of respect for human life.
Taylor further complicates the argument by suggesting that ‘[i]t is not just cases where 
we can explicitly identify the common premise from the outset that allow of rational
42 Taylor, op. cit., in note 16, p. 119.
43 Charles Taylor, ‘Explanation and Practical Reason’, in Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, op. cit., in 
note 14, p. 52.
44 Ibid., p. 53.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., p. 35. Taylor makes regular references to the ‘universal’ respect for human life. See, for 
example, Taylor, op. cit., in note 4, pp. 11-15 and 64-65.
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debate’.47 Because debate rarely takes place between two completely firm and discrete 
positions, ‘a great deal of moral argument involves the articulation of the implicit, and this 
extends the range of the ad hominem far beyond the easy cases where the opponent offers us 
purchase in one explicit premise’.48 This raises two crucial epistemological questions. First, 
how can we know that we have accurately represented the position of the opponent? In other 
words, how can we be sure that we have not read our own values into their position? This is 
particularly important in conversations where power plays a significant role and in those 
where one of the ‘conversing’ parties has already passed away and is communicating through 
a written legacy. The second epistemological question concerns how we can tell whether and 
why this method is not working. For example, if we are arguing with someone and they are 
not coming over to our position, is it because they ultimately do not share any of our value 
premises or is it because our method is flawed? As with most epistemological questions, 
Taylor is loathe to provide an answer. However, he does claim at one point that ‘there is no 
way to go except forward, to apply further doses of the same medicine’.49 Taylor eludes the 
epistemological question by reaffirming a faith in his method, possibly at the expense of 
great cultural misunderstanding.
There is still another question outstanding in this analysis. How does the language of 
perspicuous contrast relate to the grounds for arguing discussed above? Is this language 
anything more than winning someone over to our point of view? If premises are often 
implicit, in what language can we carry out the debate that will establish whether we have 
shared premises or not? Taylor clearly wishes that the language of perspicuous contrast will 
be one that can do justice to all interlocutors. In his words, ‘the goal is to reach a common 
language, common human understanding, which would allow both us and them 
undistortively to be’.50 However, in trying to address the criticism that it is always we who 
are devising the language in which the other is understood, he finally admits what has 
seemed obvious in the few paragraphs above, namely that ‘the contrast is in a language of 
our devising’.51 In other words, we still judge other cultures in light of reality, but our reality 
has (hopefully) expanded as we have tried to make sense of the contrasts with other cultures. 
This premise might aid us in understanding how we might be less ethnocentric, but it is not 
strong enough to support the claim that a fusion of horizons has taken place and that a 
language of mutual understanding has been developed.
Nonetheless, Taylor does not account for how interaction might move from ‘our’ 
attempt to highlight errors in ‘their’ position (the transcendence argument) to an attempt to
47 Taylor, op. cit., in note 27, p. 53.
48 Ibid., p. 55.
49 Taylor, op. cit., in note 25, p. 150.
50 Ibid., p. 151.
51 Ibid , p. 152.
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create a language in which a more egalitarian conversation might take place (the common 
language argument). These two elements of Taylor’s paradigm of understanding seem to be 
in tension with one another. For example, Taylor wants a common language that respects all 
cultures, but he also wants to maintain the integrity of judgements about what constitutes an 
‘error-reducing move’.52 He argues that whatever we make of the differences between 
cultures, we can’t reduce reason to the status of a cultural myth. Specifically, ‘whatever it is 
that has pushed modem western culture to study others, at least nominally in the spirit of 
equality...is missing in many other cultures. Our very valuing of this equality seems to mark 
a superiority of our culture over some others’.53 What Taylor is discussing here is the idea 
that as members of modem western culture, we cannot be true to ourselves and still reject the 
hierarchy of rational over not-yet-rational.54 This, however, seems to be precisely the 
difficulty with the aspiration to a language of perspicuous contrast.
Much more can be read into Taylor’s paradigm of understanding if it is located in the 
context of his politics. In particular, the paradigm of understanding must be understood in 
part as Taylor’s contribution to resolving the constitutional conflict between Quebec and 
Canada. Clearly, Taylor believes that a great deal of progress can be made in this context if a 
greater degree of mutual understanding could be reached. His goal is to stimulate both parties 
towards that understanding. For example, in his 1970 article, ‘A Canadian Future?’, Taylor 
claims that he will defer the problem of incompatible perspectives ‘by speaking first in one 
perspective and then in the other. Let me try to draw out of both some understanding of the 
common predicament and common goals’.55 Taylor achieves this by carefully and sensitively 
elucidating the positions of both parties. He shows that English Canada’s reticence to accept 
a special status for Quebec stems from a misunderstanding of the demands of nationalism. In 
particular, English Canadians do not see that French Canadians simply need to be recognised 
for who they are. Instead, they view Quebecois national identification as an antechamber to 
separatism and therefore deny the recognition that Quebec needs. In turn, French Canadians 
need to understand English Canada’s anxiety about unity. In this way, Taylor attempts to 
show each side why the other is responding in a particular way and thereby break the pattern 
of destructive relations and mutual misunderstanding that has characterised relations between 
French and English in Canada for so long. Moreover, he claims that Canada and Quebec can 
be brought together by common purposes: ‘the continuance of Canada may...depend on our 
giving a more meaningful content to the positive sense of being part of a bigger country’.56 
These common purposes include building a bicultural society, focusing on Canada’s role in
52 On error-reducing moves, see especially Taylor, op. cit., in note 43, pp. 36 and 52.
53 Taylor, op. cit., in note 25, p. 156.
54 Ibid., p. 159.
55 Charles Taylor, ‘A Canadian Future?’, in Taylor with Laforest, op. cit., in note 28, p. 24.
56 Ibid., p. 35.
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the world, and the creation of a more egalitarian society. In this article, it is clear that Taylor 
is struggling to define a common language for Canada and Quebec. He is hoping to 
contribute to the achievement of intercultural understanding and therefore to the resolution of 
Canada’s constitutional woes.
Although the discussion above clearly demonstrates the high place that understanding 
holds in Taylor’s ethics, it nonetheless highlights certain problems with his approach. First, it 
is difficult to see where Taylor himself stands. It is clear that he sees great value in 
intercultural understanding. However, it is not clear whether he views himself as belonging 
to the French Canadian group, the English Canadian group, or both. In the context of his 
theoretical claims about our ability to understand people who are culturally different from us, 
one would suspect that Taylor sees himself as having a dual allegiance and therefore as 
uniquely placed to achieve understanding between the parties. However, Taylor never 
discusses these issues and in this sense, vital questions about the nature of a common 
language and how precisely understanding might arise are left unanswered.
By 1991, these questions have been answered at a specific level in Taylor’s work on 
Quebec. In ‘Shared and Divergent Values’, Taylor again approaches the question of 
understanding and delineates in greater detail the cultural background to French and English 
misunderstandings. The English Canadian position is defined by its existential questions 
about unity and identity. These doubts have largely been answered for ‘Canada outside 
Quebec’ (COQ) by a common agreement on and pride in the rule of law, collective 
provision, the equalisation of life chances, multiculturalism, and, most recently, the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms.57 French Canada, on the other hand, has no uncertainty over 
identity. Thus, the above ‘rallying points’ are less important to them than is Canada’s 
contribution to the defence and promotion of the French Canadian nation. In turn, the latter 
would require not only a commitment to French language rights, but also a formal 
recognition of the autonomy of Quebec.
However, this particular resolution of Taylor’s difficulties serves only to highlight 
even greater difficulties with his ethics. In this later article, however, the problem is one of 
serious incompatibility between Canadian and Quebecois visions of the good life. In fact, the 
special treatment entailed by the recognition of Quebec would challenge the procedural 
equality enshrined in the Charter. In other words, the cultural values upon which Canadian 
unity is presently based are actually incompatible with the needs of Quebec. The procedural 
liberalism of the Charter actually reinforces the existing denial of recognition to Quebec. 
This framing of the problem is much more consistent with those situations in which the 
paradigm of understanding is most needed—i.e., where there is no pre-existing common
57 Charles Taylor, ‘Shared and Divergent Values’, in Taylor with Laforest, op. cit., in note 28, pp. 158-
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language. However, in this case, Taylor is unable to show how his paradigm might lead to a 
resolution of differences. He does refer to the need for ‘common ground’ between Canada 
and Quebec, but in his view, ‘the possible common ground is obvious. Procedural liberals in 
English Canada just have to acknowledge, first, that there are other possible models of liberal 
society and, second, that their francophone compatriots wish to live by one such 
alternative’.58 Here, Taylor provides a much more definite statement of what needs to be done 
if the Canadian federation is to stay together. However, Taylor’s own starting language is 
now acutely obvious and his ability to facilitate understanding is circumscribed. In fact, the 
understanding which Taylor now suggests seems very one-sided. Moreover, the cultural 
engagement and fusion of horizons so necessary to intercultural understanding have 
disappeared entirely from Taylor’s analysis.
Despite these difficulties, it is not hard to see that the paradigm of understanding 
provides a very ready explanation of and solution to Canada’s constitutional situation. In fact, 
it is tempting to suggest that Taylor had Canada in mind when he was developing the 
paradigm. Canada is already a liberal democracy with a significant amount of 
decentralisation and a precedent of respecting cultural rights. Within this hospitable 
framework, a dialogue between Canada and Quebec about the terms of their cultural 
coexistence is already underway. The problem in this case is how to achieve a resolution that 
entails understanding and recognition of the cultural other. However, this is less true of the 
Canada-United States cultural issue (and even less true of other cases). In the Canada-United 
States case, the cultural others are more obviously multiple, both within Canada and between 
Canada and the United States. Moreover, the achievement of understanding between all of 
these parties, even if it could be achieved, does not provide a very adequate guide to cultural 
policy. How could a dialogue be initiated if some (perhaps the most powerful) parties did not 
feel the need to talk? What if an understanding was reached between the many different 
groups within Canada alone—how could this inform Canadian cultural policy towards the 
United States? The paradigm of understanding can be helpful in showing how two different 
cultures can learn to peacefully coexist. Beyond this, however, it gives little direction as to 
the appropriate goals of policy or the means by which these should be pursued. In short, it is 
difficult to fruitfully apply Taylor’s paradigm in this form to the case under study in this 
thesis.
To sum up, Taylor argues that intercultural understanding can come about through the 
application of practical reason. In turn, this relies upon the existence of some shared values. 
These ‘shared values’ could, in principle be composed of anything that those cultures held
61.
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dear. However, Taylor clearly does not wish to endorse the cultural relativism implicit in the 
idea that any value which attracted agreement was good. To support his position, Taylor 
introduces his own standard of the good. But, he does so in a backhanded way. He avoids 
tackling the ethical question of what the good is and how it is constituted by making an 
empirical claim about the widespread acceptance of the value of human life. This has two 
advantages for Taylor. First, it widens the potential scope of his paradigm of understanding 
to include nearly all cultures and so sidelines the question of how to engage with ‘non- 
liberal’ societies. Second, it allows him to evade an ethical justification for his standard of 
the good. Where does it come from and how does it get its legitimacy? This latter point will 
be addressed in greater detail below. First, however, it is necessary to address the second 
point of critique: Taylor’s conception of culture.
Conception of Culture
The second difficulty with Taylor’s ethics concerns his conception of culture. In an insightful 
article, Amelie Oksenberg Rorty makes several important points about Taylor’s usage of the 
term culture.59 One of her main criticisms is that Taylor sometimes slips from one usage of 
the term to another without explaining or justifying the shift. She is clearly right that there is 
some shifting in Taylor’s discussions of culture. In Sources of the Self alone, Taylor employs 
the term culture in no less than 39 distinct ways. However to characterise these different 
usages as slippage would be to fundamentally misunderstand Taylor’s conceptualisation. At 
the very least, Taylor’s usages of culture can be grouped into families. For example, it would 
not be too far-fetched to argue that ‘our culture’, ‘national culture’, and ‘German culture’ 
might be used interchangeably with very little slippage. The same might be true of ‘modem 
culture’, ‘scientific culture’, and ‘contemporary culture’. The fact that Taylor does indeed use 
some of these terms interchangeably indicates that his terms could use greater definition. 
However, it also indicates that Taylor does not view these terms as mutually exclusive. It is 
quite possible that ‘national culture’, ‘scientific culture’, and ‘family culture’ are all contexts 
of experience and frameworks of meaning that vie for our moral attention. As Taylor 
remarks, ‘our identities, as defined by whatever gives us fundamental orientation, are in fact 
complex and many-tiered’.60 Moreover, it is clear from his discussion of Enlightenment 
rationalism that a complex of values such as ‘scientific culture’ can generate meaning just as
58 Ibid., p. 178.
59 Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, ‘The Hidden Politics o f  Cultural Identification’, Political Theory (Vol. 22, 
No. 1, 1994), pp. 152-66.
60 Taylor, op. cit., in note 9, p. 28.
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easily as ‘national culture’. So, Taylor’s conception of culture is a fluid one, but it does not 
justify the criticism levelled at it by Rorty.
Nonetheless, such a fluid conception of culture does raise the question of where one 
culture ends and another begins. Taylor does not address this issue, preferring instead to use 
the label ‘culture’ wherever it fits the situation. For example, his treatment of Canada and 
Quebec focuses on several cultures: Canadian, Quebecois, and those of the unnamed 
minorities. However, his discussion would become significantly more complicated if he also 
wished to include religious, scientific, political, modem, Western, intellectual, or capitalist 
cultures. In fact, the question of what was cultural might become so clouded as to preclude 
any useful comment at all. It might be possible to argue that language or national sentiment 
are so prominent in meaning-creation for Quebec that special attention to these factors is 
justified. However, it is still not clear why these factors should be singled out as defining of 
cultures in this case. Why not the cultural ties which place Canada and Quebec as part of the 
same culture (say, modem culture), or those which command allegiance among some people 
on both sides of the provincial boundary (say, Muslim culture)? By ignoring these cultural 
ties, it seems as though Taylor is prioritising certain types of culture, at least in this case. 
Without further explanation or justification, this prioritisation has the effect of glossing over 
the difficulties of Taylor’s fluid conception of culture. As Rorty has noted, Taylor’s 
‘argument occasionally exploits the ambiguity of his usage’.61
More importantly, this criticism points to the fact that the very definition of a culture 
and the identification of who its members are is often the site of serious political 
contestation. To take terms such as ‘us’ or ‘Quebec culture’ as given implies that these 
debates are settled. This may seem like an oversensitive claim. After all, if we wish to 
undertake empirical studies, then we must at some point refer to recognisable entities, even if 
these cannot be precisely defined. However, as the Canadian constitutional case has shown, 
the characterisation of the debate as ‘Quebec versus Canada’ grossly underestimates the 
variety of cultural claims involved and could lead to a solution which ignores the needs of 
many people. The most notable group in this regard are probably the non-French speaking 
Quebecois, although French speakers outside Quebec are also an obvious example, as are 
aboriginal peoples. Making claims about Quebec, as though the question of who is Quebecois 
is already settled, threatens to neglect the claims being made on behalf of these groups, 
among many others. This is perhaps an overly politicised example. However, the debates 
about what is modem, Western, or scientific are no less affected by the politics of setting 
boundaries. Taylor’s approach to culture is unable to address some of these crucial questions.
61 Rorty, op. cit., in note 59, p. 156.
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A further question arises out of Taylor’s fluid understanding of culture. If it is the case 
that culture is a very broad concept and if we all may be influenced by many different 
cultures in the composition of our identities, then it must be asked how this affects the 
relationship between culture and identity that was set out above. Clearly, it is still possible 
that cultural frameworks provide the background understanding upon which identity relies. 
However, if these frameworks are plural and competing, then there is no reason why any 
identity will rely on cultures in the same combination as any other. In other words, unless 
Taylor is willing to essentialise identities and to fix the relationship between culture and 
identity, then his argument is forced back to the individualisation of identity. The frameworks 
may be common, but each identity is individual. This forces a gap between culture and 
identity and suggests the possibility that even culturally-informed identities may entail 
greater subjectivity than Taylor would appreciate. This point is reinforced by the discussion 
of culture in the previous paragraph. The idea of a multicultural society already implies such 
a great deal of cross-cultural interchange that it becomes impossible to discuss the ‘cultures’ 
involved as anything like identifiable, separate entities. For example, in the case of the 
daughter of Chinese immigrants to Montreal, one must ask how easily her identity could be 
understood in terms of two distinct cultures operating on and against one another. 
Nonetheless, it is also not the case that her identity can be ‘read’ directly from a single 
particular culture. In other words, there is no doubt that her identity is impacted upon by 
plural cultural forces and yet this does not mean that these cultures can be separated and 
identified. Taylor’s theory of intercultural understanding, as much as his conception of 
culture, relies upon preexisting, identifiable, fixed cultural entities.62 His paradigm can 
accommodate cultural evolution, but only in so far as this generates a new cultural entity. The 
first difficulty with this understanding is that it provides an inadequate account of cultural 
evolution and intercultural interpenetration. This is particularly problematic for a theory 
attempting to cope with multicultural societies. Second, the concept of plural identities tends 
towards a subjectivity that Taylor would reject. This can only be avoided by an implicit 
essentialisation of identity and a fixing of the relationship between identity and culture more 
firmly than Taylor acknowledges.
The necessity of a tight relationship between culture and identity emerges again in an 
article where Taylor discusses how the public sphere relates to policy-making. He defines the 
public sphere as ‘a common space in which the members of society meet...to discuss matters 
of common interest; and thus to be able to form a common mind about those matters’.63
62 See, for example, William Connolly, ‘Pluralism, Multiculturalism and the Nation-State: Rethinking 
the Connections’, Journal o f  Political Ideologies (Vol. 1, No. 1, 1996), pp. 53-74.
63 Charles Taylor, ‘Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere’, in Taylor, op. cit., in note 16, p. 259.
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According to Taylor, the public sphere is crucial for democratic decision-making in that it 
enables ‘the society to reach a common mind, without the mediation of the political sphere’.64 
But what role does culture play in the ability of a society to reach a common mind? This 
becomes clear when Taylor sets out the conditions for genuine democratic decision-making. 
According to Taylor, ‘they include (a) that the people concerned understand themselves as 
belonging to a community that shares some common purposes.. (b) that the various groups, 
types, and classes of citizens have been given a genuine hearing and were able to have an 
impact on the debate; and (c) that the decision emerging from this is really the majority 
preference’.65 In a sense, Taylor is setting out how it is possible to be sure that any public 
policy decision embodies a respect for cultural difference. Taylor does admit that his 
description of the public sphere is an ideal type. Nonetheless, his suggestion that a ‘common 
mind’ is both desirable and possible, and his predication of democracy upon community 
presuppose a greater degree of cultural homogeneity than is likely. In other words, they 
reinforce the idea that people in a certain area can be expected to subscribe to the same 
culture. Not only does this presuppose a very tight relationship between a single culture and 
identity, it leaves very few resources for policy-making in situations where cultures are 
diffuse or where there is no common mind or sense of community.
In sum, then, Taylor wishes both to give moral value to culture as constitutive and to 
avoid the possibility of relativism or radical subjectivity. In order to tread this middle course, 
he is required to firmly fix the relationship between culture and identity. This is not achieved 
in the unnuanced way that many communitarians are often accused of adopting.66 
Nonetheless, it produces a similar essentialisation. As the next section will show, this view of 
identity is itself energised by a very powerful but also very subtle conception of the good. 
The following section will argue that this conception is not adequately defended, thereby 
creating problems for Taylor’s argument. The final section will show how Taylor’s theory 
could adequately defend a narrower conception of the good, without relying exclusively on 
culturally-specific norms or on universals.
Conception of the Good
The final aspect of Taylor’s cultural ethics that requires critical examination involves his 
conception of the good. Much of Taylor’s work is devoted to negotiating a middle way
64 Ibid., p. 266.
65 Ibid., p. 276.
66 See, for example, Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f  Minority Rights 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), p. 91. See also Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
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between complete moral subjectivism and moral universalism. As was shown above, this 
attempt to chart a middle course created some difficulties for his paradigm of understanding. 
The difficulties for his conception of the good are even more serious. In Sources of the Self 
Taylor is concerned to retrieve and elaborate the moral sources which underpin the modem 
self. As his theory of culture and identity would suggest, Taylor is critical of approaches 
which locate moral sources within each individual. According to Taylor, thoughts, goods, and 
values can only be the thoughts, goods, and values that they are against the social background 
of meaning.67 Equally, however, Taylor resists the opposite notion, namely that moral sources 
are external to people. In particular, he argues that ‘ [underlying our modem talk of identity 
is the notion that questions of moral orientation cannot all be solved in simply universal 
terms’.68 But where, then, do our moral sources originate? More importantly, what is the 
‘good’ for the modem self?
Taylor’s discussion of these questions is rarely direct and the reader is often left 
grasping at short comments and unexplained references. For example, Taylor seems highly 
sympathetic to the Romantic notion of nature as an external source that can only be realised 
within. According to Taylor, ‘these modem views give a crucial place to our own inner 
powers of constructing or transfiguring or interpreting the world, as essential to the efficacy 
of the external sources. Our powers must be deployed if these are to empower us’.69 
Moreover, he often remarks how a moral source is one which moves us or resonates within 
us. For example, Taylor claims that ‘[w]e sense in the very experience of being moved by 
some higher good that we are moved by what is good in it rather than that it is valuable 
because of our reaction’.70 Later, he argues that our concern should be with ‘the search for 
moral sources outside the subject through languages which resonate within him or her, the 
grasping of an order which is inseparably indexed to a personal vision’.71 In other words, the 
standard of the good is not purely subjective. Nonetheless, we recognise the good by our 
subjective reaction to it. This is a very delicate position to maintain successfully, and Taylor 
does not offer enough detail to be convincing. Most importantly, he does not provide an 
explanation of what motivates our moral reactions. For example, he often refers to being 
motivated by ‘the higher’ but does not adequately explain what this might consist of or why it 
has legitimacy as a moral source. These are crucial questions if Taylor is to successfully 
negotiate the middle course between subjectivism and universalism.
67 On this point, see especially Taylor, op. cit., in note 14.
68 Taylor, op. cit., in note 9, p. 28.
69 Ibid., p. 455.
70 Ibid., p. 74.
71 Ibid., p. 510, emphases in original.
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There are several things which might fill this criterion of ‘the higher’. In Taylor’s 
view, one clear possibility is God. Many critics have discussed Taylor’s theistic references 
and especially the place given to the Augustinian thread in Sources of the Self.12 Indeed, 
Taylor’s frequent references to epiphany as an unveiling of moral sources and his interest in 
the question of grace are suggestive. Moreover, no reader can fail to note his comment in the 
closing pages of the book that his hope for the future, ‘is a hope that I see implicit in Judaeo- 
Christian theism (however terrible the record of its adherents in history), and in its central 
promise of a divine affirmation of the human, more total than humans can ever attain 
unaided’.73 Indeed, Taylor fully intends to depict God as a moral source in the modem 
Western world. However, as Michael Morgan has convincingly argued, ‘opponents of 
religion have to distort what he says in order to mount an attack on him’.74 There are two 
reasons for this. The first is that Taylor is exceedingly fair both to the believers and the non­
believers. In fact, far from overstating the claims of Christianity, it seems more that he 
overstates the degree of non-belief in the modem world. Second, as Morgan notes, ‘[h]e does 
not argue directly that God and religion should play a central role in our moral lives; he does 
show how, subject to detailed clarification, they could do so’.75 Moreover, while religion 
seems to be Taylor’s personal favourite, he is equally aware of two other modem moral 
sources: nature and reason. The former derives its force from the remnants of Romantic 
expressivism, while the latter is handed down to us from the Enlightenment.
The more important question, perhaps, is why these particular sources have legitimacy. 
Clearly, Taylor believes that they are unavoidable terms of reference for the modem identity. 
He is probably correct that the legacy of these sources permeates our identity, at least in the 
modem West. However, it is not clear that the very existence of these as sources of meaning 
makes them legitimate. As Ronald Beiner has argued in relation to another value, that of 
ordinary life,
if it is the case that the basic justification for the prominence that domestic life 
has in the lives of modem individuals is simply that this is in fact how 
individuals inhabiting the modem dispensation have come to understand 
themselves and articulate their self-identity, then what objection could be posed
72 See, amongst others, Harvey Mitchell, ‘Review Article: Charles Taylor on the Self, Its Languages 
and Its History’, History o f  Political Thought (Vol. 12, No. 2, 1991), p. 357; Quentin Skinner, ‘Who 
Are “We”? Ambiguities o f the Modem S e lf, Inquiry (Vol. 34, No. 2, 1991), pp. 133-53; Connolly, op. 
cit., in note 62, p. 63; and Judith Shklar, Review o f Sources o f  the Self, by Charles Taylor, in Political 
Theory (Vol. 19, No. 1, 1991), pp. 105-109.
73 Taylor, op. cit., in note 9, p. 521.
74 Michael L. Morgan, ‘Religion, History and Moral Discourse’, in James Tully (ed.), Philosophy in an 
Age o f  Pluralism: The Philosophy o f  Charles Taylor in Question (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), p. 51.
75 Ibid., emphases in original.
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if individuals within some new dispensation come to understand themselves and 
define their identity in a way that requires radical liberation from the moral 
constraints and social obligations of family life?76
Beiner goes on to argue that Taylor would be uncomfortable with such an outcome. This is 
probably an ungenerous representation of Taylor’s views on the family. Nonetheless, several 
broader points are highly relevant.
Most importantly, Taylor makes it seem that a practice or an idea is morally valuable 
simply by virtue of it having evolved as part of human experience. As Beiner comments, ‘the 
standard of theoretical judgement is simply the historically contingent evolution of 
identity’.77 In other words, the conception of the self which triumphed just happens to be 
judged by Taylor to be a good one. This coincidence will be discussed in greater detail 
below. However, the important point for this discussion is that Taylor is not willing to accept 
as valuable any practice that might arise out of or be affirmed by human experience. For 
example, some practices, such as family life are clearly valuable, while others, such as 
Nazism and nationalism are bad.78 What are the criteria which distinguish some meaningful 
practices from others? Taylor’s own comments give no indication. This is hardly surprising 
given that any such principle would almost certainly lend significant support to the liberal 
universalism that Taylor critiqued so vehemently. Nonetheless, there are strong grounds for 
suspecting that an unacknowledged and undefended standard of the good operates in Taylor’s 
work.
The Value of Taylor’s Approach
The difficulties described above are serious enough to prevent this thesis from advocating 
that Taylor’s ethics should underscore Canadian policy towards free trade and culture. 
Nonetheless, Taylor’s ontology is highly insightful and will provide the necessary theoretical 
grounding of the position developed in the next chapter. Taylor’s ontology is important 
because of the strong challenge it provides to the atomist preconditions of much scientific 
endeavour (be it natural or social). He does not simply state his own disagreement with 
atomism, but sets out in great detail and depth what an alternative social ontology entails. It is
76 Ronald Beiner, ‘Hermeneutical Generosity and Social Criticism’, Critical Review (Vol. 9, No. 4, 
1995), p. 455.
77 Ibid., p. 454.
78 On family life, see Taylor, op. cit., in note 9, p. 305; on nationalism, see Taylor, op. cit., in note 16, 
p. 142; and on Nazism, see Charles Taylor, ‘Heidegger and Wittgenstein’, in Taylor, op. cit., in note 14, 
p. 76.
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a forceful concept that demonstrates the possibility of seeing culture as constitutive of 
identity and yet allowing for a plurality of cultural frameworks.
Nonetheless, the ethical position which Taylor himself draws from this ontology is 
beset with difficulties. The three most important ones for culture and free trade were set out 
above. Despite the seriousness of these criticisms, they do not present a large impediment to 
the development of a different and more adequate cultural ethics, hi fact, as the next chapter 
will show, it is even possible to develop such an ethics without betraying Taylor’s powerful 
ontology. The following chapter will draw on the work of Iris Marion Young to show how, 
starting from Taylor’s ontology, it is possible to develop a radical democratic ethics that can 
empower a useful and ethical policy for trade and culture.
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Chapter 9
Social Justice in a Multicultural Context
The previous chapter set out the foundations of the approach that this thesis will take towards 
free trade and culture. It established the value of Charles Taylor’s ontology, even though it 
argued that his ethical and political positions contained serious difficulties and were 
inappropriate for this project. The tasks of this chapter are twofold. First, it will show how 
Taylor’s ontology can be developed to produce a different and more useful ethics for cultural 
policy. This will be achieved by drawing on the work of Iris Marion Young. Second, this 
chapter will briefly suggest the ways in which this ethics can inform Canadian policy for free 
trade and culture. The details of these suggestions will be drawn out in the final chapter.
Ontology
Like Taylor, Young’s work is rooted in her firm opposition to the atomist ontology which 
grounds much social and political theory. However, in contrast to Taylor’s focus on culture, 
Young’s foundation is her conception of the social group.
Young begins her discussion of the social group by rejecting two common models of 
social association. These are the aggregate model and the associationist model. In the 
aggregate model, groups are defined by a certain attribute which all group members are 
thought to possess. For example, a group might equally be composed of people who are 
women, just as easily as it might be composed of people who own red cars. According to 
Young, however, ‘[a] social group is defined not primarily by a set of shared attributes, but 
by a sense of identity’.1 Although the members of a group might share certain attributes, 
these are not the basis of their identification with the group. Instead, ‘[g]roup meanings 
partially constitute people’s identities in terms of the cultural forms, social situation, and 
history that group members know as theirs’.2 Groups are forms of social relations, rather than 
combinations of people. This means that the ongoing processes of engagement and 
identification are crucial to the identity-formation of both the group and its members.
The second common model of social organisation is the associationist model, Social 
contract theories are one prominent example of this model. Unlike the model of aggregates,
1 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1990), p. 44.
2 Ibid.
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associationism understands that practices and processes may be pivotal in group formation. 
However, according to Young, both models still understand that the individual is constituted 
prior to his affiliation with the group. In Young’s words, ‘the person’s identity and sense of 
self are usually regarded as prior to and relatively independent of association membership’.3
Instead, Young defines a social group as ‘a collective of persons differentiated from at 
least one other group by cultural forms, practices, or way of life’,4 and argues that the 
individual cannot be understood outside of her group affiliations. According to Young, ‘[a] 
person’s sense of history, affinity, and separateness, even the person’s mode of reasoning, 
evaluating, and expressing feeling, are constituted partly by her or his group affinities’.5 
Young maintains that the self must be considered as a product of social and linguistic 
processes and that identity is constituted relationally.6 Li order to give some idea of what it 
might actually mean for identity to be constituted relationally, Young highlights the work of 
several recent philosophers. She refers to poststructuralist philosophies which challenge the 
assumption that consciousness develops prior to language. Instead, they claim that ‘the self is 
an achievement in linguistic positioning that is always contextualized in concrete relations 
with other persons’.7 She also describes Jurgen Habermas’ claim that ‘group categorization 
and norms are major constituents of individual identity’.8 Finally, Young takes on Martin 
Heidegger’s notion of ‘thrownness’ to explain how ‘one finds oneself as a member of a 
group, which one experiences as always already having been’.9 This is perhaps to overstate 
the case, as it ignores the processes by which groups may form and by which they evolve to 
assume identity proportions. However, Young does temper Heidegger by suggesting that we 
come to be members of a group not by ‘satisfying some objective criteria, but [by] a 
subjective affirmation of identity with that group, the affirmation of that affinity by other 
members of the group, and the attribution of membership in that group by persons identifying 
with other groups’.10 In other words, the group, in general exists as ontologically prior to any 
individual. Group affiliations may change or that some may be overcome and replaced by 
others. However, according to Young, ‘changes in group affinity are experienced as 
transformations in one’s identity’.11
3 Ibid., p. 45.
4 Ibid., p. 43. It should be noted that Young does allow for other types o f  group, most notably interest 
groups, but since these do not entail the same process o f group identification and identity-constitution, 
they do not carry the same moral standing. See ibid., p. 46.
5 Ibid., p. 45.
6 Ibid.
1 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 46, emphasis in original.
10 Ibid., p. 172.
" Ibid., p. 46.
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Unfortunately, Young does not develop her conception of group identification in any 
greater detail. In fact, apart from these few references to Jacques Lacan, Habermas, and 
Heidegger, she gives very little indication of what it might actually mean for identity to be 
social and relational. Nor, as we noted, does she indicate how groups develop or lose their 
capacity for fostering identities. Nonetheless, much of what she describes as her social 
ontology can very comfortably be grounded in Taylor’s ontology. Like Taylor, Young denies 
the ontological priority of the isolated individual. Also like Taylor, she seeks to show that 
individual identity is inescapably group-based and yet wishes to avoid giving license to the 
community to determine what is good for the individual. Not surprisingly, in grappling with 
this problem, Young also turns to poststructuralist theories of language in order to ground her 
conception of the self and its relation to society.12 The result is that both theorists lay great 
importance on the need for social recognition of and respect for people’s different identities. 
Neither can conceive of a meaningful freedom in the absence of this. Moreover, they both 
stress the importance of conceiving of society dialogically and relationally. In short, both 
Young’s arguments against atomism and her positive comments about how the self should be 
understood mirror Taylor’s very closely. There is clearly no contradiction in taking Taylor’s 
ontology as the basis for an ethics of culture that draws heavily on Young. In fact, since 
Young devotes so little attention to the philosophical underpinnings of her ethics, a 
connection to Taylor’s ontology adds greater depth to her work and underscores its normative 
significance.
Nonetheless, one important point of divergence must be dealt with. As was mentioned 
above, where Taylor emphasises the centrality of culture for identity, Young focuses on the 
social group. As will be shown below, such a shift in emphasis need not affect the utility of 
Taylor’s ontology in this context. In fact, in the context of this thesis, Young’s conception of 
the social group is able to fulfil the most important functions of Taylor’s theory of culture 
while avoiding many of its difficulties. As a result, it provides a much more useful basis for 
the development of a satisfactory cultural ethics.
The particular features of Young’s conception of the social group which make it 
especially useful arise in her discussion of social groups and oppression. Young is careful to 
claim that while certain particular groups have been oppressive, there is nothing inherently 
oppressive in recognising the primacy of the social group. This is only true, however, if one 
adopts a conception of group identification that is ‘much more relational and fluid’ than
12 On Taylor’s use o f modem, and especially poststructuralist theories o f language, see Charles Taylor, 
Hegel and M odem Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Charles Taylor, 
‘Heidegger and Wittgenstein’, in Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), pp. 61-77; and Charles Taylor, ‘Heidegger, Language, and Ecology’, in 
Taylor, Philosophical Arguments, pp. 100-26.
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many commentators, including Taylor, are willing to acknowledge.13 It should be recalled 
that Young argues that groups are not defined according to the specific attributes of their 
members and that they are essentially the product of dialogical and relational social 
engagement. Following from these claims, Young argues that ‘[t]here is no common nature 
that members of a group share. As aspects of a process, moreover, groups are fluid; they 
come into being and may fade away’.14 In this way, Young is able to give primacy to social 
groups without thereby assuming an essentialised group, externally and arbitrarily fixing 
what is entailed by group membership, or predefining what the good for the group might be.
Young is also attuned to the multiple nature of modem group attachments in a way that 
Taylor is not. She recognises that ‘every social group has group differences cutting across it, 
which are potential sources of wisdom, excitement, conflict, and oppression’.15 These cross­
cutting group differences serve to create multiple affiliations and allegiances within society, 
but also within individuals. As a result, although the social group remains the central 
category of human relations, it is no longer possible to assume homogeneity of values or 
interests within smaller groups, never mind within nations or classes as a whole. Nonetheless, 
this lack of homogeneity does not rule out the utility of the social group as a concept. In fact, 
it is the very fluidity of it that can capture our modem sense of multiple and sometimes 
conflicting poles of identification.
Young’s focus on the social group can very easily be substituted for Taylor’s 
conception of culture. Once culture is understood broadly to incorporate people’s values and 
ways of life, it is imperative that we also broaden our understanding of ‘cultural groups’ to 
include the many different affiliations that comprise a ‘way of life’ for any particular person. 
That these are not easily definable or homogenous does not make them any less constitutive 
of our identities. It may create difficulties for social theory, but, as Taylor’s ethics showed, 
without such a fluid and cross-cutting conceptualisation, the pluralistic type of freedom 
envisaged by both Taylor and Young would be an impossibility.
In this way, the strengths of Taylor’s ontology can be retained and used as the 
foundation for a different ethics of culture. This ethics is the subject of the next section.
Ethics
The problems with Taylor’s ethics were discussed at length in the previous chapter. Any 
attempt to build on his ontology in order to develop a workable ethics will have to remedy
13 Young, op. cit., in note 1, p. 47.
14 Ibid.
xs Ibid., pp. 172-73.
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those problems and avoid generating any new and serious difficulties. The section above set 
out Young’s conception of the social group as an important substitution in Taylor’s ontology. 
This section will show that the ontology developed above can spawn an ethics that is much 
more useful and culturally-sensitive than Taylor’s.
Unlike Taylor, Young’s ethics are clearly stated and occupy the forefront of her work. 
She begins by locating her position in contrast to what she terms the distributive paradigm. 
According to Young, this paradigm dominates much of contemporary thinking about justice. 
It is characterised by an understanding of social justice in terms of ‘the morally proper 
distribution of social benefits and burdens among society’s members’.16 Young sees this 
approach as problematic for two reasons. First, she claims that it ignores and often 
presupposes the institutional context that underlies particular patterns of distribution. As a 
result, these institutional structures are never brought forward for normative evaluation. 
Second, she claims that when distributive approaches do deal with non-material issues, they 
do so by treating any social value ‘as some thing or aggregate of things that some specific 
agents possess in certain amounts’.17 This provides a misleading account of the issues of 
justice entailed, since ‘[i]t reifies aspects of social life that are better understood as a function 
of rules and relations than as things. And it conceptualizes social justice primarily in terms of 
end-state patterns, rather than focusing on social processes’.18
Instead, Young argues for a conception of social justice that she describes as 
‘enabling’. In other words, our conception of justice should be broadened beyond distribution 
to include an examination of institutional conditions. More specifically, we should expect 
institutional conditions to ‘make it possible for all to learn and use satisfying skills in socially 
recognized settings, to participate in decision-making, and to express their feelings, 
experience, and perspective on social life in contexts where others can listen’.19 Young is 
very open about the values that underlie this position. In particular, she highlights two values 
that are especially important for social justice: ‘(1) developing and exercising one’s 
capacities and expressing one’s experience, and (2) participating in determining one’s action 
and the conditions of one’s action’.20 These values are central to Young’s ethics. They 
reappear throughout her work, though often in different formulations. For the purposes of the 
discussion below, the first value will be referred to as enablement and the second as 
participation. These will each be discussed before their relationship to democracy will be 
drawn out.
16 Ibid., p. 16.
17 Ibid., p. 24.
18 Ibid., p. 25.
19 Ibid., p. 91.
20 Ibid., p. 37.
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Enablement
The idea of enablement appears throughout Justice and the Politics of Difference. Although 
Young uses it only in the context of social justice, it nevertheless has several meanings. First, 
enablement is used to refer to expression. Justice, for Young, entails that people are enabled 
to express themselves in a variety of ways. They must be able to express their experiences, 
their needs, their feelings and perspective on social life, their desires, and the particularities 
of themselves.21 At the most basic level, expression is crucial for people to be able 
communicate with one another, and to meet their needs. According to Young’s ontology, 
people cannot simply or easily change who they are, even if such a change might bring social 
or material benefits. As a result, ensuring that people have both the freedom and the capacity 
to express themselves is crucial to the achievement of social justice based on an appreciation 
of diversity. Moreover, as will become clear below, participatory democracy would be 
meaningless in the absence of the freedom for people to express themselves and publicly 
discuss their needs and desires.
Second, enablement refers to the capacity to perform certain actions. More 
specifically, Young discusses the importance of people being enabled to develop and exercise 
their capacities, to meet their needs, and, ultimately, to exercise their freedom and realise 
their choices.22 Young does not detail why this second type of enablement is important, 
although she clearly assumes that the ability to exercise one’s capacities is central to human 
fulfilment. This is evident in her discussion of the need to reform the hierarchical division of 
labour. In particular, she criticises the distinction between ‘those who plan their own or 
other’s work routines...and those who follow routines that have been planned for them’.23 
This distinction, she claims, fosters the notion that some types of work are better or more 
important than others and therefore ‘tends to ignore intelligence and skill that have different 
and in some ways incomparable forms’.24 This reproduces the oppression of these groups, 
since it ‘condemns a large proportion of the population to a situation in which they cannot 
develop and exercise their capacities’.25
The precise requirements of enablement can further be drawn out by examining 
Young’s approach to injustice and specifically her conception of oppression. Paralleling her 
description of social justice according to two values, Young defines two types of injustice,
21 Ibid., pp. 23, 34, 37, 38, 91, 92, 119, and 121.
22 Ibid., pp. 34, 39, 54, 56, 92, 173, 193, and 251.
23 Ibid., p. 216. Originally from Philip Green, Retrieving Democracy (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and 
Allanheld, 1985), p. 81.
24 Young, op. cit., in note 1, p. 222.
25 Ibid., p. 221.
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namely oppression and domination. Domination is the opposite of participation and so will be 
dealt with in the sub-section on participation below. Oppression, however, ‘consists in 
systematic institutional processes which prevent some people from learning and using 
satisfying and expansive skills in socially recognized settings, or institutionalized social 
processes which inhibit people’s ability to play and communicate with others or to express 
their feelings and perspective on social life in contexts where others can listen’.26 In this 
sense, oppression names the conditions that enablement must overcome. According to 
Young, oppression is a ‘family of concepts and conditions’.27 No group is oppressed in the 
same way or to the same extent as any other. In an effort to avoid the reduction of oppression 
to a single indicator, Young discusses it according to its ‘five faces’. These are exploitation, 
marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence.28 In this context, we can 
gain some insight into the specific demands of enablement by briefly delineating the 
injustices that it is expected to rectify.
First, exploitation describes the type of oppression in which the results of the labour of 
one social group are transferred to benefit another. The injustice in this case consists not just 
in the unequal distribution of income, but also in the structural relations that ‘are produced 
and reproduced through a systemic process in which the energies of the have-nots are 
continuously expended to maintain and augment the power, status, and wealth of the haves’.29 
Rectifying this situation, therefore, entails not just a redistribution of incomes, but also 
requires a restructuring of decision-making and a reorganisation of the division of labour. 
Second, marginalisation describes the situation of people that ‘the system of labour cannot or 
will not use’.30 As a result, ‘[a] whole category of people is expelled from useful participation 
in social life and thus potentially subjected to severe material deprivation and even 
extermination’.31 Third, powerlessness describes those people ‘who lack authority or power 
even in [a] mediated sense, those over whom power is exercised without their exercising it; 
the powerless are situated so that they must take orders and rarely have the right to give 
them’.32 The injustice occurs because people are prevented from exercising their capacities, 
they have no decision-making power, and they are subjected to disrespectful treatment. These 
first three types of oppression are all linked quite closely to the division of labour. In this 
context, several demands of enablement are highlighted. These include a reorganisation of 
the institutions of decision-making power, a restructuring of the division of labour, and a
26 Ibid., p. 38.
27 Ibid., p. 40.
28 For a fuller discussion o f  these five aspects o f oppression, see ibid., pp. 48-63.
29 Ibid., p. 50.
30 Ibid., p. 53.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p. 56.
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recognition of the value of all social groups. In this way, people can be enabled to express 
their needs in a context where others can listen, exercise their capacities, and exercise some 
power over their actions and the conditions of their actions.
The fourth type of oppression, cultural imperialism, refers to the process by which ‘the 
dominant meanings of society render the particular perspective of one’s own group invisible 
at the same time as they stereotype one’s group and mark it out as the Other’.33 Unlike the 
previous three types of oppression, cultural imperialism does not refer mainly to the division 
of labour. Instead, it relates to social processes of cultural representation and recognition. 
The injustice consists precisely in the fact that ‘dominant cultural expressions often simply 
have little place for the experience of other groups’.34 Not only is the experience of 
subordinate groups not recognised as valuable, but the dominant group often universalises its 
own way of looking at the world and imposes it on other groups. In this context, enablement 
must entail a recognition of and respect for the plurality of cultural experiences. It should 
allow people to express their particularities in a context of social recognition and respect.
The final type of oppression is violence. This refers not simply to specific violent acts, 
but more importantly to its existence and reproduction as a social practice. Young is 
concerned to show that certain types of violence against particular social groups are not 
random, but instead are ‘rule-bound, social, and often premeditated’.35 Moreover, according 
to Young, it results from the threat to dominant identities that is posed by subordinate groups. 
The particular details of Young’s theory that difference is threatening to identity will be 
drawn out further below. It is sufficient here to note that, for Young, enablement must entail 
a change in ‘cultural images, stereotypes, and the mundane reproduction of relations of 
dominance and aversion in the gestures of everyday life’.36 Only in this way can the identity- 
based violence be overcome.
Participation
After enablement, the second value that dominates Young’s work is participation. Most 
commonly, Young refers to participation in deliberation and decision-making.37 The 
importance of this type of participation is that it allows people to have the power over their 
actions and the conditions of their actions that was described as a condition of social justice. 
However, she also refers to the value of participation in social and political institutions, in
33 Ibid., pp. 58-59.
34 Ibid., p. 60.
35 Ibid., p. 62.
36 Ibid., p. 63.
37 Ibid., p. 34, 37, 38, 73, and 91.
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dialogue, and in moral and social life.38 Specifically, Young’s conception of social justice 
demands participation that is universal—in terms of the people who participate and the 
institutions subject to democratisation—but also immediate, local, and accessible.39 It must 
give people a chance to discuss and decide on issues concerning the institutions and rules that 
affect them. Moreover, in keeping with her social ontology, Young requires forms of 
participation that adequately take account of group difference. As will be discussed in the 
following section, this view of participation itself requires that group representation be 
guaranteed in certain decision-making institutions.
Mirroring the relationship described above between oppression and enablement, the 
illustrative flip-side of participation is domination. Specifically, domination is an injustice 
created by the absence or denial of participation. According to Young, it ‘consists in 
institutional conditions which inhibit or prevent people from participating in determining 
their actions or the conditions of their actions’.40 In this sense, social justice demands that 
decision-making structures and institutions of all types be made more participatory. 
Moreover, it entails that many institutions become more democratic. The details of Young’s 
concept of democracy give substance to the minimal claims about participation made in the 
preceding paragraphs.
Democracy
Enablement and participation are the two values that define Young’s conception of social 
justice. They detail the meaning of social justice as a goal towards which our action and 
policy should be oriented. However, they also explain and justify Young’s commitment to 
democracy as a normative and political principle. This section will set out Young’s idea of 
democracy, focusing particularly on her conceptions of the heterogeneous public and the 
need for group conscious policies.
According to Young, ‘[sjocial justice entails democracy’.41 In other words, the values 
of enablement and participation are best achieved in a democratic society. Specifically, 
Young claims that democracy has value on two grounds. First, instrumentally, ‘participatory 
processes are the best way for citizens to ensure that their own needs and interests will be 
voiced and not dominated by other interests’.42 Second, ‘democratic participation has an 
intrinsic value over and above the protection of interests, in providing an important means for
38 Ibid., p. 53, 83, 105, 107, 116, 168, and 173.
39 Ibid., pp. 173 and 252.
40 Ibid., p. 38.
41 Ibid., p. 191.
42 Ibid., p. 92.
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the development and exercise of capacities’.43 Here, Young relies on the work of many 
theorists before her who argue that participatory democracy fosters certain capacities of 
consideration and action that would otherwise remain underdeveloped.44 In particular, she 
claims that democracy urges people to consider their needs in relation to others’ and gives 
them an active relationship with social processes and institutions. Moreover, it should be 
clear that democracy is an essential means by which the demands of enablement and 
participation can be met.
Young never explicitly defines her conception of democracy. However, it is clear that 
she has in mind something far more radical than most theorists would advocate. Specifically, 
she argues that ‘[a]ll persons should have the right and opportunity to participate in the 
deliberation and decisionmaking of the institutions to which their actions contribute or which 
directly affect their actions’ 45 Accordingly, democratisation should not be restricted to 
institutions of government, but must be extended to ‘all institutions of collective life’ 46 The 
implications of this claim are drawn out in Young’s criticism of impartial moral reasoning 
and in her development of the ideal of the civic public.
Young is an adamant opponent of the ideal of impartiality which dominates much 
modem moral reasoning. She claims that most moral theories are based on the assumption 
that ‘in order for the agent to escape egoism, and attain objectivity, he or she must adopt a 
universal point of view that is the same for all rational agents’.47 In turn, this impartial point 
of view is attained by abstracting from the particularities of the agent’s position and situation. 
So, an impartial reasoner must be detached, dispassionate, and universal.48 He presents the 
point of view that any rational person could adopt, regardless of their situation, experience, 
or feelings. Given her ontology, it is not surprising that Young takes issue with this picture of 
moral reasoning. She argues that it attempts to deny existing difference in order to create a 
singular, transcendental subject.
Specifically, the attempt to achieve disengaged moral reasoning actually forces 
difference out of the moral and political realm altogether: ‘the concrete interests, needs, and 
desires of persons and the feelings that differentiate them from one another become merely 
private, subjective’.49 What results is an ideal of the civic public which is itself impartial and 
expresses a general will. It is a homogenous public, since all difference has been removed to
43 Ibid.
44 For more on this concept, see the interesting discussion in C.B. Macpherson, Democratic Theory: 
Essays in Retrieval (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), especially pp. 52-57.
45 Young, op. cit., in note 1, p. 91.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., pp. 99-100.
4* Ibid., p. 100.
49 Ibid., p. 103.
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the private sphere. In the first place, this acts to exclude from public life all those who cannot 
or do not wish to distance themselves from feeling and experience. However, if Young is 
correct that it is impossible to achieve the disengaged stance, then the ideal of impartiality 
actually serves to mask ‘the inevitable partiality of perspective from which moral 
deliberation.. .takes place’.50 The ideal of impartiality, then, aids in the universalisation of a 
particular, usually dominant perspective. The universal standpoint itself cannot but be 
imbued with the particularity of experience and feeling. As a result, the desire to limit all 
particularities to the private realm actually functions to limit the public participation of 
groups whose own experience and subjectivity does not mirror that presented as universal by 
the ideal of impartiality.
Instead, Young argues that the public sphere and the democratic ideal should embrace 
difference, allowing the feelings, experiences, and desires of all to become part of public 
discussion. It should be recalled that Young’s idea of enablement repeatedly referred to 
feelings, experiences, and desires—these are the elements of who we are and where we’re 
coming from which must be expressed in a context of recognition for social justice to be 
achieved. Moreover, this need for recognition explains why existing civil rights are 
insufficient to promote Young’s social justice. According to Young, civil rights may offer 
participation, but not on a basis which affirms the different experiences and perspectives of 
the groups involved. Civil rights do allow for a great variety of different ways of behaving, 
but these are considered private choices. Instead, Young’s politics of difference takes as an 
example gay pride which ‘asserts that sexual identity is a matter of culture and politics, and 
not merely “behaviour” to be tolerated or forbidden’.51 So, ‘[ijnstead of a fictional contract, 
we require real participatory structures in which actual people, with their geographical, 
ethnic, gender, and occupational differences, assert their perspectives on social issues within 
institutions that encourage the representation of their distinct voices’.52 This, in turn, explains 
why social justice requires a radical form of participatory democracy. In Young’s words, 
‘[rjadical democratic pluralism acknowledges and affirms the public and political 
significance of social group differences as a means of ensuring the participation and 
inclusion of everyone in social and political institutions’.53
Social justice also requires a particular type of public sphere, namely one characterised 
by heterogeneity. Somewhat unusually, Young defines the public as ‘what is open and 
accessible’.54 Ideally, ‘persons should stand forward with their differences acknowledged and
50 Ibid., p. 115.
51 Ibid., p. 161.
52 Ibid., p. 116.
53 Ibid., p. 168, emphasis added.
54 Ibid., p. 119.
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respected, though perhaps not completely understood, by others’.55 In contrast to theories 
which present a homogeneous public sphere, according to Young, ‘the perception of anything 
like a common good can only be an outcome of public interaction that expresses rather than 
submerges particularities’.56 The private, in this context, is not what the public sphere 
excludes, but instead what the individual chooses to withdraw from the public. Both spheres 
exist, but the boundary between them is fluid and often itself becomes a public issue.57 
Within this context, the achievement of a heterogeneous public sphere has two preconditions: 
‘(a) no persons, actions, or aspects of a person’s life should be forced into privacy; and (b) no 
social institutions or practices should be excluded a priori [sic] from being a proper subject 
for public discussion and expression’.58
Thus, social justice requires not that group differences be overcome or assimilated but 
that they be acknowledged and affirmed. Equality, in this context refers not to equal 
treatment, but to the principle that differential treatment may be justified to ensure the 
‘participation and inclusion of all groups’ in society’s main institutions and practices.59 
Moreover, because of the centrality of the social group for identity, ‘a politics that asserts the 
positivity of group difference is liberating and empowering’, most particularly for those who 
have not been recognised or valued by the dominant culture.60 For Young, what this means is 
that group conscious policies, including affirmative action, are an intrinsic part of social 
equality. According to Young, groups cannot be socially equal without recognition of and 
respect for who they are. Clearly this applies to all groups. However, groups that are 
oppressed or disadvantaged also require additional mechanisms to ensure representation, 
such as public aid to help them organise, obligations on decision-makers to take group- 
generated proposals into account, and group veto power regarding decisions that affect them 
directly.61 Young does hint at the fact that this principle of representation is a broad one, but, 
she argues, ‘[s]ocial justice would be enhanced in many American cities...if a citywide 
school committee formally and explicitly represented Blacks, Hispanics, women, gay men 
and lesbians, poor and working-class people, disabled people, and students’.62 She also 
acknowledges that such a degree of representation may increase conflict but argues that such 
conflict is more just in that differences are brought out into the open and are discussed, even
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., p. 121.
58 Ibid., p. 120.
59 Ibid.,?. 158.
60 Ibid., p. 166.
61 Ibid., p. 184.
62 Ibid., p. 189.
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if this makes decision-making more difficult.63 As will be argued below, there are logistical 
and ethical complications created by this principle of representation. These must be mitigated 
if Young’s approach is to be useful.
There is one aspect of Young’s ethics that remains to be discussed. Specifically, it 
should be recalled that Young’s conception of oppression described cultural imperialism as 
an injustice that is often symbolic and rarely expressed through society’s formal structures. In 
setting out why this is so, she refers to Anthony Giddens’ three levels of subjectivity— 
discursive consciousness, practical consciousness, and basic security system.64 She argues 
that while aversion at the level of articulated, discursive consciousness is rare, such aversion 
often manifests itself through unconscious or unintended reactions stemming from the 
practical consciousness or basic security system. More specifically, Young argues that 
cultural imperialism arises from a threat to identity caused by that which is different. She 
claims that we feel aversion in this context, not because that which is different is in fact 
foreign, but rather because it is so close to our own identities that we must constantly push it 
away. Our identities are not fixed and so the possibility that we too might be ‘other’ is ever­
present. As a result, we are constantly policing the borders of our identity and reacting to 
difference with aversion.65
Since cultural imperialism does not manifest itself at the level of discursive 
consciousness, it is impossible to remedy it through changes to the formal structures of 
society. The achievement of more democratic decision-making or structures of representation 
will be of little help in overcoming this type of oppression. In order to eradicate cultural 
imperialism, Young argues that we must initiate a cultural revolution, whereby ‘we who are 
the subjects of this plural and complex society should affirm the otherness within ourselves, 
acknowledging that as subjects we are heterogeneous and multiple in our affiliations and 
desires’.66 What this entails is illustrated in Young’s discussion of homophobia. Specifically, 
Young claims that we must accept ‘the possibility that one might become different, be 
different, in sexual orientation’.67 This is more than a simple demand for empathy with 
oppressed groups. It requires people to see that their own identities are not completely secure, 
to acknowledge the sites of difference within themselves, and to recognise the value of such a 
fluid subjectivity. Without this type of revolution in attitudes, cultural imperialism will never 
be completely overcome. This is one of Young’s most radical claims and it is also one of her
63 Ibid.
64 Greater detail about Giddens’ formulation o f  these three levels is available in Anthony Giddens, The 
Constitution o f  Society: Outline o f  the Theory o f  Structuration (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: 
University o f  California Press, 1984), especially pp. 41-109.
65 Young, op. cit., in note 1, pp. 144-45.
66 Ibid., p. 124.
67 Ibid., p. 155.
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most problematic. Some important criticisms of it will be raised in the final section of this 
chapter. First, however, it is necessary to delineate the particular political institutions that 
Young argues will best promote her ethics.
Political Institutions
Although Young clearly enjoys critique, she is also determined that normative political 
theory must have a more active political role to play. This role takes two forms. In the first 
place, normative theory must engage with existing social and political conflicts, to look ‘for 
the unrealized possibilities of emancipation latent in institutions and aimed at by social 
movements in those conflicts’.68 Second, and in this context, normative theory has an 
obligation to set out its alternative view of social and political relations and institutions. This 
is not to suggest that normative theory must aim to control political processes. As Young 
makes clear, normative theory can offer ‘proposals in the ongoing political discussion and 
means of envisaging alternative institutional forms, but they cannot found a polity. In actual 
political situations application of any normative principle will always be rough and ready, 
and always subject to challenge and revision’.69 It is in this specific way that Young intends 
normative theory to engage with and hopefully also motivate political action. Indeed, this is 
also the spirit in which the conclusions of this thesis are offered.
Young begins by explicitly rejecting the vision of social life as community that she 
attributes to her fellow critics of atomism. In particular, she claims that the ideal of 
community presents subjects as ‘understanding one another as they understand themselves, 
fused’.70 This can only serve to reinforce the desire for homogeneity in social life and ‘denies 
the ontological difference within and between subjects’.71 Instead, Young offers an 
alternative political vision centred around the ideal of city life. According to her, city life is 
defined by the fact that very different people live side-by-side and often share public spaces. 
In contrast to visions of community, this ideal exemplifies the affirmation of group 
difference. This is so for four reasons. First, city life demonstrates how group differences 
may coexist without necessary exclusion. It allows for ‘a side-by-side particularity neither 
reducible to identity nor completely other....groups do not stand in relations of inclusion and 
exclusion, but overlap and intermingle without becoming homogeneous’.72 Second, city life 
fosters variety. Social spaces are often multi-use and have multiple and coexisting meanings
68 Ibid., p. 66.
69 Ibid., p. 190.
10 Ibid., p. 231.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., pp. 238-39.
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for the people who use them. Third, city life encourages people to view that which is 
different as exciting and interesting: ‘[o]ne takes pleasure in being drawn out of oneself to 
understand that there are other meanings, practices, perspectives on the city’.73 Finally, cities 
exemplify the heterogeneous public sphere. According to Young, ‘[c]ities provide important 
public spaces.. .where people stand and sit together, interact and mingle, or simply witness 
one another, without becoming identified in a community of “shared final ends’” .74 They 
provide exceptional opportunities for enablement and participation while affirming group 
differences. The complexity of politics, then, is not assumed away through positing a 
common identity or subjective understanding between participants. Instead, it is affirmed and 
realised through the heterogeneous public of city life. This is why city life defines Young’s 
political vision.
In keeping with her views on the role of normative theory, Young is quite clear that 
city life represents an ideal. She acknowledges that modem cities do not often display the 
positive characteristics that she describes. However, she does see that there is an unrealised 
potential within cities to become more just. Decision-making structures may be made more 
just, people may be given more power over their lives, and existing patterns of segregation 
and exclusion may be overcome. In order for this is to be achieved, Young recommends that 
participation should be broadened and reinforced at the local level. She suggests that the 
basic unit of democracy should be the neighbourhood assembly, a local institution, ‘right 
where people live and work, through which they participate in the making of regulations’.75 
The goal of such assemblies, however, is not to make decisions, but to ‘determine local 
priorities and policy options’.76 Young argues that if decision-making authority is too 
concentrated at the local level, then the bigger picture will be ignored and more serious 
inequities will result. Instead, the lowest level of decision-making government should be 
regional. Regional bodies should have extensive power to make decisions concerning tax, 
regulation, investment, land use, and the design and implementation of public services.77 
Neighbourhood assemblies would be represented at the regional bodies, and representation 
for oppressed groups would be guaranteed. Above the regional level, several other tiers of 
government would be necessary, although Young does not detail how these might be 
organised or what powers they might have.
73 Ibid., p. 240.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., p. 252.
16 Ibid.
77 Ibid., pp. 252-53.
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The few sections above have set out the most important elements of Young’s ethics. 
They have argued that this ethics can best be understood through Young’s two central 
values—enablement and participation. Moreover, these two values combined provide the 
foundation for Young’s commitment to radical pluralistic democracy. In other words, for 
Young, social justice can only be realised through an enabling, participatory democracy. A 
renewed city life is the ideal which exemplifies these values.
Critiques
The discussion of the previous few sections focused on setting out Young’s ethics and her 
vision of ideal political institutions. Throughout this elaboration, several problems were 
highlighted and then deferred. Before Young’s ethics can be extended to provide suggestions 
for Canadian policy, these criticisms must be addressed.
The problems with Young’s ethics do not arise from her general call for enablement, 
participation, and a democratisation of decision-making structures. Instead, they occur mainly 
in some of her specific proposals for overcoming oppression. Nonetheless, these problems 
bring to the fore some less obvious and less useful elements of Young’s conception of the 
good. The two main problems—limitless affirmative action and ontological insecurity—will 
first be discussed before the implications for our understanding of Young’s underlying 
conception of the good are detailed. Finally, some ways of mitigating these problems will be 
suggested.
L im itless A ffirm ative A ction?
From the starting point that group-based differences are relevant in the political sphere, it 
does not require a big leap to argue that equality and positive freedom may actually require 
differential treatment. Young and many philosophers preceding her have made exactly this 
connection. However, in Young’s formulation, the particular demands of equality produce 
some very difficult issues. This is because according to Young’s definition, oppression 
defines a huge variety of social processes. In fact, it would not be unfair to argue that, in one 
way or another, nearly all members of society are exploited or marginalised by the world 
economy, are made powerless by massive bureaucratic machinery, or are un- or under­
recognised within the dominant set of social meanings. Perhaps this is simply a feature of 
modem life. Nonetheless, it creates several problems for a system of affirmative action based 
on extra representation for oppressed groups: a problem of identification, a logistical 
problem, a representation problem and an ethical problem.
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The problem of identification is twofold. First, we must be able to identify which 
groups are actually constitutive of identity as opposed to those associations based merely on 
common interest. Young is aware of this difficulty and attempts to resolve it by 
distinguishing between group memberships based on the type of identification entailed. 
Social groups involve ‘a social process of interaction and differentiation in which some 
people come to have a particular affinity for others’.78 Mere interest groups, on the other hand 
are primarily defined by shared interests or ends and do not share certain cultural forms. 
According to Young, social groups may have shared interests, but these do not constitute the 
primary reason for group identification. This distinction is somewhat helpful. Nonetheless, 
one is still left wondering whether and under what circumstances an interest group may 
become a social group or vice-versa. Young does not address this point directly. However, 
since groups are themselves aspects of a social process, it is clearly possible that common 
interests may, over time, produce a deeper kind of group identification and vice-versa, that 
groups may wither away.79 Understanding groups in this way, however, highlights the 
importance of subjective identification in group constitution. In this context, an answer to the 
question of which groups are social groups cannot avoid placing great importance on the 
sense of identification that group members convey. Empirical study may contribute to our 
understanding of a particular group, but it ultimately cannot do justice to the sense of 
identification which defines the group as a social group.
The second aspect of the problem of identification is that we must identify cases in 
which groups are actually oppressed. As with the first problem of identification, the 
subjective element of feeling oppressed is an important element in identifying which groups 
may be oppressed. However, unlike the case above, the identification of oppression is much 
more conducive to empirical study. In this context, Young’s ‘five faces of oppression’ can be 
understood as an attempt to describe very broadly what can be considered oppression. Her 
aim is to capture the wide variety of forms that oppression can take, while still setting a 
standard by which we can judge which groups are oppressed. This method is certainly not 
precise, and nor is it empirically foolproof, but it does do some justice to the subjective 
claims involved while preserving a general standard of judgement.
However, Young’s ‘five faces of oppression’ also produce a logistical problem. The 
standard set by the ‘five faces’ is so broad that almost everyone could legitimately claim to 
be oppressed. Moreover, Young is adamant that we should recognise all claims to oppression 
without judging which are more fundamental or more urgent.80 In this context, it is difficult
78 Ibid., p. 172.
79 Ibid., p. 47.
M Ibid., p. 40.
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to see how affirmative action can mean anything at all. Nonetheless, as will be discussed 
below, Young cannot consistently sustain the claim that we should abandon all standards of 
judgement about which groups are socially acceptable. However, even if we focus 
exclusively on the groups which Young most often cites—blacks, ethnic minorities 
(immigrants and First Nations), women, and homosexuals—then there is still a logistical 
problem. Specifically, if people have many different group affiliations, then the permutations 
of types of people requiring representation multiply dramatically. For example, taking 
Young’s school council example that was cited above, would it be enough that blacks, 
hispanics, women, gay men and lesbians, poor people, disabled people and students were 
represented? What about black, professional men or hispanic lesbian students? The 
representation problems highlighted here will be discussed below. Disregarding the issue of 
representation, however, there is still a significant logistical problem relating to the numbers 
of people requiring representation. There is a very real danger that the demands of 
representation might make the decisionmaking process so cumbersome as to impede the 
achievement of any kind of decision at all. These difficulties are clearly important for the 
achievement of social justice. Unfortunately, however, it is not clear that logistical problems 
such as these can or should be addressed by moral theory. The question, perhaps, is not 
whether a suggestion is perfectly implementable, but whether it expresses values that the 
people concerned wish to endorse. If the values are acceptable, then a more sensitive and just 
solution to these logistical problems can be better achieved through negotiation and debate at 
the political level, by the groups concerned in their particular social contexts.
More importantly for this thesis, the problem of logistics also rebounds into a problem 
of representativeness. For example, if professional men are considered to be a dominant 
group, can a black professional man still represent black people more generally? These are 
huge problems of group politics which are played out every day. However, it is not clear that 
this struggle undermines the need for a group-based understanding of subjectivity and, by 
extension, ethics and politics. In fact, in some ways, the fact that these types of political 
conflict are so common in so many different societies world lends support to the claim that 
group identities matter. In this context, it is clearly important to ensure that the structures 
exist for adequate discussion within a group and that the question of representativeness is 
brought to the fore. Beyond allowing representativeness to be raised as a political issue for all 
the groups in question, it is not clear that there is any role for formal political theory. In terms 
of generating opportunities for group discussion and deliberation, Young’s ethics cannot be 
faulted.
The final difficulty with Young’s concept of affirmative action is an ethical one, 
although it does relate generally to the problem of identification discussed above.
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Specifically, is it the case that we would want to offer additional assistance to all oppressed 
groups? This question raises directly the issue of Young’s conception of the good and will be 
addressed in the penultimate section of this chapter.
Ontological Insecurity
It was suggested earlier in this chapter that Young’s conception of the social group is useful 
precisely because it introduces a fluidity and pluralism to the study of identity. Indeed, her 
full avoidance of cultural essentialisation is crucial to the ethics being developed in this 
thesis. However, in suggesting that a cultural revolution is necessary to overcome cultural 
imperialism, Young creates a few major problems. Specifically, the extension of fluidity and 
pluralism to the very core of identity through a revolution in subjectivity is both unrealistic 
and undesirable. In particular, in her rush to condemn the villification of difference, it seems 
that Young has completely ignored the psychological function of the basic security system. In 
Giddens’ original depiction, the basic security system represents the unconscious. It differs 
from practical consciousness in that the agent is psychologically barred from accessing what 
is contained there.81 Young hints at this when she discusses ‘aspects of subjectivity one 
refuses to face’.82 However, where Giddens sees that the bar acts as a necessary protection 
mechanism against overwhelming ontological anxiety, Young treats it as though it exists only 
in order to differentiate and therefore alienate others. It may well be that our identities are 
fluid. However, this does not diminish people’s need for a certain degree of ontological 
security, or, in Giddens’ words, ‘trust that the natural and social worlds are as they appear to 
be, including the basic existential parameters of the self and social identity’.83 In this sense, it 
is unrealistic to expect the cultural revolution that Young describes. Moreover, precisely 
because ontological security is so crucial to our ability to function normally and to cope with 
anxiety and self-questioning at the conscious level, a society which denied this security to its 
members would be itself be in a permanent state of crisis. It is important for people to think 
that they know who they are, even though this may place limits on our ability to accept those 
who are different from us. After all, without ontological security, we could not express our 
desires, exercise our capacities, or realise our freedom. In short, we could not hope to achieve 
any kind of social justice at all. In this sense, it may be possible to accept that identity 
necessarily entails difference without accepting the goal of eliminating difference altogether. 
However, if this is to be possible within the ethical framework described here, we must be
81 Giddens, op. cit., in note 64, p. 49.
82 Young, op. cit., in note 1, p. 155.
83 Giddens, op. cit., in note 64, p. 375.
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able to show how the demands of enablement and participation themselves require that the 
goal of eliminating difference must often be overridden. These issues are worked out more 
fully in the section which follows.
‘Difference ’ and the Limits of the Good
Young’s conception of the good is not easy to ascertain. She clearly sees value in her 
conception of social justice not just for its own sake, but also because it creates the 
conditions for a culturally-sensitive and therefore more authentic human emancipation and 
fulfilment. This is also why diversity is important. However, Young avoids the question of 
whether there are or should be moral limits to diversity. In discussing oppressed groups, she 
always refers to those that Western society has already formally accepted, such as blacks and 
homosexuals. The implication is that all oppressed groups are good and that they all deserve 
recognition and adequate representation. Oppression is bad wherever it occurs. This might be 
an acceptable claim if social justice entailed only a minimal requirement—the universal right 
to have one’s views heard and considered. However, the demands of Young’s ethics are 
much greater. In this case, what should we do about groups that we might not find 
acceptable? To take extreme examples, does Young anticipate that paedophiles or Nazis 
should also be recognised and granted representation? Naziism might be dismissed on the 
grounds that it does not constitute a true social group, but that is not necessarily true for all 
groups that we might find reprehensible. Some, even paedophiles perhaps, might be able to 
make a strong subjective claim to status as an oppressed social group.
The question of the good also arises in the context of Young’s calls for a revolution in 
subjectivity. Should we be aiming for a cultural revolution which acknowledges our own 
unconscious tendencies towards paedophilia? This is not a spurious question, and nor is it 
meant to equate Young’s example, homosexuality, with paedophilia. Instead, it is meant to 
highlight the fact that even if we should struggle to normalise some oppressed groups, we 
must nevertheless draw boundaries around what is tolerable in society. Not only does this 
entail that some people must necessarily and rightfully be considered ‘other’, but it forces us 
to consider what conception of the good we should promote. By advocating diversity for its 
own sake and by focusing solely on oppressed groups that we already consider acceptable, 
Young effectively avoids the important question of precisely where and how to draw the 
boundaries of the normal. In short, there are elements of her standard of the good that cannot 
be adopted by this thesis in their current form.
Nonetheless, there are elements within Young’s work that may fruitfully be developed 
to provide the kind of boundary of acceptability described above. Most importantly, it is
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crucial that diversity be properly limited within the context of Young’s focus on social justice 
as enablement and participation. Thus, no group conscious policy can be supported if it 
conflicts with the realisation of social justice for other groups. Fortunately, Young herself 
sets out a non-interference principle of this sort. Although Young develops this principle to 
describe the limits of autonomy for regional governments, it can very easily be applied in this 
context. Young describes it as a modified Millian test which entails the following:
[a] gents, whether individual or collective, have the right to sole authority over 
their own actions only if the actions and their consequences (a) do not harm 
others, (b) do not inhibit the ability of individuals to develop and exercise their 
capacities within the limits of mutual respect and cooperation, and (c) do not 
determine conditions under which other agents are compelled to act.84
Although this is usually seen as a basically liberal condition of non-interference, it 
necessarily takes on new dimensions when incorporated into a society based on a deeper 
pluralism. In particular, since the development of capacities is an intrinsically social process, 
it is highly unlikely that the Millian test described above would, in fact, require a return to an 
individualist, procedural liberalism. It is impossible to say in advance exactly how these 
conditions would be implemented in any given society, but this does not make them any less 
important. In fact, they are required if the conception of the good endorsed by Young’s ethics 
is to actually be upheld.
Clearly, Young’s work has both ethical and practical difficulties. In ethical terms, the 
most important problems arise not in terms of Young’s basic ethical commitments, but in her 
suggestions for eliminating oppression through affirmative action and a revolution in 
subjectivity. As the section above demonstrated, the first principles of Young’s ethics are 
sound. Moreover, these principles provide a very good basis from which to rework some of 
her more problematic claims. In other words, the issues that created the greatest problems can 
easily be accommodated while reinforcing Young’s basic ethical commitment to social 
justice.
In terms of practical problems, moreover, it is not clear that the question of logistic 
feasibility is within the scope of this, or any, academic exercise. Of course, any ethics should 
not be completely implausible. However, the question of whether, to what extent, and in what 
form an ethics is taken up is always a political issue, subject to the competing efforts of many 
social agents. As Young herself has noted, the role of normative theory is to develop an 
ethics that is as fair and just as possible, to detail the alternative vision created by this ethics, 
and to highlight political opportunities for steps to be taken towards this vision. It must be
84 Young, op. c i t in note 1, p. 251.
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workable, but it cannot solve in advance the many institutional and political problems that 
may arise. To do so would be to undermine the political agency of the society in question.
From Young to Canadian Cultural Policy
In terms of the concerns of this thesis, Young’s ethics clearly has value. It builds upon the 
many attributes of Taylor’s ontology, developing a sound and useful statement of how culture 
should be accommodated in social theory and practice. Her conception of social justice and 
its manifestation in radical democracy will be taken up by this thesis as the ethical basis for 
its claims about Canadian policy towards culture and trade. The basis of this argument will 
be drawn out here, while the next chapter will detail its specific, practical implications for 
Canadian policy.
The most obvious connection between Young’s ethics and questions of cultural policy 
arises from her discussion of cultural imperialism. Specifically, it is possible to claim that 
free trade in culture perpetuates a type of cultural imperialism, where the dominant group is 
the United States and the subordinate cultural group is Canada. In this context, the greater 
economic and market power of the United States has led to a situation where Canadians are 
in danger of losing the opportunities to express their desires, exercise their capacities, and 
fulfil their needs in a context of recognition. In other words, the dominance of the United 
States threatens the enablement and participation of Canadians. It obstructs Canadian social 
justice. In one sense, this is an accurate representation of the implications for meaning- 
creation if the economic and market power of the United States was allowed free reign in the 
Canadian cultural marketplace. However, this is only part of the story. First, the assumption 
that Canada and the United States are each discrete social groups, and that they are the only 
ones which are relevant in this context is limiting. It runs contrary to the plural and fluid 
conception of group identity that this thesis has shown to be ethically acceptable. Second, if 
culture is defined broadly as the way of life of a people, then the issue of social justice 
concerns more than ensuring adequate avenues for public expression. Finally, this thesis is 
concerned with offering normatively justifiable policy options for Canadian culture in the 
context of free trade. Presenting the issue as one of oppression within a single society does 
not incorporate the fact that the Canadian state is itself a political actor. As a result, this 
interpretation does not help to show how Canadian cultural policy can be made more ethical.
Although this thesis does not disagree with the narrower claim that democracy requires 
cultural outlets, it will argue instead that cultural policy must subjected to the demands of 
social justice set out by Young. In other words, Canadian cultural policy must strive to be as 
enabling, participatory and, ultimately, democratic as possible. It must listen to, respect, and
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take account of the views of all social groups. The institutions and structures by which policy 
is made and funds disbursed must be subjected to a radical democratisation. What this 
specifically entails will be the subject of the next chapter. Only in the context of these 
recommendations will Canada have a strong normative basis from which to defend its policy 
for culture and trade.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions: International Trade, Ethics and 
Cultural Policy
In concluding this thesis, I wish to return to several important claims made in the 
introduction. Specifically, the introduction located this research within several different 
literatures and, in so doing, set for it several related tasks. First, it claimed that the thesis 
would build upon earlier analyses of protectionism—further investigating non-commercial 
motivations for protectionism, and taking up calls for ethical analysis in IPE. Second, the 
thesis would exploit the space for counter-discourse established by neo-Gramscians, while 
taking an explicitly normative approach. Third, it would show how an adequate emancipatory 
method for IPE requires taking seriously the meaning and importance of culture. This would 
be achieved by asking two central questions: i) what are the ethical premises underlying the 
conventional approaches to trade and magazines; ii) what legitimate alternatives can we 
envisage?
The thesis has advanced claims on each of these points. First, it showed that the 
Canadian and American positions on free trade and culture can be understood as normative 
positions, stemming from different perceptions of the role of culture in social relations, the 
appropriate criteria for ‘good’ public policy, and the ideal relationship between culture and 
free trade. Second, the thesis argued that welfare economics and some types of 
communitarianism provide an ethically unsatisfactory basis upon which to ground Canadian 
periodicals policy. Finally, in Chapters 8 and 9, the thesis suggested that a normatively 
justifiable approach to culture is one that begins from the ontological primacy of culture in 
the constitution of identity. Chapter 8 drew on Charles Taylor’s work to show what is 
entailed by understanding culture as integral to identity. It developed a thick conception of 
moral personhood and showed how such a conception is important for intercultural 
understanding and, ultimately, freedom. Building on this, and in an attempt to avoid some of 
Taylor’s most serious problems, Chapter 9 relied on Iris Marion Young’s work on social 
justice to develop an ethics which is founded in respect for other cultural forms. This ethics 
stresses social equality, but broadens it beyond distributive concerns to include primarily the 
‘full participation and inclusion of everyone in society’s major institutions, and the socially 
supported substantive opportunity for all to develop and exercise their capacities and realize
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their choices’.1 Drawing on this ethics, Chapter 9 made the initial suggestion that a radical 
democratisation of cultural structures and decision-making bodies at all levels is required.
Together, these claims constitute a philosophical foundation upon which to discuss 
appropriate trade policies for magazines. However, until this point, the thesis has only hinted 
at the policy gains that may be achieved from the method advocated here. This concluding 
chapter will be primarily concerned with offering preliminary suggestions concerning the 
ways in which the theoretical and methodological gains of Chapters 7 through 9 can be used 
to generate new and more ethically acceptable forms of policy for trade in periodicals. The 
chapter will first discuss the general ways in which Young’s ethics can be applied to 
magazines. Subsequently, it will address the main elements of Canadian periodicals policy, 
making specific suggestions for improvements or policy cuts. Finally, it will suggest new 
ways in which the Canadian government can approach international trade negotiations.
An Ethical Approach
The analysis developed throughout this thesis suggests that magazines policy ought to be 
aimed at meeting the demands of participation and enablement described in Chapter 9. To 
recap, enablement entails that people have substantive opportunities to express their 
experiences, their needs, their feelings and perspectives on social life in contexts where 
others can listen.2 It further entails that people are enabled to develop and exercise their 
capacities, to meet their needs, and, ultimately, to exercise their freedom and realise their 
choices.3 Li turn, participation entails that people have power over their actions and the 
conditions of their actions -  that they can discuss and decide upon issues concerning the 
customs, rules, and institutions that affect them. Participation ought to be universal, but also 
immediate, local, and accessible.4 In other words, this ethics demands the full participation 
and inclusion of everyone in society’s major institutions and the socially supported 
substantive opportunity for all to develop and exercise their capacities and realise their 
choices. Additionally, however, enablement and participation require particular claims about 
democracy and diversity. These will be briefly set out below.
1 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990), p. 173.
2 Ibid., p. 91
3 Ibid., pp. 34, 56, 92, 193.
A Ibid., pp. 34, 37, 73, 173, 252.
208
D em ocracy
This thesis agrees with Young on the importance of democracy in ensuring that people’s 
voices are heard and as an opportunity for the development and exercise of capacities. 
Furthermore, a deep democracy is one which brings cultural difference into the public sphere, 
allowing it to become part of public discussion. In this way, democracy is essentially linked 
to dialogue, and respect for difference. Furthermore, building on Charles Taylor’s relational 
view of identity, this thesis has taken a view of dialogue both as a means of intercultural 
understanding, but also as the process by which the boundaries and substance of culture are 
defined and renegotiated. To recap,.democracy entails that ‘[a] 11 persons should have the 
right and opportunity to participate in the deliberation and decisionmaking of the institutions 
to which their actions contribute or which directly affect their actions’.5 Furthermore, 
attempts should be made to ensure that all social groups are adequately represented in 
decisions affecting them. The broad outlines of the ways in which these two claims are 
reconciled are discussed in Chapter 9.
As was noted in Chapter 9, the demands of full democracy and representativeness may 
be quite high and, in practice, difficult to achieve. In this light, this thesis proposes that the 
demands of radical democracy be taken as an ideal towards which cultural policy ought to be 
directed. As we will see below, even in this less demanding way, the ideal of democracy 
nonetheless suggests significant revisions of policy.
Diversity
Clearly, diversity often arises in discussions of cultural policy. However, it is important to 
note that there are two important respects in which diversity should be considered. In the first 
place, as this thesis has stressed, it is important to ensure that Canadians have a wide variety 
of magazines to choose from. In this context, policy should be concerned that there is a wide 
diversity of cultural output. However, it is important to note that variety is not important for 
its own sake, but rather to ensure that there exist a large number of different sites for 
discussion, debate, and sharing of thoughts and interests. This relates to the importance of 
dialogue, which will be discussed below.
Second, it is important to ensure that the cultural diversity of the Canadian community 
is represented in the magazine industry. This is important in the sense that magazines are an 
important site of dialogue for the many social groups within Canada, but also because
5 Ibid., p. 91.
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opportunities for cultural expression are an important element of enablement, as discussed by 
Young. Indeed, magazines can be included amongst the ‘real participatory structures in which 
actual people, with their geographical, ethnic, gender, and occupational differences, assert 
their perspectives on social issues within institutions that encourage the representation of 
their distinct voices’.6
In this regard, cultural policies should strive to foster diversity in the deep sense 
advocated by Young. The implications of this will become clear below.
Magazines and Community
The approach set out above allows us to finally offer an answer to a question that has been 
outstanding since the beginning of this thesis, namely, why are magazines so important to the 
community? From the point of view of the ethics developed here, magazines constitute one 
important forum for people to express themselves. They contribute to discussion and debate 
and they thereby enable people to fulfil their capacities and exercise their choices. Second, 
involvement in magazines as readers or contributors offers opportunities for people to 
develop and exercise their capacities. Importantly, however, magazines do not simply fulfil 
these functions in a superficial way. Because of their inherently cultural nature and because 
of the specialisation possible in the magazine industry, magazines can provide a forum 
through which group differences can be brought into the public sphere and where distinct 
voices can be represented and recognised.7 In other words, magazines are important sites for 
expression and capacity-building precisely because they have the potential to bring a 
substantive cultural diversity into public respect and recognition. In this respect, magazines 
are important agents of the heterogeneous public sphere that Young discusses. Notably, 
however, magazines will not successfully fill these roles unless there are a significant number 
and variety of them within the community. Moreover, although government intervention is 
essential to preserve the conditions within which an enabling and participatory magazine 
industry can flourish, government must do little to predetermine the content or direction of 
the magazines. Specifically, government action should be limited to preserving minimum 
standards of decency as delimited by Young’s modified Millian harm principle.
6 Ibid., p. 116.
7 On the relatively specialised nature o f magazines compared to other media, see Diana Crane, The 
Production o f  Culture: Media and the Urban Arts (London: SAGE, 1992), pp. 43-44. On the unusually 
diverse composition o f the Canadian magazine industry, see International Federation o f the Periodical 
Press, Magazine World (No. 18, 1998), available at http://www.fipp.eom/news/l 998/1 Sseptoct/ 
index.htm#focuscanada.
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One more question must be addressed before the specific policy implications of 
enablement and participation can be discussed. In particular, given the fluid and plural 
conception of identity developed here, and the deemphasisation of specifically national 
cultures, why is it necessary for magazines to be specifically Canadian? So far, the thesis has 
relied generally on the idea that communities require adequate outlets for democracy, 
dialogue, and participation amongst their members. Taken literally, this would mean that 
Canadian residents require outlets for dialogue between them. In this regard, there is a sense 
in which this thesis has prioritised the boundaries of the state as the limits of community. The 
reasons for this are mainly pragmatic. In particular, the state is currently the central 
institution through which the cultural ethics described here can be defended. It is, first, the 
central agent through which cultural policies are conceived, implemented and defended. 
Second, at least for now, the state is the main negotiating party in international trade 
agreements and the final source of accountability in the case of trade disputes. Finally, even if 
our ethics did suggest the eventual surpassing of the state, its current importance must at least 
force us to think about whether and what role the state can play in the longer-term 
achievement of our critical cultural goals. For all of these reasons, this thesis has 
endeavoured to take the role of the state seriously, and to pay attention to precisely how the 
state should and should not act in the cultural sphere. Unfortunately, the interesting question 
of non-state means of furthering our cultural ethics and a study of the relationship of the state 
to plural, cross-border communities must remain topics for further research.
However, even if this thesis has prioritised state boundaries and institutions, it has not 
done so without concern for diversity within those boundaries and potential evolution beyond 
them. The foregoing analysis has consistently emphasised the relevance of multiple social 
groups within Canada. In no case has this thesis aimed to limit the dialogue that takes place 
between members of different communities—whether they be within the Canadian state or 
without. In this regard, it is worth reiterating that the point of this thesis has never been to 
deny die relevance of ‘foreign’ magazines as important sites of dialogue for Canadian 
residents and non-residents alike. Instead, it is merely to ensure that Canadian residents have 
adequate outlets for expression and dialogue. In this sense, the thesis accepts the current 
relevance of the Canadian state, but deliberately offers policy suggestions that leave open the 
opportunity for cultural evolution, both within and beyond state borders. In time, the 
Canadian state may no longer be an important site of community—culturally, politically, or 
administratively. While this thesis cannot claim to understand what such a transformation 
might entail, the very possibility of such change ought not to be ruled out in advance.
211
Canadian Magazine Policy
Before making policy suggestions, it will be helpful to review the details of current Canadian 
policy for magazines. In particular, we need to briefly revisit the central goals of Canadian 
magazines policy and the central policy instruments by which these goals are furthered. The 
goals of Canadian magazines policy have been regularly discussed throughout this thesis. 
Primarily, the Canadian government has sought to enact policies that, in the words of the 
1961 Royal Commission, ‘secure a climate of competition in which Canadian publications 
now serving Canada worthily, and other publications which may later come to serve Canada 
worthily, shall have a chance to survive’.8 ‘Serving Canada’, in this context, has always 
meant offering the means to ‘express a distinctive voice, speaking to a Canadian audience’ 
whereby ‘cultural expression, social cohesion, and a sense of national destiny’ are preserved.9 
Moreover, successive Canadian governments have sought to support Canadian magazines 
without adversely affecting the ability of Canadians to exercise a wide freedom of choice in 
the selection of their reading material, whether foreign or domestic. Indeed, Canadian 
policies have generally been seen by Canadians as facilitating rather than limiting greater 
consumer choice.
While the goals of policy have remained constant, the instruments required to achieve 
these objectives have shifted significantly in response to new technological and political 
challenges. Currently, four main policy instruments are in effect. First, the Foreign Publishers 
Advertising Services Act (Bill C-55) makes it illegal for foreign publishers to ‘supply 
advertising services directed at the Canadian market to a Canadian advertiser or a person 
acting on their behalf.10 Foreign publishers whose Canadian advertising revenues are less 
than 18 percent of their total advertising revenues are exempted. Second, Section 19 of the 
Income Tax Act, as amended in 1999, allows 50 percent income tax deductibility on 
advertisements placed in publications with 79 percent or less original content. 100 percent 
deductibility applies for ads placed in publications with greater than 80 percent original 
content, regardless of nationality. Section 19 also defines original editorial content as ‘non­
advertising content that is: (a) authored by a Canadian...or (b) created for the Canadian 
market and does not appear in any other edition of one or more periodicals published outside
http://www.parl.gc,
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of Canada’.11 Third, the Publications Assistance Program provides a direct subsidy ‘to 
Canadian publishers of paid-circulation magazines that meet certain criteria, to help defray 
the cost of distributing subscriber-paid copies of their publications’.12 Finally, a limited 
system of grants is available to magazines through the Canada Council for the Arts.
It is also important to recall that in negotiating international trade commitments, the 
Canadian government has long pursued a broad strategy of cultural exemptionalism. As was 
noted in Chapter 5, however, this strategy has not always been successful in adequately 
protecting Canadian cultural policies. In particular, the ‘notwithstanding’ clause of the 
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA) demonstrates some of the pitfalls of an 
exemptionalist strategy. Moreover, even when successful, an exemptionalist approach has not 
prevented Canadian cultural policies from coming under repeated international scrutiny. 
Recent Canada-United States history has demonstrated the ways in which any exemption 
requires constant justification and is often subject to continuous re-negotiation.
Goals and Instruments Assessed
Chapter 7 has already suggested that the Canadian government’s goal of promoting national 
identity through culture is flawed and dangerous. Indeed, as was argued in Chapter 7, a focus 
on the survival of the nation has a strong tendency to essentialise the community and reify the 
relationship between culture and identity. These approaches assume that the identity of an 
individual is a singular thing, that it exists in direct relation to a single, uncontested (national) 
culture which itself is manifest in a single well-defined (and usually political) community. As 
Chapter 7 emphasised, it is not clear that this concept of the nation is open to substantive 
revision, nor that it can accommodate extensive cultural pluralism.
The destructive tendencies of national identity approaches are reinforced by the 
reliance of the Canadian government on ‘Canadian content’ requirements as the primary 
criteria by which the cultural validity of different media are judged. For example, until very 
recently, magazines were required to contain 75 percent Canadian content in order to be
11 From letter o f agreement between Ambassador Raymond Chretien and USTR Charlene Barshefsky, 3 
June 1999. Included in Canada, Canadian Heritage News Release, ‘Canada and United States Sign 
Agreement on Periodicals’, 4 June 1999, available at: http://www.pch.gc.ca/bin/News.dll/View?Lang= 
E&Code= 9NR031E.
12 From Canada, Department o f Heritage, ‘Policies: Magazines’, unpublished document available at 
http://www.pch.gc.ca/culture/cult ind/pol/magazines.htm. For more on the Publications Assistance 
Program, see Canada, Department o f Heritage, ‘Publications: Publications Assistance Program’, 
unpublished document available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/culture/cult ind/pap/pubs/english.htm.
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considered ‘Canadian’ magazines.13 Canadian content is, of course, any content produced by 
Canadian citizens. In other words, if a British (but not Canadian) citizen living in Canada 
contributed an original article on a Canadian theme to a Canadian journal, it wQuld not be 
considered Canadian content. In the first place, this approach is restrictive in the sense that 
many people who consider themselves a part of the Canadian community may be excluded 
from conversation in that community, simply because they do not meet formal criteria of 
citizenship. Second, however, this approach limits the extent to which those who would be 
identified and would self-identify as cultural outsiders can contribute to the Canadian debate 
on any subject. In this way, it restricts the cultural evolution that is itself an important result 
of inter-cultural interaction.
Furthermore, the Canadian government has always considered that Canadian 
ownership of cultural industries is essential to ensuring that these meet the nationalist goals 
of Canadian cultural policy. In particular, they have assumed that one important way of 
ensuring Canadian content is through Canadian ownership. To a certain extent, this is true. 
Because there are few Canadian multinational entertainment giants, Canadian ownership 
usually leads to original content, although there is no necessary reason why this content 
should be particularly Canadian. However, Canadian ownership criteria are not the only way 
to ensure original content. In fact, by confusing ownership with content, they can 
unnecessarily inhibit intercultural dialogue. For this reason, this analysis is generally 
sceptical of Canadian ownership criteria. Similarly, given the distribution problems faced by 
Canadian magazines, this thesis suggests that steps be taken to ensure adequate access to 
newsstands for Canadian magazines. This may entail buttressing existing Canadian-owned 
distribution companies, but should be achieved more directly if possible. Magazines can 
hardly fulfil their important role in fostering dialogue and ensuring cultural expression if they 
face such huge difficulties in reaching many potential readers.
Notably, the recent shift in Canadian policy towards original content—content 
produced for the Canadian market—marks an important step towards a magazine policy that 
can move beyond exclusively nationalist criteria to accommodate cultural diversity. This is 
particularly true when original content provisions have replaced both existing ownership and 
content rules. Relying on original content acts to protect a space for discussion and to protect 
diversity in face of homogenising global influences but it does not do so in a way that 
prejudges the substance, direction or participants in cultural exchange.
13 Isaiah Litvak and Christopher Maule, Cultural Sovereignty: The Time and R eader’s Digest Case in 
Canada (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1974), Appendix E, p. 132. Reprinted from Canada, ‘The 
Income Tax Act’, Revised Statutes o f  Canada 1952 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1952), Chapter 148.
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As a means of achieving the revised goals described above, the idea of preserving 
some part of Canadian advertising revenue for Canadian magazines is a very good one. Such 
an approach helps to ensure that there will continue to be a diversity of both foreign and 
domestic magazines available in Canada. Nonetheless, Canadian magazines must still 
compete with each other and with other media for advertisers. If they wish to be successful, 
the burden remains on the individual magazines to produce interesting editorial content, 
thereby attracting subscribers and, in turn, advertisers. In effect, this approach provides the 
space for Canadian magazines to flourish—and thereby allows Canadian consumers to 
exercise a real choice—without involving government in the process by which successful 
magazines are weeded out from unsuccessful ones. However, the one drawback of this 
approach is that, in pursuing the freedom of magazine industry, it restricts the freedom of 
Canadian advertisers. Under all the magazine policies pursued by the Canadian government, 
advertisers have been prevented from selling advertising to foreign publishers. However, 
there is a strong argument to be made for the fact that advertisers benefit greatly when the 
Canadian magazine industry is healthy. If the magazine industry were to become smaller and 
less vigorous, Canadian advertisers would clearly suffer, as would Canadian consumers. In 
this regard, so long as magazines policy is successful and maintains significant number and 
range of advertising outlets in Canada, then the freedom of advertisers is not significantly 
damaged.
In this regard, the Foreign Publishers Advertising Services Act is detrimental in that it 
allows the Canadian advertising ‘pie’ to be divided amongst foreign and Canadian publishers. 
To be fair, foreign access to Canadian advertising is limited to 18 percent of total advertising 
in any given magazine. Nonetheless, critics are right to be point out that 18 percent of the 
advertising in several large American magazines could constitute the skimming off of a 
serious proportion of the overall Canadian advertising market.14 Indeed, if reality was even to 
approach this prediction, then the FPAS Act would prove to have been a very foolhardy 
policy. Not only would the Canadian magazine industry be seriously damaged and Canadian 
choices and dialogues significantly reduced, but Canadian advertisers would be even more 
limited in terms of the magazines in which they could place ads. In these respects, the FPAS 
Act could turn out to be a half-way house that fails to satisfy any goals at all. To be fair, in 
this case, some degree of compromise was clearly necessary in order to avoid an all-out trade 
war with the United States. However, a following section will suggest ways in which 
Canada’s trade negotiation strategy could be altered in order to better defend its cultural 
goals at the international level.
14 The Toronto Star, 28 May 1999, no page given.
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In contrast to the FPAS Act, Section 19 of the Income Tax Act is a very useful 
instrument, especially as it has been revised most recently and when it is applied in 
conjunction with an absolute limit on Canadian advertisements in foreign magazines (such as 
Bill C-58). In particular, as discussed above, the idea of original content is a crucial one. 
Further, the concept that different degrees of tax deductibility should apply to ads placed in 
magazines with different levels of original content is a sophisticated way of rewarding those 
magazines that make a commitment to producing original content for the Canadian market. 
Unlike a direct subsidy, Section 19 does not entail government intervention in the process by 
which certain magazines succeed and others fail. Furthermore, Section 19 allows any 
magazine from any country to become a ‘Canadian’ magazine and to enter the dialogue 
taking place within and about the community. Furthermore, it does not restrict trade in 
foreign magazines that do not compete for advertising and thereby fosters cultural openness 
and intercultural penetration.
The new program of postal subsidies (PAP) has both advantages and disadvantages. 
The particular distribution problems of Canadian magazines creates an inordinate reliance on 
subscriptions as a source of revenue and a means of maintaining circulation figures. In this 
regard, it is not unreasonable to provide some sort of assistance to help defray bulk mailing 
costs for Canadian magazines. However, at the same time, it is not obvious that this 
assistance is actually necessary. In other words, it is not clear that an end to postal subsidies 
would be so damaging as to cause a precipitous decline in the number or variety of Canadian 
magazines. Indeed, it seems that the continuation of the postal subsidy program owes more to 
insistent lobbying on the part of Canadian magazine publishers, than any demonstrated need 
for it. Nonetheless, if the Canadian government is to maintain the postal subsidy programme, 
it ought to make several important changes to its administration.
Currently, postal assistance is available to magazines that meet several criteria. First, 
in keeping with general cultural ownership provisions, it must be owned and 75 percent 
controlled by Canadians. Second, the publisher must have its principal place of business 
located in Canada and the magazine must be published, typeset, printed, and edited in 
Canada, by persons resident in Canada.15 Third, ‘[a]n eligible publication must also contain a 
significant portion of original material produced by Canadian citizens or individuals resident 
in Canada’.16 In keeping with the thrust of the discussion above, this thesis disagrees with the 
thrust of ownership requirements. Furthermore, print-in-Canada requirements seem to be 
designed to promote the Canadian printing and editing industry. Finally, the criteria
15 Canada, Department o f Heritage, ‘Publications Assistance Program: Program Description’, 
unpublished document available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/culture/cult ind/pap/pubs/part 1 e.htm.
16 Ibid.
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concerning original content differ somewhat from the similar provisions of Section 19. In 
Section 19, originality was defined by the fact that editorial material has not previously or 
simultaneously been published in a foreign market. This open-endedness provided much of 
the appeal of Section 19. In contrast, the PAP includes a concern for citizenship or 
residency—original material must be produced by a Canadian citizen or resident. By adding 
this criteria, the PAP reinforces the nationalism of earlier Canadian content approaches. If the 
subsidy programme is continued, it should be revised to centre on the concept of original 
content set out in Section 19.
Finally, we need to assess the status of current grants policies. In practice, the best 
means by which to deliver government support to cultural activities generally is through the 
use of ‘arm’s length’ policies -  namely, those which keep the decisions about which cultural 
activities are valuable at an arm’s length from government. Arm’s length allocative 
organisations are already quite common in North America and Europe -  for example, the 
Arts Council in Great Britain and the Canada Council in Canada.17 However, despite its 
distance from government, the Canada Council has itself often not met the demands of 
enablement and participation. In an effort to preserve its own organisational raison d’etre, the 
Canada Council has often replicated the drawbacks of a centralised government agency. In 
the first place, its allocative goals have often remained secret. Furthermore, as Jean Guiot has 
noted, ‘[g]rants are convincing arguments to bring about desired behaviour...on the part of 
companies which remain chronically dependent on public support’.18 Ihe  argument here is 
not so much that the Canada Council has aimed to foster such dependence. Instead, it is 
simply to note that shifting grant-making to a single arts council may not avoid the over­
centralisation and opacity characteristic of direct government granting agencies. As a result, I 
suggest that decisions about arts funding should take place at several different levels, and 
must incorporate much more localised groups than does the current Canada Council. Every 
attempt should be made to ensure that these new grant-making bodies are broadly 
representative of Canadian social groups. Furthermore, they should operate democratically 
and encourage broad dialogue relating to their activities.
17 For more on the philosophy behind arm’s length Arts Councils, see John Meisel and Jean Van Loon, 
‘Cultivating the Bushgarden: Cultural Policy in Canada’, in Milton C. Cummings, Jr. and Richard S. 
Katz (eds.), The Patron State: Government and the Arts in Europe, North America, and Japan (New 
York, NY and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 276-310 and Joy Cohnstaedt, ‘Shoulder to 
Fingertip and Points Between in Canadian Cultural Policy’, in Andrew Buchwalter (ed.), Culture and 
Democracy: Social and Ethical Issues in Public Support fo r  the Arts and Humanities (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1992), pp. 169-80.
18 Jean M. Guiot, ‘Arts Councils as Organized Anarchies and De Facto Regulatory Agencies: Some 
Comments on the Bureaucratization o f Artistic Production’, in Harry-Hillman Chartrand, Claire 
McCaughey, and William S. Hendon (eds.), Cultural Economics 88: A Canadian Perspective (Akron, 
OH: The University o f Akron for the Association for Cultural Economics, 1989), p. 239.
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Clearly, the policy suggestions made here are not without their difficulties, nor can 
they unquestionably ensure that the cultural needs of every individual residing in Canada are 
adequately met.19 Nonetheless, the method advocated here clearly offers new insights that 
both welfare economics and national survival approaches cannot articulate. Furthermore, in 
assessing the claims made above, it is important to note that these comments are intended 
only as suggestions for new avenues for policy, not as once-and-for-all solutions to trade 
disputes concerning magazines. Following Young, these conclusions are meant to ‘offer 
proposals in the ongoing political discussion’.20 Indeed, it is crucial for both democracy and 
diversity that there be an inclusive and substantive dialogue about magazine policies. The 
debate over normative principles and the appropriate way to apply them is ongoing—and 
these suggestions ought to be treated as one contribution to this process of normative 
engagement.
International Trade Negotiations
Along with the domestic policy suggestions made above, Canada ought to reconsider its 
general approach to cultural issues in international trade negotiations. Recently, the Canadian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade convened a special Cultural Industries 
Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade (SAGIT). This advisory group consisted of 
several prominent members of the arts and media communities, along with academics, 
solicitors and consultants.21 In this report, SAGIT considered four possible approaches that 
the Canadian government could adopt towards culture in new trade negotiations. First, the 
government could seek to achieve a broad cultural industries exemption in the next round of 
multilateral trade talks. Second, Canada could unilaterally decline to make any trade or 
investment commitments relating to cultural products. Third, Canada could seek to negotiate 
multilateral agreements for culture on a sector-by-sector basis. Finally, Canada could ‘initiate 
a new international instrument, which would lay out the ground rules for cultural policies and
19 The determination o f what is meant by ‘adequate’ is highly problematic in itself. I do not yet have an 
answer to what can be said to be ‘adequate’; however, I have the sense that this will vary from person to 
person. More importantly, there is also the outstanding question o f how to reconcile this principle with 
finite economic resources. A useful and interesting discussion o f the satiability o f needs and limited 
resources can be found in the commentaries by Chandran Kukathas, Patrick Minford, and Raymond 
Plant, in John Gray, The Moral Foundations o f  Market Institutions, Choices in Welfare No. 10 
(London: The IEA Health and Welfare Unit, 1992).
20 Young, op. cit., in note 1, p. 190.
21 For the exact composition o f the group, see Canada, The Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group 
on International Trade, Canadian Culture in a Global World (Ottawa: Department o f Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade, 1999), also available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/canculture-e.asp.
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trade, and allow Canada and other countries to maintain policies that promote their cultural 
industries’.22
SAGIT was firmly in favour of the latter option and argued strongly against the other 
three. In particular, they argued that the strategy of exemptionalism, particularly when 
pursued unilaterally, has only resulted in ‘continued international pressures to change 
domestic cultural policies’.23 This conclusion was also reached by the present study in 
Chapter 5. Furthermore, SAGIT suggested that any approaches pursued unilaterally would be 
less likely to meet the expectations of their drafters. Indeed, there are many countries who 
agree, in principle, with Canada on the need for international trade agreements to contain 
provisions allowing for the protection of cultural diversity.24 This is not to suggest that it 
would be easy to reach a consensus on the terms of any such agreement. It is only to 
demonstrate that broad international concurrence on the importance of culture is not 
completely unrealistic. Further, if any new trade instrument were to be agreed-upon, it would 
have much greater force and relevance if more than one country is involved.
According to SAGIT, such an instrument would ‘identify the measures that would be 
covered and those that would not, and indicate clearly where trade disciplines would or 
would not apply. It would also state explicitly when domestic cultural measures would be 
permitted and not subject to trade retaliation’.25 In very general terms, the thrust of this 
analysis would support the position taken by SAGIT. However, SAGIT goes on to suggest 
conditions that the new instrument would be required to meet, if it were to be effective. In 
particular, SAGIT argued that the instrument would have to:
• be as broad as possible and provide global coverage;
• embrace cultural goods as well as cultural services
• include all financial and tax support measures, regulations and controls over 
foreign investments
• make references to competition policy to address market dominance 
problems that can adversely affect the vitality of indigenous cultural 
industry; and
• include references to copyright policy, which are not inconsistent with 
Canada’s other intellectual property obligations.26
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 One example o f this is found in the response to the Canadian government’s 1998 call for an 
international meeting on cultural policy. The meeting o f culture ministers from 22 countries marked the 
first time a globally representative ministerial-level group had come together outside o f a formal 
institutional context to discuss international cooperation on cultural policy. The meeting resulted in the 
creation o f the International Network on Cultural Policy, currently consisting o f 38 countries. For 
further information, see Canada, Department o f  Heritage, ‘International Network on Cultural Policy’, 
unpublished document available at http://www.pch.gc.ca/network-reseau/eng.htm.
25 Canada, The Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade, op. cit., in note 21.
26 Ibid.
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According to the ethics set out by this thesis, broadness and inclusiveness are clearly 
important elements of any new trade instrument if it is to be legitimate, as well as effective. 
However, this thesis disagrees that it would be right to set in advance the substantive content 
of such an instrument. As a statement of Canadian goals, this is reasonable, but it can hardly 
be defended as the only way that negotiations can conclude. In particular, from the point of 
view of this thesis, one of the advantages of a new cultural trade instrument is surely the very 
process of reaching agreement. The process of negotiating such an instrument offers the 
possibility for the kind of intercultural dialogue and subsequent ‘fusion of horizons’ that was 
so important to Taylor’s ethics. Stating up front, as SAGIT does, that certain things are 
required of such an instrument precludes the possibility of learning from and understanding 
others while in the course of the negotiations.
Furthermore, if such an instrument is to be legitimate, negotiations must include and 
respect the points of view of all countries. In short, it must be democratic in the sense 
described above. Just as such a forum ought not to be dominated outright by proponents of 
the market-based approach, so too, it must not become a forum where the cultural needs of 
non-Westem societies are disregarded. Indeed, many different constituencies may have many 
different cultural concerns and these must all be respected and brought into dialogue. Indeed, 
if this is the form taken by negotiations not only will it support the community-based vision 
of justice outlined above, but it may provide a limited first step towards a deep 
democratisation of the international political economy.
Where To From Here?
This thesis has developed and defended a culturally-sensitive ethics to guide thinking on free 
trade in magazines. In so doing, it has provoked several questions that suggest avenues for 
further research. First, it is clearly important to address the implications of the argument 
presented here for cultural policies in other parts of the world, and for cultural issues 
extending beyond magazines policy. In particular, further research ought first to ask whether 
the framework developed here could be used to understand other disputes about cultural 
protectionism, such as those surrounding European audiovisual regulations or Canadian 
border broadcasting prohibitions. Even if it was determined that many other cases could not 
be evaluated according to the demands of this approach without doing damage to their 
cultural integrity, we would still have achieved results by understanding our cultural limits. 
Furthermore, this sense of cultural difference could be the first step towards a productive and 
transformative intercultural dialogue.
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Second, interesting work could be done in understanding cases where the practices or 
products concerned are less obviously cultural, at least compared to magazines. Indeed, some 
of these constitute the ‘hard’ cases raised by the analysis of this thesis. In particular, it would 
be interesting to address cultural justifications for certain labour or environmental practices, 
such as child labour or the fishing rights of Canada’s First Peoples. Further, instances that 
might appear to us as political corruption or bribery are also ‘grey areas’ where a cultural 
analysis would be fraught with difficulties, but might nonetheless be interesting. As with the 
first set of questions, it is not immediately clear whether and how the approach of this thesis 
can be applied to these cases. It bears noting that this uncertainty does not constitute a failing 
on the part of the thesis. In this respect, much of the interesting work following on from it 
consists precisely in analysing this approach, understanding its broader achievements and 
limitations, and stretching it to see how it can accommodate the ‘hard’ cases.
Finally, it would be interesting to explore the current and potential effects of the 
internet for intercultural communication and for cultural policy-making. Indeed, the internet 
clearly is an important means by which any government’s attempts at cultural protectionism 
may be undermined. However, it also provides a low-cost and highly diffuse means by which 
a diverse and accessible cultural dialogue can flourish, both within and beyond the Canadian 
community. In this regard, it is not yet clear how the internet will affect either the Canadian 
magazines industry or cultural policy more generally. Nonetheless, it remains a fascinating 
subject for further research.
Clearly, this thesis has raised some questions about the international dimensions of 
communitarian politics which simply cannot be answered within the context of this work. 
Nonetheless, it is to be hoped that the thesis has contributed to the advancement of 
knowledge in ER. and IPE. It has made a meta-theoretical case for the importance of critical, 
normative approaches in IPE. More importantly, however, the thesis has gone beyond 
critique. It has developed and defended one particular normative position, showing 
specifically how it can improve our understanding of a particular case. Finally, in addressing 
this particular case—Canadian magazines policy and Canada-United States free trade—the 
thesis has generated new and relevant policy suggestions.
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